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                                                                                                                                     ΣΙΜΗ΢ ΕΝΕΚΕΝ:  
                                                                                                         ΦΙΛΗΙ ΜΗΣΡΙ ΣΕ ΦΙΛΩΙ ΠΑΣΡΙ 
  
Description of thesis: 
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the nature of the expertise which the first Greek 
cosmologists pursued, and the way in which they introduced a new area of 
knowledge. It is also investigates the way in which these early thinkers expressed 
their personal views, and the way in which they attempted to claim public attention 
in order to establish themselves as experts in society. The knowledge which they 
wished to divulge in the community is quite distinct from the knowledge which was 
disclosed by other prestigious individuals, such as the epic poets or the seers. 
However, there are significant respects in which the authority claims of the first 
cosmologists resemble the authority claims of these individuals. This thesis proposes 
an interpretation of these similarities in light of the oral nature of archaic 
communication, which the discussions of these texts often neglect. The need to 
persuade a live audience had a considerable impact on the way in which the first 
cosmologists presented themselves to their audience, since they could use traditional 
material differently in order to reach out for a larger audience. Tradition was thus 
appropriated to new ends and to a new way of self-projection. At the same time, 
however, the content of the knowledge which the individual disclosed did not 
exactly fit to traditional standards. This thesis examines the relation of the 
Presocratics with tradition and the respects in which they differ and attempt to mark 
a new area of expert knowledge. This in turn helps us re-evaluate the authority 
claims of the Presocratics and to interpret them in connection with the circumstances 
under which these texts were published rather than in connection with our modern 
expectations about what qualifies for theoretical investigation.  
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Chapter I: Introduction 
1. The context for Presocratic authority claims 
 
This analysis promises to examine the authoritative perspective of the 
most prominent cases of early cosmologists. Before turning to the major 
question of this examination, it is important to define first the particular sense 
with which “authoritative” occurs in this study. Authority is here used in 
connection with that particular occasion of presenting oneself and one’s work 
in front of a live audience.  It is in this respect that this term aspires to refer to 
the specific way in which an individual wishes to present himself to his 
audience as someone who is worth listening to, but also as someone who has 
managed to acquire advanced knowledge. In addition, the term 
“authoritative” pertains not only to the person, who presents his personal 
point of view about a specific topic, but also to the peculiar nature and 
implications of his truth, such as its content, thought, and language. It may be 
noted from the outset that authority claims and the wish to establish oneself 
as a competent individual in the archaic epoch were generally raised within a 
traditional and social context.  
In order to understand and define the particular quality and key 
features of the type of authority asserted by the Presocratics, and what is 
telling, and potentially distinctive, about the way in which they make their 
authority claims, it is essential to explore firstly the special types of authority 
which were current in their society. This is important because, when new 
forms of authorities appeared in 5th century Greece, the audience expected to 
find in their presentation a kind of self-projection, which would evoke in their 
minds familiar modes of expressing authority. In archaic presentation, that is, 
the act of defining oneself in relation with existing tradition was to a 




considerable extent a common way of claiming personal authority in public. It 
should be pointed out however that our examination of background 
authorities does not aim in directing the attention of the reader towards a 
black-or-white understanding of archaic authority. Epic poetry and the art of 
divination are picked out as examples of archaic authority, because they 
represent the most prestigious and popular cases of authority in Greek 
society. At any event, this contrast fails, when considered alone, to 
accommodate a substantial interpretation of the authoritative perspective of 
the first cosmologists.  
At the same time however, it is vital to distinguish Presocratic 
authority claims from those made by other authorities, mainly because 
modern scholarship has occasionally treated apparent similarities between the 
two as evidence for an identical authoritative status. For example, 
Xenophanes has been sometimes understood as a rhapsode, Parmenides as a 
shamanistic figure, whereas Empedocles as some kind of a mystical icon. In 
other words, it is impossible to interpret the various ways in which the 
Presocratics under examination attempt to differentiate, and eventually 
establish, their cosmological enterprise from other areas of expertise, unless 
we have firstly examined the particular and crucial features of other types of 
expert knowledge.  
The examination of other cases of archaic authority thus helps us throw 
some light upon the standard expectations which the audience of the first 
cosmologists had, when they listened to new kind of logos which laid a claim 
to a privileged status. It also helps us clarify the way in which novel ideas 
were received by their public, and interpret the authority claims of the 
Presocratics from a new, and perhaps more suitable, angle. If we chose to 
follow this line of reasoning, it is then possible to view the authority claims of 
Presocratic logoi in connection with the element of audience familiarity, which 
plays a central role in the construction of an authoritative identity in oral 




cultures. The oral circulation of ideas in archaic Greece required from 
authoritative individuals to interact with a previously formed tradition. In the 
oral presentation of ideas, that is to say, multiple forces of tradition were at 
play. It is therefore vital to adopt this point of departure in this analysis, 
because it is fruitful, when it comes to understanding the particular function 
of some apparently problematic features of the early cosmological accounts 
under examination, which cannot be otherwise explained.  
The reader will also detect the absence of Greek lyric from the 
discussion of early expressions of individual authority. Lyric poetry is 
deliberately excluded from this analysis, whereas epic poetry is here used as a 
point of reference, because it is this domain of poetic activity in particular 
which is more frequently acknowledged in the surviving Presocratic 
fragments.1 It is also with this kind of traditional authority that Presocratic 
thinkers bear the most striking and significant resemblance in terms of the 
intellectual role which they were at pains to undertake in society.  In addition, 
Presocratic cosmologies do not generally give the impression that they were 
formulated as a response to the tradition of lyric but of epic poetry.2 The 
question of understanding the significant implications of epic authority is 
thus important for this examination, because this authoritative activity set the 




                                                 
1 Although there is a single mention of Archilochus in Heraclitus (B42), according to 
whom he should be dismissed together with Homer from the poetic contests. 
Nonetheless, the point made here is that the Presocratics under examination do not 
launch a systematic attack against lyric poets.  
2 Except in the exclusive case of Xenophanes, for which see analysis in relevant 
chapter.  




i) Epic poetry 
 
The first example of an authoritative posture was preserved in the oral 
poetry of Homer and Hesiod, from whom we acquire important information 
about the way in which the question of authority was firstly raised. Although 
epic poetry acknowledges various types of social authority,3 the authority of 
the poet in particular is the only case for which the information is moderately 
more extensive. Epic poetry defined its authoritative truth as a form of 
knowledge, which can be generally described as the narration of past heroic 
deeds as well as the explanation of the world in terms of human and divine 
interaction.4  
 It then appears that the authoritative task of the epic poet was related 
from the earliest beginnings with a kind of truth, which was believed to 
transcend everyday life, since it dealt with matters unattainable by the 
common lot. The reliability of this truth, however, was endorsed by the 
traditional and religious belief that the gods are prone to communicate, in fact 
intimate, their high-status knowledge to privileged individuals of their 
choice, and through them to human society.5 The Muses were, because of 
                                                 
3 In the Homeric poems we find figures of σοφοί, like Nestor, army leaders, valiant 
warriors, and honourable aristocrats, but also other forensic types of authority (i.e. 
the δημιοεργοί) such as that of crafters, whose art and expertise are important 
because they attend to society’s everyday needs.  
4 For the view that the truth presented in epic poetry aims in the reconstruction of 
past events and in the presentation of the κλέα ἀνδρὦν, see Detienne (1994, p. 66), 
Thalmann (1984, pp. 124 and 132), Murray (1981, esp. p. 91), and Humphreys (1983, 
p. 214). Cf. also Demodocus’ song in θ 489 and θ 498 ff. For that the truth presented 
in epic poetry combines the narration of past events with a description of the nature 
of the divine, see Th. 33 and 100-5.  
5 The contact of the epic poet with the divine is revealed from that he is commonly 
referred to as θεῖος, but also from that epic poetry defines poetic craft as a gift which 
divine grace bestows (cf. θ 43, 64, 498 and 539; Th. 93-4 and 103-105; Arch. fr. 1; and 
Pind. Ol. 7.7). The Muses were believed to both dispense and deprive an individual 
from the ability to sing, as in the case of Thamyris (B 594-9). For the common belief 
that gods could hear and respond to human requests, see Ε 121; Sol. fr. 13; Sapph. fr. 




their divine status, omniscient, and for this reason they could inspire the poet 
with the transcendental vision which his task required. This is expressed in 
the motif of poetic invocation, which occurs at critical and important parts of 
the poem.6 In addition, the motif of divine inspiration also meant to remind to 
the audience that the account which they were about to hear was partly the 
product of a divine revelation and hence particularly important.   
Epic poetry repeatedly associates the activity of singing with an 
authorised setting of performance, such as the banquet. This poetry, 
furthermore, claims that song corresponds to specific social purposes.7 The 
social prominence of the early poetic logos had two aspects: it aimed in 
entertaining and in teaching the audience.  Examples of poetic performance in 
Homer suggest that this poetry was sung and that it was subject to pre-
defined standards in terms of both language and content.8 This is also 
suggested by the fact that epic poetry often describes an authoritative 
performance with the expressions κατὰ κόσμον or κατὰ μοῖραν.9 These 
                                                                                                                                            
1; Alcm. fr. 5; Arch. fr. 108, and Pind. Paean. 6.68. For the archaic notion that the poet 
receives his information from the Muses, see Λ 218, Ξ 508, Π 112, and Β 761. 
6 See, e.g. B 284-93. Cf. Pind. Pyth. 6. The omniscience of the Muses was traditionally 
attributed to their omnipresence, for which reason they were also believed to witness 
everything. They were also credited with the ability to speak eloquently, which 
seems to imply the epic view that skilful utterance was one of the many aspects of 
poetic authority. Hesiod, for example, describes them as ἀρτιεπεῖαι (Th. 29).  
7 This is revealed in the inclusion of the bard in the δημιοεργοί list (ρ 382-5), but also 
from that this poetry was performed in the centre (ἐς μέσον) of the gathering (cf. θ 
262). For the eminent position of the poet, see, e.g. θ 471-2 and ν 27-8.  
8 However, this does not also imply that oral epic poetry appeared in a fully 
organised and conscious fashion of this kind of authority as such. The point here is 
rather that it was the first kind of a socially important activity, whose rule of 
composition gradually formulated a traditional pattern of presentation and of self-
presentation.  
9 For these expressions, see θ 488; Β 213; Ι 236 κοσμήτορε λαὦν; Κ 472; Λ 48; ἵππους 
εὖ κατὰ κόσμον ἐρύκεμεν. The basic sense of κατὰ κόσμον in the Iliad is that of an 
ordered whole, e.g. the formation of the army in battle array (cf., Λ 48; Μ 85).  Cf. 
also, the example of Thersytes’ bad speech in the Iliad (B 211-6). He is thus 
characterised as ἀμετροεπής and for this reason his words are described as ἔπεα 
ἄκοσμα, which is to say that his words lack measure.  




authoritative expressions bear a two-fold meaning: on the one hand they 
imply the arrangement of the traditional material and formulaic language in a 
manner that is suitable for oral communication, and on the other they suggest 
the notion of what is morally fitting and therefore potentially educational. 
They also illustrate the implications of poetic expertise (σοφία), since their 
skilful application calls for a remarkable capacity for remembering in live 
performance the stock of the epic formulae, which oral tradition made 
available to the individual poet.10 
In terms of the performance itself, the limitations inherent in the 
compositional technique of the epos required a particular kind of verbal 
expression, which made apt use of tradition, and which in this way 
encouraged the perpetuation of tradition. This in turn implies that in this 
mode of communication and of authoritative self-presentation the verbal 
form, and consequently the general thought thereby expressed, of the 
published information was to a considerable extent constrained by rigidly set 
standards, which could not be easily overlooked by the epic poet in his 
composition. At the same time however, he was relatively free to enrich in his 
performance the way in which traditional material was presented or to refine 
the oral formulae by submitting with his performance possible variations or 
new formulae.11 
Consequently, in terms of the way in which epic poetry was 
experienced by its audience, they expected, in fact demanded, to listen in this 
                                                 
10 In Murray’s view the poetic processes of performance and of composition are 
simultaneous (1981, p. 95). See also, Lord (1960, p. 13). The “steady flow of words” is 
thus a vital element of the poet’s linguistic task and formed a part of his expertise. 
This becomes apparent from the poetic metaphors which simulate the flow of speech 
to the flow of a river. Cf., Th., 39 (ἀκάματος ῥέει αὐδή), and 97; and Α 249. It is much 
later with Pindar however that the poet appears to be self-conscious about his 
craftsmanship, for he explicitly tells us that he will find a way to articulate the things 
he wants to say (Cf. e.g., Ol. 3. 4-6: εὑρόντι τρόπον). 
11For a discussion of variation in performance, see discussion below. 




kind of performance a familiar and moderately standard set of words and 
ideas but also of stories. The authoritativeness thus of individual composition 
and performance was decided according to how skilfully the individual poet 
treated existed tradition. This in turn implies that the authoritative task of 
epic poetry was confound not only by the themes and expression permitted 
but also by the standard expectations, even perhaps disposition, of the 
audience.  
Although scholars do not commonly agree to what extent personal 
creativity was an active option for epic poets, it seems generally safe to 
assume that at least to some extent it was. The authoritative image, which the 
epos affirms, presents us with a paradox; it is of a personal and at the same of 
an a-personal nature. It was a-personal insofar as the poetic truth was 
believed to derive from a divine source, and it was personal insofar as the 
extensive variety of the formulaic stock offered the opportunity for variation 
and constant change within a relatively stable tradition.  
This paradox can be however explained when viewed in light of the 
oral status of this poetry, which hampers the appearance of permanent and 
fixed versions of a song. The epic poetry of the archaic age was delivered 
orally and it was not, at least at its early stage, preserved with writing. For 
this reason, poetic performances varied according to the taste and craft of 
each individual performer. What this means is that the audience was inclined 
to accept alternative takes on the same theme provided, of course, that the 
composition generally conformed to the traditional rules of the epos. This 
eventually encouraged a spirit of individual competition and, more 
importantly, of inner-differentiation, within the domain of this kind of poetic 
activity. In the Homeric hymn to Apollo, for example, the poet advertises 
himself against other poets, thus acknowledging a more general situation 
according to which individual authorities with the same type of social 




influence and recognition attempt to differentiate themselves from one 
another. 12  
In addition, Hesiod in the opening of his Opera advises Perses to 
always distinguish good (i.e. constructive) from bad (i.e. unproductive) Ἔρις. 
Hesiod then goes on to describe the nature of Ἔρις by adding that one 
rhapsode hates the other in the same way in which a potter or a builder 
“hates” an individual, who practises the same craft. In his view, this kind of 
human behaviour is nonetheless an example of good Ἔρις, since for Hesiod 
competition in general is not considered ignoble or barren, when it is directed 
towards a good cause.13 Hesiod thus illustrates a complex social phenomenon 
of competition, which eventually results in positive progress. According to 
him, the authoritative activity of poetry can advance exactly because 
individual poets are at liberty to compete against one another in contests.14  
The commonness of the spirit of poetic competition is also confirmed 
by the fact that the Greeks were particularly keen on attending poetic 
contests, which took place on mainly religious occasions such as public 
festivals. In fact, Hesiod himself accounts for his personal victory in such a 
contest in memory of Amphidamas.15 It then becomes apparent that already 
                                                 
12 Cf. Hymn. hom., In Apoll., 161 ff., which includes a direct address to the audience. It 
also worthy of note that the singer of this hymn links his authority with his ability to 
contrive verses which can please the audience. For an examination of Greek poetic 
contests, see Herrington (1985, pp. 5-6).  
13 Cf. Op. 24-6. Note also that according to Hesiod such competition is not only 
productive but it is also acceptable on moral grounds (ἀγαθὴ Ἔρις).  
14 It also seems likely that Hesiod understood his poetry in connection with this 
belief. This becomes apparent especially when considering the distinctively different 
kind of epos he composes for his Homer-accustomed audience.  
15 Cf. Op. 654-662. Although Hesiod simply says that he won the prize of a tripod 
with his ὕμνος, the phrasing he uses points at his Theogony. It is also worthy of note 
that he appears to be particularly concerned with mentioning his victory, since it is 
apparently irrelevant to what he previously advises Perses. He is also emphatic in 
the way he introduces his victory (μέ φημι). The Theogony is implied especially in 
lines 658-9.  




in the epic the tradition inner-differentiation was an acceptable way of 
establishing personal authority.  
The custom of performing poetry in public has one further implication 
for our point of analysis. J. Herrington points out that archaic poetry was not 
a collection of written texts but an ensemble of various live performances of 
the same poem.16 Quite naturally then, it is impossible for us to recover 
completely the oral version of a poetic composition. At the same time, 
however, epic poetry discloses some aspects of its oral communication, which 
are telling for the occasion upon which epic poetry was firstly communicated.  
Homeric poetry repeatedly associates song and, consequently, the skill 
of singing with musical performance. In the Odyssey, whenever authoritative 
singing is about to commence, the κῆρυξ places in the hands of the gifted 
individual a κίθαρις, which accompanies his composition.17 When Homer 
distinguishes different kinds of νόος, which Zeus bestows to mortals, and 
which brand various areas of human competency, the skill of the κίθαρις is 
mentioned together with the skill of ἀοιδή.18 In a similar fashion when Hesiod 
distinguishes different authoritative classes of individuals, he groups together 
                                                 
16 Cf. Herrington (1985, p. 3). In terms of how epic poetry was sung he claims that it 
was not a fully melodic song but a form of either unadorned speech (λέγειν) or non-
melodic chant (one sense of ἀείδειν). It seems that in the Homeric age it was recited, 
like lyric, with the accompaniment of a musical instrument. It is thus hard to miss the 
powerful impact that music had on the audience due to its pleasing effect (τέρψις).  
For the view that lyric poetry was performed παρακαταλογή, i.e. in a plain recitative 
mode (cf. Gentili (1988), p. 35).  
17 Cf. α 153, θ 261, Σ 569, and α 155 (in which Phemius is said to possess the skill of 
both φορμίζειν and ἀείδειν), but also Hrd. Hist. 1.155. The same is, of course, true 
also for lyric poetry (cf. Theogn. El. 1.778, 1.761, 1.791; Alcm. fr. 41). Moreover, 
Pindar frequently pairs a musical instrument either with song (Ol. 2.1: 
ἀναξιφόρμιγγες ὕμνοι and 4.2: ποικιλοφόρμιγγος ἀοιδᾶς, cf. Nem. 4.14-6 and 4.44) or 
with its ability to produce a wide gamut of sounds (Ol. 3.8), which are interestingly 
enough compared to the sounds of the human voice and language, since the 
phorminx is described as ποικιλόγαρυς. These examples suggest that in archaic 
poetry the word is always the melodic word and that performance is always musical 
performance.  
18 Cf. N 731. See also α 159.  




the ἀοιδοί with the κιθαρισταί in a single class.19 In addition, in the Iliad 
Patroclus finds Achilles soothing his mind (φρένα τερπόμενον) with a 
phorminx,20 whereas in the Odyssey, when Odysseus stretches the bow in order 
to slay the suitors, the poet tells us that he does so that as skilfully as someone 
who knows how to play the phorminx and to sing.21  
Homeric poetry was at the time before it acquired its standard form 
audience-controlled and recipient-designed. The prominent role of the 
audience in the shaping of poetic performance is also suggested by that in the 
Odyssey the singer has to be requested to sing by the audience, which in turn 
suggests that despite his privileged status he was not self-appointed. The 
authoritative activity of singing, that is to say, was always a matter of public 
demand and not of personal initiative. It was, furthermore, licensed by the 
audience, and it is in relation with this that the poetic motif of divine 
inspiration can be interpreted. In light of this, the audience was chiefly 
responsible for setting the standards for poetic performance.22 In addition, the 
                                                 
19 Cf. Th. 95.  
20 Cf. I 186 ff. It is noteworthy that Achilles sings about the κλέα ἀνδρὦν, a phrase 
which is frequently used in Homeric poetry in order to describe the very content of 
epic song. This belief is still active for Hesiod (cf. Th. 95-103).  
21 Cf. φ 406. It is also worthy of note that the mention of ἀοιδή is here irrelevant to the 
skill of archery. It does seem to suggest, however, that the two separate skills of 
ἀοιδή and of the playing of the phorminx were so intrinsically connected in the mind 
of the epic poet that it is impossible to mention the one without the other. Needles to 
say, the pairing of song to a musical instrument was still common in the classical age. 
Aristophanes, for example, invents the epithet κιθαραοιδότατος (Vesp. 1278), while 
he tells us elsewhere that the custom of κιθαρίζειν and singing after drinking is very 
ancient (Nub. 1357-8). However, he also mentions the skill of playing the cithara as a 
separate and independent kind of skill, which forms a part of man’s education (Vesp. 
959).  
22 It is in Theognis’ σφρηγίς that we find the first implication of the notion that poetry 
is an activity authoritative in its own right and not fully dependent upon the 
demands of its public. Theognis expresses this view clearly when he declares that 
ἀστοῖσιν δ’ οὔπω πᾶσιν ἁδεῖν δύναμαι (1.19-24). He is nonetheless confident that his 
poems will endure in time otherwise and because of their value. See also Nagy (1996, 
p. 222). The advantageous opportunities which the advent of writing provided the 
individuals with are discussed below. 




authorising role of the audience is easy to understand, when viewed in 
connection with the oral status of archaic poetry. Audience approval plays a 
crucial role in the communicative circumstance of oral presentation for 
establishing personal authority, mainly because individual performance 
otherwise drops from collective memory.23 In effect, any personal claim laid to 
authority would be thereby left unsatisfied, exactly because it is unsatisfying 
for the audience in the first place. 
The role of the audience in poetic performance is relevant also to the 
examination of Presocratic authority. It is particularly useful in helping us to 
understand the poetic attributes of Presocratic style in connection with the set 
of necessities which the oral dissemination of ideas of the archaic age 
imposed. It also offers considerable assistance in approaching the question 
how these Presocratic individuals could authorize themselves as people 
worthy of public attention, even if the audience had not yet authorised 
cosmos-focused performances, and even if it had not yet credited an activity 
which verges on the investigation of the physis with a distinct authoritative 
status. The element of audience-control was gradually emasculated with the 
advent of literacy, with which the mentality of accepting daring originality 
and personal innovation of tradition finally became available.24   
It should be pointed out at this point however that epic poetry became 
from an early stage established as an authoritative form of logos in society not 
only because of its pleasing value but because of the kind of knowledge later 
                                                 
23 For an examination of this topic, see Thomas (1982, p. 51).  
24 To this view Havelock objects that the poet never really lost the authority of being 
society’s encyclopaedist, as suggested by the fact that his formulaic speech remained 
till the end of 5th century a powerful medium for expressing cultural information 
(1963, p. 95). In late 5th century however the medium of expression was distinguished 
from the kind of authority it implied or required, something to which the works of 
the Sophists contributed, which voiced the conception of the logos as a separate 
faculty governed by its own laws. What this means is that by that time the tradition 
of formulaic diction was a fossilised kind of speech; it generally implied authority 
but it did not affirm the specialised authoritative status of the Homeric bard.  




audiences understood to be disclosed by such poetry. A. Finkelberg has 
observed that in Homer poetic authority is associated with knowledge 
whenever the song is not subject to the limitations imposed by the banquet. 
This becomes apparent, for instance, in the song of the Sirens, which does not 
commit itself to entertainment but to knowledge.25 This suggestion implies 
that the gradual disassociation of poetry from the banquet described in the 
epos and its incorporation into the public context of religious festivals 
eventually gave the poetic truth a different twist. Knowledge was thus 
brought to the foreground of society’s attention as a distinct aspect of the 
poet’s authority.26 Finkelberg’s remark is important because it implies the 
possibility of mistaking the tradition about Homer with the multiple oral 
compositions, which eventually formulated the standard version of the 
Homeric poems.   
It would be therefore unwise to assume that epic poetry had a purely 
entertaining function in Greek society, since the aesthetic gratification which 
derived from poetic performance was combined with instruction. E. A. 
Havelock has maintained that Homeric poetry functioned as a didactic 
instrument, because Greek society lacked a formal educational system till 5th 
century. This in turn allows us to view the educational role of epic poetry in 
                                                 
25 Cf. μ 184-91, Finkelberg (1998, p. 95), but also Goldhill (1991, p. 65). Finkelberg 
adduces the example of the invocation of the Muses in the catalogue of the ships in 
the Iliad (Β 485-492). It is worthy of note however that the song of the Sirens is still 
governed by pleasure (cf. esp. line 188: ἀλλ’ ὅ γε τερψάμενος νεῖται καὶ πλείονα 
εἰδώς). Although Finkelberg is eager to accept the pleasing value of epic poetry, he 
nonetheless maintains that it was meant to function as a precondition of poetic 
performance, insofar as it made the audience more receptive to the poetic logos (p. 
90). However, it seems hard to lend support to the view that this kind of pleasure did 
not derive also from performance itself, especially when taking into consideration 
that early poetry was commonly accompanied in performance by a musical 
instrument. For the potency of oral poetry to persuade and instruct through pleasure, 
see analysis below.  
26 For this reason, it cannot be a matter of mere coincidence that Hesiod, the first 
individual who consciously adopts a didactic posture in the Opera, is also the first to 
famously distinguish between knowledge and the possibility of knowledge (Th. 27-8).  




light of its oral status. The oral nature of archaic communication, that is to say, 
was partly responsible for establishing poetry in society as the most 
competent medium for instruction.27 In such a society, παιδεία was not based 
upon education through schools and teachers, but it was a matter of 
indoctrination or, as K. Robb puts it, of “enculturation”.28 Following this 
course of reason, Havelock maintains that the poems of Homer were a form of 
“tribal encyclopaedia”, since they functioned as compilations of technical 
knowledge, such as that of carpentry or of sailing. They were also a powerful 
medium of preserving valuable social constitutions and customs which were 
still current in Greek society.29 Havelock concludes his analysis by stating that 
Homeric poetry was a “mechanism of power”, since the poet controlled 
collective memory because he controlled the memory of the individual.30 
However, it appears that the passages in Homer which present a 
technological kind of knowledge are dispersed and do not occur in a 
                                                 
27 Cf. Havelock (1963, pp. 43-5). See also Beck (1964, pp. 32-3), for the oral poet in 
general as the educator of his community and pp. 55-6 for Homer in specific as 
educator. He reasonably observes that Homeric poetry was responsible not only for 
the narration of past events but also for establishing patterns of acceptable human 
behaviour. For a similar suggestion see also Robb (1994, p. 33, and p. 174). Robb 
objects to interpreting Homeric poetry as a cultural phenomenon dominated by 
pleasure on grounds that such an assumption is based exclusively upon the Parry-
Lord thesis, which is actually a case-study of Balkan song culture (p. 168). It does 
seem however that epic poetry understood itself both as instructive and pleasing. 
28 Cf. Robb (1994, p. 33).  
29 Cf. Havelock (1963), esp. Ch. 4 (pp. 61-84), and (1982, p. 226), also accepted by 
Robb (1994, pp. 164-6). According to Havelock, this is exemplified in the Iliad’s scene 
about the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon, which he reads as an 
illustration of the public law (1963, p. 79). In Robb’s view, this function of the 
Homeric poems is manifested particularly in book viii of the Odyssey,  which 
apparently describes some of the most basic institutions of Greek everyday life, such 
as the male symposium, the rules of xenia, song dances and games (1994, p. 35). Robb 
thus concludes that epic poetry was a collection of technological lore (p. 164). It is 
true that Hesiod registers νόμοι and ἤθεα as the content of the song which the Muses 
sing and, hence, of poetry in general in Th. 66. However, for a criticism of Havelock’s 
suggestion see Harriott (1969, pp. 107-9), who renders his view extreme. 
30 Cf. Havelock (1963, pp. 145-7).  




systematic fashion. At any event, it is not least unexpected to find in the oral 
poetry of epic the reflection of society itself.31 This is easily explained when 
taking into account that oral epic poetry was a social product, and for this 
reason it is only natural that it occasionally addressed the common experience 
of its audience.  
There can be no doubt about the educational efficacy of Homeric 
poetry. However, as R. Harriott has pointed out, some room should be 
allowed for scepticism about whether he was himself well-aware of his role as 
educator, especially when considering that his authoritative ego rarely 
appears in the poems.32 The examples of Hesiod, especially his Opera, and of 
Theognis show us how the conscious instruction of an audience could acquire 
authoritative centrality in poetic compositions.33 For this reason, it seems safer 
to accept that the educational tone of Homeric poetry is at least indirect, and 
that it results from the paideutic function which its primary material, namely 
myth, generally has.34  
                                                 
31 As Brunschwig recently put it, “it is in a work of poetry that a society reveals itself 
to itself” (2000, p. 40). For the same view see also Russo (1978, p. 49).  
32 Cf. Harriott (1969, p. 108), but also Sikes’ outdated view (1931, p. 4). According to 
their interpretations Homeric poetry never lays conscious emphasis on its instructive 
value. For a list of examples of gnomes in Homeric poetry see Chadwick (1968, pp. 
178-9) but also p. 390 and 392 ff. Contra this view see Robb (1994, p. 166), who insists 
that the fundamental cultural purpose of Homer was the formalisation of an oral 
παιδεία. According to his analysis the poetic effect of pleasure alone does not 
provide a satisfying explanation of Homer’s “remarkable phenomenon” or of his 
prestigious position in Greek education. However, there is no reason why we need to 
justify here Homer’s popularity, unless we are interested of course, like Robb, with 
Homer’s reception in antiquity. 
33 West remarks in his commentary on the Opera that Hesiod draws from an existing 
tradition of wisdom literature (1988). It is important to note however that he does not 
identify this particular tradition with that of Homer but with one which is for us 
irretrievably lost.  
34 Nagy thus defines myth as a “coding of truth values through narratives” (1996, p. 
54). For a similar definition of myth see Johnstone (2009, pp. 14-6 and p. 32). On myth 
as retrogressive, i.e. as a means of preserving society’s past, see Hatab (1990, p. 194).  




It is in fact true that myth reflects the memory of the collective and that 
oral societies generally tend to preserve in the form of myth information 
considered important for the establishment of social and cultural conformity. 
Myth, that is to say, bears a normative force, since it provides society with a 
common moral ground for personal action.35 It is mainly in this respect that 
myth carries within itself educational overtones, which eventually made it a 
rather powerful and impressive medium for instruction. Epic poetry 
bequeathed to later authorities the paideutic efficacy of myth, which in that 
time went hand in hand with verse. This was so also for the Presocratics, for 
whom myth was still exploitable for their authoritative self-projection.   
In addition, it cannot be safely argued that the epic poets can be held 
responsible for formulating their contemporary society.36 Their social 
importance depended upon the way in which they revealed society to itself 
and for this reason they were expected to work with elements which were 
already present in the community by the time when they composed. This was 
the primary function of Homeric performance, the insertion of which in 
public festivals was a method of perpetuating the traditional ethos and of 
establishing a coherent cultural background for personal action.  
J. Russo interpreted the educational function of the epos in connection 
with the exclusive nature of formulaic diction, which such poetry had to 
employ because of its oral recital. In his view, it is the regularity implied by 
                                                 
35 As B. Snell has maintained, unanimity for Homer is something mental, i.e. the 
ὁμόθυμον is the ὁμόφρονον (1961, p. 17). In a similar vein Robb remarks that archaic 
ethics was a matter of aspiration (1994, p. 34). 
36 So according to the Havelock-Robb thesis. Havelock argues that the story is 
subordinated to the educational material which it carries (1963, p. 61). So also for 
Robb (1994, p. 176). However, this interpretation is left unsupported by convincing 
textual evidence. Harriott dismisses Havelock’s view, which he renders extreme. 
According to Harriott, epic poetry combined aesthetic gratification with moral 
instruction (1969, p. 109). And Havelock does not appear to be completely unaware 
of this double function of epic poetry, when he later accepts that the unconscious part 
of poetic creativity was also concerned with entertaining the audience (pp. 90-1).   




the formulae that element which results in the construction of a coherent 
world-picture thus validating the common-held beliefs of the audience.37 In 
effect, the authority of the Homeric bard is “traditional” not only because it 
intends to communicate culturally important information, but also because 
poetic expression is controlled by a standard set of words and phrases. This in 
turn left the epic poet with no option other than that of expressing the core 
culture of his society. The coherence inherent in his language naturally 
reflects the coherence manifested in his society, and it is in this respect that 
cultural uniformity, i.e. tradition, was communicated and eventually 
preserved by Homeric poetry. Such an interpretation, furthermore, not only 
explains Homer’s role as teacher in terms of the natural implications of his 
oral style, but it also accords with the way in which epic poetry defines poetic 
expertise as that particular type of σοφία which relies upon the possession of 
a specific craft. The epic descriptions of poetic authority, moreover, appear to 
imply the skill of a good command of language insofar as the successful 
delivery of epic authority called for a dexterous implementation of the 
formulae. After all, as B. Peabody has maintained, in practice oral 
composition was not a case of mixing words randomly.38 
However, in examining the nature of epic authority we should not give 
our full and exclusive attention to the potentially instructive features of the 
                                                 
37 Cf. Russo (1978, pp. 45-9). He examines the levels of regularity in Homeric 
language, the fifth of which is the “outlook”, i.e. the presentation to the audience of 
coherent world-picture, which nonetheless has to make sense for them. Russo 
concludes that the picture of society in Homeric poetry “emanates from its normative 
centre”. This in turn implies that the social information present in Homer was 
available to the poet prior to his composition, which nonetheless gave it a voice in 
society. For the way in which Homeric language mirrors the reality of the world see 
Johnstone (2009, p. 25) following Eliade (1963, p. 6). This belief in the reality of 
language was inherited by Heraclitus, who of course reinterpreted and used it in 
new cosmological terms.  
38 Cf. Peabody (1975, p. 112).  




epos.39 This is not to say that Homeric poetry meant to entertain all audiences 
throughout the ages, but that it aimed partly at entertaining that particular 
society which invented and fostered it. The advantage of not dismissing from 
our consideration the element of pleasure in connection with the authoritative 
function of the epic logos is that we thereby acknowledge the archaic spirit, 
which recognises a certain efficacious quality in the spoken word. In addition, 
this belief is further attested by the essential features of epic formulaic diction, 
which were believed to bring about a special kind of peitho.40 This effect of the 
techniques employed in epic composition was reinforced by the oral status of 
early epic, in the case of which the repetitive rhythm reached through 
patterns of metre and of imagery made the content of the message all the 
more impressive and agreeable for the audience, and eventually memorable.  
In late 5th century Gorgias interpreted persuasion in connection with 
pleasure. He describes the dominating effect which the spoken word has 
upon the human soul in terms of the potency of the former to persuade the 
latter by means of charm.41  In his view, the trick lies in the natural aptitude of 
language to engage the soul of the recipient with the stories it presents and, 
consequently, with the set of information or beliefs enclosed in such a 
                                                 
39 For an out-dated support of this view see Sikes (1931, pp. 1-7) and, more recently 
Harriott (1969, p. 109 and p. 117) and Thomas (1992, p. 51), but also Robb (1994, p. 
163 and 168). The view that the persuasiveness of poetry results from the nature of its 
phrasing but also from the application of myths originates with Plato. 
40 The effect of poetic performance is frequently described in the Odyssey in terms of a 
silence befalling the audience, which results from that they are mesmerised by the 
poetic logos. The poetic logos was also believed to exert thelxis on the audience thus 
luring the audience into accepting the content of its message. The story about the 
singing of the Sirens, for instance, corresponds to this traditional belief. See also 
Hesiod’s Cassandra.  
41 Cf. B 11.10. Gorgias illustrates the way in which the logos impinges upon the soul 
and stirs emotions by drawing an analogy with the way in which the φάρμακα 
applied in medicine affect the human body. For an extensive examination of the 
implications of this metaphor see Segal (1962, pp. 105 ff.), but also Johnstone (2009, p. 
14). According to Segal, the effectiveness of the logos involves the emotional 
participation of the audience and is conditioned by τέρψις, namely aesthetic 
gratification.  




message.42 It then becomes apparent that for Gorgias pleasure is still a form of 
effective persuasion and, more specifically, an instrument which, once 
adequately employed, may orient the audience toward specific matters and 
according to the needs and intentions of the speaker, thus interfering with 
their personal opinions and accomplishing persuasion.  
It can be generally said that the personal authority of the epic poet did 
not require a straightforward argumentation in defence of its authoritative 
status, mainly because the belief in the poet’s divine inspiration was accepted 
by the audience as a sufficient guarantee for the authoritativeness of his 
message. Later tradition explains the persuasiveness of epic accounts in 
connection with the aesthetic gratification which resulted from poetic 
performance.  E. Minchin has recently maintained that the surface features of 
epic song (including rhythm, alliteration, assonance and the formulae) do not 
only imply the personal mastery of the poet. They also affect the way in 
which the Greek audience experienced epic poetry, and for this reason they 
formed a part of its entertainment.43 In the same vein, C. Johnstone and J.P. 
Vernant have maintained that the persuasive value of epic poetry derives 
from its oral status, which they understand as the power of the spoken word 
to enchant.44 These interpretations suggest that the surface features of poetic 
                                                 
42 Cf. Ion passim but especially Socrates’ remark in 535b ff. Gorgias’ interpretation 
directly brings to mind Plato’s description of rhapsodic performance. Of course, 
Gorgias does not mean the same pleasure which the Homeric verses in particular 
produce. He expresses a general belief about the human language, which he 
objectifies in his analysis.  
43 Cf. Minchin (1996, p. 13).  
44 Cf. Johnstone (2009, pp. 26-8) and Vernant (1980, pp. 206-7). In Johnstone’s view, 
the competency of poetic language lies in its ability to engage the imagination of the 
audience due to its pleasing value. Vernant sees in the oral word a tendency to give 
pleasure, which he associates with the magical quality of speech, as for instance in 
the case of charms and incantations. Contra such interpretations see Gentili (1978, 
pp. 142-3), according to whom at the heart of poetic creation lies the mimesis and not 
just pleasure, which he dismisses as a mere artifice of style. It is impossible to offer a 




utterance had the advantage of impressing the poetic message on the soul of 
the recipient in the same way in which Gorgias describes the efficacious 
cogency of human language in general.  
At the same time, however, epic poetry was something more for the 
society than just a great model of language and of persuasion. It offered with 
its presentation a particular mode of conceptualising and of forming ideas 
about human life or the cosmos, which gradually became very influential in 
Greek society and which, in the long run, became a standard way of 
understanding the world. It could offer explanations, that is to say, of the 
mortal world as well as of man’s relation with it and position in it. The 
cosmological aspirations of epic poetry were expressed through myth thus 
formulating a particular mind-set. In order to estimate then the authoritative 
gravity and novelty of early cosmological speculation it is vital to firstly 
examine the way in which the epos conceptualises through myth, to which we 
shall now turn.  
L. Hatab maintains that mythic cosmologising constitutes a direct 
response to the world, because it does not reflect upon its primary material, 
and it takes existing reality as it is. This characteristic of the mythical mind, 
furthermore, presupposes a unity between thought and sensation. Hatab goes 
on to observe that a sense of “givenness” arises in the way in which myth 
understands the world. It is in myth, moreover, that the extraordinary finds 
its place.45 Hatab’s view is attractive, especially when considering that folk 
imagination is particularly enthusiastic about the extraordinary. It can be 
generally said that the more extraordinary a belief is the more likely it is to 
find its expression in myth. This in turn implies that the mythical state of 
mind is not concerned with the presentation of a world view which is 
                                                                                                                                            
hierarchy of the authoritative aspects which were active in poetic performance. It 
seems that they were all equally significant for the successful delivery of epic poetry.  
45 Cf. Hatab (1990), pp. 31-34 and p. 162.  




accepted on rational grounds or because it is justifiable in a plausible manner. 
However, we should be careful enough to distinguish that this is not to say 
that myth generally lacks any signs of reasonableness, but that it employs a 
form of reasonableness, which is nonetheless of a distinct nature. 46  
In addition, myth is characterised by a plurality of explanations.47 It 
does not offer a single account of the cosmos but it accommodates multiple 
separate explanations of its reality. Furthermore, in myth every phenomenon 
or form of existence is dealt with independently. Mythical explanations do not 
therefore support a single cosmological scheme and they are not subject to the 
regularities of a standard and recurrent cosmic pattern.  
If there is one thing which all mythical explanations appear to have in 
common, this is the element of divine interference. According to myth, that is, 
human world has acquired its current form because the gods were, or are, 
actively involved in the happenings of the world in which mortals dwell, and 
for this reason their actions were believed to affect largely its constitution.48 
Mythical comprehension thus takes the cosmos as a manifestation of divine 
presence. According to this frame of mind, for instance, every tree, mountain, 
river, city and the like all had their origin in a story about a god or about a 
demigod figure. Moreover, the participation of the gods in the world of 
mortals was conceived by the Greek mind in human terms and according to 
                                                 
46 The context in which archaic poetry in general was presented did not altogether 
lack a reflective mood. The symposium obviously attests to the opposite. The point 
here is that this kind of reflectiveness, nurtured by the friendly and happy 
atmosphere of the symposium, does not appear as the product of a systematic or 
joined effort. It depended upon the personal initiative of the individual poet, insofar 
as it was permitted by the flexible rules of the symposium. Lyric poetry in specific 
favours but it does not require personal reflection in the process of composition.  
47 See also Hatab op. cit.  
48 Thus Lloyd claims that the myth explains in a restricted sense, according to which 
one unknown is replaced by another. Myth, in Lloyd’s view, tells us why but not how 
the cosmic reality occurs (1979, p. 32 and pp. 52-3).  




standards of human behaviour. In fact, it is human behaviour viewed 
however from a different angle.  
In addition, myth does not describe the particular details of the process 
which generated a cosmic phenomenon, although it does provide a higher 
inaccessible cause for it, provided of course that we are eager to accept that 
gods is not what one normally encounters in everyday life. Myth, and 
through it poetry, accounts for the past and present but it does not account for 
the future, since divine will is rather fickle and impossible, at least for poetry, 
to predict, because there is no guarantee of the way in which gods will act in 
the future.49 In effect, mythical reason does not pursue the element of 
predictability in connection with the cosmic happenings, and for this reason it 
falls short of providing the audience with a firm cosmological framework. 
Myth can be thus said to explain the way things are or the way they once were 
but it does not as a rule provide its audience with a clue of how things will 
occur in future time. It is in this respect that Presocratic cosmologies signal a 
departure from the traditional poetic mindset, since the cosmic infrastructure 
which they propose is not valid only for past and present times but also for 
the future.  
In light of this evidence, it cannot be safely argued that myth 
deliberately and systematically discloses a cosmology. Epic poetry is 
concerned with the human enterprise and for this reason it is only natural that 
it occasionally attempts to answer some of the basic questions which naturally 
occur to men, such as their position in the cosmos or the origins of existence. 
                                                 
49 It is only fair to exclude Hesiod from this observation. In the Opera he presents an 
impressive, imaginative and inspired view about the succession of human races, 
which are apparently doomed to gradual deterioration and moral decadence. For an 
analysis of the meaning of this myth in Hesiod, see Vernant (1982, p. 3). However, 
this is the exclusive example of the Greek epos putting forward an explanation with 
prophetic overtones, and for this reason it is perhaps more useful in examining the 
way in which the poetry of Hesiod is distinguished from its Homeric background, 
which of course goes beyond the interest of this analysis.  




At the same time however, the explanations provided by myth are not 
primarily focused upon a thorough investigation of these questions. Myths 
are stories and epic poetry is interested in singing these stories from the past 
about how gods affected, and thus still affect, the human world or human life 
in general. Cosmological explanations thus constitute an irregular and 
intermittent area of myth and they are not characteristic of every story, which 
the epos recounts. They form a special subcategory of myth, since they do not 
define or determine its every aspect, and they do not lie in the heart of epico-
poetic statements of authority.  
All the same, it is only fair to distinguish at this point Hesiod’s view of 
the world from that presented in Homeric poetry. In the Theogony Hesiod 
deals with the past but he gives a new twist to Homer’s version. Hesiod does 
not simply recount in Homeric fashion past heroic deeds and specific stories, 
but he goes even further back to the very origins of the world. This in turn 
implies that Hesiod does not share the same priorities and concerns with 
Homer. Of course, for him the world is still governed by the gods, only that 
he elaborates and clarifies the particular genealogical order which lies 
underneath it. Hesiod thus offers a more systematic and more abstract 
approach to the problem of understanding the cosmos, which is not yet 
formulated however as a specific question to be answered. This is also 
suggested by the fact that to Hesiod’s religious mind cosmology is still 
understood as cosmogony and, more specifically, as theology. Hesiod also 
does not reject Homer on such grounds (unless perhaps in Th. 27) but he 
enriches and refines his beliefs. Homeric and Hesiodic types of cosmic 
understanding remain thus essentially the same, and Hesiod still thinks in 
Homeric terms, albeit with a somewhat more apparent “philosophical” 




impulse.50 If we are eager to accept that the poetry of Hesiod offers an account 
of the cosmos, then we shall at least admit that he understands the world 
basically in terms of sexual unions, which may anticipate Presocratic 
cosmologising but is at the same time of a different nature.   
ii) The art of divination 
a) The oracles 
 
The oracles were institutionalised centres with perhaps the most 
influential authoritative position in society. Their responses were understood 
to express the highest form of knowledge achievable by mortals, which could 
be acquired through a direct or indirect communication with the divine. 
According to Xenophon, for example, the oracles were consulted about 
matters unattainable by human wisdom, and that they provided society with 
a possible answer, whenever the basic capacity of human intelligence failed.51 
The kind of knowledge they divulged in the community was understood in 
connection with a divine source, and was thus of a divine, i.e. transcendental, 
status. They were consulted by either individuals or by city-states.52 Oracular 
knowledge was thus considered authoritative for both everyday personal 
matters as well as for important civil affairs. In the ancient world the 
                                                 
50 For the same conclusion see Hatab (1990, p. 161). Hatab makes the stimulating 
observation that Hesiod traces the origins of existence but not the first principles of 
the cosmos. In his view this is manifested in that in the Hesiodic account gods appear 
out of nowhere, since Hesiod simply says that they ἐγένοντο (p. 64). Indeed, 
Hesiod’s description of the origins of the world is no less abstract than in any other 
case of archaic cosmological ἀρχή.  
51 Cf. Xen. Mem. 1.1.6-9. See also Price (1985, pp. 153-4).  
52 Fontenrose thus distinguishes the following four topics of oracular responses: res 
divinae, res publicae, res domesticae and profanae, i.e. ethical commands, which were 
regularly phrased in the form of gnomes (1978, pp. 24-27 and Table II). Fontenrose 
also points out that in terms of the civic affairs for which the oracle provided 
guidance, the majority of the surviving oracular responses deals with approvals of 
cult laws and treatises, but also with proposals of cult foundation (p. 22).  




authority of the oracles reigned supreme in both the public and the private 
sphere.53  
In terms of the content of the knowledge presented by the oracular 
responses J.E. Fontenrose has offered an extensive list of the different kinds of 
questions, which were asked to the oracles. His examination of surviving 
oracular pronouncements clearly shows that the majority of historical 
oracular responses is characterised by an imperative mood, and that they 
regularly advise on whether a particular action should be performed or not.54  
Furthermore, the standard set of questions used in inquiring the oracle 
confirms that in most cases there had to be a practical reason for the inquiry.  
The content of oracular knowledge was thus of a practical nature, 
insofar as it advised the inquirer on the particular course of action that he 
should follow. It offered an authorisation of his personal intention or, to put it 
differently, it proffered institutional approval and orientation in inquiring the 
oracles, thus supervising human activity. It is noteworthy that while epic 
poetry provided its audience with a divinely inspired knowledge of past 
events, and which was not, strictly speaking, immediately applicable to 
specific matters of their everyday enterprise, oracular centres provided to the 
community a divine knowledge that could be straightaway applied to human 
life. The modern mind usually expects to find in oracular pronouncements an 
                                                 
53 For an examination of the prominent status of Delphi amongst the Greeks, see 
Price (1985, p. 141 ff.) and Bowden (2005, esp. ch. 4: pp. 87-108, on how and why the 
Athenians consulted the oracle).   
54 Cf. Fontenrose (1978, p. 13: type A of oracular responses). See also Table 1 (p. 21), 
which compares modes of legendary and historical responses, and which 
demonstrates that the most common type of oracular knowledge attested offered by 
historical responses is that of clear commands. See also p. 35 ff., for the question 
formulae used in historical and legendary consultations. According to Fontenrose, 
the most frequent question formulae attested are: “(how) shall I do x?”, “what should 
I do?” or “what is it better for me to do?”. Cf. also Bowden (2005, Ch. 5, and pp. 47-8, 
but also Appendix 1, for a list of forms of oracular questions in Greek tragedy). This 
in turn implies that the questions posed to the oracle were formulated in a way 
which generally anticipated a “yes” or a “no” as an answer.  




attempt to predict the future. However, Fontenrose’s meticulous examination 
of oracular responses clearly indicates that oracular knowledge revealed the 
truth about multiple grades of time.55 The transcendental insight which is 
displayed in oracular responses, that is to say, pertained not only to the future 
but also to the past or present.  
Furthermore, the oracles constituted an autonomous source of 
authoritative knowledge, since the civic authorities could not interfere with 
their activity.56  This becomes apparent also from that process of consulting 
the oracle was fixed, which arose from a clearly defined kind of authority. 
Oracles were given under specific and controlled circumstances, since the 
same standard procedure was performed prior to the consultation, and which 
took the form of a ritual. The process of oracular inquiry, that is, required the 
preparatory purification of the client. At the same time, the very process of 
the oracular medium obtaining the answer to the client’s question was also 
standard.  The process followed in consulting the oracle was thus organised 
and predefined according to a formulated tradition of consulting the oracle. 
In addition, this procedure could be performed only in the oracular shrines 
and not on any other site. This in turn implies that oracular responses could 
be received only within the limits of the oracle itself, and that oracular 
authority was in this respect a particularly localised and institutionalised 
activity Furthermore, oracular prophecies could only be given by specific 
charismatic individuals, who were the mediators between divine and mortal 
knowledge, and for this reason they were believed to transcend the limits of 
ordinary human experience.  
                                                 
55 Cf. Fontenrose (1978, pp. 17-8: type D). His list shows that the oracles could 
occasionally reveal a kind of knowledge, which was commonplace and known to 
everyone, as well as a kind of knowledge, which was extraordinary and hidden. For 
future predictions, see also, pp. 19-20: type E. Fontenrose divides future predictions 
into non-predicative and predicative, since not all prophecies were a clear foretelling.  
56 Although Herodotus records two instances of bribery. Cf. Hist. 6.66 and 6.75.  




The domain of the authoritative responsibility of the oracles was thus 
clearly defined, since it provided an answer to a standard set of questions and 
it conformed to a fixed process of prophesying. However, although oracular 
knowledge was socially significant and extensive, it was not nonetheless 
unlimited. Garland has argued that an oracle would never offer an answer 
unless upon request.57 To this we may add that the oracle was consulted by an 
individual or a polis on specific occasions.58 It therefore becomes apparent that 
this kind of authority was expressed under specific circumstances, and that it 
was deprived of the liberty to practice its authoritative competency as a 
source of wisdom on its own initiative.59 This in turn implies that the oracle 
had to be licensed either by the recipient in order to display its authoritative 
expertise, in the same way in which the audience had to authorise the 
performance of the epic poet. 
Oracular authority was limited insofar as it was restricted by the 
question asked by the client, which anticipated a specific type of answer, 
which remained authoritatively valid only for a specific problem at a 
particular time. The reliability and truthfulness of oracular responses were 
attached only to a specific recipient and could be applied only in their 
interest. Oracular knowledge was thus to a considerable extent recipient-
designed. It never exceeded the exclusive needs of a particular client and its 
content was never intergraded into a larger frame. It made known multiple 
truths, which were nonetheless treated independently from one another. 
The expression thus of oracular authority was strictly limited within 
the boundaries of the oracular shrines and corresponded to specific social 
                                                 
57 Cf. Garland (1984, p. 81 and p. 119. See also Parke (1962, p. 145 ff.), who argues that 
αὐτοματίζω appears in late 4th century with the sense of “to speak a prophecy 
without being questioned”.  
58 For a list, see Fontenrose (1978, p. 39 ff.).  
59 See also Maurizio (2001, pp. 44-5), for the view that the oracles never constituted a 
formal body of knowledge but responded to particular crises.  




needs. This is not to say, however, that oracular knowledge did not circulate 
at all in the community. We know that the specialised class of the chresmologoi 
was responsible for publishing oracular responses to the community.60 To the 
authoritative class of the chresmologoi we also add the ἐξηγηταί, who formed 
an advisory body of experts on religious matters. Their task was to 
understand and make public the way in which religious customs, such as 
religious ceremonies, burials and purifications should be properly 
performed.61  
In terms of the nature of the presentation and dissemination of oracular 
knowledge in society, it appears that it was in accord with the oral 
communication of ideas in the archaic age. L. Maurizio has recently pointed 
out that the Delphic tradition was in fact an oral one, since the oracles were 
both orally-derived and orally-circulated, which is to say that they firstly 
survived in collective memory before being recorded.62  Maurizio’s suggestion 
is confirmed by the existence of collections of oracles, which were either 
private or public, and which were delivered in a live performance.63 This in 
turn suggests that the surviving written records of oracular responses stand 
last at the end of a long tradition of oral performances. In effect, the essential 
features of their style were formulated according to a process similar to that 
according to which epic poetry was composed and performed. Oracular 
expression was thus subject to the requirements and conditions of orality and 
for this reason it was characterised by a traditional regularity of content and 
phrasing. In effect, the group of specialists who were responsible for the 
                                                 
60 Cf. Hrd. Hist. 1.62 and 8.96. On the chresmologoi as publishers and interpreters of 
oracles, see Collins (2004, p. 385). According to Garland, our sources make no clear 
distinction between the seer and the chresmologos (1984, p. 113). The etymology of the 
word suggests that they had at their disposal collections of oracles, which they 
recited in public (cf. Aristoph. Av. 960, Pax 1047; Thuc. Hist. 2.8.21).  
61 Cf. Hrd. Hist. 1.78, and Garland (1984, pp. 82-3).  
62 Cf. Maurizio (1997, p. 313).  
63 For these collections, see Fontenrose (1978, p. 165).  




verbal transcription of the prophetic message into intelligent speech 
employed oral formulae and recurrent patterns of expression which were 
conventional, and therefore constant, but at the same time variable according 
to each individual case of consultation.64  
The oral circulation of oracles had two further implications for the 
expression of oracular authority in the society: one the one hand it was to a 
considerable extent audience-controlled, since the authenticity of an 
individual performance could be doubted and a better interpretation could be 
sought, and on the other flexibility in performance was common, since the 
content or meaning of the response could be altered in its live publication.65  
The oral communication of oracular responses had one further 
implication their reception by the public. It appears that oracles which 
addressed matters pertinent to the interest of a particular polis were open to 
public discussion and debate. Herodotus, for example, records such a critical 
reception of the wooden wall oracle, which the Athenians received from 
Delphi, and which only Themistocles managed to interpret correctly.66 
Herodotus’ testimony shows that the interpretation and execution of the 
advice given by the oracle was left entirely to the responsibility of the city-
state. It clearly shows, moreover, that the interpretation of an oracle was not 
merely the exclusive responsibility of specialists, since the polis could also 
lend credibility to those interpretations which were suggested by individuals, 
provided of course that they were considered reasonable and successful. It 
therefore becomes apparent that in the publication of oracular responses we 
find a critical spirit and the cross-examination of alternative possible 
                                                 
64 For an examination of the conventions and structure of traditional oracles in verse, 
see Fontenrose (1978, Ch. VI, p. 166 ff.).  
65 For these aspects of the presentation of oracles in the community, see also Maurizio 
(1997, pp. 316-7 and p. 323). Herodotus, however, tells us that Croesus read the 
response of the Pythia to his inquiry (ἐπώρα τὦν συγγραμάτων), cf. 1.48.  
66 Cf. Hdt. Hist. 7.143, and for an analysis, see Garland (1984, p. 81), Flower (2008, p. 
58), Collins (2004, p. 383), and Maurizio (1997, p. 316 ff.).  




interpretations. It should be pointed out however that whilst it was possible 
to reject the individual performance of an oracle, it was impossible to dismiss 
the oracular pronouncement itself as wholly unreliable or false. Such 
behaviour would imply a distrust towards the widely accepted superior 
status of the divine and, consequently, the religious structure of society would 
collapse.    
Herodotus tells a story which apparently accounts for a critical attitude 
towards the truthfulness of oracular pronouncements. He says that Croesus 
desired to test the reliability of oracular wisdom in the following manner: he 
sent out on a mission his representatives to inquire various oracles what 
Croesus was doing on the 100th day from their departure from Sardeis. 
According to Herodotus, only the Pythia made the correct prediction and 
gave the right answer.67 It should be pointed out however that Herodotus’ 
story does not imply an altogether critical spirit towards the institution of 
oracles. It is used in order to reinforce the authoritative prestige of the Pythia 
and certainly not in order to dismiss it.   
It has been a commonly held view in modern scholarship that oracular 
pronouncements went hand in hand with ambiguity. The expression of the 
nature of oracular authority has been understood the deliberate tricking of the 
inquirers into error.68 However, the examinations of historical oracular 
responses by Fontenrose and, more recently, by H. Bowden, have 
convincingly shown that this standard way of receiving oracular authority 
                                                 
67 Cf. Hdt. Hist. 1.47. To this we may add Iocasta’s doubt of the reliability of oracular 
predictions (Aesch. OT 707-25), which of course has a specific function in terms of the 
didactic goals of tragedy and should not be taken to imply the audience’s shared 
opinion of oracular authority. For the representation of Delphic authority in Attic 
tragedy, see Bowden (2005, pp. 46-55, and Appendix 1, for a list of oracular questions 
which receive an answer in Greek tragedy).  
68 In fact, deliberate ambiguity was fairly common in future predictions, cf. e.g. Hrd. 
Hist. 1.53, on whether should Croesus march against Persia.  




does not in fact correspond to the authentic authoritative tone of the oracles.69 
These examinations of historical oracular responses show that their 
understanding by the recipient did not require a special kind of cleverness or 
insight, since the majority of these responses indicates that they frequently 
took the form of simple commands or generally truthful statements.70 It 
therefore becomes apparent that the oracles did not intentionally mislead 
those who sought their wisdom. The traditional stories presented in Greek 
historiography and in Greek tragedy magnify the perilous consequences of 
human folly, when it falls short of grasping the obvious and disregards the 
authoritativeness of divine knowledge. They are therefore meant to affirm the 
authoritative status of the oracles.  
Maurizio interpreted the apparent obscurity of oracular responses 
from a different angle. She has suggested that this attribute of oracular style 
should be viewed connection with the fact that the oracular responses, which 
literature records, correspond to an earlier oral tradition of oracles. The 
content of this oral tradition, moreover, was formulated by a community of 
believers, who were naturally inclined to lay stress on the unquestionably 
superior status of oracular knowledge and wisdom.71 Maurizio maintains that 
it possible to trace one further plausible reason for this common 
misunderstanding of oracular style. She holds that the oral circulation of 
oracles implies the involvement of male agents in the verbal formulation of 
                                                 
69 Fontenrose points out that there are no actual historical responses of this type but 
only three legendary responses (1978, p. 13: type A). Bowden adds further that the 
rate with which ambiguous oracular predictions occur is 3/21 (2005, p. 49 ff.). 
Bowden rightly observes that the traditional stories about the oracles, which 
apparently register intentional ambiguity as the key-feature of the oracular sayings, 
are not so much concerned with the historical method applied at the oracular shrines 
but with the behaviour of the inquirer.  
70 Cf. Fontenrose (1978, pp. 22-4). See also Price (1985, p. 148), according to whom the 
oracles demanded intelligence but this does not necessarily imply that they were 
deliberately obscure in the first place.  
71 Cf. Maurizio (1997, p. 313).  




the prophetic message, which is hard to estimate, since we are not in the 
position to tell to which extent these male agents, who were responsible for 
translating the oracular revelation into an intelligent response, altered the 
actual oracle given by the prophetess herself. Maurizio then goes on to argue 
that the female voice was always a voice of deception in antiquity.72 This is an 
attractive interpretation, mainly because there is a conspicuous and persistent 
link between ambivalent language and female language in the Greek male 
imagination.73 This suggestion is important because it offers some assistance 
in understanding the reasons why the female voice of the prophetess is 
represented in Greek literature as intentionally deceiving the male clients, and 
it thus reveals a possible cause for the tradition about oracular ambiguity.  
Maurizio viewed elsewhere the rise of the oracular shrines to 
prominence in connection with the contemporaneous political atmosphere of 
archaic Greece, and in particular with archaic colonization. In her view, the 
ambiguity manifested in oracular language was meant to reflect the instability 
of the times, during which it was formulated, and during the uncertainty 
resulting from the exploration of new lands was predominant. Maurizio 
interprets the latter as equivalent to the exploration of an unknown female 
voice, and claims that ambiguity was particularly favoured by the clients of 
oracles, since they desired to know the unknowable by replicating it in 
language. She goes on to argue, however, that ambiguity was not just a 
representational strategy but also the foundation of oracular authority and the 
reason why it ruled supreme in the ancient world. According to her 
examination, oracular ambiguity can be understood to intentionally weaken 
the authority of Homer and Hesiod, since it requires a different handling of 
                                                 
72 Cf. Maurizio (2001, pp. 39-40). See also Nagy (1990).  
73 See also, Detienne (1996, p. 79). According to Hesiod, for example, all troubles of 
mankind spring from the woman, whom Zeus gave as a present to men in order to 
repay them for his deception by Prometheus. Cf. Op. 560-612. 




human language thus freeing the recipients from tradition and the types of 
authority normally associated with it, whilst employing the same verbal 
medium and a relatively similar style.74 
It therefore becomes apparent that oracular expression drew from 
available modes of expressing divine information which were already 
explored and exploited by epic poetry. The correlation of these two types of 
expression is manifested, for instance, in that the oracles incorporated some of 
the techniques of oral poetry, such as, most conspicuously, the hexameter.75  
The suggestion, however, that the verbal features of oracular language 
imply the self-conscious intention of distinguishing oracular authority from 
that claimed by epic poetry in order to become established as an alternative 
source of wisdom, seems somewhat farfetched. The oracles could be hardly 
credited with such an authoritative concern and the antagonistic spirit alone 
cannot be expected to account for every phenomenon in the ancient world. It 
does help us view, however, the authoritative implications of the use of epic 
verse in oracles in new light. It seems that the oral nature of standard archaic 
communication favoured the employment of the epic hexameter, and 
encourages its acceptance as a competent, but also suitable, medium for 
voicing an authoritative message. The archaic belief in the authoritative 
efficacy of epic phrasing is vital for the interpretation of the use of the same 
medium for the expression of ideas, which do not exactly conform to the 
essential features of epic authority.  
The case of oracular style thus suggests that the use of the medium of 
verse did not by default imply an epic poetic authority claim and that it could 
be used in order to respond to the demands of the oral circulation of views 
                                                 
74 Cf. Maurizio (2001), pp. 41-5.  
75 For the poetic form of oracles, see Nagy (1990, p. 61). According to his examination, 
the προφῆται of an oracle were the re-composers of the inspired message in poetic 
form, and were thus involved in the poetic formalisation of prophecy. Cf. also, 
Fontenrose (1978, Ch. VI). 




and ideas, which was characteristic of the archaic age. It does prove, that is to 
say, that epic phrasing could be employed in alternative and dissimilar 
authoritative contexts in order to nonetheless correspond to a different 
authoritative representation than that of the epos. It could appear 
independently from the type of authority asserted, albeit it always hinted at a 
superior and not immediately graspable kind of knowledge.  
At the same time it implied to the audience, because of the traditional 
associations which it carried, that the message thereby communicated was of 
a particular significance, and that it was expected to affect them in a beneficial 
manner. Oracular responses were thus understood to indicate the right course 
of action, whereas epic poetry was understood to instruct through pleasure 
and to perpetuate the patriarchic mores. It therefore becomes apparent that in 
our attempt to examine the nature of the available modes of archaic authority, 
it is crucial to distinguish that particular element of the authoritative message, 
which is believed to contribute to the audience’s well-being, and which is for 
this reason considered by the practitioners of this type of authority central to 
the function, and therefore nature, of their social authority.  
In addition, an overview of the surviving oracular responses clearly 
shows that the oracles do not generally appear to argue in defence of their 
authoritative status and that they simply provide some rather dismissive 
directives for human action. The widely acknowledged validity of the 
oracular logos was sanctioned by the belief that the truth which the oracle 
revealed was the product of a direct communication with the divine. For this 
reason oracular shrines (though not independent individuals such as seers) 
were in no immediate need of an extensive justification and verification for 
the authoritativeness of their message or of an explicitly stated differentiation. 




Disbelief towards their authority was tantamount to questioning the divine 
order itself and, consequently, suggestive of impiety.76  
The un-argued for authoritativeness of the oracles conspicuously 
manifests itself in the ancient stories which deal with the apparent 
problematic cases in which an oracular prophecy turns out to be false. 
According to such stories, the responsibility for an untrue prediction is 
attributed to human foolishness and never to the oracle itself, the 
authoritative status of which remained intact even if it was proven to be 
wrong. Oracular centres thus retained their authoritative prestige as reliable 
sources of superior knowledge and insight into human affairs. Greek society 
found this cunning way of confirming the authoritative trustworthiness of 
oracles against the possibility of error.  If the authority of an oracle was 
doubted, this would provoke a feeling of distrust towards the gods, which 
could not withstand in a society as devoted to its gods as that of ancient 
Greece.  
In light of this, the gods of the Greeks were believed to always speak 
the truth and to be thus excused them from the possibility of error. In this 
way faith in the system remained intact despite its occasional imprecision or 
incorrectness. After all, Apollo was said to have a νημερτέα βουλή.77 In 
addition, G. Nagy observed that Apollo (Ἀπέλλω in Doric and Ἀπείλον in 
Cypriot) derives from the Homeric verb ἀπειλέω (as in the Spartian Ἀπέλλα), 
which means “to hold out authoritatively in the way of either promise or 
threat”.78 It is also worthy of note that the prestigious status, which oracular 
revelations had for the Greeks corresponds to the commonly held belief that 
divine wisdom can be potentially communicated to mortals, albeit not in 
                                                 
76 See also Flower (2008), p. 18. Oracular pronouncements were not beyond doubt 
because their “ambiguity” was pregnant with meaning, as Maurizio, for example, 
holds (2001, p. 45). 
77 Cf. Hymn. Hom., In Apoll. 292.  
78 Cf. Nagy (1990, p. 59).  




familiar or wholly human terms. Our literary sources, although relatively 
remote from historical actuality, occasionally imply the traditional view that 
the gods are apt to disclose their high-status knowledge to mortals. However, 
they were not believed to do not in a fully comprehensible fashion, but they 
were expected to communicate a significant part of their knowledge. It was 
left in the responsibility of the inquirer to reconstruct the compete picture 
which the oracle indicated in an indirect manner. The authoritative reliability 
of the knowledge or information it divulged was never questioned and the 
clients always sought for the best interpretation of the prophetic message. The 
oracles retained their social influence and prominent status through antiquity 
and their advice was always taken into consideration.  
 
b) The seers 
 
 The modern mind is naturally inclined to regard the art of divination 
as a primitive and irrational habit but Flower has convincingly argued that 
this view is wrong and quite far from the archaic reality. Throughout his 
examination Flower rightly argues that it is impossible to impose a distinction 
between different and wholly different kinds of divination based on the 
inspirational and non-inspirational categorisation, since it is highly unlikely 
that such a rigid classification existed in the ancient world. He reasonably 
points out that the theoretical underpinnings of manticism can be very 
sophisticated and observes that it is an authoritative activity which is actually 
an attempt to extent the range of the rational by encompassing what is 
graspable, though not immediately perceptible, in human terms.79 
                                                 
79 In light of this observation, Flower also dismisses as unreliable the proposed 
categorisation of divination into inspirational and non-inspirational on grounds that 
divination in fact included a far wider range of techniques than the one which this 
division acknowledges (cf. 2008, p. 13, and pp. 85-7). Contra his view, see Nagy 




It seems that the reception of mantic as manic originates in Plato, who 
attacked the poets and the prophets on grounds of the “irrational” value and 
function of their authority.80 In terms of the etymology which Plato adduces in 
the Timaeus, his view is not completely wrong, since, as Flower maintains, the 
word μάντις derives from the root μαν-, which is identical to μα-, as in the 
unattested present of  *μάω, which stands for “to desire passionately”.81 At 
any event, Plato attempted to distinguish different types of authority, 
according to different grades of rationality. At the same time however, it is 
plain to see that in this way Plato aimed partly in substantiating the basis of 
his personal authoritative enterprise and superiority. His testimony therefore 
is unable to support an actual account of the essential features of mantic 
authority, since it reconstructs the authoritative identity and outlook of the 
seers in such a way that Plato’s authoritative advantages become too obvious 
to be objected to by the audience.  
In addition, Plato has misinterpreted, perhaps deliberately, one 
important characteristic of the seer’s activity. It seems prima facie permissible 
to accept that the seer was a person who prophesised in a state of altered 
consciousness, insofar as the knowledge he communicated and, more 
specifically, the method he employed in perceiving this knowledge was not 
ordinary or reachable by the application of normal human intelligence. In 
                                                                                                                                            
(1990, p. 64), for whom the Pythia is a μάντις ἔνθεος. It is worthy of note, however, 
that Nagy’s analysis does not discern the authoritative status of the μάντις from that 
of the προφήτης. Although statements which the Pythia made were a form of 
manticism, that is to say, she was commonly referred to nonetheless as προφῆτις and 
not as μάντις, who was a different kind of diviner (Cf. Eur. Ion, 42, 321, and 1322-3; 
Pl. Phdr. 244a; Plutarch, De defect. oracul. 414B6; Iambl. Myst. 3.11.50; and Michael. 
Psel. Theolog. 19.76. It cannot be safely argued therefore that the προφήτης 
“communicated the message of a μάντις”, as Nagy has it.  
80 Cf. Phdr. 433c; and Tim. 71e-72b. For μαντική as μανία θεὦν, see Phdr. 244a ff., and 
Suda’s definition of ἐνθουσιασμός as ὅταν ἡ ψυχὴ ὅλη ἐλλάμπηται ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου.  
81 Cf. Tim. ibid., and Flower (2008, p. 23). Flower goes on to add that the word μάντις 
is of Indo-European origin and it denotes “one who is in a special mental state” 
without however necessarily implying that this state is an irrational one.  




other words, the authoritative skill of the seer was considered by the 
community as the best example of human capacity in perceiving and 
understanding out-of-reach phenomena. The information provided by the 
seers was intellectually demanding, since it was founded upon the 
interpretation of a particular sign or omen thus aiming in deducting a plausible 
directive for human action from the visually obvious.82  
It is hard to miss the fact that the nature of the divine information (i.e. 
the omens) acquired by the seer is different from that delivered by the gods in 
oracular prophesising. It is unwise, however, to make a distinction based on 
the amount of rationality involved in these two alternative processes of 
divination. The shrine of Dionysus in the most prominent site of oracular 
authority, namely in Delphi, suggests that both types of mental attitude (i.e. 
the Dionysian “irrational” and the Apollian “rational”) coexisted side by side. 
It also suggests that the two were closely related in popular Greek 
consciousness, and that they were not received as two wholly dissimilar 
mentalities.83  The only authoritatively significant difference that can be traced 
between oracular and mantic knowledge pertains to the process followed in 
obtaining and expressing the divine message in either case.  
The seers, and not the priests, were considered the most authoritative 
experts on religious matters, the authority of whom combined personal skill 
(techne) with charismatic inspiration.84 Furthermore, the authoritative 
competence of individual seers could include varied forms and techniques of 
                                                 
82 For an analysis of this aspect of the knowledge which the seer presents to the 
community, see Flower (2008, p. 14).  
83 For a thorough examination of the exclusive way in which the Greek mind 
associated the rational with the irrational, see Nietzsche’s monograph The birth of 
tragedy (1956).  
84 This is manifested, for example, in that the election of a priest did not require the 
possession of a personal charisma, since it was merely a matter of official procedure. 
In general, in antiquity religious faith was not a question of being loyal to the control 
of the authority of the priesthood but a question of personal faith and worship.  




divination. The Odyssey, for instance, describes an example of possessed 
manticism, according to which Theoclymenus predicts with the assistance of 
his ecstatic visionary powers the forthcoming killing of the suitors.85 In some 
other cases, such as that of the quasi-mythical and controversial figure of 
Epimenides, the field of competence of manticism could even extend to 
different spheres of influence and of social efficiency by including healing and 
purification.86 It therefore becomes apparent that the art of divination had a 
wide range of skilful resources and of adroit techniques at its disposal, which 
it implemented accordingly, and that in the ancient world alternative types of 
divination mingled invariably without necessarily implying a deliberate or 
fully mapped out differentiation in terms of the kind of authority they 
claimed.87  
Ancient divination was an activity parallel to that of the oracular 
enterprise. It employed its own specific art and had a different social function 
and authoritative representation from that of oracles. Individual divination 
differs in many ways from the kind of religious authority practiced in the 
oracular shrines but it also bears some significantly striking similarities. It also 
occasionally resembles Presocratic authority in some respects, and for this 
reason it is necessary to pursue an examination of its central features, which 
                                                 
85 Cf. υ 350-7.  
86 See, for instance, the role attributed to Teiresias in Oedipus Tyrannus (285 ff.). 
Oedipus consults Teiresias in order to resolve the epidemic that has broken out in 
Thebes. The seers were credited with such ability, because for the Greeks crises of 
epidemics were caused either by impiety or by moral defilement (μίασμα).  
87 Cf. Garland (1984, p. 114), who observes that the techne of the seer was quite 
extensive and it ranged from haruspicy to augury, from celestial phenomena to 
sneezes. See also Collins (2004, p. 383), who adduces the seer’s skill in ornithomancy 
and oneiromancy. For an examination of some of the techniques applied by the seers, 
see Pierris (2006, Ch. 3 (pp. 68-149). The same was true also of oracular authority. 
Flower has drawn attention to the fact that ecstatic divination was not the only way 
in which the Pythia prophesised. She also made use of other inductive methods (e.g. 
ornithomancy or cleromancy) and it is in this respect these two types of divination 
overlap (2008, p. 86).  




essentially distinguish the authoritative status of the seers from that of 
oracles, thus determining the core of mantic authority, which formed a 
substantial constituent of the background of archaic authoritative claims. It 
will thus help us view in new light the actual particularity of some otherwise 
apparently problematic Presocratic statements of authority, and to interpret 
them in relation with their appropriate archaic context of traditional 
authoritative declarations.  
To begin with, both the inspired prophet of the oracle and the learned 
diviner accomplished the same social role as authoritative intermediaries in 
the communication of divine knowledge.88 This in turn implies that the 
members of their community recognised and accepted these authoritative 
individuals as qualified mediums in performing this demanding and yet 
necessary task. They were religious types of authority, the validity and 
reliability of which was endorsed by an implicit and coherent system of 
traditional religious beliefs, such as the communicability of divine knowledge 
to mortals, the intervention of gods in human affairs, the superiority and 
truthfulness of divine knowledge, and so forth, all of which were common 
and beyond doubt beliefs for the archaic Greek consciousness.89  This 
underlying socio-religious structure accounts for the fact that the 
authoritative status of divination was so well-rooted in Greek society that it 
was in no need of establishing its authoritative significance by employing a 
reasonable argumentation, and that it did not need to explicitly differentiate 
the particularity of its knowledge and craft from that proffered by other 
specialists. 
It is also worthy of note that the art of manticism provided the 
community with an answer to questions and problems, which were of a 
similar content to those asked at the oracular centres, the most common of 
                                                 
88 See also Flower (2008, p. 86).  
89 See, for instance, Xen. Mem. 1.4.2-9.  




which was the “what should I do” type.90 According to Xenophon, for 
instance, the art of divination reveals what one ought to do and what not.91 It 
then becomes apparent that the authoritative knowledge of the seer offered 
no explanation, or a set of explanations, which were intergraded into a single 
general scheme, but simply a guidance for action, and that as such it 
sanctioned the intention of the client. It simply provided the community, that 
is to say, with important information to be taken into account prior to making 
the final decision about a specific problem or crisis. Its authoritative purpose 
was thus to offer an orientation for what should be done always according to 
the general purpose of pleasing the gods. In effect, the knowledge of the seer 
facilitated decision-making, since it was not pursued for the sake of personal 
curiosity but for the sake of being correctly directed.92   
It is also worthy of note that the knowledge disclosed by the seer did 
not, as in the case of oracular revelations, pertain exclusively to the future, 
since it could also provide insight into past affairs either by locating the root 
of a present misfortune or by illuminating questions of origin.93 The 
underlying assumption is that the past was believed to be the cause of the 
present in the same way in which the future is formulated through present 
action. However, this system of interaction which divination assumes is never 
used to account for the world as a totality, but it furnishes a limited 
                                                 
90 As Flower points out in his analysis (2008, pp. 100-2) the most common set of 
questions asked to the seers was the “is it better to do x”, the expected answer to 
which was either “yes” or “no”. The client could never ask, however, “is it better to 
do x or y”, a question which would very likely fail to receive an answer. See also 
Vernant (1991, p. 310 and Ch. 18), on oracles and types of divination.  
91 Cf.  Mem. 1.4.15, and Symp. 4.47.  
92 For the function of the art of divination in society as a guide to action, see Flower 
(2008, pp. 74-5).  
93 See, for instance, the crucial role with Teiresias’ knowledge of the past plays in 
resolving the epidemic in Thebes in Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus, but also Oedipus’s 
inquiry to the oracle about his real parents. See also Flower (2008, pp. 76-8), 
according to whom the distinction between future and present was not as clear in 
this type of knowledge.  




explanation of specific events. A particular action, that is to say, influences the 
present or the future in a specific respect. It therefore becomes apparent that 
in the case of the knowledge of the seer past, present, and future were 
inextricably linked, since the one was expected to affect the other. The 
knowledge thus which divination reveals (as in every case of knowledge, 
which the gods bestow) transcends the boundaries of time.  
As in the case of the oracles, the authoritative knowledge of the seer 
was sought either by an individual client or by a polis. Individual manticism 
and oracular manticism addressed society on the whole, like epic poetry. 
They were two alternative and common customs of the same type of religious 
authority, the audience of which was not limited by any specific restrictions 
or conditions, unlike the participants in mystical cults. They were thus 
equally authoritative both for the uneducated folk as well as for the elite, 
since their higher knowledge did not address a specific social class.  
The art of seercraft was practised by individuals, who wandered, like 
the rhapsodes, in the ancient world in order to display their authority and to 
thereby establish their right in claiming an authoritative status. In order to 
accomplish this it was crucial that they were able to advertise themselves to 
their audience as competent intermediaries to divine will and knowledge. 
They did so in order to obtain clients and to create a personal reputation, 
which would reinforce their credibility and prestige, but it would also assist 
them in making their living. They thus formed an authoritative class of 
specialised and itinerant professionals, insofar as they were the self-conscious 
performers of a long tradition of manticism, which fulfilled a specific function 
in society, and which corresponded to a specific group of needs.94 The seers 
were received as specialised professionals because they made their living 
from a high-status occupation, since they could be richly rewarded by their 
                                                 
94 For manticism as a professionalized activity, see Flower (2008, pp. 94-6; and pp. 
146-7).  




client for having prophesised correctly.95 The mention of the seers in the 
δημιοεργοί list, moreover, further reinforces this impression.96 It is in this 
respect they apparently share some common ground with the epic bards and 
rhapsodes, who were attached to a particular oikos in order to make their 
living.97 On the other hand, lyric poetry was a money-free aristocratic activity. 
It can be generally said that intellectual authoritative activities were not 
commonly received in the ancient world in the standard modern sense of a 
profession. It is in late 5th that the more “technical” disciplines, such as 
medicine and sophistic oratory, brought into play the question of money. 
As far as the differences between these two types of divination are 
concerned, it seems generally safe to accept that the art of the seer was based 
upon a non-ecstatic process, unlike the possession of the Pythia by Apollo.98 
In the case of individual divination, however, the personality of the 
individual did not merge with the divine nor was it completely controlled by 
it.99 The seer projected himself to his clients as the competent intermediary in 
the communication of divine knowledge, but he was not believed nonetheless 
to be immediately contacted by a god. The seer claimed to have the innate gift 
of prophecy in the same way in which the Homeric bards claimed that the 
                                                 
95 Cf. Xenoph. Anab. 1.7.18-20, but also M 233, according to which line the seer 
prophesises ἀπὸ σπουδῆς, which suggests a professional, but also specialised, 
occupation.  
96 Cf. ρ 383-5.  
97 Cf. θ 477. In this way they gained, however, the essentials, not money. See also 
Telemachus’ comment that Phemius sings for the suitors ἀνἀγκηι, i.e. not so much 
because he really enjoys doing so, but because he can in this way afford the essentials 
in life (α 154).  
98 See, e.g., the way in which the Sibyl struggles to break free from Apollo in the 
Aeneid (6.80 ff., esp. fera corda domans, fingitque pre mendo), but also the description of 
Cassandra as θεοφόρητος in Aesch. Ag. 1140 (cf. also 1084, 1202).  
99 The shaman, however, as Dodds points out in his analysis was able to pass to a 
state of “mental disassociation” at will (1951, p. 140).  




product to their poetic creativity was the practice of a divinely inspired 
skill.100  
However, the gift of prophecy was a permanent skill which could be 
successfully applied on every occasion, and the god of prophecy was not 
expected to be actively involved each time in the process of prophesising.101 
The seer thus was not, strictly speaking, a messenger (προφήτης), who 
obtained his message through a direct contact with the divine, but the 
interpreter of the manifestations of divine will. In addition, the seer was 
responsible for the interpretation of visual phenomena, unlike the verbal 
interpretation required in oracular consultation.102 This also implied that he 
was thought to have in his possession a particular techne, which he 
implemented accordingly and regardless of whatever situation. Oracular 
pronouncements on the other hand did not derive from the employment of a 
systematised skill, since the authoritative efficacy of the natural charisma of 
being directly contacted by a god came to the oracular medium intuitively 
and spontaneously.  It is also worthy of note that oracular divination involved 
a repeated experience, which was nonetheless able to provide a wide range of 
answers.  
                                                 
100 Calchas was thus said to have received his ability to prophesise from Apollo (cf. A 
72), while Plato, of course, tells us that manticism is a form of μανία which derives 
θείᾳ δόσει (Phdr. 244a).  
101 For that the seer was commonly believed to practice a certain techne, see Soph. OT, 
311 (μαντικῆς ὁδόν), and 389. It seems that the employment of a specialised 
technique was considered in Greek society central for the establishing oneself as an 
authoritative figure. When Solon describes the mastery of the blacksmith, for 
instance, he refers to Athena and Hephaestus, who symbolise in poetic language 
wisdom as well as the possession of a technical skill (Cf. fr. 13. 49-50).  
102 Peek maintains that it made little difference, whether the diviner was possessed by 
the god or not, but Flower has reasonably objected that from the seer’s point of view 
this was certainly an important element of authoritative differentiation. According to 
Flower, furthermore, this was not important, however, for the client, since all he was 
interested in was to obtain a reliable answer to his inquiry. Cf. Peek (1991, p. 12), and 
Flower (2008, p. 87).  




In addition, the skill of the seer was not practiced at a particular shrine 
or at a similarly institutionalised authorised setting, since wandering was one 
of its essential features.103 It is also telling for the authoritative perspective of 
the seer that he wandered in order to advertise his knowledge and not in 
order to acquire it, as in the case of ἱστορίη for instance.104 Furthermore, the 
seer was a man of his own enterprise, for whom there was no system or a 
specific context which endorsed his privileged status as an expert on religious 
matters. Consequently, he was all the more dependent upon gaining his 
personal reputation, and for this reason he was particularly antagonistic 
against other competent religious mediators, whereas the oracles were not.  
G. Nagy has pointed out that the seer controlled entirely the verbal 
form of his prophecy as well as the successful delivery of his message.105 In 
the case of oracular manticism on the other hand unintelligible cries of the 
Pythia were “translated” into comprehensible language by the specialised 
group of the προφῆται. However, the προφῆτες were involved only in the 
verbal formalisation of the oracle and they did not actively participate in the 
process, during which divine knowledge was revealed by the god.106 This in 
turn suggests that the standard procedure, which was followed in oracular 
prophesising, required a hierarchy, on top of which was the Pythia who was 
mainly in charge of the process. This is also suggested from that she is 
                                                 
103 For the seer as an itinerant specialist, see Flower (2008, p. 31), Garland (1984, p. 
113), and Oliver (1950, p. 9).  
104 For an interesting examination of types of wandering in antiquity in relation with 
the types of authority associated with them, see Montiglio (2005, esp. pp. 100-1). In 
her analysis she proposes a distinction of those authorities who wandered in order to 
acquire knowledge (e.g. Hecataeus, Herodotus, and Democritus) from those who 
wandered in order to display their expertise (e.g. Xenophanes, Empedocles, and the 
Sophists).  
105 Cf. Nagy (1990, pp. 59-64).  
106 For the limited role of the prophets in the ordering and writing down of the 
oracular response, see Price (1985, p. 142).  




occasionally referred to as πρόμαντις.107 It should be noted however that this 
should not be taken to imply that the Greeks consciously differentiated the 
Pythia from the προφῆται, since they practically functioned as one. At any 
event, our literary sources make no such distinction. Yet it is always the 
Pythia the one who was believed to “speak” and not the προφῆται, who 
undertook the responsibility of assisting the client in understanding her 
revelation.108  
Nagy maintained that the techne of the seer included a skilful handling 
of language, in the same way in which the epic poets exploited traditional 
formulae in order to phrase their divine message. However, this suggestion 
should be treated with caution, since it is not exactly beyond doubt that the 
Greeks clearly discerned skilful utterance as a distinct and self-determined 
kind of art. This was accomplished with the Sophists and the rise of rhetoric, 
in which case the human logos was firstly confronted as a distinct 
phenomenon, which implied a domain of specialised authority, and which 
could function as the basis of personal expertise, and which could be publicly 
displayed. In fact, it appears that it was a standard conviction in archaic 
Greece that any form of logos, insofar as we are eager to identify this with the 
oral presentation of an authoritative view, necessarily required the 
application of a verbal skill or it was otherwise rendered as unsuitable for 
communication or it would be otherwise eventually forgotten, which was 
certainly an undesired outcome of authoritative presentation.109 In other 
words, every case of logos which laid claim to an authoritative status was 
required to display some amount of skilfulness in its phrasing, because the 
                                                 
107 Cf. e.g., Hdt. Hist. 6.66 and 2.55, 7.11, 7.141; Paus. Graec. descr. 3.4.3.6 and 10.5.5.6, 
but also Thuc. Hist. 5.16.2 (Δωδωναίων αἱ προμάντιες).  
108 Cf. Nagy, ibid.  
109 For the view that the circulation of a message depends on its popular reception, 
see Thomas (1994, p. 51). 




needs and purposes of oral communication were in this way served more 
effectively and, consequently, more competently.   
For this reason it is preferable to avoid incorporating this feature of the 
mantic logos, despite its importance, into the very core and essence of mantic 
authority. The seer established his credibility and authoritativeness in the 
social group by projecting himself as the competent mediator between gods 
and humans, and certainly not by advertising his proficiency in verbally 
formulating his mantic messages. In addition, the seers are not normally 
represented in literature as individuals with such stylistic concerns, and their 
speech is never credited with a performative function, unlike the practical 
efficacy of the spoken word in the case of the μάγοι or the shamans.110  
At any event, the general spirit of Nagy’s suggestion is safe, since it 
seems safe to accept that the individual seer gathered under his control the 
disclosure and interpretation of divine will and manifestations as well as the 
publication of a divine message to the community or to the individual it 
concerned. Ancient seercraft therefore presents us with an example of 
individual authority and with a question of personal expertise. In the case of 
oracles, on the other hand, the ultimate voice of authority always belonged to 
the god and partly to his authorised clairvoyant. The seer was thus an 
independent and self-sustainable source of knowledge, whereas the oracles 
were established and institutionalised sources of knowledge. In other words, 
whilst it was impossible to doubt the authorisation of the Pythia, it was very 
likely to doubt the authorisation or skill in delivering divine messages of an 
individual seer.  His authority could thus be received with scepticism, which 
the diviner in any case had to withstand.111 For this reason, the authoritative 
                                                 
110 See Chadwick (1942, p. 57), for whom the prophet is dependent on the immediate 
effect of his spoken word.  
111 This is manifested, for example, in the mythical example of Cassandra, who claims 
to be able to predict the future, but is nonetheless never believed (cf. Aesch. Ag. 
1239). She declares that future events will prove the truthfulness of her predictions 




activity of the seers was frequently characterised by a competitive spirit, the 
adoption of which aimed in displaying, and thereby justifying, their 
expertise.112  
If the predictions of a seer were revealed by the facts as wrong, this 
meant for society that this individual diviner did not practice his art well and 
it was not taken to vouch for the  failure of the art of manticism altogether. 
After all, as noted already, it was a standard belief that the gods always spoke 
the truth whereas their human audience could be easily fooled into error. The 
responsibility thus of error was never attributed to the gods but to the 
individual, either inquirer or medium. Furthermore, the human capacity for 
apprehension could never be wholly identified with the divine, although it 
could occasionally approximate it, since divine knowledge was believed to be 
potentially graspable. It is essential to note at this point however one further 
detail: in the case of the seers false predictions were a matter of personal 
responsibility and, more specifically, an example of a deficient techne, and not 
so much the product of their client’s human folly as in the traditional stories 
about oracular wisdom.  
We can now discern some of the rudimentary features of the 
specialised type of authority claimed by individual diviners. It was a socially 
important activity, and it addressed matters of public or personal welfare.113  
                                                                                                                                            
(ibid., 1240-1). A similar statement is made by Teiresias in Soph. OT. 341 (ἥξει γὰρ 
αὐτά, κἀν ἐγὼ σιγῆι στέγω).  
112 Flower points out that in order to achieve this they could use the language of epic 
as part of their self-projection (2008, p. 97). As noted already, the oracles also 
exploited the authoritative implications of epic language with the same intention. For 
the competitive spirit of the seers, see also ibid., p. 13, and pp. 107-8.   
113 The author of the Sacred Disease attacks in the opening previous explanations 
provided by the μάγοι, the καθάρται, and the ἀγύρται, whom he describes in terms 
which apparently imply the authority of the seer (Chs. 1-4). His mention of the seers 
suggests that they were considered, at least in late 5th century, charismatic but 
nonetheless marginal figures. In the Odyssey, however, they are certainly dealt with 
more respect (ρ 383-5). See also Flower (208, p. 65 ff.), according to whom the most 




The authority of the seer also required the possession of an individual skill, 
since the social function of the seer could only be accomplished with the 
appropriate implementation of his specialised craft.114 The acquisition of 
authoritative knowledge was thus understood by the seers as the product of a 
specialised and technical skill, which was mainly identified with the 
interpretation of visually observable signs. As Flower maintains, it was within 
the seer’s domain of authoritative responsibility to choose the correct 
interpretation of an omen as well as to be alert (i.e. mentally proficient) in 
discerning the mantic sign from other non-mantic signs.115 This in turn implies 
that his craft called for a combination of personal charisma with a personal 
capacity of intelligence in assessing observable experience.  
Furthermore, it seems generally safe to accept that seercraft implied the 
practice of an essentially religious type of authority, insofar as it brought the 
human and the mundane in contact with the divine. It is also worthy of 
attention that the authority of the oracles and of the seers, although 
significant, was not nonetheless unlimited. Divination, that is to say, provided 
society with a form of advanced knowledge but it could only be perceived 
and communicated upon specific and exclusive occasions. It was restricted, 
moreover, to a standard set of questions and problems, and the oracle or the 
seer could not offer a prophecy unless firstly upon request. A polis consulted 
the oracle or the seer, that is, about specific matters and about a particular 
problem that had to be resolved. In a similar fashion, the seers undertook 
special assignments but were dismissed as soon as this assignment was over. 
This in turn implies that the authoritative pronouncements of the seers and of 
the oracles were confined to the particular needs of their clients. In effect, 
                                                                                                                                            
serious offence for a seer was to call him a μάγος, which denoted a relatively obscure 
and suspicious activity.  
114 Although heredity also played an important role in establishing oneself as an 
authoritative seer. Cf. Flower (2008, p. 37), and for an example see Eur. Hel. 15.  
115 Cf. Flower (2008, pp. 72-3).  




neither the content of mantic knowledge nor the occasion of its authoritative 
display were free of the restrictions imposed by an existing tradition. Their 
expertise, furthermore, provided the community with a guide to action but 
they never interfered with the execution of their advice. They thus had little 
political influence, despite their social prestige, since the final decision was 
left entirely to the responsibility of the city or the client.  
All the same, the seers were itinerant specialists who were not attached 
to a particular individual, oikos, or city-state. They were at the service of the 
community but they were free from its control, insofar as the interpretation, 
which they offered, could be doubted by the polis. In their case, moreover, it 
was easy for society to identify them as members of a distinct authoritative 
group, mainly because the content of their knowledge and the authoritative 
implications of their expertise were of a very specific nature and of a distinct 
social function. Their authoritative status was of an individual type and, 
although they belonged to the same authoritative case, they could 
occasionally compete against one another, but not, it should be admitted, in a 
systematic or fully regular fashion. In fact, competition was essential for the 
establishment of their authority in the community, since the publication of 
their truth was not exactly beyond doubt and public criticism. It seems 
nonetheless that society was more reserved in granting authoritative status to 
individual seers. The reason for this perhaps was that they were individuals 
whose activity was not intergraded into an organised and formal 
authoritative structure, as in the case of oracular manticism, and they were 
thus exposed to public disbelief and objection. In their case, that is to say, 
social recognition had to be gained through multiple and unfailing 
performances of their craft.  
At any event, it can be generally said that seers and oracles shared a 
similar kind of religious knowledge and that they occasionally employed the 
same divinatory techniques. Yet the essential difference between these two 




authoritative cases is that the oracles were formal sources of divine wisdom, 
whereas the seers were informal sources of divine knowledge. The seers were, 
at least to some extent, marginal figures, who practiced their art single-
handedly.  
It is also essential to draw attention to the fact that the seers did not 
openly contrast their authority to that of the oracular centres. Although the 
authority claimed by the seers and that of oracles converge and at the same 
time differ in several crucial respects, that is to say, their authoritative 
dissimilarities are never brought into a clear focus. This is important because 
it shows that it was possible in the archaic world to belong at a similar 
authoritative class without necessarily expressing concerns about consciously 
differentiating oneself from a similarly specialised group. It also suggests that 
authoritative competition in archaic Greece did not so much require by 
default the adoption of an openly argumentative standpoint against other 
authorities or the explicit expression of self-awareness, since it seems that the 
presentation and display of authority alone was considered sufficient. This 
was not the case however in classical antiquity, during which authoritative 
competition became more specialised and, consequently, more demanding in 
terms of employing convincing evidence in support of an authoritative status.  
It is hard to miss the fact that the seer and the oral epic poet shared the 
same degree of authoritative responsibility for the message they made 
publicly available.116 However, the nature of their techne was differentiated in 
one crucial aspect: the seer was an interpreter of divine signs, while the epic 
poet was the messenger of divine information. The knowledge of the seer was 
based upon observable evidence, whereas that of poet was certainly not. At 
                                                 
116 Perhaps this similarity in terms of authoritative expression and presentation is 
implied by that the rhapsodes and the hierophanteis were dressed in the classical 
times in a similar way; they both wore purple robes and held a staff, which was 
generally used as a symbol for authority also held by the kyrex or the king. See also, 
Garland (1984, p. 102).  




any event, their authoritative projection is akin to the extent that they both 
claim the social prestige of a clairvoyant who has a divine and, consequently 
unordinary and transcendental, message at his disposal, and which he desires 
to deliver. What is particularly characteristic in both examples of archaic 
authority is that they represent cases of authoritative individuals. Both the 
seers and the poets spoke on behalf of a higher force and their accounts were 
authorised by a divine agent, with whom they claimed to be on good terms. 
For this reason, they commonly viewed the communication of their divine 
message as a personal mission, which could be accomplished only through 
divine supervision. Consequently, in these cases of archaic authority the 
ability of the individual to be contacted by the divine was a requisite but also, 
and more importantly, a vital condition.  
In addition, both types of authority were restricted in a similar way, 
insofar as the performance and display of their wisdom was conditioned by 
the client’s or the audience’s authorisation. The epic poet, that is, composed 
and performed his compositions under circumstances of total audience 
control. In a similar fashion, the seer was deprived of the right of initiative in 
offering his authoritative knowledge to the community. It then becomes 
apparent that divination and epic poetry were two authoritative activities 
which were subject to the limitations of a traditional conformity. They were to 
a considerable extent occasional, in the sense that they were presented to the 
public under specific and controlled circumstances.  
At any event, the seer and the epic poet were both regarded as 
specialists, since they were both understood as the practitioners of a 
specialised techne. At the same time, however, the content of their message 
and the essence of the knowledge which they communicate is not understood 
and pursued in exactly the same manner and by the applications of the same 
means. However, they displayed an authoritative pursuit of knowledge, 
which, whilst relevant to the divine, was nonetheless of a quite different 




nature.117 The knowledge of the seer, that is to say, was to be applied to a 
specific problem, whereas the knowledge presented by the epic poet was to 
be applied in everyday human life altogether, insofar as it provided the 
general framework for human morality.  
 This is not to say, however, that they were always conceived of as two 
wholly distinct authoritative cases in Greek society, for, interestingly enough, 
poetic authority was occasionally expressed in prophetic terms.118 It is 
impossible to offer here an extensive examination of the authoritative details 
implies by the poet-prophet correlation.119 However, it is essential to 
introduce this similarity in this discussion of Presocratic authority, because it 
reveals the flexibility with which claims to a superior status could occur prior 
to the development of a more specialised authoritative differentiation. It 
shows, that is to say, that in archaic Greece it was acceptable, indeed 
permissible, to borrow the language and codes of authoritative representation 
from individuals with different authoritative aims and concerns without 
necessarily indicating an exact identification in terms of the authoritative 
status claimed. 
The poet and the diviners both shared an inspired vision, since they 
both claimed to be able to perceive what the common lot can not. It therefore 
becomes apparent that for the archaic consciousness the transcendence of 
perceptible reality was commonly seen as a task that was normally 
accompanied by the intervention of a divine agent. At the same time however, 
it was also believed, quite paradoxically, to be a matter of human intelligence 
                                                 
117 Perhaps this similarity explains why for Plato the poets were the προφῆται or the 
ἑρμηνευταί of the Muses (cf. e.g. Phdr. 244d; Ion 534e).  
118 The most conspicuous examples of a poet explicitly relating himself with a 
prophet are Hesiod’s declaration that the Muses will grand him with the ability to 
foretell future events (Th. 32), and Pindar’s renowned line μαντεύεο, Μοῖσα, 
προφατεύσω δ’ ἐγώ (fr. 150).  
119 The topic was introduced to scholarly discussion by Cornford (1952, Chs. V and 
VI).  




and of personal skill, as implied in the authoritative case of the epic poet and 
as made more conspicuous in the authoritative case of the seer. More 
importantly, such an interpretation of the primary types of archaic authority 
is not only suggested by our general knowledge and understanding of the 
archaic mentality, but it is also regularly and explicitly demonstrated by the 
individuals themselves.  
2) Orality and the development of alternative mediums of expression 
 
In order to understand the particular nature of the circumstances 
under which Presocratic cosmologies were communicated and to interpret the 
way in which they acquired the peculiarity of their authoritative expression, it 
is important to examine firstly the way in which important information was 
publicised in their times. It is therefore vital to investigate the role which 
writing had in archaic communication. The archaeological evidence at our 
disposal attests to a surge of literacy in the 7th century B.C. It also indicates 
that writing was firstly used in order to commemorate, to mark property, or 
to write down verse.120 The most striking characteristic of the way in which 
writing was used in Greek culture was that it was public and that it was never 
confined to a particular specialised cast of scribes as in ancient Egypt or in the 
                                                 
120 The archaeological items which are frequently used as evidence for this dating are 
Nestor’s cup and the Dipylon vase, for which see Yunis (2003, p. 45); Nagy (2001, p. 
28 ff.), Strong (1966, p. 38), Russell & Lewis (1988), and Oliver (2008, p. 231). For an 
examination of the early diverse uses of writing see Thomas (1992, p. 48; but also pp. 
57-61), and Hershbell (1968, p. 191 ff.). Moreover, Harris has suggested that in late 8th 
literacy was already widespread in Greek society, as it becomes apparent from the 
custom of ostracism (1984, p. 47 and p. 55 respectively), which Thomas dates 
however, perhaps more plausibly, in mid 7th century (1992, p. 65). Havelock thus 
held that Greek society was characterised by “craft literacy”, since the first and 
habitual users of the alphabet were craftsmen and traders (1963, p. 34, and 1983, p. 
233). He has also maintained that writing was the invention of minstrels (1963, p. 50; 
followed by Robb (1994), p. 13). But Havelock’s suggestion goes beyond the interest 
of this analysis.  




Mesopotamia. The appearance of writing in public places (e.g. public 
inscriptions or graffiti) or on public or domestic items (e.g. statues and 
pottery) reinforces the impression that a considerable part of the community 
was able to read certainly by late 7th century B.C. Moreover, Rosalind Thomas 
has shown in her examination that the induction and circulation of writing 
was intrinsically linked with the emergence of the polis and especially with 
the development of law and offices, which generated the need for official and 
permanent records.121 The early uses of writing thus suggest that it was to 
some extent a technological product and also that it was a social product, 
insofar as it served specific needs of the polis.122  
There is a considerable amount of evidence which suggests that 
literacy was wide-spread in the early years of the 5th century, from which 
women were not excluded.123 It is wiser, however, to avoid interpreting the 
wide publicity of writing as an indication of that the larger part of the Greek 
                                                 
121 Cf. Thomas (1992, pp. 57-65). To this we may add Solon’s testimony that he wrote 
laws (ἔγραψα), which established a fair equality between the citizens (fr. 36W, 18-20). 
Solon’s testimony indicates that by late 7th writing could function as a record not only 
for property but also for laws. According to Lloyd, furthermore, this public use of 
writing did not take the form of written archives but of inscriptions, which in turn 
suggests that the official records were actually on public display and were not 
hidden away from the society in archival stacks (1987, p. 156; but also Ch. 7 on the 
use of writing for bureaucratic purposes). See also Rhodes and Lewis (1997), and 
Sickinger (1999). Aristotle mentions that writing helps the keeping of records either 
in household management or in other civic activities (Polit. 1338a15-7).  
122 Cf. Thomas (1992, pp. 106-7). Thomas also points out to the use of writing for 
display or propaganda, which is quite different from the use of writing for 
administrative purposes. She argues that the content of written discourse is decided 
by social and political factors. She thus stresses the influence of groups with a 
developed and powerful social identity (e.g. the aristocracy) in the transmission and 
production of individual compositions. Cf. also Thomas (1994, pp. 33-50).  
123 Such as an amphora from the temple of Deidamia Zeus in Olympia depicting 
Athena holding a writing tablet (τρίπτυχον) dated ca. 480 BC; the Berlin School cup 
with a master holding an open book-roll crafted by Douris (Staatliche Museen 2285, 
ca. 485 BC); and a lekythos from Thessaloniki representing Nice with a book. See also 
Turner (1977), who observes that representations of School scenes become more 
frequent from about 475 BC onwards.  




community could also confidently read and digest large blocks of written 
information. At any case, the first surviving examples of writing are usually 
names or lists, which are at best a couple of phrases long, do not allow for this 
view to be safely claimed.124 As far as the presentation of literary works to the 
public is concerned it seems that live performance remained the main vehicle 
for transmission throughout the archaic age. This in turn implies that the 
nature of the communication of ideas remained essentially oral. Yet at the 
same time it seems that authoritative individuals, starting with Hesiod, made 
some use of writing when composing their works.125 The induction of writing, 
moreover, to the process of composition had a considerable bearing upon the 
way in which authoritative expertise was defined and claimed.   
The modern philosopher P. Ricoeur and E. Bakker have recently 
observed that the logos of an inscription does not have the exact same function 
                                                 
124 As Lloyd has pointed out, in classical Athens those unable to read were not 
completely cut off from the cultural products of their time, since literary works were 
performed (1987, pp. 150-1; He points to Aristoph. Eq. 188-90, in which Kleon’s lower 
education is parodied and may perhaps reflect the average educational level of the 
late 5th century Athenian public). There is in fact convincing evidence in support of 
the view that performance did not cease to be central in Greek life till 4th century, 
which has been recently brought into focus by Thomas (see 1992, esp. p. 132 ff., for 
an examination of the relation between the written text and its performance). On the 
oral nature of Greek communication cf. also, Havelock (1963, p. 39); but also 
Hendrickson’s very early study (1929, esp. p. 128). Hendrickson rightly points out 
the centrality of orality throughout antiquity and in the Middle Ages, during which 
the written text was generally understood as the text which is heard, i.e. read out 
loud, including the habit of silent reading. In his view, this is manifested in that in 
Greek ἀκούειν is used synonymously to “reading”. In order for a written text to be 
understood, that is, it had to be read.  
125 For the view that the poems of Hesiod were the product of an oral process similar 
to that of Homeric poetry, cf. Peabody (1975, p. 7), who examines the nature of the 
techniques employed in oral composition and the way in which they were used in 
the composition of Hesiod’s Opera et dies. For a criticism of his suggestion see 
Havelock (1982, pp. 153-65). According to myth the inventor of writing was 
Prometheus (Cf. Aesch. PV 459-61; cf. also Plat. Protag. 320d-328d; and Polit. 274c-d; 
but also the parody by Aristophanes in Av. 685-736).  




with the logos of a more discursive presentation as in the case of accounts.126 
What their suggestion implies is that when writing was introduced in 
composition this advance involved  a creative use of language other than that 
of simply recording information, as in the early uses of the alphabet, 
according to which the letters were inscribed upon an item or a material in 
order to represent specific units of the human language. The important 
difference between these two uses of writing lies in the fact that in the first 
case writing conveys ideas, whereas in the second case it is used in order to 
mark property, or to identify a figure on pottery, or to express a short 
statement (e.g. inscriptions), or to draw awareness to publicly important 
information. The first case makes, that is to say, a somewhat more 
sophisticated use of writing. This non-technological use of writing, 
furthermore, marks a transition not only in the way in which writing is used 
but also in the way in which the individual composes and performs his work 
in public.  
The use of writing by individuals, who laid claims to an authoritative 
status, brought about two important elements: on the one hand it established 
the permanence of the logos (it thus formulated the notion of a preceding 
tradition), and on the other it produced a more reflective attitude towards 
existing logoi.127 The use of writing in composition meant that the account 
could not survive only through its performance, since there was a fixed 
version which could endure in time and circulate in different communities. In 
                                                 
126 Cf. Bakker (1997, p. 26), according to whom writing in composition is a “form of 
speaking” and not the mere transcription of the sounds used by the human voice. See 
also Ch. 1 (pp. 7-17), for an examination of the construction of orality. For Ricoeur’s 
view, see (1991, p. 44), who remarks that a “text is not really a text when it is 
restricted to transcribing an interior speech”.  
127 But as Kahn has observed, the relationship of writing with the birth of reasoned 
forms of logos and with the adoption of a more critical standpoint was not that of 
cause and effect. In his view writing facilitated their appearance but it did not cause 
it (2003, pp. 140-1).  




effect, new compositions did not have to serve the needs of a particular 
audience or of a particular society, since the popularity of a work was no 
longer exclusively attached to a favourable reception by a live audience.128 
The immediate dependence thus of the individual upon his public was 
thereby weakened, although, of course, he was not yet completely free from 
their favour or judgement.129 This was so mainly because in the archaic age 
literate and oral publication were two complimentary forms of 
communication, and literacy did not immediately replace orality.  
Writing also influenced individual consciousness in a different way. 
The question of committing certain events to memory no longer dominated 
man’s creative intellectual concerns, and, consequently, new ground was 
made available.130 To the permanence of the written word we may contrast the 
                                                 
128 For the permanent value of writing in connection with the way in which it affected 
the process of composition, see Thomas (1992, p. 62).  For the view that writing 
contributed to the formulation of a pre-existing tradition, since it tends to canonise 
knowledge, see Harris (1989, p. 62), who also makes the suggestion that Homer and 
Hesiod became socially important in later generations because they wrote or because 
their works were at some stage written down. In a somewhat similar spirit Murray 
claimed that the poetic motif of poetic inspiration should be interpreted as an 
implied description of that the poet consulted his “precious roll”, a view which has 
been received with much negativism in scholarly discussion (1960, p. 94). However, 
his suggestion cannot be credited with reliability not because it is absurd but because 
it defies the ἀκάματη αὐδή law of oral composition, according to which no pause is 
permitted in the poetic performance. For the single mention of writing in Homer, cf. 
E 168-70.  
129 Theognis’ statement, for example, that ἀστοῖσιν δ’ οὔπω πᾶσιν ἁδεῖν δύναμαι (El. 
1.24) marks the beginning of the movement towards this new stage. 
130 According to Lord writing provided a freer opportunity for new themes, since the 
composition was no longer confound by those particular themes which serve the 
special needs of oral composition (1960, pp. 124-38). For the view that the language 
of an oral tradition in general is by default thematically limited, see also Peabody 
(1975, pp. 113-4 and 217). From a more general scope of analysis, Goody gives in his 
examination prominent position to the change in the system of communication in 
terms of the way in which the authoritative content of a logos changes (1973, p. 5). 
Jordan, furthermore, maintained that literacy stimulates an interest in a different set 
of questions; an interest in lists, for example, suggests an interest in classification. It 
also implies an advance in the mental capacity of man (1960, p. 9). For an 
examination on the performance of lists and catalogues in epic poetry and the 




intrinsic fluctuation of the epic poet’s ἔπεα πτερόεντα, since the epic 
formulae function as variables of utterance. This in turn implies that before 
the epic poems were written down there was no standardised form of the Iliad 
or the Odyssey but numerous and alternative versions of the stories which 
they narrated.131 These versions followed the same general plan, but a 
particular episode in the story was not nonetheless presented according to a 
canonised prototype.132 The authoritative activity thus opened up in scope 
and in content but also in depth.  
                                                                                                                                            
cognitive skills which they require, but also on their difference from the Homeric 
narrative and their bearing on style, see Minchin (in Worthington (1996), pp. 4-20).  
131 As far as ancient tradition is concerned, Plato tells us that Hipparchus was 
responsible for the canonisation of the Homeric poems into books and for setting the 
rules for their performance in public festivals (Hipp. 228b-c). According to his 
testimony, Hipparchus “forced the rhapsodes at the Panathenaia to go through 
(διιέναι) these utterances in sequence (ἐφεξῆς) by relay (ἐξ ὑπολήψεως= ἐξ 
ὑποβολῆς) just as they do even nowadays”. Cicero on the other hand tells us that 
Peisistratus arranged the previously disordered books of the Homeric poems (De 
orat. 3.137). In terms of the way in which Homeric poems were delivered Diogenes 
Laertius informs us that τά τε Ὁμήρου ἐξ ὑποβολῆς ῥαψῳδεῖσθαι, οἷον ὅπου ὁ 
πρὦτος ἔληξεν, ἐκεῖθεν ἄρχεσθαι τὸν ἐχόμενον (I. 57). For an examination of the 
expressions ἐξ ὑποβολῆς and ἐξ ὑπολήψεως ῥαψῳδεῖν, see Davison (1959, pp. 216-
222). 
132 For an examination of writing in Homer, cf. Bakker (ibid., Ch. 2 (pp. 18-32)). 
Bakker rightly points out that the writing of the Homeric poems provided a 
normative model for re-enactment, which he understands as an attempt to establish a 
canon for multiple and sundry presentations. Cf. also Nagy (1996), Ch. 1 (pp. 7-38) 
on the poetics of variation in Homeric poetry, which he terms as mouvance, i.e. 
“composition-in-performance”. See also Parry (1971, p. 336), who was the first to 
point to the instability of early epic performance, which results from the oral status 
of this kind of poetry; and Lord (1960, p. 13); but also Thomas (1992, p. 45). In the 
same vein, Scodel interpreted the motif of poetic inspiration as the implied claim that 
the audience should not think of alternative performances of the same poem, since it 
lays a claim to a unique moment of access to the knowledge of the Muses (2002, p. 
114). In her view Hesiod’s distinction between ψεύδεα and ἔτυμον registers for the 
first time the awareness of the possibility of error in the presentation of a version of a 
poetic truth, and it is used as a polemic against the varying versions of other poets. 
See also West’s comment ad loc, who takes these lines to imply the belief that 
contradictions between different legends made it clear that poets did not tell the 
truth invariably (cf. also Solon fr. 29W: πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί, which later 
acquired a proverbial value). A similar polemic is expressed by Semonides’ Palinode 




With the use of writing in composition new kinds of knowledge and 
new areas of authoritative concern, and consequently new types of authority, 
we made available. The authoritative mind of an individual was no longer 
dominated by the social need for mnemosyne, and thus new topics could be 
investigated but also traditional topics could be critically evaluated, since at 
this stage accounts acquired an objective status. In a more literate society, that 
is to say, the individual can confront tradition, since previous accounts are 
canonised. In addition, he can relate himself to existing tradition, whereas in 
primary orality this is not achievable to the same extent, mainly because the 
individual is tradition, insofar as he is responsible for its perpetuation, as in 
the case of the Homeric bards. This also implies that writing made it possible 
for the individual to understand himself and the authority of his logos as 
something different from the cultural and social task of the epic poet but also 
from that of other traditional types of authority.133 Writing thus facilitated, 
although it did not dictate, the birth of the critical mind, since it contributed to 
the formalisation of previous accounts, but also in the formalisation of 
criticism itself.134 Writing, that is to say, involves a backward look at previous 
accounts, and enables the setting of one account next to another. This in turn 
                                                                                                                                            
of the story about Helen (PMG, fr. 192). At any event, the lying of the poets was not a 
question of wrongness but of presenting an alternative, and in some cases less 
traditional, version of a well-known story. Aristotle on the other hand defines the 
“lying” of literature as the appropriation of the incredible (ἀδύνατα εἰκότα) to what 
counts as credible (δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα), cf. Poet. 1460a11-b5. 
133 According to Goody, oral cultures are characterised by a general tendency of 
establishing cultural uniformity (1973, p. 9). In his view, this becomes apparent in 
national festivals, in which the rhapsodes actively participated, and in which the 
renewal of social ties was as important as the conduct of religious rituals (p. 11). This 
social function of poetic performance has been examined in the relevant section.  
134 For the view that writing encourages a more critical attitude, see Lloyd (1987, p. 
72), Harris (1989, p. 63), Goody (1977, p. 37), but also Watt & Goody (1963), according 
to whom the modern sense of logic was a function of writing, since the setting down 
of speech enabled man to separate words clearly and, consequently, to manipulate 
their order and to develop syllogistic forms of reasoning. In connection with the 
Presocratics in particular and the way in which writing signalled the departure from 
mythical explanations in their works see, more recently, Johnstone (2009, pp. 39-40). 




makes it easier to discern and perceive contradictions, errors, or omissions, 
and to claim authority on new and unfamiliar grounds.135  
J. Goody observed that writing also increased the potentiality of 
accumulating knowledge and that in this way, it may be further added, it 
created the notion of learned polymaths.136 Goody’s observation is crucial for 
understanding the authoritative consciousness expressed in the relatively 
undeveloped literate stage of the archaic age, but it has received little 
attention in philology. It is nonetheless important to draw attention to the fact 
that the possibility of accumulating knowledge provided the background for 
inter-disciplinary conflicts. In such an era, moreover, the scope of a discussion 
was not rigidly set in terms of the kind of responsibility which the discussion 
of a particular topic implied. This in turn implies that the same question, or 
alternative aspects of the same question, could be answered by individuals, 
who did not understood themselves active in the same area of authoritative 
concern. This characteristic accounts for why the first individuals who 
attempt to claim an authoritative status occasionally address concerns and 
pursue answers which are not registered under their domain of authoritative 
expertise. At the same time however they start to display an awareness of 
other accounts which are in circulation but which are nonetheless of a 
different authoritative focus. Writing thus generated the model of the learned 
individual, something which is textually manifested in that from mid 5th 
century onwards the indications which suggest an inter-disciplinary 
discussion become all the more frequent.   
                                                 
135 In Herodotus we find writing as the record of various oral accounts (τὰ 
λεγόμενα). According to Herodotus it is the task of the authoritative individual to 
regard them critically (πείθεσθαι οὐ παντάπασιν ὀφείλω, cf. Hist. VII 152). The same 
view is implied by the opening of Hecataeus’ work (cf. B1: οἱ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι πολλοί 
τε καὶ γελοῖοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, εἰσίν), for an analysis of which see Scodel (2001, p. 
135). According to his interpretation what Hecataeus means to imply in his first 
fragment is that he relied on inference based on general principles of probability. 
136 Cf. Goody (1977, p. 37).  




It therefore becomes apparent that the use of writing in composition 
made available new modes of affirming authority. It also made acceptable 
inter-disciplinary correlation or contrast. Personal authority could now be 
defined not independently but in relation with a pre-existing tradition of 
attempts to claim a status of personal authority. In effect, the question of 
individual authority was now raised in relation with a context of other 
individuals, and new ideas were formulated partly as a response to existing 
logoi. The kind of authority claimed was thus no longer that of the social self, 
as in the case of oral epic poetry, but that of the contextual self. 
Furthermore, writing had a considerable bearing on the rise of 
individuality.137 The system of communication of primary orality, that is to 
say, favours a de-personalised expression of individual authority and 
hampers, due to the specific social needs to which it corresponds, the 
admission of a more outspoken ego. In a more literate society, on the other 
hand, the individual is more free to fix, and even declare, in his account his 
personal, and perhaps untraditional, priorities and concerns.  
The existence of a permanent text, which could travel without 
requiring the immediate presence of its author, revolutionised the range of 
authoritative expression.138 Writing, that is, weakens the efficacy of the oral 
                                                 
137 For the view that writing contributed to the rise of the individual consciousness, 
see Thomas (1992, pp. 103-6), who points out that the literate mind tends to 
introspection and self-consciousness as opposed to the oral mind, for which these 
features are less conspicuous. See also Goody (1973, p. 9), Goody & Watt (1968), Ong 
(1982) contra Andersen (1987, pp. 38-41). The credibility of such interpretations is 
further reinforced by the fact that lyric poetry, which evidently adopts a more 
introverted angle than the epos, was produced in a period when writing more 
frequently used.   
138 It is in this spirit that Pindar proudly declares that his poems are better than 
statues, since they travel from town to town, whereas the same is impossible with 
statues (Nem. V.1-3). Simonides in a similar vein mocks the idea that a stone 
inscription may last forever, when a human hand can easily destroy it (PMG, fr.581). 
Hesiod, furthermore, perhaps implies the view that his poetry bears an authoritative 




formulae, which no longer are the only available medium for publishing a 
message. In other words, formulaic diction served particular mnemonic 
necessities, which were with writing eliminated.139 In the display of personal 
expertise, consequently, individuals sought new ways of establishing their 
prestige other than that of the skilful handling of the formulae. They could 
also interact more freely with language and experiment with words, since the 
permanence of writing allowed, in fact encouraged, the search for that 
particular phrase which suited best the message or the intention of the 
individual, and which could now be preserved outside the system of oral 
transmission.140 This in turn implies that in a more literate stage the individual 
has acquired full control over his material and his language, and that he can 
thus use terms as part of his personal vocabulary.141 He can also use personal 
recurrent themes, which are not barred however by the traditional phrasing, 
and which do not thus belong to a traditional oral stock of expression.142 In the 
                                                                                                                                            
value not only for as long as the performance lasts but permanently (cf. Th. 27-8, as 
interpreted by Scodel (2001), p. 114). 
139  The gradual abandonment of elements present in composition and performance 
because of mnemonic necessity is also noted by Johnstone (2009, pp. 39-40), and 
Havelock (1963, pp. 42-3). In his view the omission of these epic elements generate 
the need for a new language and, consequently, for a new mode of thinking. 
Havelock interpreted elsewhere this characteristic in connection with the birth of 
Presocratic thinking (cf. 1982, pp. 232-3). It should be noted however that the 
Presocratic accounts did not in the first place arise from the need for a new language, 
as Havelock’s analysis perhaps implies, but from the need for a new set of 
authoritative questions, an aspect of which nonetheless was the problem of exploring 
and making available new types of expression.  
140 The epic poet on the other hand may recombine available words and phrases but 
he can never devise a style which is altogether his own. At least this is not possible 
without violating tradition (see also Parry (1971), p. 270). He might occasionally 
search for new phrases but he does so always under the stress of the metrical 
conditions of the hexameter (Cf. also Lord (1960, pp. 43-4)). 
141 For an excellent examination of the linguistic task of the Presocratics and of the 
way in which they gradually developed a cosmologic terminology, see Havelock 
(1983).  
142 See, e.g., Parry (1971, p. 317 and p. 329), according to whom the epic poet is barred 
from the search of words, and this limitation is lifted only with writing.  




long run he is permitted to submit his personal style, which will survive in 
future generations with his name. 
Writing thus made possible the innovation of tradition in terms of both 
content and of expression. It affected the word, insofar as we are eager to 
accept that the formulae do not bear the same function in an account which 
was written prior to its presentation, and which was not composed in 
performance. This in turn implies that the formulae are no longer a vehicle for 
thought and expression but just for expression, and that as such they have 
different connotations in the presentation of personal authority.143 It also 
affected the content of the logos, insofar as it permitted a greater freedom in 
the topics and questions discussed. It allowed, moreover, the attachment of 
the individual to more specialised concerns. It thus facilitated largely the rise 
of individuality, and it encouraged the appearance of the critical and more 
reflective mind, since it made admissible for the thinking ego to pose more 
confidently, more self-consciously, and eventually more competently and 
competitively in society.  
The esteem which writing gradually acquired in Greek society affected 
in several crucial aspects the way in which logoi, which laid a claim to an 
authoritative status, were performed in the community. To begin with, oral 
presentation was not immediately and completely dislocated by writing. For 
this reason, the implications of writing described above on the way in which 
it altered the individual and social consciousness should not be taken to 
suggest a strict distinction of two independent and clear stages in the nature 
of Greek communication. For a considerable period of time orality and 
                                                 
143 For the view that a formula expresses an idea under specific metrical conditions, 
by which it is however confined, see Gentili (1988, p. 39), Parry (1971, pp. 272 and 
324), Lord (1960, p. 31), and Peabody (1975, p. 96 and pp. 179-80). According to these 
examinations, the thoughts which the epos can set forth are restricted, since not 
everything is expressable with the formulae. The epic poet could thus voice only 
those ideas, for which he could find a place in his formulaic diction.  




literacy overlapped and constituted interchangeable but also interactive 
modes of presentation.144 It is important to point out that the surviving 
Presocratic fragments under examination come from this intermediate epoch. 
In fact, orality was quite common as late as in the classical times. At the same 
time however the existence of two alternative modes of publication 
formulated a new set of dynamics in the distribution of ideas. Oral 
presentation remained the main vehicle for circulation, but nonetheless a 
significant change was introduced: a text was now used as guide, in other 
words as an aide-memoir, for whatever form the live performance would 
take.145  
The use of writing by the individual in composition thus assisted him 
in the live presentation of his ideas, albeit it did not dictate to him in a strict 
manner the particular form of his presentation. In a more literate age, that is 
to say, the individual perceives his logos prior to his performance and for this 
reason he can shape and arrange it in a way that befits best his personal needs 
of presentation and of self-projection. In addition, writing functioned as the 
model for performance, according to which future performances were re-
enacted or adapted. The performance of a work in front of an audience 
became a kind of live illustration of the text, or, to put it differently, its public 
and spoken version.146 In the case of Homeric poetry on the other hand 
writing was used at some later stage in order to preserve it and to set a 
                                                 
144 For the continuity between orality and literacy, see Thomas (1992, p. 73), and 
Goody (1973, p. 9).  
145  For the view that archaic writing was at the service of the spoken word, see 
Thomas (1992, p. 62), Lloyd (1987, p. 119), and Gentili (1988, p. 15). The interaction 
between the written and the spoken, i.e. orally communicated, text is also reflected in 
that oracular responses were written down and later orally delivered in the 
community, for which see analysis in the relevant section.   
146  For an examination of epic poetry as re-enactment, see Gentili (1988, p. 39), and 
Nagy (1996, p. 61), according to whose arguments the rhapsode is re-enacting Homer 
by performing Homer, and he is Homer as long as the performance lasts. Viewed 
from the standpoint of mimesis, the rhapsode is thus a recomposed performer, and he 
becomes recomposed into Homer each time he performs Homer.  




standard for performances of this kind of poetry. In effect, the composition-in-
performance of primary orality gradually gave its place to composition prior 
to the performance.  
In addition, the continuous interrelation of orality and literacy in Greek 
life did not leave style completely unaffected. Authoritative individuals had 
to meet, at least in some crucial respects, the stylistic expectations of their 
audience, exactly because public attention was central in a still essentially oral 
system of communication and therefore in establishing oneself as a credible 
authority in society.147 In other words, they employed established forms of 
expression in order to correspond successfully to the demands of the 
communicative situation of their times. 
The permanence of writing ensured that individuals could twist the 
traditional and familiar language in order to signal their novel authoritative 
intentions and claims. This in turn implies that individuals with new 
authoritative concerns could use the language of epic poetry in order to 
express their personal views. At the same time however they did not in this 
way affirm the same type of authority, although, it is only fair to admit, they 
did desire to claim thereby for themselves the same prestigious position in 
society. It therefore seems hard to accept that style means the adoption of a of 
a specific and clearly defined authoritative perspective, mainly because, 
strictly speaking, personal “style” cannot develop freely in a society which  
                                                 
147  The familiarity which formulaic diction establishes is convenient for the 
successful delivery of a message because it makes it easier for the audience to follow 
the ideas presented to them, since they are not required to take in a new form of 
expression. This was due to the fact that literacy and orality were for a considerable 
period of time interactive, and thus the oral techniques of performance retained their 
eminence and social validity as preferable modes of expression. 




does not use books as the primary medium of acquiring and of publishing 
knowledge.148  
  In addition, in the accounts, which make some use of writing, a word 
alone is unable to submit an account of reality, as opposed to the case of the 
Homeric formulaic epithets for example. On the other hand, reality is 
expressed through the combination of multiple words in an ordered whole 
and through the arrangement and sequence of several phrases, which 
function as the verbal illustration of more complex concepts and ideas. The 
units of expression are no longer single words, that is to say, but larger 
phrases, which allow, through their multiple combinations, the reconstruction 
of a more abstract, concrete, and less figurative scope of presentation. In 
effect, language gradually became the tool for communicating personal 
thoughts. This requires more, or at least a different kind of, intellectual effort 
on behalf of the charismatic individual in comparison with the narration of a 
traditional story-theme. This in turn implies that the individual was in this 
way more free to produce a system of thoughts and ideas.149  
The advent of writing thus encouraged the appearance of more 
discursive forms of logoi. The epic narration, which proceeds with the 
development of particular storyline, gave its place to the opportunity for 
more detailed and specialised accounts, which could  be now oriented 
towards  the investigation of a single question.150 In effect, the process of 
                                                 
148 In terms of the effect of writing on an essentially oral tradition, see Parry (1971, p. 
270), and Lord (1960, pp. 124-138), who argue that orally-delivered poetry retains its 
basic features and functions even when it acquires a written form.  
149 It is interesting to compare this with the way in which comedy mocks 
philosophers and the Sophists, because ἀδολεσχία was perceived as the basic 
characteristic of their accounts (cf. Aristoph. fr. 490, Cl. 1480-5; and Eupolis fr. 386-
88).  
150 Kahn has recently pointed out that early examples of prose, such as that of 
Pherecydes of Syros or of Anaximander and Anaximenes deal with a standard set of 
topics (2003, pp. 143-6; see also pp. 149-50 for examples of prose in other fields such 
as architecture, music, etc., which suggest the use of prose for technical purposes). 




specialised differentiation was thereby initiated, since it was now possible for 
individuals to pursue an in depth examination of specific matters and to 
register specific primary concerns.   
The first surviving examples of archaic prose are a couple of phrases 
long, which give the impression that they are apparently independent from 
one another.151 It is reasonable to assume, however, that this brevity of 
expression was not regarded by the author as an obstacle to the 
communication of his message, and that this kind of expression actually 
corresponds to an quasi-oral manner of publication, according to which the 
audience is not yet fully accustomed to taking in a large amount of 
accumulated information, when read out. It is perhaps for this reason that 
these first cases of prose generally appear to avoid extra adornments of style, 
and to be characterised by a tendency to be precisely to the point and to not 
take so much interest in arranging their hypothesis in a coherent (textual) 
whole.  The immediate implication of this is that they give to the modern 
reader the impression of being unpolished and, at least in some cases, 
unexpectedly categorical and rather dismissive in tone.152 We should allow for 
                                                                                                                                            
Kahn also maintains that these works do in fact display an awareness of applying a 
standard order in their presentation, which begins with the examination of the first 
principles and the creation of heaven and earth, and ends with the discussion of the 
formation of human beings.  In a similar vein, Hershbell contends that in more 
literate societies prose is the primary form in which experience is documented, 
whereas poetry is more esoteric and sophisticated and for this reason it is used in 
order to preserve a special experience outside the day’s work  (1968, p. 189).  
151 For Anaximander’s book, see KRS (1983, pp. 102-3), and for Pherecydes’s, see (ibid. 
pp. 51-2). The first work of prose which appears to have employed a more coherent 
form of presentation is that of Zeno. Guthrie and KRS have observed the way in 
which the preserved fragments from this work actually constitute an ensemble  of 
multiple arguments, a characteristic which suggests  some uniformity in terms of its 
content (cf. Guthrie (1965, I pp. 81-3) and KRS (ibid. pp. 263-5).  
152 The dogmatic tone of Presocratic speculation in specific is commonly accepted by 
modern scholarship, and it has been examined in detail by Curd (1998). We should 
be careful to distinguish however our modern expectations from those valid in the 
different system of communication of archaic Greece.   




some time, however, for the particular efficacious features of prose to be 
discovered and developed by individuals.  
This remark is significant for this scope of examination, because it will 
help us interpret in new light some of the most prominent archaic modes of 
argumentation, when taking into consideration that what qualifies as 
“persuasive” and “argumentative”, i.e. acceptable on rational grounds, in a 
quasi-literate society is not necessarily identical with the criteria of 
argumentation, which writing establishes. This distinction is vital for the 
investigation of the peculiar features of Presocratic “argumentation”, because 
their attempt to persuade their audience is not viewed in modern scholarship 
in connection with the nature of the conditions under which their works were 
published, although there are important indications that the latter had a 
considerable impact upon the way in which these first cosmologies were 
verbally formulated. In other words, it is unwise to expect from an audience 
of listeners to be persuaded in the same way as an audience of readers. In 
addition, this is all the more unlikely to be the case, when taking into account 
that at that time there was no preceding tradition of prose, and that it was 
much later with the development of the art of rhetoric that the potency and 
range of πειθώ were more systematically mapped out. 
3) The publication of early cosmologies and their audience 
 
Our analysis of epic poetry implies that it addressed society on the 
whole, and this kind of activity produced works, which were expected to 
benefit society. This is also suggested by the cultural function which the 
Greek epos acquired, according to which this kind of poetry was a way of 
preserving the ancestral ethos. When the poems of the great epic became 
crystallised and acquired a standard written version we know that they were 
frequently recited and presented to the public at religious festivals. However, 




it is important to note that these poems do not generally acknowledge a 
context for their performance. R. Scodel, moreover, has recently pointed out 
that the Homeric hymns do not explicitly affirm the location of their 
performance.153 It is worthy of note that the exclusive exception to this is the 
Homeric hymn to Apollo, which addresses a specific circumstance of poetic 
communication, i.e. a public festival.154 In addition, lyric monody was 
definitely composed for relatively small private gatherings, such as that at the 
symposia.155 In terms of the standards which were at play in the context of the 
symposium, it seems that freedom of thought and originality of ideas was 
permitted and in fact encouraged by its atmosphere. The adoption of a 
reflective standpoint was also acceptable, as the gnomic elegies of Theognis 
clearly show.  
 It therefore becomes apparent that the performance of epic and of lyric 
poetry made available two contexts for the publication of ideas in the archaic 
times: the public and the private. In light of this, J. Herrington has drawn 
attention to the fact that the archaic context of performance was diverse, since 
it ranged from private gatherings to the more formal setting of the public 
sphere, such as that of the Agora or of the festival contest.156 In a similar vein, 
J. Hershbell has interpreted this diversity of contexts in connection with the 
undeveloped literacy of the archaic times, which makes the truly private 
communication impossible.157  
                                                 
153 Cf. Scodel (2001, p. 111). According to her interpretation, this also implies that 
each performance is independent. For poetic performances at public religious 
festivals, see also Herrington (1985, pp. 5-15).  
154 Cf. esp. lines 146-76.  
155 See also Herrington (ibid. pp. 32-6). It is interesting to note Philochorus’ testimony, 
according to which the Spartans chanted each in turn a poem by Tyrtaeus after 
dinner and the general gave a prize to whoever performed it better (cf. Athen. Deipn. 
14. 29).  
156 Cf. Herrington (ibid. p. 35).  
157 Cf. Hershbell (1968, p. 187).  




In order to throw some light on the manner in which Presocratic 
cosmologies were presented to the community our best option is to look with 
reservation at the formalised manner in which philosophy was later 
presented. In this way, however, we are bound to accept a continuity, but also 
a kinship, between these two forms of authoritative expression. In order to 
avoid such a misinterpretation, it is best to bear in mind that Plato’s works 
assume an audience which is attentively and consciously interested in 
φιλοσοφία, whereas this cannot be claimed with the same amount of certainty 
for the Presocratic audience.  
It seems that Plato had a reserved attitude towards writing and 
reading, and that, as Havelock argues, the communicative situation which his 
dialogues acknowledge is still dominated by oral presentation.158 In the 
Phaedrus he tells us that in Egypt Theuth discovered letters, which he 
expected to contribute to the μνήμη and the σοφία of men, who are still 
nonetheless characterised as πολύκοοι.159 Plato’s distrust towards writing is 
repeated in the unauthentic 7th letter, according to which philosophical 
doctrines should not be written down or they will in this way become 
available to those ignorant or to those who cannot appreciate their exquisite 
value.160 M. Finkelberg has interpreted Plato’s view in connection with that he 
considered writing as an inseparable attribute of mass culture, which was 
inadmissible considering his elitist approach to the activity of 
philosophising.161  
The most telling Platonic dialogue about the way in which prose was 
presented to the audience is the opening of the Parmenides, which describes 
                                                 
158 Cf. Havelock (1963, p. 38).  
159 Cf. Phdr. 273c-275b. It is also worthy of note that Thamus implies the view that 
memory is a skill that requires frequent practice (μνήμης ἀμελετησίᾳ).   
160 Cf. Ep. 340c ff, but also Edelstein’s monograph (1966).  
161 Cf. Finkelberg in Cooper (2007, p. 296 ff.).  




the circumstance under which Zeno’s book was published.162 In this passage 
Zeno himself reads his book, which he brought with him to Athens in order to 
make his work known, in front of an audience in the house of Antiphon. The 
important information, however, is found in what follows Zeno’s reading. 
Plato tells us that Socrates, who is a member of the audience, takes over and 
asks Zeno to repeat the first hypothesis of his first argument. He then asks 
Zeno to clarify his view and thus the cross-examination of his theory 
commences. In addition, the Hippias Major acknowledges a similar 
communicative condition. In this dialogue, when Hippias has completed the 
presentation of his view, Eudias is curious to know why Socrates has fallen 
silent instead of proceeding to the refutation of his thesis.163  
In the opening of the Thaetitus, furthermore, Euclid, Socrates’ student, 
says that he made short written memos (ὑπομνήματα), whilst listening to a 
discussion of Socrates, which he latter reconstructed based on these notes and 
on the capacity of his memory (ἀναμιμνησκόμενος ἔγραφον). He goes on to 
add that next time he meets Socrates he will ask him about those points of his 
presentation, which were unclear to him or for which his memory failed him 
in order to correct and refine his notes.164 In Euthyphro the philosophical 
discussion is conducted in a way which resembles modern academic talks, 
since it is supervised by a panel constituted by Socrates, Euthydemus, and 
Dionysiodorus.165  
                                                 
162 Cf. Parm. 127c ff. Diogenes Laertius describes a similar method of publication for 
Alcidamas’ book (cf. Vit. Philos. 9.54). According to his testimony, Alcidamas himself 
read out his book at the house of Euripides. Diogenes also tells us that his book was 
read at the Lyceum by his student Archagoras.  
163 Cf. Hppias Major 363a ff. See also Diog. Laert. Vit. Philos. 3.35, according to whose 
testimony Antisthenes invited Plato to the live presentation of his book, the topic of 
which Plato criticised.    
164 Cf. Thaet. 142a ff.  
165 Cf. Euthyph. 2a ff.  




Plato’s testimony helps us illuminate the way in which philosophy was 
presented in his more philosophically confident days. M. Douglas doubts, 
however, the reliability of these scenes on grounds that all that is being 
claimed for them is verisimilitude.166 Without belittling the important role 
which imagination plays in Plato’s dialogues, it is important to note that there 
is no serious reason to doubt the validity of Plato’s account or to view the 
information he provides us with wholly as a literary construct. It seems that 
the setting he chose for his dialogues was only in part a product of his 
imagination, one that at least had some resonance for the audience, and with 
which they were to some extent familiar.  
We can now discern the basic features of publication which are 
manifested in the dialogues of Plato. To begin with, it appears that written 
works were read to the public. The oral presentation of prose appears 
somewhat problematic to the modern mind, mainly because we are 
accustomed to reading and digesting large amounts of written material, 
whereas we cannot process information that is orally communicated to us 
equally easily and effectively.167 It does seem, however, that the oral mind had 
a different capacity in understanding and processing orally delivered 
accounts.168  
                                                 
166 Cf. Douglas (1996, p. 151). He also contends that such scenes fail to provide us 
with the complete picture, since the works of the Sophists and of epideictic oratory 
were presented in front of a much larger audience than the one of the Platonic 
dialogues. Douglas also proposes a division between public and private prose. 
According to his examination, the former includes forensic and deliberative oratory, 
which was presented to large audiences, while the latter was suitable for 
presentation to small, but selective, groups in private houses.  
167 Gentili and Ceri have pointed out to the difficulties that the option of oral 
presentation in cases of more complex prose, say Thucydides, presents us with (1978, 
p. 140). However, Thomas’ more recent analysis has convincingly argued that oral 
presentation was possible even for works which adopt a more discursive form of 
presentation (cf. 2000 and 2003). 
168 According to Plato, for example, Hippias could memorise fifty names after having 
heard them once (cf. Hipp. maj. 285e).  




It is also possible that some members of the audience were meticulous 
enough to keep notes of the account presented to them, which they would 
consult at some later stage. It also becomes apparent that the setting of these 
dialogues is both public (e.g. Crito, Phaedo, Euthyphro, Lysis, and Charmides) 
and private (e.g. Symposium, Gorgias, Timaeus and Parmenides). This in turn 
implies that Plato accepted both the public and the private sphere as two 
equally suitable contexts of communication. It is worthy of note, however, 
that even in the dialogues which are staged at some public place the spirit 
with which the philosophical discussion is carried out is characterised by 
intimacy. The Platonic dialogues, that is to say, in both cases illustrate an 
explicitly or implicitly private form of communication.169 They frequently 
mention a gathering of persons (συνουσία), who are personally acquainted 
with one another. Those who participate in these gatherings, furthermore, 
have a student-teacher relationship. They collaborate in this fixed context of 
studentship in order to examine the reliability of personal assumptions about 
a specific topic of discussion and in order to acquire in this way high-status 
knowledge. It is also this kind of civic interaction which they brand as 
“philosophy”. 
In order to achieve this philosophy-orientated aim the oral 
presentation was followed by a cross-examination of the account published. 
At this stage of oral delivery members of the audience could either require 
further clarifications from the speaker or they could object to the reliability of 
his views. It is also at this stage that the author-speaker was given the 
opportunity to elaborate or defend his case.  
Plato’s description of the communicative situation of his time shows 
that philosophy taught mainly through oral presentation, which took the form 
                                                 
169 For a similar suggestion, see von Reden & Goldhill (1999, pp. 265-6). According to 
their interpretation, the contrast between the private and the semi-private setting of 
the dialogues constitutes the dialogues as a form of performance in exile 




of a lecture (διδασκαλία). This is also revealed in that according to Plato 
readers always remain δοξόσοφοι, whereas listeners are more likely to become 
σοφοί.170 With this distinction Plato differentiation between those who have 
some knowledge of doctrine, which they do not nonetheless fully 
comprehend, from those who have a more substantial understanding of an 
account. The key difference between these two cases is that in the latter the 
account is explained to the audience by the author himself, for which reason it 
less likely that they will misunderstand the major points of his argument. It is 
important to note that Plato does not belittle the importance of writing in 
general. Quite on the contrary, he appears to be at pains to stress the necessity 
of oral presentation in a society, in which books are certainly easier to obtain. 
In the process of acquiring knowledge, that is to say, Plato considered it vital 
that the audience was guided by the author himself at a live presentation of 
his book. Plato’s testimony is important, because it reflects the dynamics 
inherent in a system of communication, which is neither fully literate nor fully 
oral. It also depicts the interactive relationship between written texts and oral 
presentation in the process of publication.   
What followed the public reading of a work is perhaps the most 
important information, which Plato provides. Plato’s testimony reveals to us 
that during the live presentation of a text to the public the new ideas or views 
suggested were subject to discussion. This feature of the system of 
communication accords with our knowledge of the competitive spirit, which 
dominated Greek intellectual life. It becomes apparent, furthermore, that 
philosophy was a question of discussing openly personally held beliefs, and 
that it was considered to be the product of the citizens’ free interaction in 
society.171 As G. Lloyd has observed, a gradual shift occurred from the private 
                                                 
170 Cf. Phdr. 275b.  
171 The important role which civil interaction played in the circulation of ideas is also 
suggested by Aristotle’s view that despotism in Persia seeks to alienate the citizens 




place of the symposium to the public sphere, where public presentation was 
by default carried out in a strongly competitive atmosphere. In his view, 
furthermore, it was this public and competitive nature of Greek life, the 
cardinal element which brought about the development of Greek thought and 
science.172 
We can now discern the basic features of Presocratic presentation. To 
begin with, the early cosmologies of the Presocratics display a continuity 
between the two types of publication, which lyric poetry and the epos made 
available. The content of the ideas which they seek to divulge and the 
conditions which they set forward for their communication encourage the 
impression that they were addressed to small gatherings, as in the case of 
lyric poetry, despite however their use of the popular hexameter, which prima 
facie would perhaps suggest a more public occasion for the presentation. At 
the same time, however, it seems generally safe to accept that these works did 
not exclude specific members of the public from such gatherings, although 
personal acquaintance played perhaps an important role.  
This possibility appears more plausible, when taking into 
consideration that at that time the activity of “cosmologising” was 
unregistered as a particular topic of discussion and concern, something which 
would require an orientation towards a specialised, and thus clearly defined, 
audience. It is equally possible that the Presocratics announced in the Agora 
the presentation of their works, and that this announcement circulated in the 
polis through a word of mouth. They would in this way reach out for a far 
                                                                                                                                            
from one another in order to hinder in this way the articulation and the discussion of 
ideas, which can potentially harm the stability of the institution (cf. Politics, 1313b).  It 
is also worthy of note that even in the classical times philosophy was not considered 
a professional activity but a σχόλασις. This might as well be because in the case of 
more practical types of authority the distribution of labour makes it easier for society 
to decide the limits of the authority of each class (cf. e.g. the δημιοεργοί list (ρ 383-4), 
but also Solon fr. 13.43 ff.).  
172 Cf. Lloyd (1987, pp. 70-91, and p. 108).  




wider public from the closed circle of their personal acquaintances. Quite 
naturally, however, it seems hard to accept that the uneducated lot would 
take much interest in such presentations of cosmology, for which reason it is 
wiser to assume that these works were presented to an audience of aristocrats, 
who had the leisure, and perhaps the necessary background knowledge, to 
give their attention to such presentations.173   
As far as the place at which Presocratic cosmologies were presented is 
concerned, this is perhaps the most difficult question to be resolved, 
especially when considering that the textual evidence which survives does 
not explicitly point towards a fixed setting or occasion for communication. 
One possible explanation for this is that cosmological discussion is not yet 
supported by an institutionalised system of publication, as in the case of 
oracles or as in the case of the philosophical schools of the classical age. In the 
times during which Presocratic cosmologies were perceived and 
communicated, there existed no organised schools which would harbour and 
encourage cosmological discussion. Any suggestion thus about the setting 
which authorised the performance of Presocratic cosmologies is a question of 
making the most probable conjecture. Yet the most plausible answer seems to 
be that of private houses, since the noise in the Agora would presumably 
render the attentive listening, which such accounts require, impossible.174 
In the previous section we have already pointed out to the fact that the 
nature of the communication in Greek society remained throughout the 
archaic and the classical age essential oral despite the appearance of writing 
as a medium for recording information. The advent of writing had a 
considerable bearing upon the content of the ideas and it affected to a 
                                                 
173 For the suggestion that the Seven Sages often had a high-status audience, see 
Martin (1993, p. 116). It seems reasonable to envisage a similar audience for the 
Presocratics.  
174 As described in the opening of Plato’s Theaetetus.  




considerable extent the way in which the individual conceptualised, but it did 
not revolutionise the manner of presentation itself. The standard way of 
publishing new ideas, that is to say, required that the text was delivered 
orally to the public. This method of publication is affirmed by the surviving 
Presocratic fragments, which describe their communicative occasion in terms 
of λέγειν and of ἀκούειν.175 It is with the opening of Heraclitus’ work that we 
come across the more discursive expression διηγεῦμαι, which may perhaps 
suggest also an audience of readers.176 It is possible, furthermore, to interpret 
as an indication of oral communication the frequent choice of the hexameter 
by the early cosmologists, which facilitated, due to its memorability, live 
presentation. As Lloyd pointed out, this choice also reflects the continuity of 
authoritative expression but also the centrality of poetry, of live performance 
namely, in the archaic Greek culture.177 
At the same time, however, it seems safe to accept that the Presocratics 
also made some use of writing in their composition. W. Harris has maintained 
that the Presocratic works were written and that writing was a subsidiary part 
of establishing the status of authority, to which these individuals laid a 
claim.178 It does seem, furthermore, that the advent of writing encouraged a 
more critical reception of existing authorities, such as Homer and Hesiod, and 
that it brought about a demand for the investigation of new questions but also 
the refinement or innovation of existing tradition.179 The Presocratics, that is, 
                                                 
175 For a list of these textual indications, see Table V in the Appendix.  
176 Cf. B1. It is interesting to compare Hecataeus’ equivalent γράφω in his 
introductory fragment (FGrH, fr. 1).  
177 Cf. Lloyd (1987, p. 113).  
178 Cf. Harris (1989, pp. 63-4). However, he is not exactly right when he later takes the 
use of writing alone to imply a claim to an authoritative status, mainly because the 
use of writing was not central to the process of publication as this view implies (ibid., 
p. 90).  
179 As Goody and Watt have maintained, it is generally easier to perceive the 
contradictions inherited in accounts in a society, in which individuals make more 
frequent use of reading (1963).  




confronted tradition with a critical mind because they perceived their ideas 
partly as a response to an existing tradition of views about the world, which 
were most commonly expressed in epic poetry. As far as the audience is 
concerned, furthermore, C. Johnstone rightly points out to the fact that the 
oral mind is characterised by a tendency to please and to preserve a tale, 
whereas the literate has the privilege of regarding an account critically and 
objectively.180 
However, it is important to distinguish at this point that Presocratic 
presentation does not imply a stage of fully developed literacy. The 
Presocratic works were perhaps read in public but they were not commonly 
read by the public. We should be thus careful to avoid accepting the 
misleading assumption that these works, because of the more critical stance 
which they adopt, suggest a literate stage of communication. G. Collins, for 
example, has recently maintained that Greek philosophy developed as a 
literary discourse and that for this reason it needed no public 
communication.181 Such a view seems to exaggerate the role of writing in the 
dissemination of ideas. As noted already, writing weakened the dependence 
of the circulation of a composition on oral presentation, albeit it did not 
completely remove its centrality. Havelock’s analysis has convincingly shown 
that the Presocratics still composed under circumstances of audience control, 
and that their presentation was only in part assisted by writing.182  
It is thus preferable to avoid the implications which a purely literate 
system of communication carries when discussing the nature of Presocratic 
publication.  To assume that the Presocratic works addressed exclusively a 
                                                 
180 Cf. Johnstone (2009, pp. 39-40). See also Lord (1960, p. 131), according to whom a 
reading public has a different taste from that of a traditional and un-literate 
audience, and it demands new themes or the twist of the traditional ones.  
181 Cf. Collins (2004, p. 542).  
182 Cf. Havelock (1982, p. 233). According to his interpretation, the Presocratics move 
forwards towards literacy and at the same time backwards towards pre-literacy, and 
their style reflects this ambivalence.  




reading public is tantamount to disregarding the oral nature of archaic 
communication and the continuity between the oral and written method of 
transmission. It appears that the Presocratic works were presented to the 
public by the individual who composed them and not by a specialist, as in the 
case of the professional rhapsodes or the itinerant seers. It also seems that the 
individual who perceived a new theory about the cosmos was personally 
responsible for its circulation, since there did not exist a circle of students, 
who would perpetuate or refine the cosmological tradition, which their 
teacher introduced. As the same time, however, it is only reasonable to 
assume that some of the upper-class citizens had access to the written version 
of these works. It is impossible to explain that cosmological theorising 
appeared as a geographically dispersed activity, unless we assume that there 
was an ongoing exchange of ideas, which was further encouraged by the book 
trade.183  
Furthermore, Lloyd has made a promising suggestion about the way in 
which later philosophy was presented, which helps us acquire some further 
insight into the nature of Presocratic publication. He has proposed that the 
philosophical works of the classical age were communicated in a manner 
parallel to that of oratory. He has drawn attention to the fact that the stages of 
rhetorical preparation and presentation might perhaps reflect the stages 
followed in the presentation of philosophy.184 In addition, Hershbell has 
maintained that the presentation of prose rhetoric retained some of the 
                                                 
183 For this reason Walker envisaged Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Empedocles as 
itinerant bards, who recited publicly their works, like Hesiod (2000, p. 22). It should 
be noted, however, that Walker does not altogether interpret the authority of these 
thinkers as rhapsodic; he simply relates these two modes of publication.  
184 Cf. Lloyd (1987, pp. 124-5). See also Pownall in Cooper (2007, p. 240), for the way 
in which Isocrates sought to educate future political leaders through the reading and 
discussion of his works in private contexts.  




fundamental features of orality such as memorization, improvisation, and 
oral delivery.185  
According to these stages, the orator memorised a written version of 
his speech prior to his oral delivery. The important aspect of this kind of 
presentation is that performance did not only include a by heart recitation of 
the speech but also an on the spot improvisation and elaboration of the 
published logos. For this reason repetitive performances of the text were 
necessary, because they contributed in enriching the content and form of the 
text and made it more attractive to the audience. The example thus of public 
oratory shows that the live performances of texts fostered improvisation and 
spontaneity. The centrality of improvisation in oratory is revealed in 
Philostratus’ testimony that Gorgias accused Prodicus of delivering speeches 
which were ἑωλά and πολλάκις εἰρημένα, and were thus deprived from 
originality. Gorgias contrasted his personal creativity to Philostratus’ lack of 
imagination, which was based upon that he followed the lead of instant 
inspiration (καιρός). Gorgias’ criticism of Prodicus is focused on that he 
simply read out his works and he did not engage in a more creative 
presentation.186 
 It appears then that improvisation was an important aspect of 
publication in both Greek oratory and for Plato. In the examination of writing 
in the previous section, we have noted its use as a mnemonic aid for whatever 
was orally communicated. We have also pointed out that the texts were used 
as a guide for live presentation.187 The immediate implication of this is that 
this mode of presentation allowed for much freedom in the reception of an 
                                                 
185 Cf. Hershbell (1968, p. 187).  
186 Cf. Philostr. Vit. Sophist. 1.483. To this we might add the testimony of Diogenes 
Laertius that Protagoras and Prodicus of Ceos made money from reading their works 
in public (λόγους ἀναγιγνώσκοντες ἠρανίζοντο, Vit. Philos. 9.50).  
187 Cf. also Lloyd (1987, p. 127), according to whom texts were used as aide-memoirs 
for what was more accurately propagated through living performance from the 
teacher himself.  




account. This occurred however in the discussion which followed the live 
presentation of a text, during which the audience could interact with the 
author either by asking for clarifications or by criticising his views. 
 The very content of the surviving Presocratic fragments encourage the 
impression that their presentation occurred in a similar atmosphere of critical 
discussion and debate. The element of on the spot improvisation upon an 
existing text suggests that the fragments which are at our disposal do not 
actually account for the complete picture of Presocratic presentation, and that 
they reveal only partial information about the nature of the publication of 
these first cosmologies. The advantage of this conjecture is that it can perhaps 
provide a possible explanation for the apparently dogmatic and un-argued for 
authoritative presentation of the Presocratics under examination.188 A reason 
for this feature of Presocratic presentation might be that this was expected to 
occur in the discussion which followed the “dogmatic” reading of the text, but 
which is nonetheless for us irretrievably lost. 
4) The question of categorisation 
 
It may be with much reason doubted, whether it is permissible to 
speak about a Presocratic “group”, especially when taking into consideration 
the flexibility of intellectual categories of authority in the archaic age. Before 
proceeding to the examination of this question, it is necessary to make a 
clarification. This analysis does not opt out the existing term “Presocratic”, 
mainly because it refers to a conventional a set of thinkers, and it thus has 
some sense for the reader. The need for the keeping of this term arises from 
that the accounts of these thinkers display some common features despite their 
apparent dissimilarities, which would be unwise to overlook. It should be 
noted however that this term refers only to the thinkers here examined, and 
                                                 
188 So according to Curd (1998).  




that it is not used in order to imply, let alone to accept, the kind of authority 
normally recognised as “Presocratic”.  
The reader may also notice that the current examination is focused 
exclusively upon four major figures. In this way it perhaps fails to provide a 
more general analysis of Presocratic authority, as the title of the thesis 
promises. However, the selection of these thinkers is based upon two criteria: 
chronology and the extent of surviving textual evidence.   
The amount of the textual evidence is important for this scope of 
analysis, because this examination does not aim in the investigation of the 
authoritative perspective of early Greek cosmological speculation based on 
the way in which it was received by ancient tradition and modern 
scholarship. It is concerned rather with the indications of authority, which can 
be deducted from the fragments, and which permit a more probable 
reconstruction of the authoritative perspective of each individual thinker. 
Such indications are important because they reveal to us the way in which 
these first cosmologists conceived, published, and affirmed their personal 
authority in public. For this reason it is vital that the material examined is of a 
length that allows the making of moderately safe conclusions. Xenophanes, 
Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles are admittedly not the only 
representatives of early cosmological speculation. They are the only ones, 
however, from whom we have the larger amount of direct evidence for their 
authoritative claims. It is for this reason, furthermore, that Anaximander, 
Anaximenes, and Zeno do not receive a detailed examination in this analysis. 
The number and extent of their fragments is limited and less easy to place in 
an appropriate context of authority.  
The second criterion used in the choice of these thinkers is that of 
chronology. The thinkers thus examined in this analysis range from mid 6th to 
mid 5th century BC, and it is for this reason that Anaxagoras and Democritus 
are excluded from this analysis. The justification for the choice of this period 




is that the rise of sophistry, medicine, in late 5th century, but also the 
philosophical activity of Plato reflect a more clear understanding and division 
of disciplines as distinct areas of interest and concern, something which does 
not apply in the case of the four thinkers examined. It seems, that is to say, 
that the appearance of the sophists and of the Hippocratics was a decisive 
factor for the development of specialised differentiation in terms of the 
authoritative prestige claimed.  
One possible explanation for this is that these domains of individual 
activity correspond to needs which are of a practical nature, and for this 
reason their difference from other types of authority is easier to perceive. The 
doctors, that is to say, were socially important provided that they applied 
their art in order to cure their patients, whereas the sophists were considered 
skilful experts insofar as they could impart to their students the art of 
persuasion. These two types of authority thus contributed largely in the 
establishment of a relatively more rigid distribution of areas of authoritative 
concern. Their activity brought about a more diverse but also more accurately 
defined and self-conscious scope of authority, since the social efficacy of their 
expertise could be easily determined. 
It is important to clarify at this point the rationale for grouping these 
four thinkers together in this examination, given that it seems highly unlikely 
that they perceived themselves as members of a separate group. These 
thinkers are dealt with as a single case of authority, because they apparently 
display some uniformity in what they understand as their mission in society. 
They all seek to provide, that is to say, a plausible and meaningful answer to 
the same question about the constitution of the cosmos or, to put it slightly 
differently, of the physis. They thus give the impression that they share the 
same area of cosmological concern, which they perceive in connection with 
their personal claims to an authoritative status.  




However, it is only fair to point out that this is not say that their 
accounts provide conclusive evidence for cosmology as a specialised activity. 
This is so because these four Presocratics are transitional figures, and this 
analysis is concerned exactly with throwing some light upon the way in 
which Presocratic speculation advanced from existing types of individual 
authority (e.g. the epic poets and diviners) to a novel, but yet undifferentiated 
as such, type of activity, which deserves a prominent position in society, and 
which was much later branded “philosophy”. This does not imply that these 
early cosmologists were, strictly speaking, “philosophers”, but only that the 
conditions which they set forward for the acquisition of knowledge and the 
method which they appear to apply to some extent anticipate the general 
features of the philosophical activity of the classical age. In other words, if we 
do wish to trace a common line of development in Greek thought starting 
with the Presocratics, then it seems only natural to acknowledge that the kind 
of activity which is most conspicuously relevant to theirs was actually that of 
classical philosophy.  
Yet their accounts cannot be with much comfort labelled as 
“philosophical” either, at least not so according to our modern understanding 
of philosophy. The problem which arises, if we opt for this view of Presocratic 
authority, is that the nature of their inquiry bears striking similarities with the 
scientific activity of physics, while at the same time it verges, due to its 
reflective quality, on philosophy. In fact, the specific kind of authority 
claimed by the early cosmologists is so hard to decide exactly because their 
material may be viewed as examples of philosophical physics or of natural 
philosophy at best. All the same, it is hard to miss that they have a different 
orientation in the reconstruction of an authoritative identity from these 
disciplines.  
At the same time, it is of some sense to ask whether a strict 
differentiation of types of authority was an active option at the time when 




Presocratic cosmologies appeared. Our previous examination of the kind of 
authority claimed by the epic poets and by individual diviners has suggested 
that archaic age was a period which did not particularly favour a clear 
distinction between various types of authority. It was also a period during 
which activities which laid a claim to an authoritative status were not 
distinctively separated from one another by fixed borders. For this reason it 
was quite frequent that the responsibility of an activity extended over a 
sphere of influence, which the representatives of this particular activity did 
not exactly pronounce as their primary concern. This becomes apparent, for 
instance, from the way in which the content of the knowledge of the epic poet 
sometimes overlaps, when viewed from our vantage point, with that of the 
seer. In a similar fashion, the professional activity of the seer could 
occasionally overlap with that of the doctor, insofar as his clients often 
consulted him in order to resolve an epidemic or to cure a disease. This 
flexibility in the categorisation of authority is difficult for the modern mind to 
perceive, mainly because our age has developed a more rigid understanding 
of classifications. We now distinguish clearly, that is, between different areas 
of knowledge, which are attached to specific functions of the human mental 
capacity.  
In examining the particular nature of the kind of authority affirmed by 
the Presocratics it is important to remark that, as André Laks argues, there are 
two possible ways of establishing an authoritative status in connection with 
differentiation: either the individual differentiates his expertise from other 
dissimilar authorities (external differentiation) or he differentiates himself from 
other similar authorities, who appear to belong to the same group (inner-
differentiation).189 It then becomes apparent that the authoritativeness of an 
enterprise may not be affirmed only in connection with other similar 
                                                 
189 Cf. Laks (2002, pp. 16-7). 




enterprises, for it is equally possible to register a particular area of concern as 
authoritative by contrasting it to other dissimilar topics of investigation. 
Furthermore, it seems reasonable to accept that these two stages of 
differentiation are successive, and that in order for the second to appear the 
first has to have been to some extent developed. In order for inner 
differentiation to appear, that is, both the individuals and the audience have 
to be able to identify the content of the knowledge presented as the primary 
concern of a specific group.                                                                                                                                                                           
It seems that in the archaic age it was acceptable to present oneself in 
contrast to other dissimilar authorities rather than in contrast with other 
authorities of the same group. This is manifested, for example, in the case of 
the seer, who appears to practice his art independently from the oracular 
shrines but also independently from other fellow seers. It appears, 
furthermore, that Greek lyric adopts a similar posture, since the lyric poets do 
not commonly launch a direct attack against another lyric poet. At the same 
time however, they could occasionally claim to present a “better” version of a 
traditional story. In this case, however, the poet points back to the epic 
tradition, from which he nonetheless wishes to differentiate himself, as in 
Stesichorus’ palinode.190 Such cases are an example of external and not of 
internal differentiation, which would require the objection to a version of a 
story presented by another poet at the symposium.  
On the other hand, it appears that inner competition was fairly 
frequent within the circle of the epic tradition. As noted already, Hesiod 
acknowledges the constructive competition amongst individuals, which in his 
view accompanies poetic composition. It should be kept in mind, however, 
that Hesiod’s testimony refers to an activity, which already has a prestigious 
                                                 
190 Cf. PMG, fr. 15. For an examination of the way in which Stesichorus treats epic 
tradition, see Woodbury L. (1967), Maingon A. D. (1978), Beecroft A. J. (2006, pp. 47-
69), and Bassi K. (1993, pp. 51-75).  




position in society, and which for this reason had reached some level of 
external differentiation. Competitive inner differentiation was thus in this 
case possible, even perhaps necessary, for establishing personal authority in 
performance.  
This general characteristic of the archaic age is important, because it 
provides us with some guidance in understanding the claims to authority 
which the Presocratics under examination lay. It is true that none of them 
appears to differentiate himself from other like-minded individual in a direct 
manner. This prima facie suggests that these individuals did not associate 
themselves with a specific group, which claimed to undertake the same 
mission in society. However, it has become apparent that inner-differentiation 
reflects a more developed stage of authoritative identification, which was 
impossible in the archaic age, during which there were no fixed borders of 
types of authority or of alternative areas of knowledge.  
We can now proceed to interpret the absence of a Presocratic 
consciousness of cosmologising as a specialised concern in new light. It is 
possible to assume that the Presocratics under examination, that is to say, give 
to us the impression that they present their accounts independently from one 
another, because the general spirit of their age did not dictate to them a strict 
definition of personal authority in relation with other similar individual 
authorities. This in turn implies that their audience did not expect a personal 
statement of authority on such grounds, and it is perhaps for this reason that 
such a way of self-presentation does not appear in the Presocratic 
cosmologies.  
It is also worthy of note that even when the somewhat more specialised 
activities of medicine and the art of the sophists appeared, their 
representatives were at pains to establish their superiority against other 
contextual authorities and not so much against other individuals with whom 
they shared the same concerns in terms of establishing their personal 




expertise as socially important. It therefore seems that inner differentiation 
took quite some time to develop in Greek culture. At the same time, external 
differentiation, which was fairly frequent and which was encouraged by the 
more general spirit of archaic competition, does to some extent suggest an 
understanding of one’s expertise in connection with a group, the particular 
knowledge or techne of which is nonetheless not yet defined definitely or 
strictly. It is possible, in other words, to understand the references made to 
other authorities as an indication of the movement towards new and untried 
types of authority. Such references admittedly do not outline the specific 
nature of the new type of authority which is starting to formulate, but they do 
nonetheless imply some awareness about its distinctive nature.  
One might quite reasonably doubt that the presentation of a cosmology 
was exclusively a Presocratic concern. The immediate implication of this view 
is that the Presocratic cosmologies cannot be taken to display sighs of external 
differentiation, and for this reason any attempt to examine them as a group is 
wrong and unsubstantiated. There is indeed much reason in this objection, 
since it seems that the presentation of a cosmology was not exclusively a 
Presocratic concern. Already in the epic tradition, and more specifically in 
Hesiod’s Theogony, we find the attempt to conceive of a world view. In 
addition, it seems that in mid 5th century the general demand for the 
examination of the cosmos rose, something which is partly reflected in the 
appearance of the Ionian historiographers. It therefore becomes apparent that 
by the time when Presocratic cosmologies were disclosed the Greek audiences 
were to some extent familiar with questions of a very broadly cosmological 
nature. At the same time, however, it is vital to discern the novelty, which the 
Presocratics introduced in cosmologising, and which distinguishes their 
accounts from those of the poets and from the accounts of the Ionian 
historiographers.  




To begin with, this is an issue which cannot be easily tackled, mainly 
because the discussion of the cosmos is a rather broad topic, and for this 
reason it is not always easy to determine its fundamental principles or to 
specify the particular borders of this area of investigation. It can be generally 
said that a cosmology may also encompass a comprehensive worldview 
according to which the individual orients himself and his behaviour, and 
which for this reason has a normative force and value. This field covers what 
is now known as “natural philosophy”, but it can also provide the 
background for moral directives, such as those implied in poetic cosmologies.  
The analysis of epic poetry in the previous section has pointed out to its 
function as a medium for establishing cultural uniformity in society through 
the presentation of a traditional standard for personal moral action. It is also 
perhaps natural to encounter cosmological beliefs in works of poetry, even 
more so in oral cultures, provided, of course, that we are eager to accept that 
poetry is an activity which is chiefly concerned with the human life. For this 
reason it does not appear odd that it often deals with questions about human 
live, which men commonly have. The understanding of the world in which 
men live, moreover, is one of the very fundamental questions about human 
existence.  
However, Presocratic cosmologies bear two striking differences from 
the cosmologies disclosed in poetry or in the Ionian historiography. To begin 
with, it seems that the Presocratics were the first to introduce cosmology as a 
major question to be investigated in their presentation. The claims to an 
authoritative status, which they lay, furthermore, apparently indicate that the 
superior truth which they divulged into their community was understood in 
connection with their cosmological remarks. It appears that the Presocratics 
under examination are primarily concerned with publicising a coherent 
worldview. This seems to be the case also when they discuss topics, which do 
not normally agree with the character of cosmological speculation. Yet it is 




hard to miss that even in this case their cosmological beliefs are appropriated 
to this different purpose. It seems, that is to say, that the various observations 
which they submit on other un-cosmological topics are an extension of their 
basic cosmological assumptions.191 Seen in this light, it seems that these 
observations are not only a further practical application but also a further 
illustration of their cosmology. In poetry and in the case of the Ionian 
historiography on the other hand, cosmological beliefs occur with such an 
unsystematic fashion that it makes it hard to accept that the individual 
prioritises their examination in his publication.  
It is possible to trace two further differences between the Presocratic 
and the epicopoetic or historiographic cosmologies. Firstly, it seems that 
cosmological knowledge is not pursued in the same way, and secondly its 
content does not have an essentially similar quality in all of these cases. 
Interestingly enough, the Presocratics proceed in their presentation to set also 
the conditions for acquiring insight into the true nature of the world. This 
characteristic of their accounts stands in direct opposition to poetic 
inspiration, which was considered, both by the individual and by his 
audience, as a substantial guarantee for the reliability of his insights. Ionian 
historiography appears to employ a somewhat more “scientific” method, at 
least so in comparison to epic poetry. Its method consists, however, in 
evaluating the information which the individual had collected during his 
travelling. The functionality of this method resides in the ability of the 
individual to present a record for the variety of ideas which were current at 
different cities across Greece. It therefore becomes apparent that there is a 
certain disparity between the methods used in these cases of authority.  
It also seems that poetic and historiographic cosmologies generally 
have a different quality. These accounts still explain the cosmos in 
                                                 
191 This was also because for the Greeks wisdom was the possession of a kind of 
knowledge which proves itself in a practical way (cf. e.g., Frede (2000), p.7).  




mythological terms and in terms of divine interference. The Presocratic 
cosmological proposals under examination on the other hand reveal an 
attempt to de-personalise the world order. In these accounts the governing 
supremacy of the gods is substituted by a “governing” material principle or 
principles.192 In the Presocratic cosmologies under examination, furthermore, 
the validity of divine genealogy is replaced by the description of a standard 
and recurrent process through which the cosmos is always generated and 
destructed. This cosmic process is periodical and time-proof, and for this 
reason it never ceases to influence the way in which the cosmos is constituted.  
This notion is notably absent from poetic cosmologies, which generally 
refer exclusively to past cosmic events and which never transcend this 
temporal grade. It then becomes apparent that the Presocratic accounts 
present us with a unique feature, which is not attested in other attempts to 
cosmologise; they transcended not only observable ordinary experience but 
also time. This in turn implies that they had a more speculative quality, and 
that they display some degree of specialisation in their undertaking. Poetic 
and historiographic cosmologies on the other hand do not generally have 
reflective overtones, and they do not consider the ability of mental 
apprehension as similarly important in obtaining knowledge about the 
cosmos. It then seems that the Presocratic cosmologies are distinguished from 
those of their predecessors in several crucial aspects.  
                                                 
192 Aristotle thus thought that the Presocratics were distinguished from their 
predecessors in that they were in search of the ἀρχαί, i.e. first material principles 
(Metaph. 983b ff.). It is worthy of note that for Aristotle philosophy is the search of the 
first principles (Phys. 185b 15 ff.) According to his view, moreover, Thales was the 
originator of this new mode of thinking, but of course it is highly unlikely that Thales 
was the founder of a philosophical school. Cf. Frede (2000, p. 6) and Hankinson 
(1995, p. 436). At any event, Thales’ contribution consists in the fact that he 
apparently adopted a less mythological outlook in his cosmology. Cf. Hatab (1990, 
pp. 162-3), Johnstone (2009, pp. 43-4), Martin (1993, pp. 113-4), Popper (1958-9, pp. 4-
6), and Kirk (1962, pp. 326-7).  




5) Early uses of “φιλοσοφία” 
 
It is interesting for the scope of this analysis to examine the sense with 
which the word φιλοσοφία occurs in non-Presocratic texts. This will help us 
throw some light upon the particular characteristics of this enterprise, and to 
trace some possible associations or dissimilarities with the essential features 
of the Presocratic accounts under examination. It is generally accepted in 
modern scholarship that φιλοσοφία was not used as technical term before 
Plato.  This issue was firstly introduced to scholarly discussion by W. Burkert, 
who has with much reason argued that the understanding of φιλοσοφία as 
“theoretical knowledge” originates in 4th century and, more specifically, with 
Plato’s Academy.193  
It cannot be doubted that the technical sense of φιλοσοφία starts 
officially with Plato.194 However, its earlier uses, although unspecified and 
relatively vague, apparently reinforce the impression that Plato did not coin 
the word in order to describe his personal intellectual undertakings. It seems 
rather that he was the first to develop a special meaning and to affirm a specific 
orientation for this term in such a way that it does not only include a specific 
area of investigation but it also constitutes a major project and area of concern 
in man’s everyday life.  
It therefore seems reasonable to accept that Plato exploited an existing 
but yet ambiguous term in order to define his personal enterprise, for which 
he proclaimed specific characteristics and rational conditions. It was on such 
                                                 
193 Cf. Burkert (1966, pp. 159-177). So also according to Nightingale (1995, pp. 14-5). 
Burkert dismisses in his examination as unreliable the testimony of Diogenes 
Laertius, according to which Pythagoras came up with  the term φιλοσοφία and was 
the first to use it in the sense of “theoretical understanding” (1.12; Cf. also DK 58, B15 
and Cic. Tusc. 5.8-9). Such interpretations are challenged by Laks’ very recent study 
(cf. 2002, esp. p. 11).   
194 For the way in which Plato understood the specialised activity of the philosopher, 
see analysis below.  




grounds, furthermore, that he tried to attract public attention and interest in 
his works. This could not have been to the same extent effective, if φιλοσοφία 
bore no connotations at all for the members of his audience. In addition, it is 
otherwise difficult to explain the appearance of philosophy as a fully 
specialised and institutionalised activity with Plato, unless we assume that 
there is a previous stage, or stages, of development, which little by little 
contributed towards a more clear and conscious understanding of what 
φιλοσοφία is.       
It should be pointed out, however, that this does not necessarily imply 
that we have to also accept that in this line of progression towards the 
modern sense of φιλοσοφία all stages need to have identical methods, 
features, and concerns, or to be clearly distinguished from one another. We 
also do not have to recognise each successive stage as “philosophical”. After 
all, even for Plato the borders between philosophy and other disciplines were 
not as strictly defined.195 
It is possible to acquire some insight into the gradual process which 
generated the way in which φιλοσοφία was used and understood by Plato 
from its first occurrences. The Hippocratic author of the Ancient Medicine uses 
the word in a context which suggests his understanding of φιλοσοφία as the 
study of nature in a speculative way. In his view, furthermore, this study is 
carried out with the purpose of acquiring theoretical knowledge.196 The 
crucial significance of this passage, however, lies in that the author explicitly 
                                                 
195 This becomes apparent from the Euthydemus, in which dialogue the sophist is 
considered a marginal figure, which verges with the philosopher and the politician 
(cf. 305c6). Plato uses the term μεθορία, which acknowledges the loose and rather 
flexible way of identifying in his times the nature of the authority claimed by 
charismatic individuals. For a comprehensive examination of this passage, see Laks 
(2002, p. 13).   
196 Cf. Ch. 20, as in Phd. 96a6-8. Interestingly enough, the description of philosophy 
which Plato provides in the Phaedo accords with the basic features of Presocratic 
cosmologies.  




identifies φιλοσοφία with the work of Empedocles.197 It seems, moreover, that 
he uses the name of Empedocles in order to clarify to his audience the 
particular type of knowledge that he has in mind, and from which he desires 
to differentiate his personal expertise.198  
Another important testimony is found in Gorgias’ fragment 11.13. In 
this fragment the phrase φιλοσόφων λόγους ἁμίλλας in specific suggests that 
Gorgias understands “philosophy” as some sort of dialectic contest.199 Gorgias 
possibly has in mind the antagonistic quality of the first cosmologies and the 
way in which each Presocratic individual presents his personal view with 
such an apparently dogmatic tone that he considers his account better than 
those of other individuals.  
It then becomes apparent that these early mentions of philosophy 
appear to acknowledge some of the basic features of the Presocratic 
cosmologies, and that as such they are not completely deprived of 
significance. They provide us, moreover, with a view of the way in which the 
Presocratic accounts were received by different and roughly contemporary 
authorities. It should be pointed out that these testimonies do not suggest an 
awareness of φιλοσοφία as a technical term. At the same time, it seems that 
they apparently assume that φιλοσοφία has some meaning for the audience, 
the particular features of which remain nonetheless unspecified. Some 
scholars have argued that such a confusion on the whole accords with the 
nature of philosophy, which by default includes a rather broad field of 
                                                 
197 Laks thus interprets this passage as evidence for an early disciplinary conflict 
(2002, p. 12).  
198 So according to Schiefsky (2005, p. 300), but also according to Jaeger (1946-7, p. 19 
n. 40). Schiefsky also points out that the mention of other thinkers is quite rare in the 
Hippocratic corpus. This in turn underlines the significance of that Empedocles is 
mentioned by name in a particularly rich in terms of establishing personal authority 
context.  
199 So according to Laks (ibid.) 




competence.200 These references, furthermore, do not help us determine the 
particular characteristics of the role of the φιλόσοφος, the authoritative status 
of whom is not associated with a specialised enterprise.  
The early mentions of φιλοσοφία reinforce this impression that the first 
cosmologists, i.e. those who put forward an understanding of the constitution 
of the world, did not have a clearly defined role in society. The differentiation 
between what was regarded as “philosophy” and what not in the archaic 
times, furthermore, is all the more difficult to decide because at this stage no 
activity has been yet properly branded as philosophical. In addition, at this 
stage there are no disciplines but just individuals who practice their art and 
display their expertise sporadically and by no fixed standards or methods. 
However, it does seem that a common pattern is beginning to emerge, to 
which these early uses of φιλοσοφία implicitly acknowledge. 
It is noteworthy that the mentions of φιλοσοφία before Plato are 
located in a strongly authoritative context, which recognises φιλοσοφία as an 
area, by all means still vague and blur, of expertise. It is also striking that 
these diverse sources which acknowledge, either implicitly or explicitly, the 
existence of φιλοσοφία describe it in terms which are confirmed by the 
content of the surviving Presocratic fragments. Yet it is only plain to see that 
                                                 
200 Cf. Laks (2002, p. 13 and p. 15). Moore on the other hand has maintained that 
“philosophy” gives a description of the whole universe. However, it is not necessary 
to appropriate our philosophical standards in order to excuse the Presocratics from 
that they are not as “philosophical” as we would normally expect (1953, p. 23). 
According to Most, moreover, philosophy is a way of life (2003, p. 305). Yet one can 
easily object that a way of life is not always “philosophy”. Jordan holds that 
philosophy is decided by the nature of the response given to a question, i.e. by the 
criteria and conditions held as valid for acquiring knowledge (1990, p. 8 and p. 12). It 
seems a fair bet to assume, together with Laks, that philosophy is a human activity, 
the borders of which are more open from those of other disciplines. The reason for 
this is that philosophy, generally speaking, deals mainly with the interpretation and 
evaluation of visual or perceptible experience, but it also defines and determines the 
relation, role, and the way in which the individual is expected to correspond to this 
interpretation. For this reason it is only natural that its range often includes various 
fields of human activity such as, most obviously, that of morality.  




all these authorities do not recognise the same authoritative quality in this 
activity. This is easily explained however when taking into consideration that 
the particular feature which is singled out in these testimonies is appropriated 
to the personal authoritative claims of the author. The early references to 
philosophy thus take full advantage of the inherent flexibility of its borders in 
order to clarify the background against which their personal authoritative 
expertise will be defined. In order to do so they select and exploit the 
implications of that particular aspect of “philosophy”, which most evidently 
in their view approximates their personal undertaking. For this reason, it is 
not unexpected to find that φιλοσοφία is for Gorgias a dialectic and 
argumentative contest, for the Hippocratic author the theoretical study of the 
human physis, and later for Plato plain theorising.  
It seems, that is to say, that these authors use this term as a point of 
reference in their presentation, and from which they will nonetheless proceed 
to differentiate themselves, in the same spirit perhaps with which the 
Presocratics often contrast themselves to the authority of the poets.  In these 
early uses, φιλοσοφία designates a special activity insofar as it clarifies the 
context within which authority will be competently pursued. It thus 
establishes the common ground, which is recognisable by the audience and it 
therefore addresses a tradition, in relation to which individual identity will be 
finally constructed and defined.  
The importance therefore of these early uses of φιλοσοφία lies in that 
they suggest that for these individuals Presocratic cosmologies have already 
formed a preceding tradition, which these authors receive however as 
outsiders. It therefore becomes apparent that these mentions of φιλοσοφία are 
scarcely reliable when it comes to defining the specific authoritative quality of 
Presocratic cosmologies, since their author is not concerned with providing a 
definition for this kind of activity in the first place. They are particularly 
valuable however insofar as they reflect the way in which the Presocratics 




were understood by authorities of a different kind, but also their reputation in 
antiquity. What is important in these references is that this late 5th century 
authors considered the Presocratics as a group which had established some 
sort of tradition by registering a set of authoritative concerns. It also becomes 
apparent that for these dissimilar authorities φιλοσοφία retains one basic 
element, which is a speculative quality but also value. We need not 
necessarily agree with them on this, but the point here is that the Presocratics 
were acknowledged at some later time by other authorities as a distinct 
group, the members of which had the same aim in their presentation. 
It is interesting to examine whether it is possible to trace a continuity 
between Plato’s institutionalised notion of φιλοσοφία and the sense in which 
it was understood by Gorgias and the author of the Hippocratic treatise. In 
this way it will appear more reasonable to ask whether it is possible to trace a 
common line of development of φιλοσοφία according to the information 
provided by these testimonies.  Of course, it is impossible to offer here an in 
depth examination of what is philosophy for Plato and Aristotle, which goes 
way beyond the interest of this analysis.   
Plato understood philosophy as the love for knowledge and, more 
specifically, for that kind of knowledge which includes theoretical study,201 
and which is contrasted to the emotions202 and to practical affairs.203 Plato 
identified this true knowledge, furthermore, with the transcendence of 
visually observable reality, which in his view could only be accomplished 
through the practice of one’s personal mental capacity.204 Aristotle provided 
an even more specialised definition of philosophy. He understood philosophy 
                                                 
201 Cf. Gorg. 484d.  
202 Cf. Phd. 68c.  
203 Cf. Gorg. ibid.  
204 Cf. Resp. 475d-480a.  




as the knowledge of the first principles and causes of things, from which 
everything else can be known.205  
It becomes apparent that the knowledge of philosophy is for Plato and 
Aristotle the product of a purely intellectual effort. At the same time, there is 
no compelling reason to accept that every case of philosophical knowledge 
has to be perceived through a process which does not involve the senses. It is 
equally possible that the latter can be obtained through a critical evaluation of 
the information which they provide. The testimonies of the Hippocratic 
author and Gorgias confirm the theoretical quality of φιλοσοφία before Plato 
and Aristotle. It then becomes apparent that in all these cases of φιλοσοφία 
the ability to speculate upon a certain topic and to substantiate a way of 
understanding is of cardinal importance but also the common element in the 
development of the notion of φιλοσοφία.  
This suggestion should not be taken to imply, however, the view that 
the Presocratics under examination claimed for themselves the status of the 
φιλόσοφος in their society. Such an assumption disregards the flexibility and 
dynamic interaction between dissimilar archaic categories, as well as the 
specialty of their desire to indicate a new orientation, which is not yet wholly 
disentangled, and thus not clearly differentiated, from preceding tradition.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
However, the particularities and distinctive character of Presocratic authority 
reveal themselves more reliably in the surviving fragments, to which we shall 
now turn.  
                                                 
205 Cf. Metaph. 982 a-b. It is noteworthy that for Aristotle the asking of questions 
central for the development of philosophy.  




ᾄδει δὲ τοῦτον τῷ θεῷ  
ἐν συνοχῇ καρδίας 
Michael Psellus, Poem. 1.171 
 
Chapter II: Xenophanes 
 
 
When Xenophanes published his poems, he entered this scene of 
undecided categorisation of personal expertise. Xenophanes presents us with 
a special case, mainly because his poems reflect this peculiarity of his times. It 
is for this reason difficult to grasp the precise quality of his authoritative 
perspective, exactly because his works reveal an interest in multiple topics, 
but also because his poems display conspicuous differences in terms of style 
and of authoritative posture. Xenophanes’ tone of voice thus varies from that 
normally adopted in standard sympotic poetry to epistemological remarks 
and cosmological reflections.1  
The immediate implication of this is that Xenophanes is hailed in 
modern scholarship either as the pioneer of philosophical thinking or he is 
wholly dismissed from the authoritative status of the philosopher.2 In order to 
investigate the particular nature of the claims he lays to a superior status, 
however, it is important to examine the kind of identity which Xenophanes 
wishes to adopt in his presentation, and which was all the more difficult to 
obtain in an age of no fixed categories or groups of individual authority.  
                                                 
1 For this reason Xenophanes is the only Presocratic, the works of whom are printed 
in both lyric anthologies (e.g. Campbell (1967), Adrados (1956), and Bergk (1878)) as 
well as in editions of early cosmologies (e.g. DK).  
2 Ancient authors on the other hand do not question Xenophanes’ value as a 
philosopher. They often consider him the founder of the Eleatic School (cf. Clem. 
Strom I 64, Pl. Soph. 242d, and Theodoret. Graec. affect. curat. 4.5) and a φυσικός (cf. 
Euseb. Praep. evang. 10.14.14, and Stob. Geog. XIV). It is highly unlikely that this is 
true, since in Xenophanes’ age different types of expertise, especially of philosophy, 
were not yet clearly differentiated. 





1. Xenophanes as a “rhapsode” and his response to the epic tradition 
 
K. Reinhardt has made the suggestion that Xenophanes’ authoritative 
perspective should be understood as that of the rhapsode.3 This impression is 
further reinforced by the fact that Xenophanes composed also hexameters, but 
also from Diogenes Laertius’ testimony, according to which Xenophanes 
ἐρραψώιδει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ.4 There are, however, numerous reasons why it is 
wiser to avoid accepting that Xenophanes shared the same status of authority 
with the rhapsodes.  
To begin with, it is not exactly beyond any shadow of doubt that in 
Diogenes Laertius’ times the verb ῥαψωιδὦ was used in the sense of “reciting 
verses in the fashion of a rhapsode”. Diogenes Laertius probably means to say 
that Xenophanes used to recite in front of a live audience the verses he 
composed. This assumption accords with our knowledge of the standard way 
in which new ideas were communicated in Greece’s semi-literate culture, in 
                                                 
3 Cf. Reinhardt (1916, p. 126), followed by Gigon (1945, p. 126). Reinhardt argues that 
Xenophanes’ status as a rhapsode is manifested in his mention of μνημοσύνη in 
B1.20. See also, Defradas (1962, p. 361), who nonetheless associates μνημοσύνη with 
Pythagoreanism. However, it is noteworthy that Xenophanes does position 
μνημοσύνη in the core of his claims to a superior status and of his concerns. He 
simply says that it is a virtuous quality that one can possibly have. According to 
Reinhardt’s examination, furthermore, Xenophanes has the repertoire of a “fahrender 
Sänger” (p. 133). This is true for his elegies, whilst it cannot be claimed with the same 
certainty for his hexameters, which obviously deal with a different set of questions. 
Reinhardt also takes the τόνος of the same line to imply Xenophanes’ skill in 
composing competent verses (ibid.). Xenophanes’ use of the medium of the poets is 
discussed further below. Contra Reinhardt’s suggestion, see Adkins (1985, p. 185).  
4 Cf. Diog. Laert. IX.18.  




which the individual was responsible for the live presentation of his 
compositions.5 
It is possible to interpret in different light Xenophanes’ choice of the 
hexameter.  His preference for the same medium as the poets does not 
necessarily imply his desire to identify himself with their authoritative 
position in society. The medium, that is, is unable to account, when taken 
alone, for the nature of the authority claimed by the individual. It can suggest 
a particular type of authority, however, when it bears an essential function 
and when it constitutes a crucial aspect of the expertise which the individual 
wishes to display to his audience in his performance.   
In addition, Xenophanes might have chosen the medium of verse, 
because it can more adequately correspond to the demands of live 
presentation and of the oral transmission of ideas. It should be kept in mind 
that prose was not yet fully developed, and also that there was no standard 
medium for the kind of knowledge which Xenophanes presents. At this stage 
of undeveloped specialisation the epic hexameter was still a highly esteemed 
medium of expression.  
Furthermore, the rhapsode is, strictly speaking, a professional 
specialist, who acquires his prestige and reputation by reciting verses from 
epic poems.6 He presents in his performance a traditional set of topics, but 
also of themes and ideas, from which he is not at the liberty to stray far. The 
rhapsode is restrained in that his composition is required to sound familiar 
with what the audience expects to hear. He recounts an episode from the 
                                                 
5 Cf. Campbell (1983, p. 331), Jaeger (1967, p. 40), KRS (1983, p. 164), and Gomperz 
(1943, p. 155). For the interaction between written text and live performance, see in 
the introduction.  
6 Heidel on the other hand is maintains that Xenophanes is a rhapsode in this strict 
sense, which he does not regard as a contradiction (1943, p. 267). In his conclusion he 
ranks Xenophanes as a minstrel, although he recognises his exceptional quality (p. 
277). This suggestion cannot stand, however, because it does not view the poetry of 
Xenophanes as a whole. 




stories narrated in the epic tradition and, although he does so according to his 
personal skill or taste thus refining existing tradition, he cannot nonetheless 
alter considerably the very content of this tradition. One important aspect of 
his performance is the successful delivery and perpetuation of the Homeric 
ideals and morality, by which social uniformity is established.7 In the case of 
Xenophanes’ hexameters on the other hand, it does not seem that they intend 
to continue and disseminate Homer’s reputation and his reliability as an 
authoritative source of knowledge.  
In addition, the element of poetic inspiration is notably absent from 
Xenophanes’ poetry.8 This appears odd, especially when taking into 
consideration that the epic poems of Homer and Hesiod rested their 
authoritativeness upon a knowledge which the individual believed to derive 
from divine dispensation. And it was this way of self-presentation that the 
audience of Xenophanes was chiefly familiar with, especially when listening 
to a poem composed in hexameters. 
 It is worthy of note, furthermore, that Xenophanes employs in his 
poems not only the epic hexameter but also the elegiac metre. The rhapsode 
on the other hand did not normally compose elegies in the same way that a 
lyric poet did not compose hexameters.  At any event, the most serious reason 
why the authoritative perspective of Xenophanes cannot be identified with 
that of the rhapsode, is that he launches a criticism against Homer and 
Hesiod. It would certainly appear surprising to the audience, if a rhapsode 
attacked the major representatives of epic poetry, the poems of whom he 
recited in order to gain his personal social recognition.  
                                                 
7 For an examination of the educational function of epic poetry, see in the 
introduction.  
8 For an analysis of poetic inspiration, see in the introduction, but also the 
examination of fragment B18 below.  




Yet it cannot escape our attention that Xenophanes’ hexameters 
immediately place him in the epic tradition. It is interesting to investigate, 
however, the way in which he views his poetry in connection with the 
existing tradition of the epos, which was in his time the most widely 
acknowledged expression of authoritative knowledge. There are however 
some striking differences between the Xenophanean and the epic hexameters. 
To begin with, Xenophanes’ hexameters are differentiated in one crucial 
respect. They do not give the impression that they are concerned with the 
same traditional material normally associated with the epos, since the ideas 
which they voice have nothing in common with the content of the knowledge 
which epic poetry presents. But Xenophanes in his hexameters displays only a 
fairly remote connection to Homer’s tradition.9   
This is overtly manifested for example in the following set of 
fragments:  
B27: ἐκ γαίης γὰρ πάντα καὶ εἰς γῆν πάντα τελευτᾶι 
B28: γαίης μέν τόδε πεῖρας ἄνω παρὰ ποσσὶν ὁρᾶται 
        ἠέρι προσπλάζον, τὸ κάτω δ’ ἐς ἄπειρον ἱκνεῖται  
B29: γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ πάντ’ ἔσθ’ ὅσα γίνονται ἠδὲ φύονται 
B33: πάντες γὰρ γαίης τε καὶ ὕδατος ἐκγενόμεσθα 
 
These fragments reveal Xenophanes’ interest in the way in which the 
human world is constituted. It can be reasonably objected, however, that epic 
poetry also provided a similar answer. The crucial difference is that it did so 
either in passing (e.g. Homer) or under the control and limitations of a 
mythical frame of understanding (e.g. Hesiod). In Xenophanes on the other 
hand, the question of cosmology is starting to acquire a centrality in the 
presentation, since it occurs more frequently. His fragment on Iris shows that 
                                                 
9 This issue is thoroughly examined by Classen (1989). Campbell observes that 
Xenophanes, like Solon, has the fewer Homeric echoes than the earliest elegiac 
writers (1983, p. 332). This may perhaps imply Xenophanes’ desire to differentiate his 
poetry from the tradition of the epos.  




his mode of perception discards the identification of divinities with the 
cosmos.10 It is only reasonable to assume, furthermore, that the actual content 
of Xenophanes’ authoritative knowledge is expressed in his hexameters, 
considering that in his elegies he simply states his authority and that he does 
not disclose any kind of knowledge other than that of his personal 
superiority.  
The reason for Xenophanes’ criticism of Homer and Hesiod is 
described mainly in the following fragments:  
B11: πάντα θεοῖσ’ ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρος θ’ Ἡσίοδός τε,  
        ὅσσα παρ’ ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν, 
        κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν. 
B14: ἀλλ’ οἱ βροτοὶ δοκέουσι γεννᾶσθαι θεούς,  
        τὴν σφετέρην δ’ ἐσθῆτα ἔχειν φωνήν τε δέμας τε. 
 
In these fragments Xenophanes simply expresses his rejection of the 
way in which the gods are represented in the epic. The basic point of his 
review is that he considers wrong the attribute of anthropomorphism, either 
in terms of physical constitution or in terms of morality, commonly attributed 
to gods.  Xenophanes tells us elsewhere why the epic understanding of the 
nature of the divine is wrong.  
B15: ἀλλ’ εἰ χεῖρας ἔχον βόες ἴπποι τ’ ἠὲ λέοντες 
        ἤ γράψαι χείρεσσι καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἅπερ ἄνδρες, 
        ἵπποι μὲν θ’ ἵπποισι, βόες δέ τε βουσὶν ὁμοίας 
        καί κεν θεῖον ἰδέας ἔγραφον καὶ σώματ’ ἐποίουν 
        τοιαῦθ’ , οἷόν περ καὐτοὶ δέμας εἶχον ἕκαστοι.  
B16: Αἰθίοπές τε θεοὺς σφετέρους σιμοὺς μέλανάς τε 
        Θρῆικές τε γλαυκοὺς καὶ πυρρούς φασι πέλεσθαι.  
 
Xenophanes rests his case upon the very simple, but also logical, 
principle that men tend to perceive based on a “like-knows-like” assumption 
(B16), which nonetheless cannot in his view stand (B15). It is difficult to 
                                                 
10 Cf. frs. B32 and B38. For attested elements of “rationality” in the poetry of 
Xenophanes, see discussion below.  




overlook Xenophanes’ reflective tone in these fragments. More specifically, 
the objection in fragment B15 derives from Xenophanes’ observable 
experience, whereas fragment B15 is a reductio ad absurdum or a modus tollens.  
If we view Xenophanes’ attack on Homer and Hesiod in light of his 
reflective standpoint, it becomes apparent that for him it is not sufficient to 
simply express his strong disagreement with these prestigious authorities. He 
also takes interest in defending the reliability of his disagreement by showing 
to his audience why their traditional assumptions about the divine are false. 
Fragments B23-26, furthermore, clearly indicate that Xenophanes did not 
engage in a sterile criticism but that he also sought to replace the traditional 
anthropomorphism of the epos with his own personal view.  
B23: εἷς θεὸς ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος 
         οὔ τι δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοίιος οὐδὲ νόημα 
B24: οὖλος ὁρᾶι, οὖλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὖλος δὲ τ’ ἀκούει 
B26:  αἰεὶ δ’ ἐν ταὐτῶι μίμνει κινεύμενος οὐδέν 
         οὐδὲ μετέρχεσθαί μιν ἐπιπρέπει ἄλλοτε ἄλληι 
 
This set of fragments describes some of the basic and untraditional 
features of the divine according to Xenophanes.  He believes that there is only 
one god (B23), who does not in any way resemble the human form (B23), the 
human way of sensing and of perceiving (B24), or human characteristics such 
as movement (B26). This understanding of the divine nature is based, 
moreover, upon the very simple realization that the divine by definition has a 
different nature from the human, and that as such it is not reasonable to 
believe that the two share common features. In his description of the divine 
Xenophanes evidently has in mind the way in which the epos represents the 
gods and, more specifically, the way in which the epos embodies an 
anthropomorphic interpretation of the divine. It therefore becomes apparent 
that Xenophanes’ critique of the epic tradition brought about the suggestion 
of a new way of understanding the divine, which Xenophanes perceived in 
response to this well-established and authoritative tradition.  




In addition, the content of his criticism implies that Xenophanes’ 
intends not so much to point out to the fact that epic poetry altogether should 
be deprived of its social importance, but, more importantly, to criticise the 
epic mode of understanding as a valid source of acquiring knowledge about 
the gods. This aim is further underlined by that he refers to Homer and 
Hesiod by name, which suggests the importance of this point he wishes to 
make.11 By referring to the most eminent representatives of this genre, 
furthermore, he wishes to hint at his personal competence as an individual 
authority worthy of public attention and acceptance. This is lucidly 
manifested in fragment B10, and more specifically in μεμαθήκασι, which 
reveals the competitive spirit with which he phrases his criticism of Homer 
and Hesiod.  
The explicit mention of Homer and Hesiod shows not only that 
Xenophanes acknowledges these poets as authorities, but also that he 
differentiates his poetry, and especially his way of understanding the divine, 
from their work. This in turn suggests that he constructs his criticism of their 
theological views carefully and with some awareness about the specialty of 
his personal message. The purpose of his attack, moreover, is to reclaim for 
his poetry their position of authority in society.  
It therefore seems that Xenophanes does not restrain himself in simply 
doubting the authoritativeness of the knowledge about the divine presented 
in the epos. He also affirms a new way of thinking about the divine and, 
eventually, of acquiring knowledge, which he contrasts to that which the epos 
made available and established.  In his hexameters he proposes a more 
reasonable evaluation of one’s personal beliefs about the gods. Xenophanes’ 
more reflective attitude towards the nature of the divine is also manifested in 
fragments B32 and B38:  
                                                 
11 Cf. Frs. B10 and B14.  




B32: ἥν τ’ Ἶριν καλέουσι, νέφος καὶ τοῦτο πέφυκε,  
         Πορφύρεον καὶ φοινίκεον καὶ χλωρὸν ἰδέσθαι 
B38: εἰ μὴ χλωρὸν ἔφυσε θεὸς μέλι, πολλὸν ἔφασκον 
         γλύσσονα σῦκα πέλεσθαι. 
 
The first fragment is a clear attempt to rationalise a religious view, 
while the second fragment is a remark upon the relativity and subjectivity of 
human knowledge in general. Although Xenophanes is not yet able to 
articulate this as a new method of approaching the question about the divine, 
he nonetheless appears conscious of the need for a new way of understanding. 
This new concern is also suggested by the epistemological concerns he 
phrases in fragments B18 and B34, which investigate the problem of how 
knowledge can be pursued.  
It is worthy of note, however, that Xenophanes’ scepticism towards the 
authority of Homer is not unprecedented.  Already in Hesiod’s invocation of 
the Muses we find an implicit criticism of Homer, and Stesichorus’ palinode, 
which is a recantation of the story about Helen of Troy, was probably 
composed with the same intention.  However, it seems that in these cases the 
author wishes to compete against the authority of Homer on grounds that he 
is able to present a better version of a traditional story, which Homer also 
recounted. Their objection to Homer’s authority, moreover, does not aim in 
replacing Homeric ideology or morality, and it does not present a new way of 
understanding.  
We have analysed above the special reflective nuances manifested in 
the way in which Xenophanes received Homeric tradition. This in turn 
suggests that he did not differentiate his poetry from that of Homer with 
exactly the same orientation and reflective mind as Hesiod and lyric poetry. 
Although the latter can be taken to phrase an objection towards Homer’s 
authority, they do not explain to their audience the specific reason or reasons 
why his version is inferior to theirs, and they do not seek to displace his frame 




of mind from society. And they, too, like Homer, take it for granted that they 
know better and that their truth is licensed by their status as poets.  
In other words, the crucial difference between the two is that 
Xenophanes’ scepticism towards Homer differs from that of Hesiod and of 
the Greek lyric in the respect that he does not criticise Homer’s version of a 
story but the moral implications in general of his stories. In so doing, 
furthermore, he is also launching a direct attack on the very basis of epic 
authority and its validity of providing the audience with a morality worthy of 
wide acceptance. These cases therefore of Homeric criticism are differentiated 
from Xenophanes’ not only in terms of the content of thought but also in 
terms of the authoritative intention they express.  
At any event, the rational elements present in Xenophanes’ fragments 
suggest that whilst he is at home with the epic tradition, as his choice of the 
hexameter and his phraseology imply, he nonetheless does not agree with the 
concerns and frame of mind which characterise this way of understanding the 
world and the gods. In so doing, his remarks also differ considerably from the 
reflective spirit towards the epic tradition which lyric poetry occasionally 
displays.   
2. The particularity of his first elegy (fr. B1) 
 
Several elements of the first surviving fragment of Xenophanes reveal 
strong associations with the elegiac genre. The metre, the language, the 
setting, the tone of voice, and even the topics discussed in this fragment, are 
typical in elegiac poetry.12 The first lines of the poem in particular are 
dedicated to the description of an overtly symposiastic setting:  
νῦν γὰρ δὴ ζάπεδον καθαρὸν καὶ χεῖρες ἁπάντων 
                                                 
12 For a detailed examination of the elegiac overtones of this fragment, cf. Bowra 
(1938a), but also Marcovich (1978), Defradas (1962a), Campbell (1983), and Adkins 
(1985).  




καὶ κύλικες. πλεκτοὺς δ’ ἀμφιτιθεῖ στεφάνους,  
ἄλλος δ’ εὐῶδες μύρον ἐν φιάλῃ παρατείνει. 
κρατὴρ δ’ ἕστηκεν μεστὸς εὐφροσύνης, 
ἄλλος δ’ οἶνος ἕτοιμος, ὃς οὔποτέ φησι προδώσειν, 
μείλιχος ἐν κεράμοισ’ ἄνθεος ὀζόμενος. 
ἐν δὲ μέσοισ’ ἁγνὴν ὀδμὴν λιβανωτὸς ἵησι.  
ψυχρὸν δ’ ἔστιν ὕδωρ καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ καθαρόν.  
πάρκεινται δ’ ἄρτοι ξανθοὶ γεραρή τε τράπεζα 
τυροῦ καὶ μέλιτος πίονος ἀχθομένη.  
βωμὸς δ’ ἄνθεσιν ἀν τὸ μέσον πάντῃ πεπύκασται, 
μολπὴ δ’ ἀμφὶς ἔχει δώματα καὶ θαλίη. (lines 1-12) 
 
The first lines are full of sympotic catchwords such as kylix, garlands, 
krater, and, of course, wine.13 In addition, the νῦν in the first line and the 
elegiac context of this fragment imply that Xenophanes is addressing a live 
audience and, more specifically, a small gathering at a symposium. This in 
turn suggests that Xenophanes delivered his poetry orally, and that for this 
reason he had to take into account, when composing, of the traditional 
expectations of his audience. It is also noteworthy that Xenophanes in these 
lines does not proceed to immediately state his authority to his audience, 
although he is, of course, credited with some recognition insofar as he is the 
one addressing the audience. But he does not proceed to openly phrase a 
claim to authority.  
From line 13 onwards, however, Xenophanes’ prominent position in 
the gathering is expressed somewhat more directly. Once the description of 
the setting is completed, that is, χρή introduces a new topic. In what follows 
Xenophanes articulates a moral duty:  
χρὴ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν θεὸν ὑμνεῖν εὔφρονας ἄνδρας 
εὐφήμοις μύθοις καὶ καθαροῖσι λόγοις.  
σπείσαντας δὲ καὶ εὐξαμένους τὰ δίκαια δύνασθαι 
πρήσσειν –ταῦτα γὰρ ὦν ἐστι προχειρότερον – 
                                                 
 13 Although, as Campbell points out in his analysis, Xenophanes apparently avoids 
using the standard Homeric epithets for wine (1983, p. 333). For wine as a favourite 
theme of Greek elegy, see also Campbell (1983, Ch. 2: pp. 28-53).  




οὐχ ὕβρις πίνειν ὁπόσον κεν ἔχων ἀφίκοιο 
οἴκαδ’ ἄνευ προπόλου μὴ πάνυ γηραλέος. (lines 13-18) 
The moral directives of these lines may be outlined as follows: praise 
and respect towards the gods, justly behaviour, and moderation in drinking. 
It also seems likely that the small length of these moral directives reinforced 
their memorability. At any event, it seems that Xenophanes assumes an 
authoritative standpoint for himself insofar as he appears self-confident 
enough to advise his audience. In other words, his willingness to provide his 
audience with a list of moral recommendations does seem to create an aura of 
authority. At the same time however, his remarks on appropriate behaviour 
at the symposium do not actually stray far from the general spirit of elegy’s 
traditional moral aspirations.  
In fact, there is nothing shockingly untraditional about the standpoint 
of authority which Xenophanes adopts in these lines. He simply presents 
himself to his audience as the leader of the symposium (potarchon), who is 
held responsible for advising the participants in the gathering and for 
regulating their behaviour. What is therefore remarkable about Xenophanes’ 
tone in the first fragment is that he begins with his presentation by assuming 
a standpoint of authority for himself. In doing so, furthermore, he is 
obviously taking advantage of the freedom which the genre of elegy granted 
to individual poets in using a tone of authority in the live presentation of their 
poem.  
This in turn accounts for why Xenophanes expected to be easily 
understood and agreed to by his audience and for that it is impossible to trace 
any sign of a reasonable argumentation in fragment B1. Xenophanes does not 
trouble himself with the development of an argument in order to state or 
clarify the reasons for his position of authority in the gathering. He also does 
not apparently feel the need to persuade his audience about the reliability or 
trustworthiness of the moral advice he gives them. Nowhere can we discern, 




moreover, an explicit statement or declaration of personal authority, as in 
fragment B2 for example. Xenophanes’ self-projection in these lines therefore 
shows that his representation as an individual with claims to a status of 
authority is cloaked with the vestment of tradition, since he appears to be the 
mouthpiece of traditional morality. His intentions and role in the gathering 
are thus rather clear and easy to decide, and they introduce no great 
originality in claiming a new position of authority in society.  
However, there are two elements which may perhaps imply a 
movement towards a new orientation, and a shift in the manner of 
Xenophanes’ self-presentation. The first is that Xenophanes addresses his 
poem to εὔφρονες ἄνδρες, and the second is found in the lines which follow 
the traditional declaration about sympotic behaviour. This change in 
Xenophanes’ tone is partly reflected, for example, in the fact that in the second 
stanza all the statements, which bear an ethical value, are introduced with 
impersonal verbs or phrases denoting necessity.14 In the first, and 
unquestionably traditionally elegiac, stanza on the other hand an 
accumulation of personal verbs is used in order to describe the occasion for 
the communication. In addition, the employment of impersonal verbs with 
moral overtones implies a claim laid to general validity, as in the case of 
gnomes, without openly affirming however Xenophanes’ personal superiority 
for being able to perceive these moral recommendations in the first place.15  
The sense of εὔφρονες ἄνδρες is however open to question. Of course, 
in such a context it is most likely to mean “cheerful” or “jolly”.16 Homer uses 
                                                 
14 Cf. e.g. χρή, ὕβρις <ἐστι>, and χρηστὸν ἔνεστι.  
15 Cf. ἀμφιτιθεῖ (line 2), παρατείνει (line 3), ἕστηκεν (line 4), προδώσειν (line 5), ἵησι 
(line 7), ἔστιν (line 8), πάρκεινται (line 9), πεπύκασται (line 11) and ἔχει (line 12). 
The use of impersonal expressions in order to refer to commonsense values or truths 
of general validity is also found in the Σκόλια, where advice towards men is widely 
expressed in this way, resembling thus the style of proverbs (cf., e.g., Carm. Conv. 
443, 444, 446 in Page’s (1968) edition).  
16 Lesher thus translates “glad-hearted men” (1992, ad loc.).  




the epithet once for wine and once in connection with feasting.17 The epithet 
εὔφρων can be also used in order to denote the kindness of the gods towards 
their worshippers,18 or a more general characteristic of being beneficial, 
favourable or simply “gracious”.19 This variety of meanings with which is 
εὔφρων is attested can be explained by the diversity in the sense that its 
compounds, namely εὖ and φρήν, have.  
It can be generally said that the word is used in connection with a good 
intention, inclination, or mood. But when the word occurs in an obviously 
elegiac context, and whenever it relates to a festive occasion the most natural 
reading is, of course, “happy” or “gay”.20 However, the LSJ lexicon cites this 
line of Xenophanes as an example of the sense of εὔφρων as “someone with a 
sound mind”. Some scholars have naturally objected to this reading on 
grounds that this sense of εὔφρων does not quite fit the evidently elegiac 
standards which Xenophanes adopts in this fragment, and which require the 
understanding of εὔφρων as “cheerful”.21   
The epithet εὔφρων can thus acquire the sense of either happy-minded, 
favourably-disposed, prosperous, but also (literally) good-thinking, i.e. 
prudent. This latter sense of εὔφρων is not in fact unknown in Xenophanes’ 
time. Homer uses it in the formulaic phrase “εὐφρονέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ 
μετέειπεν”,22 where the word appears to have evidently the sense of 
                                                 
17 Cf. Γ 246: οἶνον εὔφρονα, and O 99: εἴ πέρ τις…νῦν δαίνυται εὔφρων.  
18 Cf. Hom. Hymn. In Ven. 103, Pind. Ol. 4.12.  
19 Cf. Pind. Nem. 7.67, Aesch. Suppl. 19, and Ch. 88. 
20 So also in Pind. Nem. 5.38: εὔφρονες ἶλαι…θεὸν δέκονται. Cf., also Semon. fr. 7.99 
W: εὔφρων ἡμέρην διέρχεται ἅπασαν, and Alcman’s version of what qualifies for a 
“happy” day in 1.1.37: ὄλβιος ὅστις εὔφρων ἁμέραν διαπλέκει ἄκλαυτος; but also 
Theogn. fr. 1.765W: εὔφρονα θυμὸν ἔχοντας…εὐφροσύνως διάγειν τερπομένους. 
The only example from elegy in which these two senses of εὔφρων to coincide is in 
Theogn. fr. 2. 1327 ff.: δὸς δ’ εὔφρονι θυμὦι…τελέσαντ’ ἔργματα σωφροσύνης.  
21 So according to Adkins (1985, p. 181) and Campbell (1983, p. 334).  
22 Cf., e.g., Η 326, Η 367, Ι 95, Ο 285, and Σ 253. Cf. also, Hymn. Hom. In Ven. 14.  




“prudent”, like its later equivalent ἔμφρων. However it is in Aeschylus that 
this sense of εὔφρων occurs.23  
It then seems that in the context of elegiac poetry, or in wherever the 
setting recalls immediately that of the elegiac atmosphere, εὔφρων generally 
has the sense “cheerful”. It does seem however that the alternative sense 
however as “prudent” was made already available in Xenophanes’ age, as 
examples from Homer and Aeschylus show, whenever the context calls for 
the sense of “prudence” and not of “festivity”. Defradas thus maintained that 
there is an intentional interplay between these two senses of εὔφρων.24 This 
reading is also encouraged by the pairing of εὔφρονες with the ability of τὰ 
δίκαια πρήσσειν, to which we should at least grant some relevance to 
intellectual ability. In order to be δίκαιος, that is say, one has to have the 
intelligence to distinguish between what is morally right from what is wrong, 
and vice versa.  
Xenophanes’ employment of a standard elegiac epithet in an elegy but 
perhaps with its non-elegiac standard meaning, suggests his desire to distance 
himself from this kind of poetry and, consequently, of the kind of posture of 
authority normally associated with this kind of poetry. This is also suggested 
in that εὔφρων is meant to intentionally mirror εὐφροσύνη of line 4, hinting 
thereby at the contrast between these two types of authority. The epithet 
εὔφρονες however is not the only example, which might perhaps indicate 
Xenophanes’ intention to distance his poetry from the standards of elegy.  
                                                 
23 Cf. Aesch. Suppl. 640: ψῆφον εὔφρον’ ἔθεντο (“cast a vote in our favour); Ag. 351: 
γύναι, κατ’ ἄνδρα σώφρον’ εὐφρόνως λέγεις (“lady you speak as wisely as a 
prudent man”); but also, Choeph. 88, and Eum. 992.  
24 Cf. Defradas (1962a, p. 357). According to his view, εὐφροσύνη is synonymous to 
φιλοφροσύνη, namely friendliness or kindliness. By εὔφρονες ἄνδρες he 
understands “les joyeux convives”. Defradas claims that the phrase  
εὐφήμοις μύθοις καὶ καθαροῖσι λόγοις suggests an intellectual quality, from which 
he concludes upon the existence of a "thiase philosophique”. This view seems far-
fetched, although the general spirit of his analysis is safe.  




In the last four lines of fragment B1 Xenophanes launches a criticism 
against the stories about the battle with the Titans, by which he seems to be 
hinting at Hesiod.25 Although this kind of criticism is not wholly new, it 
connects Xenophanes’ elegies with his non-elegiac poetry. It constitutes an 
example of his critical spirit, or of his “destructive criticism” as some scholars 
have understood it,26 with which Xenophanes tends to face traditional ways of 
thinking and of understanding.  
οὔτι μάχας διέπων Τιτήνων οὐδὲ Γιγάντων 
οὐδέ <τε> Κενταύρων, πλάσματα τῶν προτέρων, 
ἢ στάσιας σφεδανάς, τοῖσ’ οὐδὲν χρηστὸν ἔνεστι.  
θεῶν <δὲ> προμηθείην αἰὲν ἔχειν ἀγαθόν.  
 
We have observed in the introduction that criticism was common 
amongst poets in order to establish personal superiority against other skilful 
individuals.27 In fact, Anacreon expresses in one of his poems a criticism 
which bears striking similarities with what Xenophanes says in these last lines 
of his first fragment.28  
οὐ φιλέω, ὅς κρητῆρι παρὰ πλέωι οἰνοποτάζων  
νείκεα καὶ πόλεμον δακρυόεντα λέγει,  
ἀλλ’ ὅστις Μουσέων τε καὶ ἀγλαὰ δῶρ’ Ἀφροδίτης  
συμμίσγων ἐρατῆς μνήσκεται εὐφροσύνης. 
 
The significant difference, however, from Xenophanes’ criticism on 
Titanomachy is that Anacreon dismisses warlike themes from his poetry, 
because he thinks that such songs do not exactly fit the sympotic occasion and 
                                                 
25 For an examination of the way in which Xenophanes’ criticism of the story about 
the fight of the Titans was received by his audience, see Sanford (1941, esp. pp. 53-
55). The Titanomachy is described by Hesiod in Th. 629 ff.  
26 So according to Guthrie (1965, p. 370). Guthrie also draws attention in his 
examination to the relation of Xenophanes’ destructive criticism with his 
“constructive theology” (pp. 373-80). Freeman also points out to this, when she 
remarks that Xenophanes’ “ideas on the nature of the deity resulted from his attack 
on the anthropomorphism of the gods” (1953, p. 95). 
27 As KRS observe “destructive criticism of gods was active for the poets in 
Xenophanes’ age” (1983, p. 180).  
28 Cf. Anacr. fr. eleg. 2.  




especially the cheerful atmosphere of the drinking party. This is implied by 
the way in which Anacreon contrasts νείκεα and πόλεμος to εὐφροσύνη. 
Xenophanes justifies his view, however, by introducing a new element of 
what can qualify for χρηστόν. With this phrase, furthermore, Xenophanes 
picks up the theme of moral appropriateness and of moral obligation, which 
he presents to his audience in the previous lines.  
It therefore becomes apparent that Xenophanes implies something 
more than just the frivolous atmosphere of the symposium, which Anacreon 
has in mind when he expresses his criticism of this poetic theme.  In addition, 
in the last line of B1 Xenophanes makes one further point. He claims that it is 
“good to always pay careful respect to the gods”. Unfortunately the fragment 
breaks off at this point, and we are unable to know in which particular way 
Xenophanes thought that one can show his respect towards the gods. Yet his 
use of προμηθείην suggests that he grants this respect that one should display 
towards the divine with a somewhat reflective quality, which he perhaps 
develops in his hexameters. If this is true, then it appears that the elegy of B1 
is not so much cut-off from the rest of Xenophanes’ thinking.  
The first fragment of Xenophanes is important because it reveals 
Xenophanes’ uneasiness with the elegiac standards, from which however he 
does not openly differentiate himself. At the same time, however, it is possible 
to trace some elements in this fragment which very subtly indicate a different 
tone of poetic authority. In the second part of fragment B1, that is, new ideas 
are introduced, while the epithet εὔφρων is credited with an alternative sense.  
It should be pointed out that fragment B1 does not provide us with 
sufficient evidence about Xenophanes’ clear and distinct differentiation from 
the tradition of elegy. He also does not introduce in fragment B1 a wholly 
new kind of discussion in the symposium. All the same, it does seem however 
that he is already not feeling at home with the tradition of elegy, although he 
is not yet able to consciously phrase this nonetheless as a new concern or to 




provide for his poetry a new kind of orientation. The latter is more clearly, yet 
also not openly stated, in his second surviving fragment.      
        3. Xenophanes’ expertise: his σοφίη (fr. B2)  
 
In fragment B2, however, Xenophanes appears confident enough not 
only to openly affirm his superior status of authority (ἄξιος ὥσπερ ἐγώ), but 
to also construct an explicit defence of his expertise (σοφίη).29 One should 
reasonably expect to find in these lines some information about the way in 
which Xenophanes perceived the speciality of his task.30 Arthur Adkins aptly 
observed that the contrast between σοφίης and ῥώμης implies something 
more than just the contrast of two mainstream virtues. He argues that while 
the first is a dactylic, the second is a spondaic, and that this disparity of metre 
would have produced an effect which would surely attract the attention of 
Xenophanes’ audience, and underline the importance of the claim he makes.31 
The answer is definitely hinted at in σοφίη, but it is not exactly clear in what 
particular sense Xenophanes refers to his personal expertise or wisdom. 
The noun σοφίη appears in early Greek literature not so much with the 
sense of “wisdom” but with the sense of possessing some specialised 
knowledge about how to do things, and it is in this spirit perhaps that 
Aristotle later understands σοφία as ἀρετὴ τέχνης.32 It could be thus applied 
                                                 
29 Athenaus thus understood Xenophanes to be lay a claim to a status of superior 
wisdom (cf. Deipn. 10.6,25). In a similar fashion, Bowra comments that “all 
Xenophanes wants is honour” (1938b, p. 262). For a detailed analysis of this 
fragment, see Bowra’s outdated but useful article (1938b), and Adkins (1985). It is 
also worthy of note that the general spirit with which Xenophanes speaks in B2 is not 
unparalleled in Greek literature. Cf. e.g. Tyrtaeus (fr. 9W).   
30 For the importance of the claims which Xenophanes makes in B2 in connection 
with the higher status he claims for himself in society, see also Lesher (1991, p. 237).  
31 Cf. Adkins (1985, p. 193). The conspicuous contrast of σοφίη to ῥώμη is also noted 
by Campbell (1983, p. 265), who identifies Xenophanes’ σοφίη however with his 
poetic skill.  
32 Cf. Eth. Nic. 6.7.  




either to the craft of a builder, a wood-cutter, or the like thus denoting the 
possession of a practical skill. It could be also used, however, for a poet in 
order to describe his, more intellectual, skill of having a good command of 
language in the communication of his message or in order to acknowledge the 
superior status of the knowledge he discloses to his audience.33  
It is in light of this evidence that some scholars have translated 
Xenophanes’ σοφίη as “art”, “craft”, or as “poetic skill”.34 K. Reinhardt, 
furthermore, interpreted the σοφίη of B2 in connection with the phrases 
εὐφήμοις μύθοις and καθαροῖσι λόγοις of B1, from which relation he 
concluded upon that σοφίη refers to the poetic dexterity of Xenophanes.35 It 
should be pointed out however, that these two phrases of fragment B1 are 
explicitly attributed to εὔφρονες ἄνδρες and not to Xenophanes himself as in 
the case of his σοφίη.  
It seems unwise to assume however that Xenophanes intends to imply 
his poetic skill, when he makes a mention to his personal σοφίη. To begin 
with, it cannot be safely argued that Xenophanes is an example of a skilful 
poet. This was clear for Cicero but also for some modern scholars.36 His verses 
are occasionally weak and less polished than one would normally expect from 
an individual conscious of his poetic charisma and his status in society as a 
poet. It is in this vein that Marcovich observed that wisdom prevails in 
                                                 
33 This is perhaps suggested by the formulae κατὰ κόσμον or μοῖραν, which are used 
in order to describe the skill of singing in Homeric poetry (cf. e.g. θ 489). For other 
uses of σοφία in connection with the superior status of the poet, see Hes. Fr. 306; but 
also Ibycus, for whom the Muses are σεσοφισμέναι (1a23.11), and Solon who declares 
that he knows ἱμερτῆς σοφίης μέτρον (fr. 13.52W).  
34 Cf. Burnet (1930, p. 117), Freeman (1953, p. 21), and Campbell (1983, p. 338) 
respectively. Bowra on the other hand resorts to the more general reading of σοφίη as 
“proficiency in any τέχνη” (1938b, p. 260).  
35 Cf. Reinhardt (1916, p. 132). For a similar view, see also Adkins, loc. cit.  
36 Cf. Cic. Acad. II.74 and, e.g., Adkins (1985, p. 174). Adkins argues that Xenophanes 
is one of the technically least well-equipped poets, although he does, of course, have 
an imagination with some poetic qualities.  




Xenophanes over poetic skill.37 In the case that Xenophanes had understood 
his σοφίη in relation with the status of the poet, then it certainly strikes one as 
odd that he failed to devise more competitive verses, which would also help 
him establish himself as a competent individual poet. At the same time, his 
shortcoming implies the difficulty which he had to face when using a medium 
of expression which was not designed to serve the kind of message he wanted 
to put across.  
When one views the poetry of Xenophanes as a whole, it becomes 
apparent that his “wisdom” lies not so much in devising elegant lyrics, which 
in any case requires a certain technical skill, but in his extensive criticism of 
traditional beliefs and acclaimed poets such as Homer and Hesiod.38 The latter 
is the most prominent and recurrent feature of his poetry, due to which 
Xenophanes acquired his reputation in antiquity. In other words, the very 
content of his thought is the element which distinguishes his otherwise poetic 
speech from other traditional modes of poetic presentation.   
It has been already noted in the introduction that in the epic poetry of 
Homer the poet perceives his craft in connection with his ability to narrate 
and make known the great deeds of the past. In the live performance of the 
epic poet the personal quality of his τέχνη was manifested in his ability to 
exploit traditional material adequately, either formulae, motifs, or stories, 
when composing his poem. The expected outcome of his performance, 
furthermore, was the instruction but also the entertainment of the audience. 
The educational value of the material presented was thus a standard option 
for poets as well as for the contexts of poetic communication such as, most 
evidently, that of the Greek symposium.39  
                                                 
37 For his examination of σοφίη, see Marcovich (1978, p. 22 ff.).  
38 See also the analysis in the previous section.  
39 For the general educational tendency of the symposium, see e.g. Jaeger (1946-7, p. 
172), but also Murray (1990). For the tendency of Greek lyric to instruct, see, for 




In the surviving poetry of Xenophanes, however, it is impossible to 
find any trace of his intention to please his audience, although, it is only plain 
to see, his speech retains the educational value of poetry. The phrase ἐμὴν 
φροντίδ’ of fragment B8, moreover, may perhaps imply, as some scholars 
have suggested, his desire to teach through his poetry.40 Throughout his 
fragments Xenophanes appears to be particularly concerned with correcting 
the set of personal convictions and customary beliefs of his audience, which, 
according to his view, they acquired from other acknowledged poets. In order 
to achieve this aim, as G. Wöhrle remarks, he employs the language of the 
epos so as to construct his personal identity as a teacher in relation with an 
existing tradition of instruction.41 It seems then that Xenophanes’ choice of 
verse was not a default option, as it certainly is for poets, but just a necessary 
feature which was dictated by the live presentation of his poetry. 
It then becomes apparent that Xenophanes competed against the great 
authorities of Homer and Hesiod not because he truly considered himself a 
poet but because he wanted to replace their frame of mind and the moral 
implications of their stories with his personal view about the divine. In the 
introduction, furthermore, it has been already pointed out that the poets 
usually competed against one another in terms of the way in which a 
traditional story could be told differently. Seen in this light, it would perhaps 
be unwise to understand, together with Adkins, Xenophanes’ coining of new 
words, such as δόκος in fragment B34, as evidence for his poetic art.42 It 
                                                                                                                                            
instance, the well-known declaration of Solon: ταῦτα διδάξαι θυμὸς Ἀθηναίους με 
κελεύει (fr. 4.30W). 
40 So according to Nietzsche (2006, p. 79). Xenophanes is understood as a teacher with 
a message to convey also by Guthrie, for whom the poetic form of his presentation is 
not bar to his “philosophy” (1965, p. 361).  
41 Cf. Wöhrle (1993a, p. 17). For a more detailed examination of this issue, see analysis 
in the previous section.  
42 Cf. Adkins (1985, p. 194). The verb προκρίνειν of fragment B2 is another example 
which Adkins adduces in his analysis. For an examination of Xenophanes’ language 




cannot be safely argued on such grounds that Xenophanes conspicuously 
displays in his work a poetic skill, mainly because this feature does not 
appear to generally characterise his style.  
In fragment B2 Xenophanes does not appear to adopt the same 
standpoint of self-presentation as in fragment B2. The significance of fragment 
B2, that is to say, lies in that Xenophanes does not simply declare his personal 
superiority over the athletes; he also provides his audience with a justification 
of his view.43 The reason why he appears to be laying a claim to a status of 
authority can be outlined as follows:  
A (basic statement):  οὐκ ἐὼν ἄξιος ὥσπερ ἐγώ 
 Α¹: ῥώμης γὰρ ἡμετέρη σοφίη  
 Α²: τοὔνεκεν ( sc. ῥώμης) ἂν δὴ μᾶλλον ἐν εὐνομίηι πόλις εἴη    
A²¡: σμικρὸν δ’ ἄν τι πόλει  χάρμα γένοιτ’ ἐπὶ τῶι  
Α²¡¡: οὐ γὰρ πιαίνει ταῦτα μοιχοὺς πόλεως 
 
The basic statement of these lines is an open declaration of personal 
superiority, which seems to be connected with Xenophanes’ mention of σοφίη 
and εὐνομίη in the following lines.44 J. Lesher draws attention to the fact that 
Xenophanes employs in these lines words which denote cause,45 while H. 
Fränkel is eager to accept an argumentative quality in these words.46 It is only 
fair to admit, however, that it is not exactly beyond doubt that these lines can 
be with much ease considered an argument, let alone a philosophical 
                                                                                                                                            
in connection with epic diction in specific, see also Classen (1989). For the importance 
and significance of δόκος in Xenophanes’ thought, see analysis below.     
43 Bowra observes that Xenophanes is here making an appeal to deep-seated 
convictions of his audience (1938b, p. 273). According to his interpretation, 
Xenophanes attacks in B2 the athletes because their prowess is bound to encourage 
ὕβρις.  
44 Bowra draws attention to the fact that in 5th century Greece the notion of εὐνομίη 
and of δίκη were among the catchwords of the aristocracy (1938b, p. 271).  
45 Such as γὰρ and τοὔνεκεν, cf. Lesher (1992, ad loc.).  
46 Cf. Fränkel (1975).  




argument.47 Yet at the same time it is only plain to see that Xenophanes is here 
interested in persuading his audience about the reliability of the view he is 
putting across, although he does not, of course, resort to an argumentative 
syllogism.  
At any event, it is not exactly clear why Xenophanes expected his 
poetry to be of such a great importance to the community or which particular 
aspect or function of his poetry he believed to contribute in the common 
good. It is impossible to determine, that is to say, the particularities of the 
relationship between civil εὐνομίη and Xenophanes’ σοφίη upon which he 
apparently bases his case. The obvious similarity of the claim which 
Xenophanes is making here with Solon suggests that Xenophanes is perhaps 
exploiting for his self-presentation the not unfamiliar understanding of the 
wise man as someone who is active in the politics of his city.48 
If we choose to interpret εὐνομίη with its literal sense, then it is only 
natural to accept together with Fränkel that σοφίη is “the ability to improve 
laws and to increase the prosperity of the community”.49 In a similar vein, 
Adkins considers εὐνομίη as the basic condition for the good government of 
the polis, while Jean Defradas refers to εὐνομίη in order to argue that 
Xenophanes is setting the standards in fragment B1 for the “bons citoyens”.50 
A considerable portion of the surviving poetry of Solon however is a direct 
                                                 
47 Curd has offered an extensive analysis of the lack of argumentation in Xenophanes 
(1998). According to her interpretation, Xenophanes is generally characterised by a 
tendency to dogmatically assert rather than to argue for his views.  
48 For an analysis of the apparent similarities between Solon and Xenophanes, see 
Lumpe’s short note (1955, p. 378). He points out that Xenophanes employs the same 
vocabulary in B2 as Solon in fr. 3. Freeman and Vamvakas, moreover, have observed 
that both individuals share the same moral concept of personal moderation (cf. 1953, 
p. 99 and 2006, p. 138, respectively). Xenophanes’ σοφίη is interpreted as some sort of 
practical knowledge by Reinhardt (1916, p. 140), Marcovich (1978, p. 22), and Gigon 
(1945, p. 189).   
48 Cf. Bowra (1938b), p. 271. 
49 Cf. Fränkel, ibid.  
50 Cf. Adkins (1985, p. 187), and Defradas (1962a, p. 360). 




testimony of his active involvement in the political life of Athens.51 Had 
Xenophanes considered εὐνομίη as central to his expertise then one would 
normally expect him to display a similar awareness in his poems. Quite on the 
contrary, the fragments of Xenophanes frequently reveal his interest in 
religion, religiousness and morality, and in the constitution of the cosmos.52 It 
is this kind of questions he is concerned with, and the special quality of his 
σοφίη lies in the answers he provides to these questions.  
 The notion thus of “utilité publique”, as Defradas put it, acquires in 
the poetry of Xenophanes a new interpretation. It is the moral constitution 
and the new understanding of the divine which he proposes the elements that 
define the specialty of the message he delivers. It is these aspects of his 
poetry, furthermore, that he possibly considered as worthy of public 
attention, and which he believed to contribute to the common good.   
It is in this spirit that W. Jaeger’s very early study on the poetry of 
Xenophanes interprets his σοφίη as the “metaphysical foundation of city-state 
morality” and concludes that what Xenophanes means with σοφίη is the 
“spiritual education” which he offered to the members of his audience.53 This 
suggestion is attractive, especially when considering Xenophanes’ interest in 
                                                 
51 Solon’s interest in politics is manifested, for example, in fr. 4.32W, in which he 
describes the political situation in his city. Solon also refers explicitly to his public 
reforms in frs. 5W and 36W. See also his telling remarks on politics in fr. 6 (on how to 
treat the δῆμος), and in fr. 11 (on advising his fellow-citizens against Peisistratus’ 
tyranny).    
52 Xenophanes’ poetry is viewed as an attempt to moralise his fellow citizens by 
Defradas (1926a, p. 359) and, more recently, by Vamvakas (2006, p. 140).   
53 Cf. Jaeger (1946-7, pp. 171-4). His view, however, that Xenophanes sought with his 
philosophical ideal to “eject the old aristocratic culture from its place and power” 
seems farfetched. It is highly unlikely that Xenophanes’ “intellectual culture” implied 
any form of social revolt. Although the general spirit of Jaeger’s interpretation is safe, 
it should be nonetheless treated with caution, because it occasionally credits 
Xenophanes with more consciously political concerns than his surviving poetry 
attests to. For an extensive criticism of his interpretation, see Bowra (1938b, p. 258).  




depriving Homer and Hesiod from the status of the teacher, which he desired 
to claim for himself. 
In a similar vein, Bowra interpreted Xenophanes’ σοφίη in connection 
with his philosophical and didactic poetry, while A. Pasquinelli, who 
translates “la nostra sapienza”, understands σοφίη as “un’ attività puramente 
speculativa”.54 It has been already noted, furthermore, that in fragment B2 
Xenophanes deliberately contrasts his personal σοφίη to the physical strength 
(ῥώμης) of the athletes. This contrast encourages the understanding of σοφίη 
as a virtue which has some intellectual quality. Taken alone, however, this 
hardly adds anything substantial to our understanding of the peculiar nature 
of Xenophanes’ expertise, and it is in the interest of this analysis to describe 
the particularities Xenophanes’ self-presentation to his audience. It is 
important for this reason to pursue an investigation of the way in which 
Xenophanes’ “intellectuality” manifests itself in the surviving fragments and, 
more specifically, in fragments B18 and B34.  
4. Establishing Xenophanes’ expertise: frs. B18 and B34 
             i) ζήτησις and εὕρεσις of fr. B18 
 
In fragment B18 Xenophanes expresses an epistemological remark, 
which provides us with important information about the way in which he 
understood his personal expertise. The fragment runs as follows:   
οὔ τοι ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοῖ θνητοῖσ’ ὑπέδειξαν, 
ἀλλὰ χρόνωι ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον.  
 
In German scholarship these lines are commonly taken to refer to the 
progress of human civilization, while ancient tradition credits Xenophanes 
                                                 
54 Cf. Bowra (1938b, p. 260) and Pasquinelli (1976, p. 357). According to Pasquinelli’s 
examination, Xenophanes was a “filosofo rhapsodo”. This question was discussed in 
the previous section.  




with an awareness about the cultural developments of his times.55 It is 
difficult to lend our support to this reading of B18, especially when taking 
into consideration that there is no serious suggestion of this assumption in the 
surviving lines of this fragment, as Lesher has recently pointed out.56 In the 
same spirit, J.P. Dumont reads in fragment B18 Xenophanes’ faith in “un 
progrès de la connaissance”.57 Nor can it be safely argued that πάντα stands 
for “Kultur” in this fragment, as Fränkel argues, mainly because this noun is 
far too general to encourage its identification with anything in particular.58 
English scholarship on the other hand has proposed a more natural reading of 
B18, which seems to be closer to what Xenophanes is most likely to be saying 
in this fragment. English scholars, that is to say, understand Xenophanes to be 
expressing here the notion of personal inquiry, which may be contrasted to 
the kind of knowledge which some charismatic individuals were believed to 
acquire through divine dispensation.59  
What has not received the attention it perhaps deserves, however, is 
that with the phrase πάντα θεοί θνητοῖσ’ ὑπέδειξαν Xenophanes might have 
implied a challenge to the prestige of the epic poet. It is nearly impossible to 
miss the obvious echo in this line of the traditional role with which the Muses 
are credited in the epos.  According to the claims which the epic poet makes 
                                                 
55 So according to Nestle (1966, p. 2), Steinmetz (1966, p. 60), and Fränkel (1951, p. 
380). Hermann on the other hand slightly differentiates his view from theirs in the 
respect that he opts for scientific instead of cultural progress (2004, p. 137).  
56 Cf. Lesher (1991, p. 246).  
57 Cf. Dumont (1988, ad B18).  
58 Cf. Fränkel (1925, p. 183, fn. 4). According to his interpretation Xenophanes is here 
expressing his disagreement with the traditional belief of “Kultur als Gottesgabe”. 
There is some truth in this, but nonetheless it is impossible to argue that Xenophanes 
implies in this fragment the progress of human civilization.  
59 So according to KRS (1983, p. 179), Popper (1998, p. 48), Lesher (1991, p. 233), and 
Guthrie (1965, p. 376). Although Guthrie maintains that Xenophanes is referring to 
the progress of arts and sciences (p. 399). In a similar fashion Heitsch claims that 
knowledge is for a Xenophanes a personal ability and a matter of personal 
responsibility (1966, p. 221). 




in significant and crucial parts of his presentation, the Muses are prone to 
reveal superior and out of ordinary reach information to particularly 
charismatic individuals. These individuals on the other hand lay a claim to a 
superior status on grounds that the knowledge which he discloses to his 
audience is the product of an insight which a divinity bestowed upon him.    
The importance of this divine communion, moreover, is further 
illustrated to the audience in epic poetry through the belief that the Muses 
are, due to their divine status, omniscient, and for this reason they are in a 
position to reveal all sorts of information which is otherwise unknown, 
indeed unattainable.60 This standard belief which the great poets of the epos 
exploited for their self-representation is hinted at in fragment B18 with the 
contrast between θεοὶ and θνητοί. It does seem, however, that the statement 
which Xenophanes makes here adds on to the traditional concept about the 
natural disparity between human and divine knowledge.61  
The core of Xenophanes’ criticism is found in ὑπέδειξαν. It seems that 
the compound verb ὑποδείκνυμι does not belong to the usual stock of poetic 
phraseology; it actually appears fairly more frequently in 5th century prose. It 
is used in the Hippocratic treatise in order to denote the discovery of a certain 
symptom.62 The simple form of the verb, namely δείκνυμι, which generally 
has a similar meaning, appears regularly in the poetry of Homer.63 
                                                 
60 See, for example, in the catalogue of the ships (B485 ff.), in which the nature of the 
interaction between the poet and his divine patron is better described.  
relationship of the poet with his divine  
61 See, e.g. Alcmaeon, B1 and Varo (apud Augustinus), CD VII. 17: hominis enim haec 
opinari, dei scire.  
62 Hippocr. Progn. 912; Coa Praesagia, 483.7; and de decente habitu, 16.5. For other 
examples from prose, see Thuc. Hist. 1. 77.6; Isocr. Philip. 27.6; Panath. 166.7; and Nic. 
57.3. Xenophon uses the verb in order to claim that the good ἔργα we see around us 
are a sign of the existence of gods (Cf. Mem. 4.3.13.5). See also Anab. 5.7.12.3.  
63 It is used, for example, of a thunder sent by Zeus, through which his presence to 
men is revealed (N 244), and also of Achilles’ placing of his trophies on public 
display, something which will make his excellence known to the rest of the Greeks 
(Ψ 701). Cf. also Hes. Op. 451 and I 196, δ 59.  




Xenophanes’ use of the compound form of the verb adds an element of 
secrecy in the way in which the communication of divine knowledge takes 
place. This immediately brings to mind the intimacy with which the Muse 
was believed to pass her divine knowledge on to the epic poets. At any event, 
the uncommonness of this verb might perhaps suggest that Xenophanes is 
here trying to voice a new and unfamiliar idea and that he is careful about the 
way he phrases his message. The use of an unfamiliar verb, furthermore, 
would strike the ear in performance thus capturing the attention of the 
audience and underlying the importance of the view that Xenophanes wants 
to put across.    
In addition, it seems that Xenophanes employed contrasting phrases 
whenever he desired to point towards a new orientation. This has become 
apparent from fragment B2, in which Xenophanes openly contrasts his 
personal expertise to that of the athletes, but also from fragment B1, in which 
it is possible to trace his subtle intention to contrast his poetry to tradition. In 
a similar fashion, the phrasing of fragment B18 is based upon the 
accumulation of several contrasts.  
To begin with, the contrast between ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς and χρόνωι, suggests 
that for Xenophanes men do not enter automatically the state of knowing, as 
in the case of poetic inspiration. It seems that Xenophanes regarded the 
acquisition of knowledge as a rather slow and painstaking process. In 
addition, the fact that this contrast is expressed with the conjunctions οὐ and 
ἀλλά suggests not only that Xenophanes denies divine knowledge but also 
that he is at pains to substitute it with personal inquiry (ζητοῦντες). This in 
turn implies that it is of cardinal importance for Xenophanes to lay a claim to 
the personal responsibility, and hence superiority, which one acquires, when 
he seeks knowledge based on his own powers. This statement was an open 
challenge of the reliability and prestige of the knowledge which was 
presented by epic poetry or by the oracles and the diviners.  




In addition, the verb ζητὦ, with which Xenophanes describes the 
process of searching for knowledge, also occurs in Parmenides’ definition of 
the two possible way of inquiry, which he calls ὁδοὶ διζήσιος.64 It is also 
worthy of note that in both Xenophanes and Parmenides ζητὦ appears in a 
strongly epistemological context, which indicates the significance of this term. 
If we view these two cases in light of one another, it then seems reasonable to 
assume that Xenophanes is perhaps trying to phrase in fragment B18 the need 
for a new method of knowing in general or for a new method of investigation 
in specific. It is impossible to agree with E. Heitsch, however, in 
understanding ζητοῦντες as “systematische Vermehrung von Erfahrung”.65 
We are not in the position to tell the particular characteristics of this new 
method, which Xenophanes had in mind and the fragment is certainly too 
short to provide a substantial proof of a belief in any systematic method. All 
the same, it would be unwise to disregard the obvious association of ζήτησις 
with a reflective, yet unspecified, quality. It then becomes apparent that for 
Xenophanes the basis for authority should not be sought in the gods, as in the 
case of epic poetry, but rather in personal ζήτησις, which in turn implies that 
with Xenophanes knowledge is made for the first time a matter of an entirely 
personal concern.66  
In addition, the phrase ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον refers to the result of 
this personal investigation. It thus describes the way in which knowledge can 
be acquired according to Xenophanes. The verb ἐφευρίσκω is not normally 
used in such a context in poetry, and it thus seems that Xenophanes 
                                                 
64 Cf. Parm. B2. For other uses of ζητὦ in poetry, cf. Sol. Fr. 27.10W, Theogn. 1.683, 
and Aesch. Pr. 262.  
65 Cf. Heitsch (1966, p. 196).  
66 McKirahan thus maintained that Xenophanes “rejects divine revelation as a source 
for knowledge” and that his knowledge is a “product of rational inquiry” (1994, p. 
67). Lesher thus took ὑποδείκνυμι to refer to “the matter of divine communication to 
mortals” (1991, p. 237). In a similar vein, Pasquinelli observed that Xenophanes 
appends knowledge to everyday experience and not to the gods (1976, p. 358).  




deliberately uses it in this fragment in order to underline his point. Its sense, 
however, is not unclear: it means “to discover”.67 According to Lesher, 
furthermore, this phrase is a declaration of authoritative superiority.68 The 
immediate implication of Lesher’s suggestion is that Xenophanes affirms in 
fragment B18 the existence of different grades of knowledge, although he 
does not explicitly refer to himself.69  
M. Untersteiner argued that for Xenophanes the process of acquiring 
knowledge is gradual, and that only he who has managed to “discover what 
is better” deserves to be called a σοφός. Untersteiner claims in his analysis 
that the intermediate state is that of δοξάζειν (i.e. true opinion), whereas the 
last stage is the knowledge of the σαφές.70 It therefore becomes apparent that 
Xenophanes did not have a sceptical or relativistic approach to knowledge, as 
some scholars have maintained,71 since in fragment B18 he openly 
acknowledges the possibility of acquiring a more reliable truth.  
                                                 
67 From which sense the verb later acquired the negative sense of “to devise”. Cf., e.g. 
Eur. Andr. 451-2: οὐ λέγοντες ἀλλὰ μὲν γλώσσηι φρονοῦντες δ’ἄλλ’ ἐφευρίσκεσθ’ 
ἀεί, and Soph. OC 938: δρὦν δ’ἐφευρίσκηι κακά. It could be also used more loosely 
in order to denote the sense “to find”. Cf. Xenoph. Vect. 4.40.6 and Pl. Pol. 307c. 
68 Cf. Lesher (1991, p. 246). According to his interpretation, men do not simply 
discover what is better but is authoritatively better.  
69 As Reinhardt observed Xenophanes does not refer in B18 to his personal findings 
but he phrases a general remark about human knowledge (1916, p. 141). All the 
same, it is plain to see that, as KRS argue, Xenophanes held himself to be in a special 
state of insight (1983, p. 179).  
70 Cf. Untersteiner (1956, p. CCXXXV). That ἄμεινον is equal to σοφόν is partly 
suggested by the fact that for Xenophanes the process of discovering “what is better” 
is conditioned by intelligent inquiry. For the authoritative implications of the σαφὲς-
δόκος contrast, see analysis below. 
71 Pasquinelli thus concluded that “la conoscenza delle cose non è assoluta, una solo 
relativa”(1976, p. 358).  The interpretations which support a sceptical reading of 
Xenophanes make no mention of fragment B18 and they are focused rather on 
Xenophanes’ δόκος in B34. But Xenophanes clearly affirms the possibility of knowing 
in B18.  




The distinction between human and divine knowledge was a 
traditional belief in Greek culture, which goes back to Homer.72 The 
originality of Xenophanes lies, however, in that with fragment B18 he revises 
the implications of this notion and re-views in an epistemological, and 
potentially philosophical, context. He makes, that is, the natural disparity 
between human (i.e. ordinary) and divine (i.e. extraordinary, and not 
immediately available) knowledge the foundation, upon which a new kind of 
expertise can be pursued.73 Xenophanes was not interested in providing an 
answer to the question of who knows betters, namely gods or men, but in 
providing an answer to the question of how is it possible for men to acquire 
knowledge based on their own powers.  
Fragment B18 then views the question of knowledge from the 
standpoint of the θνητοί. Xenophanes separates mortal knowledge from its 
previously divine sources, since according to him men stand alone in their 
attempt to discover what is “better”. With this statement, furthermore, he 
implies a contrast with the popular belief that the gods are prone to 
communicate their knowledge, as claimed by the epic poets and the diviners. 
In this way he effectively emphasised his personal expertise against other 
traditional types of experts.   
The expertise of a charismatic individual is thus no longer identified 
with the ability to contact or be contacted by divine patrons. Xenophanes 
clearly states in fragment B18 that expert knowledge originates from personal 
                                                 
72 It was a “Gemeinplatz” as Mansfeld points out (1983, p. 212).  
73 Deichgräber claimed that for Xenophanes human understanding is a divine 
property which consists in the combination of certainty (σαφές) with uncertainty 
(δόκος). However, this interpretation disregards the point which Xenophanes makes 
in B18, in which he attempts to discard the communication with the divine as a 
reliable source of knowing and to disassociate divine intervention from human 
knowledge. It is unwise, furthermore, to charge σαφές with a divine overtone, as 
Deichgräber maintains, because in fragment B34 Xenophanes explicitly attributes it 
to men and not to gods (1938, p. 21). 




effort and that it is therefore the product of personal aptitude. The particular 
way in which Xenophanes understood personal expertise is hinted at with 
ἐφευρίσκουσιν, which the context of fragment B18 encourages us to 
understand as thoughtful inquiry. Xenophanes also registers for the first time 
ζήτησις as the concern of individuals who want to lay a claim to a status of 
authority. It then becomes apparent that although Xenophanes does not 
propose a specific method of investigation, he nonetheless attempts to initiate 
the personal quest for the discovery of knowledge.  
             ii) the discovery of “ἄμεινον” and the authoritative implications of 
σαφές and τετελεσμένον in connection with the publication of 
Xenophanes’ account 
  
Xenophanes refers to “what is better” in B18, without defining 
however what in his view qualifies as ἄμεινον. Nor does he attach the 
proposition he articulates about the possibilities open to human intelligence 
explicitly to himself. It is only when one views fragment B18 in light of 
fragment B34 that it is perhaps possible to clarify the concept of ἄμεινον, and 
to throw some light upon the way in which Xenophanes understood his 
personal expertise in connection with it.  
καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔ τις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν οὺδέ τις ἔσται  
εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων. 
Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών, 
αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε. Δόκος δ’ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται. 
 
The exact sense of the key terms σαφὲς and δόκος is hotly debated. The 
general tendency is to translate σαφές as “truth” or as “clear, certain truth”, 
and δόκος as “opinion” or “belief”.74 Regardless of the fact that these senses 
                                                 
74 Cf., e.g., Fränkel (1951): „klar gesehen“ and „Annehmbarkeit“ and (1925, p. 184) 
„Wahrheit“ and „Wahn“; Lesher (1991, p.20 and 1978, p. 1): „truth and „belief or 
seeming“; Burnet (1930, p. 121): “certain knowledge” and “fancy” (based on B35’s 
δεδοξάσθω); Guthrie (1965, p. 395): “certain truth” and “opinion”; Barnes (1987, p. 
138) “clear truth” and “belief” (he also reads ἐπὶ πᾶσι as masculine); Freeman (1953, 




appear somehow to refer to the same sense of “knowledge-truth”, it is 
important to distinguish between these possible readings, because they imply 
a different posture of authority.  
Parallel cases from Homeric poetry encourage the translation of σαφές 
as “certain truth”. C. J. Classen pointed out, however, that Homer uses σάφα 
and not σαφές with this sense.75 Homer, furthermore, uses σάφα in order to 
describe the way in which one knows, i.e. with certainty.76 It then becomes 
apparent that in Homer’s use of the word the stress lies in the certainty with 
which one knows and not in the nature of the knowledge he holds.  
Xenophanes on the other hand, uses σαφές not in order to refer to the manner 
in which knowledge is held, but in order to register knowledge as the 
authoritative object of personal thought, as suggested by the phrase σαφές 
ἴδεν. It then becomes apparent that for Xenophanes σαφές is not a way of 
knowing but knowledge itself.77 Σαφές possibly retains in fragment B34 its 
Homeric sense, for which Xenophanes nonetheless provided a new 
orientation, since he identified it with the product of personal insight.  
Σαφές, and not σάφα, is also attested in Pindar with the sense of what 
is “real” and, consequently, “true”, and we should therefore accept some 
                                                                                                                                            
p. 33): “certain truth” and “opinion (seeming)”; KRS (1983, p. 180): “truth” and 
“seeming” (indifferent to the genre of ἐπὶ πᾶσι); McKirahan (1994, p. 66): “truth” and 
“belief” (also indifferent to the genre of ἐπὶ πᾶσι); Popper (1998, p. 46): “certain truth: 
sichere Wahrheit” and “web of guesses: Vermutung”; Untersteiner (1956, p. CCXIX): 
“chiaramente esperimentato” and “il congetturare”; and Pasquinelli (1976): “essata 
verità” and “sapere apparente”. Sextus’ interpretation here that σαφὲς μὲν ἔοικε 
λέγειν τἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ γνώριμον and δόκον δὲ τὴν δόκησιν καὶ τὴν δόξαν is hardly 
helpful (Advs. math., 7.50.1).  
75 As pointed out also by Classen (1989, p. 100).  
76 Cf. Β 252: οὐδέ τί πω σάφα ἴδμεν, ὅπως ἔσται τάδε ἔργα; Ε 183: σάφα δ’οὐκ οἶδ’ εἰ 
θεός ἐστιν; and Δ 730: ἐπιστάμεναι σάφα θυμὦι.  Cf. also: Ο 632; Υ 201; β 108; and ω 
404. The sense given in the “Lexicon des frühgrieschen epos” (1956) is that of 
“ἀκριβὦς”, “ἀληθὦς”, and “ἀσφαλὦς”:  genaue klare Weise nur bei Verben des 
Wissens, Könnens”; cf. also, Pind. Isth. 7.27: ἴστω γὰρ σαφὲς.   
77 In Homeric poetry on the other hand a similar use of σαφές is attested only 
once.Cf. Hymn. Hom., In Merc., 208: σαφὲς δ’ οὐκ οἶδα. 




relevance of σαφές with truth.78 In Aeschylus, however, it is regularly used of 
a λόγος presented to a person of the drama in order to describe its making 
sense to the one who hears it. In this case the epithet σαφής refers to the 
comprehensive quality of an account.79 In addition, σαφές retains, 
furthermore, the sense of “being intelligent” later in Plato.80 It then seems that 
σαφές could be used in Xenophanes’ time in order to imply not just the ability 
to express a real truth but also the ability to discern what is true in the first 
place. It is nonetheless implied in the English translation of σαφές as “clear-
truth”, provided that one accepts by “clear” the intellectual ability of 
recognising that which is true.  
Now, the pairing of σαφές with οἶδα, or with other words which 
signify knowledge, is not wholly unusual. However, Xenophanes pairs σαφές 
with ἴδεν, which may also imply the faculty of vision. This expression is an 
odd one but not unparalleled. In Aeschylus’ Supplices, for example, the 
Chorus retorts to Atossa: ξυνῆκας, ὤμμάτωσα γὰρ σαφέστερον.81 In this case, 
the phrase “to see the σαφές” stands for “to realise the σαφές”, which signifies 
an intellectual ability. For this reason it is not exactly safe to translate the 
phrase σαφὲς ἴδεν as “knowing what is true”, since it seems that σαφὲς ἴδεν 
                                                 
78 Cf. Pind. Ol. 8.45: σαφὲς οὐκ ἄν εἰδείην λέγειν ποντίαν ψάφων ἀριθμόν; Ol. 8.103: 
τά τ’ ἐσσόμενα τότ’ ἄν φαίην σαφές. Cf. also Isth. 6.20: τέθμιον σαφέστατον. It seems 
however that for Pindar, too, the noun basically retains the Homeric echo of 
“knowing with certainty”.  
79 Cf. Aesch. Suppl., 930: ἐννέπω σαφέστερον; Choeph. 767: λέγ’ αὖθις, ὡς μάθω 
σαφέστερον; and Pers. 705: κλαυμάτων λήξασα τὦνδε καὶ γόων, σαφές τί μοι λέξον, 
i.e. something which will make sense to me, something other than your 
incomprehensible cry. Whenever Homer combines σαφές with words which signify 
λόγος, σαφές still means “true” and not “comprehensible”, cf. Δ 404: μὴ ψεύδε’ 
ἐπιστάμενος σάφα εἰπεῖν; and ρ 106: νόστον σοῦ πατρὸς σάφα εἴπεμεν, εἴ που 
ἄκουσας. Cf. also, β 31 and β 43. Pindar uses the word once in order to denote critical 
ability. Cf. Nem. 11. 43-5: ἐκ Διὸς ἀνθρώποις σαφὲς οὐχ ἕπεται τέκμαρ. 
80 Cf. Ast (1908), sub σαφής: “perspicuous, manifestus, clarus, evidens; certus”. 
Although for Plato the word does not have the same bearing which it obviously has 
for Xenophanes, cf. Leg. 11 921b; and Phaed. 69D. 
81 Cf. Suppl. 467. Cf. also the expression φρὴν ὠμματωμένη (Ch. 854), a mind 
furnished with eyes, i.e. capable of realising exactly because it is capable of seeing.  




does not so much refer to the stage of “knowing” but to the stage of perceiving 
knowledge. This distinction is a subtle one, albeit significant. It is thus better 
to understand the phrase σαφὲς ἴδεν as the intellectual ability to discern what 
is true from what is not.  
 This encourages us to understand σαφές in connection with 
ἐφευρίσκουσιν of fragment B18, since both words have an intellectual quality. 
If this is true, then Xenophanes implies that his expertise was conditioned by 
inquiry (ζήτησις, B18), which was carried out with personal reflection (Β34). 
In addition, the careful ordering of the words in fragment B34 shows that 
σαφές corresponds to τετελεσμένον, and that the two are for Xenophanes 
inextricably connected. If this is true, then Xenophanes registers 
τετελεσμένον as an inept attempt at expressing the σαφές. This impression is 
further encouraged by the fact that Xenophanes treats both σαφές and 
τετελεσμένον as basic verbal features of an account. This is also implied by 
the fact they are both followed by λέγων or εἰπών, with which Xenophanes 
describes the way in which an account is published. Both σαφές and 
τετελεσμένον, that is, refer to the verbal qualities which a thought acquires 
when it is communicated by an individual to the public.  
In modern scholarship τετελεσμένον is generally construed as 
“complete” 82 in the sense of “real” or “true”.83 It seems safer, however, to 
                                                 
82 So according to Heitsch: “τετελεσμένον ist das Was Ziel und Absicht erreicht 
hat“(1966, p. 227), and according to Wöhrle (1993b, p. 9).  
83 Lesher (1978, p. 20): “speaking of the real”; Burnet (1930, p. 121), Freeman (1953, p. 
33), and KRS (1983, p. 180): “the complete truth”; Barnes (1987, p. 138): “something 
that is the case”; Guthrie (1965, p. 395): “what is true”; Popper (1998, p. 46): “the 
perfect truth” and “vollkommene Wahrheit”; McKirahan (1994): “what is absolutely 
the case”; Gigon (1945, p. 178): “in vollkommenster Weise das Wikliche zu 
beschreiben, wie es ist” (but there is no need to translate τετελεσμένον as an 
adverb); Mansfeld (1983, p. 211) “vollkommensten”; Fränkel (1925, p. 184): 
“allervollendeste”; and Pasquinelli (1976): “una cosa compiuta”. The only translation 
that lays emphasis not so much on the quality of “truth” but on its uttering is that of 
Untersteiner (1956, p. CCXIX): “è riuscito a esprimere nel mondo migliore la realità”. 




accept that τετελεσμένον keeps in Xenophanes the Homeric meaning of 
“complete”. The reason for this is that, if we understand τετελεσμένον as 
“real”, then what Xenophanes says in fragment B34 amounts to absurdity. If 
Xenophanes really considered τετελεσμένον as “true”, that is, then what 
possible reason would he have in openly excluding it completely from the 
communication of the σαφές? It must then be that Xenophanes means 
something else when he refers to τετελεσμένον, and that he uses it with its 
standard sense of “complete”.  
In addition, the example of δόκος shows that Xenophanes could 
employ opinion-vocabulary, whenever this was his intention. It therefore 
seems unlikely that he would use a word as ambiguous as τετελεσμένον in 
order to denote by implication what is “falsely true”.84 Nor is τετελεσμένον 
attested with the sense of “false belief” in Greek literature. The possibility 
thus remains that it is better to understand τετελεσμένον as a defiant feature 
in the way in which an account is communicated.  Seen in this light, 
Xenophanes uses τετελεσμένον in order to describe that particular 
characteristic, which some accounts have, and which makes them give the 
impression to their audience that they are consistent and ordered, i.e. 
“complete”. Τετελεσμένον thus refers to the way in which a personal view is 
communicated and not as much to its truth-value. If this is true, then 
Xenophanes launches an attack against other individuals, who also laid a 
claim to a status of authority.  
Lesher suggested that τετελεσμένον implies an attack on the prestige 
of oracles and of the diviners. He argues in his examination that 
                                                                                                                                            
He is also the only one who understands σαφές as “chiaramente esperimentato”, i.e. 
as the expression of what is true. 
84 Fränkel on the other hand took the phrase τετελεσμένο εἰπών as synonymous to 
τὸ ὄν εἰπών, i.e. as speaking the truth (1925, p. 188). So also for Luther who 
understood τετελεσμένον as a “Bezeichnung für Wahrheit, Wirklichkeit”(1958,  p. 
84), and Wöhrle (1993b, p. 9). The point here is that τετελεσμένον could not have for 
Xenophanes the sense of “true”, because it is attributed to those who are deceived.   




τετελεσμένον should be viewed in connection with its Homeric use. In 
Homer, that is, τετελεσμένον bears the sense of “speaking that which has 
been brought about or will be brought about”, which Lesher identifies with 
the major function of divination. In his view, the point which Xenophanes 
wishes to make in fragment B34 is that even those who are supposed to know 
in fact know nothing at all.85 Lesher’s interpretation is attractive, because it 
defends Xenophanes’ desire to compete with other prestigious experts. This 
view is further supported by Cicero’s testimony, according to which 
Xenophanes was interested in criticising the art of divination.86  
However, Homer uses τετελεσμένον in this sense in order to refer to a 
speech which is uttered, and he does not use it in these of “realisation of a 
prophecy”, as Lesher’s analysis conveniently assumes.87 In addition, there is 
nothing in fragment B34, which encourages such a reading of τετελεσμένον. 
Quite on the contrary, Xenophanes refers to ἀνήρ in the first line, something 
which implies that he makes a general statement about human knowledge 
and not about the knowledge of a specialised group.88 If Xenophanes really 
intended to attack the reliability of a specific type of expertise, then it is odd 
that he does not openly acknowledge the kind of expertise which he has in 
                                                 
85 Cf. Lesher (1978, p. 12ff.).  
86 Cf. Cic. de div. I 3.5 : divinationem funditus sustulit.  
87 Lesher bases his case on A 108, in which Agamemnon says to Calchas “ἐσθὸν δ’ 
οὔτε τι πω εἴπας οὔτε ἐτέλεσσας”. Only that the way in which τελὦ is used in this 
Homeric verse does not so much recall the art of the prophets. It expresses rather the 
traditional contrast between words and actions, as its contraposition to εἴπας 
indicates. Had it been here used a noun of τελὦ in the place of ἔπος to complement 
εἴπας, then this line from Homer would provide more adequate support for Lesher’s 
suggestion.  
88 Lesher cites Soph. OT 390: σὺ μάντις εἶ σαφής (of Teiresias), which in his view 
proves that Xenophanes uses σαφές in order to imply the prophets. Sophocles does 
not employ σαφές, however, in the same sense with Xenophanes, because he refers 
to the popular understanding of mantic pronouncements as incomprehensible. Cf. 
also Aesch. Ag. 1112-3: νῦν γὰρ ἐξ αἰνιγμάτων ἐπαργέμοισι θεσφάτοις ἀμηχανὦ; 
and Soph. OT 439: αἰνικτὰ καὶ ἀσαφὴ λέγεις. It is therefore unwise to identify σαφές 
with the core of mantic expertise.  




mind, as he does elsewhere for Homer and Hesiod.89 It then seems that there 
is no compelling reason to assume that Xenophanes criticises in fragment B34 
the art of manticism specifically. At the same time, however, it seems that 
Xenophanes objects in fragment B34 to the reliability of other accounts, which 
also claim to disclose the σαφές about the gods and περὶ πάντων.  
The phrase ἀμφὶ θεὦν καὶ ἅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων defines the content 
of Xenophanes’ knowledge (εἰδὼς), which fragment B18 encourages us to 
understand as the product of personal inquiry (ἐφευρίσκουσιν). At the same 
time, Xenophanes states with this phrase to his audience the topic of his 
hexameters. This phrase is, as Deichgräber put it, a “Thema Stellung”.90 
Xenophanes thus declares here his personal (λέγω) two-fold interest. On the 
one hand he is interested in examining the nature of the gods (ἀμφί θεὦν) 
and on the other hand he is concerned with περὶ πάντων. The former is 
manifested in his criticism of the way in which the gods were represented in 
epic poetry, while the latter possibly implies his investigation of the cosmos in 
his hexameters. Although Xenophanes does not refer explicitly to φύσις in his 
poetry, a considerable amount of his surviving fragment examines the 
cosmos. In addition, the expression περὶ πάντων may perhaps imply the 
ambition of the first cosmologies to interpret the cosmos as a whole.91 It 
should be pointed out, however, that Xenophanes does not present in his 
                                                 
89 Cf. frs. B9 and B10.   
90 Cf. Deichgräber (1938, p. 19). Scholars generally agree that Xenophanes states with 
this phrase the topic of his account. Barnes argues that this phrase refers to 
Xenophanes’ theology and natural philosophy, and concludes upon the existence of a 
“fairly systematic and comprehensive parcel of scientific and philosophical verse” in 
Xenophanes (1987, p. 84). In the same vein, Jaeger maintains that Xenophanes is here 
concerned with the presentation of a “Weltanschauung” (1967, p. 39). So also for 
Gigon (1945, p. 178), and KRS (1983, p. 167). The importance of this phrase is 
extensively examined by Classen, who reads it as a “programmatic statement” in 
connection with Xenophanes’ wish to lay a claim to a superior status (1989, p. 101).  
91 So according to Fränkel, who observed that Xenophanes “wie die Ionischen 
Naturphilosophen ein Weltbild konstruiert“ (1925, p. 180).  




poetry a systematic interpretation of the cosmos. All the same, it is possible to 
trace in his fragments a recurrent interest in the world.  
 
            iii) The authoritative importance of the belief that “to see is to know” 
 
Fränkel made the interesting suggestion that Xenophanes’ use of ἴδεν, 
εἰδώς, and οἶδε in fragment B34, which are etymologically associated, implies 
the “philosophical” conviction that “to see is to know”.92 This view is 
attractive for many reasons. To begin with, it is certainly not easy to question 
the etymological relation of the stem ιδ- with the stem οιδ-.93 In Xenophanes’ 
time, furthermore, was still highly valued. This is manifested not only it the 
example of historiography, but also in the traditional belief of poetry that the 
Muses are omniscient, because they are omnipresent, i.e. because they can 
witness everything with their eyes.94 In fragment B28, furthermore, 
Xenophanes approaches with a reflective spirit the natural phenomenon of 
the rainbow-Iris. According to Deichgräber, fragment B28 is a “Vermutung 
des Wahrscheinlichen” from visual experience.95 In a similar vein, KRS argue 
that the testimony A33 possibly suggests a plausible argument from observed 
facts.96 
In the previous section it has been argued that σαφές is a word which 
belongs to Xenophanes’ intellectual vocabulary, since it refers to the critical 
                                                 
92 Cf. Fränkel (1925). The first serious attempt to systematically object to his reading 
was undertaken by Heitsch (1966, esp., pp. 208-16).  
93 Cf. Smyth (1956, paragr. 795): the stem of the verb means “to find out”; cf. Lat. vid-
eo. Classen holds that Xenophanes’ pairing of these verbs here cannot be coincidental 
(1989, p. 100).  
94 Puelma thus argued that the skill of the epic poet rested upon “die authentischen 
Echtkeit eines Augezeugenberichtes” (1989, pp. 67-8). In a similar vein, Heitsch 
observes that the man on his own knows nothing, whereas the man who is inspired 
by the Muse, as in the case of epic poetry, knows everything (1966, p. 195).  
95 Cf. Deichgräber (1938, p. 20) but also Lesher, ad loc.  
96 Cf. KRS (1983, p. 168).  




ability to realise and perceive that which is true. It then seems that its 
association with ἴδεν and οἶδε in fragment B34 implies mental apprehension, 
which in Xenophanes’ view relies upon an adequate evaluation of the 
information, which the senses provide.97 It is in fact possible to trace in 
Xenophanes’ fragments evidence that he believed in the critical evaluation of 
the sense data. Xenophanes often refers to ordinary observable experience, 
from which he proceeds to draw a conclusion.  
A33: ὁ δὲ Ξενοφάνης μίξιν τῆς γῆς πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν γίνεσθαι 
δοκεῖ καὶ τῶι χρόνωι ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγροῦ λύεσθαι, φάσκων τοιαύτας 
ἔχειν ἀποδείξεις, ὅτι ἐν μέσηι γῆι καὶ ὄρεσιν εὑρίσκονται κόγχαι, 
καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις δὲ ἐν ταῖς λατομίαις λέγει εὑρῆσθαι τύπον 
ἰχθύος καὶ φωκῶν, ἐν δὲ Πάρωι τύπον δάφνης ἐν τῶι βάθει τοῦ 
λίθου, ἐν δὲ Μελίτηι πλάκας συμπάντων τῶν θαλασσίων. Ταῦτα δέ 
φησι γενέσθαι, ὅτε πάντα ἐπηλώθησαν πάλαι, τὸν δὲ τύπον ἐν τῶι 
πηλῶι ξηρανθῆναι.98  
Β16: Αἰθίοπεές τε <θεοὺς σφετέρους> σιμούς μέλανάς τε 
Θρῆικές τε γλαυκοὺς καὶ πυρροὺς <φασι πέλεσθαι> 
 
Fränkel takes fragment B16 as evidence that Xenophanes explains 
everything on the basis of everyday experience.99 This evidence should be 
nonetheless treated with caution. Xenophanes never fully articulates a 
coherent method of inquiry. He does not also single out the senses as a 
reliable or valid source of information, and he never refers explicitly to sense 
perception. He never spells out a specific method of investigation.100 All the 
same, it does seem that he attempts to introduce a new way of knowing, as 
                                                 
97 Fränkel thus understands σαφές as “Erkenntnis die auf Empirie gegründet 
ist“ (1925, p. 191). Fränkel also observes elsewhere that Xenophanes explains 
everything on the basis of “Alttags-erfahrungen”, which he takes as an “Erweiterung 
unserer Denkweise” (1951, p. 381). In a similar vein, Luther interpreted σαφές as 
“Wissen das sich auf Autopsie gründet“ (1958, p. 82), whereas according to Rudberg 
Xenophanes was a “scharfer Beobachter” (1948, p. 128).  
98 Cf. B27: ἐκ γαίης γὰρ πάντα καὶ εἰς γῆν πάντα τελευτᾶι.  
99 Cf. Fränkel (1925, p. 182).  
100 Deichgräber thus credits Xenophanes with a “Tekmerien-methode” (1938, p. 29). 
Guthrie on the other hand is sceptical about whether Xenophanes regarded empirical 
data as trustworthy (1965, p. 397).  




this set of fragments suggests.101 He uses observable facts in order to 
substantiate his objection to the traditional anthropomorphic representation 
of the divine. In this way he implies the need for a new way of thinking, as 
McKirahan observed.102  
In addition, there is one further important phrase in fragment B34, 
which is telling for the nature of Xenophanes’ authority claims. Xenophanes 
uses the phrase αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε in order to describe a case of unreliable 
knowledge. Fränkel interprets this phrase as a statement for that one knows 
from personal experience.103 In a similar fashion, Heitsch contends that 
Xenophanes is here saying that sometimes a view which is regarded as true 
contradicts ordinary experience.104 These interpretations propose that for 
Xenophanes the knowledge which one has must necessarily take into account 
empiric reality, i.e. what one observes with his own eyes (αὐτός). It is possible 
to read αὐτός with a different meaning without however violating the general 
spirit of Fränkel’s and Heitsch’s interpretations.  
 A. Hermann paraphrases this line as follows: “a mortal man may very 
well stumble upon the truth and speak it, without knowing of course that he 
did”.105 It is clear that in this case one perceives what he mistakenly considers 
“true” and not the real truth. This reading is further encouraged by the 
pairing of αὐτὸς οὐκ οἶδε with εἰ τύχοι, which implies the randomness with 
which one commits oneself to a wrong view. Interestingly enough, the idea 
appears also in Heraclitus and Empedocles.106 It therefore seems safe to accept 
                                                 
101 It is for this reason hard to agree with Curd on that Xenophanes completely lacks a 
method, since the way in which he uses observable experience attests to the opposite 
(1998, p. 7).  
102 Cf. McKirahan (1994, p. 68).  
103 Cf. Fränkel (1925, p. 187).  
104 Cf. Heitsch (1966, p. 230).  
105 Cf. Hermann (2004, p. 208).  
106 Cf. Heraclitus B1 and Empedocles B2.5: αὐτὸς δὲ μόνον πεισθέντες, ὅτῳ 
προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος.  




that Xenophanes means with αὐτὸς οὐκ οἶδε that “he himself does not know”, 
i.e. he does not know consciously. In this case he would be unable to provide 
the reason why his personal belief can stand, when asked to.  
If this is true, it then becomes apparent that Xenophanes actually 
affirms in fragment B34 that knowledge alone is not sufficient for laying a 
claim to a status of authority. In his view, there must be some correspondence 
between one’s personal belief and observable reality, which can to some 
extent vouchsafe the validity of his knowledge. Xenophanes did not go as far 
as to establish a specific method of thinking, he does nonetheless seem to be 
pointing to the need for a new one. It is then possible to accept Xenophanes as 
a conscious thinker, despite the fact that he does not have a sophisticated 
method at his disposal, since in his poetry he raises the question of 
epistemology and of valid knowing.  
It then seems that σαφὲς refers to the intellectual ability to discern the 
truth based upon a critical evaluation of the sense data. If someone fails to 
pursue knowledge in this way, then he is prone to conceive of a δόκος, which 
is for Xenophanes the exact opposite to σαφές. For this reason δόκος refers to 
a view which lacks intelligence and coherence. Some scholars have 
interpreted the σαφές-δόκος contrast as the first step taken towards 
Parmenides’ distinction of the two possible routes of inquiry, namely ἀληθείη 
and δόξα.107 At any event, the noun δόκος is an ἅπαξ εἰρημένον and its exact 
meaning is therefore unclear.  
                                                 
107 So according to Untersteiner (1959, p. CCXXVI), Guthrie (1965, p. 399), Hussey 
(1972, p. 143), and Popper (1998, p. 136). Dumont understands with this contrast “la 
distinction entre vérité et opinion” (1988, p. 121), while Gigon understands σαφές as 
“die Währe Erkenntnis” and δόκος as “die eigene unmittelbare Auschauung der 
Dinge” (1945, p. 178). Vamvakas, furthermore, reads a deliberate contrast between 
the “objektiver Warhheit (σαφές) and “subjektiver Gewissheit” (δόκος), (2006, p. 
141). So also according to Popper (1998, p. 49).  




Homer uses δοκ- words in order to denote personal belief, regardless 
of whether this belief is true or not.108 It is noteworthy that Hesiod, who 
brought into play the distinction between truth and semblance, did not 
describe false opinion as δόξα but as ψεύδεα and ἐτύμοισι ὁμοῖα.109 Although 
the noun δόκος occurs only in Xenophanes, the compound forms of δόκος are 
attested in other writers, from which it is possible to acquire some insight into 
the sense with which Xenophanes uses δόκος in fragment B34.  
Homer’s word for “hostel” is ξενοδόκος, which literally means the 
“house which accepts guests”.110 In a similar fashion his word for “quiver” is 
ἱοδόκος, which literally means “the case which accepts arrows”, i.e. the case in 
which arrows are placed.111 Hermes is thus referred to as πυληδόκος, which 
does not so much mean “gate-keeper” as the one who stands at the gates of 
Hades and receives the souls of those deceased.112 In addition, Aeschylus uses 
ἱεροδόκα and ἱκεταδόκος, with which he describes the one who receives the 
sacred or the suppliants respectively.113 
It then seems safe to agree with Fränkel in that δόκος stems from 
δέκομαι, which means “to take in” or “to accept”.114 In the context of fragment 
                                                 
108 Cf. Ζ 90: ὅς οἱ δοκέει χαριέστατος ἠδὲ μέγιστος; Z 338-9: δοκέει μοι λώιον 
ἔσσεσθαι; Ι 103: ἐγὼν ἐρέω ὥς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἄριστα; cf. also, Μ 215, Ν 735, and Ψ 
130. Homer uses this verb in order to denote false belief just once, in κ 415, when the 
companions of Odysseus mistake Circe’s island for their homeland (δόκησε δ’ ἄρα 
σφίσι θυμός). He also uses it in the sense of “to decide”, thereby implying critical 
ability. Cf. Α 376: εἰ δ’ὕμιν δοκέει τόδε λωϊτερον καὶ ἄμεινον ἔμμεναι, i.e. if this 
looks preferable to you, because you think that it is better, then you will decide to 
ἀνδρὸς ἑνὸς βίοτον νήποινον ὀλέσθαι. Cf. also, β 141.  
109 Cf. Th. 27.  
110 Cf. θ 210.  
111 Cf. φ 12; Φ 60; and Ο 444. See also the word ἱστοδόκη in Hymn. hom. In Apoll. 504, 
which means “mast-holder”, i.e. a rest which “receives” the mast when it is laid 
down, and Pindar’s ματροδόκοις in Nem. 7.84. 
112 Cf. Hom. Hymn. In Merc. 15.  
113 Cf. Aesch. Suppl. 363 and 713 respectively.  
114 Cf. Fränkel (1925, p. 189). The German translation of δόκος as “Annahme” is thus 
more precise. Heitsch on the other hand objected to Fränkel’s suggestion and insisted 
on reading δόκος as “unsicher und nur-Meinung” (1966, p. 231 ff.). The possibility of 




B34 it is likely that δόκος refers to observable experience, which one 
uncritically “takes in”, i.e. accepts as valid although it is not. Seen in this light, 
it seems safe to accept that Xenophanes uses δόκος not in order to express the 
idea of “false belief” (although this is certainly also implied by his statement in 
fragment B34), but in order to express rather the uncritical, and therefore 
unjustifiable, acceptance of such a belief as true. This interpretation accords, 
moreover, with our reading of the preceding phrase αὐτὸς οὐκ οἶδε, which 
was presented above.115 
It therefore becomes apparent that the σαφές-δόκος contrast does not 
pertain only to a distinction between truth and falsity, as in Hesiod’s famous 
statement. It also implies what human intelligence can perceive as true 
(σαφές) as opposed to the un-thoughtful and un-insightful acceptance of a 
false belief (δόκος). Xenophanes thus advances the truth-semblance contrast 
of Hesiod one step further, since he views it in connection with one’s personal 
awareness and intelligence. In this way Xenophanes improves the significance 
which this distinction has in terms of laying a claim to a completely personal 
status of expert knowledge.  
All the same, it is plain to see that Xenophanes does not employ the 
σαφές-δόκος contrast in order to substantiate or to provide a justification for 
his personal expertise, as one would perhaps expect him to. He simply makes 
                                                                                                                                            
understanding δόκος as “false opinion” has resulted in regarding Xenophanes as a 
sceptic. This view originates in ancient tradition. Cf. Sext. Adv. Math. 7.48.6; Hippol. 
Ref. 10.7. It is accepted by Barnes on grounds that for Xenophanes “true belief does 
not guarantee certain knowledge” (1987, p. 139). So also according to McKirahan 
(1994, p. 67). The sceptical reading of Xenophanes is dismissed by Mansfeld and 
Steinmetz, who contend that Xenophanes did not completely refuse the possibility of 
knowing. Cf. 1983 (p. 211) and 1966 (p. 32), respectively. According to Heidel, 
furthermore, Xenophanes is certainly not a sceptic, because he does not speak in his 
poetry as someone who does not believe at all in the possibility of knowledge (1943, 
p. 275).  
115 So also according to Heitsch, who takes the word to mean “unsicher und nur-
Meinung”, whereby the sense of a positive “Probabilitas” is implied (1966, p. 231, fn. 
21).  




a general remark about human knowledge.116 Yet the importance of this 
contrast lies in that it shows that Xenophanes obviously feels uncomfortable 
with existing forms of reasoning and of knowledge, the reliability of which he 
openly questions. However, he does not present a thorough new method 
which can lead to knowledge. He thus refers exclusively to human knowledge 
in general and he never associates his personal expertise with his 
epistemological conclusions. It then follows that Xenophanes fails to construct 
a precise personal identity of expertise in the way in which he presents 
himself to his audience. He emphatically denies any relation with other 
figures of authority, such as athletes, Homer, and Hesiod, but he never 
succeeds in completely distinguishing himself from these figures on grounds 
of a specialised method or of other features which established a specialised 
form of knowledge. 
It is also highly unlikely that he understood himself as a member of a 
specialised group of experts. The surviving evidence from his poetry shows 
that he felt himself as an independent reformer of religious traditional beliefs. 
He does not register this concern, however, as a specialised concern of a 
particular group. He also never acknowledges, either implicitly or explicitly, 
other like-minded individuals. All the same, Xenophanes cannot be with 
much ease categorised into any traditional type of authority of his time. His 
importance as an individual authority lies in his attempt to indicate, though 
not to establish, a new area of concern. 
                                                 
116 Classen takes B34 as a direct attack on poets and philosophers (1989, p. 101). This 
fragment certainly has a polemic character, but against whom in specific in particular 
it is too hard to tell from the surviving text.  




πρὸς θεὦν εἰδότες 
οὔτε κακὸν οὔτ’ἀγαθόν 
Mimnermus, fr. 2 
 
Chapter III: Heraclitus 
 
Heraclitus is certainly more focused upon the investigation of cosmic 
reality than Xenophanes. His fragments also present us with a special case, 
because he is the only thinker examined here, who made use of the medium 
of prose. The kind of prose which Heraclitus composed, however, is quite 
distinct in its own right. His fragments consist of brief statements of truth, 
and resemble apophthegms and oracular responses. In addition, there is no 
textual evidence which indicates a specific sequence of the fragments, and 
each fragment is comprehensible even when read alone. The lack of a firm 
context for these fragments makes it particularly hard to decide their meaning 
categorically. The immediate result of this is that every interpretation of 
Heraclitus has to assume an arranging and ordering of the fragments, which 
makes sense, when viewed from a certain standpoint.  
 
1. The book of Heraclitus 
 
Ancient tradition credits Heraclitus with the composition of a treatise 
titled Περὶ Φύσεως. This testimony cannot be taken into serious account, 
however, because ancient scholars generally tend to attribute such a treatise 
to nearly every early thinker.1  At the same time, it is important to note that 
                                                 
1 Diogenes and Aristotle make a mention a βιβλίον or σύγγραμμα, which was written 
by Heraclitus, which Diogenes divides into three sections: περί τοῦ παντός, 
πολιτικόν, and θεολογικόν (cf. Diog. Laert. Vit. IX.V; and Arist. Rhet. 1407b11). In 
Diogenes’ testimony Heraclitus deposited his work at the temple of Artemis in 
Ephesus (ibid. IX. VI), while this book was apparently available till the time of 




there are some words in the fragments of Heraclitus which seem to imply 
coherence in the exposition, while the first fragment gives the obvious 
impression that it has an introductory quality. This is a hardly substantial 
piece of evidence that Heraclitus composed a book, especially when taken 
alone.  
It seems that the brevity of expression and the apophthegmatic style 
was a conscious choice of Heraclitus, and that it constitutes an essential 
feature of his personal style. It is perhaps in light of this that H. Cherniss 
distinguished Heraclitus’ style from the Ionian historiographic prose. He 
observed in his analysis that while Heraclitus’ sayings are not connected by 
any immediately obvious logical transitions, historiographic prose makes a 
good use of continuity and of systematic exposition.2 
The style which Heraclitus adopts in the surviving fragments 
encourages the impression that even if he ever composed a book, it did not 
have the form of a discursive treatise. It seems reasonable to assume that it 
was at best a compilation of his personal insights, which was fashioned 
according to the collections of the sayings of the Sages. C. Poster and C. Kahn 
have thus understood Heraclitus’ style as an example of gnomic prose, which 
was largely influenced by the kind of expression which is used in proverbs.3 
As far as the way in which Heraclitus published his cosmology is 
concerned, it seems safe to accept that he presented them to a live audience. 
KRS have thus maintained that the fragments of Heraclitus do not so much 
resemble extracts from a continuous written work, but that they give the 
impression that they are oral apophthegms.4 In a similar vein, G.S. Kirk held 
that Heraclitus presented his views orally before they were committed to 
                                                                                                                                            
Socrates, who having read it famously remarked that in order to comprehend its 
content one must be at least as skilful as a Delian swimmer (ibid. XII).  
2 Cf. Cherniss (1951, p. 330).  
3 Cf. Poster (2006, p. 16) and Kahn (1979, p. 7).  
4 Cf. KRS (1983, p. 184).  




writing.5 In the introduction, furthermore, we have noted that the surge of 
literacy in 5th century Greece did not alter considerably the nature of 
communication, since the live performance of a text remained the main 
vehicle for publication.  
According to Kahn, however, Heraclitus’ fragments bear internal signs 
that they were intended for an audience of readers rather than of listeners. In 
his view, this is mainly manifested in Heraclitus’ taste for ambiguity, which 
requires a reading and often a re-reading of the fragment in privacy in order 
for one to grasp the hidden meaning. The same is also suggested, Kahn goes 
on to argue, by the accuracy and occasional perplexity which characterises the 
expression of Heraclitus.6 There is indeed much reason in Kahn’s suggestion, 
but this interpretation is challenged by the conclusions of R. Thomas’ very 
recent study on archaic literacy and orality.7 It seems safe to accept that some 
elements of Heraclitus’ style apparently suggest that he composed with the 
aid of writing. At the same time, however, our knowledge about archaic 
communication encourages the view that his work was published chiefly, 
though not exclusively, through live performance.  
This impression is further reinforced by the fact that Heraclitus 
frequently describes in his fragments communication in terms of listening and 
of speaking, as Lesher also points out in his examination,8 and as suggested 
by the following fragments:  
Β1: καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον...πειρώμενοι 
καὶ   ἐπέων καὶ ἐργων 
                                                 
5 Cf. Kirk (1954, p. 36).  
6 Cf. Kahn (1983, pp. 116-7).  
7 For which see the relevant section of the introduction. 
8 Cf. J. H. Lesher (1981, p. 7). Guthrie takes the phrase τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντες in 
fragment B1 to imply Heraclitus’ conviction that the λόγος exists independently 
from the one who expresses it (1965, p. 425, and p. 434). This may be perhaps 
concluded from B108 but not from fragment B1. It is more likely that Heraclitus is 
referring in the opening of his work to the first encounter of his audience with his 
λόγος, as what follows in this fragment further indicates.  




Β19: ἀκοῦσαι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι οὐδ’ εἰπεῖν 
Β34: ἀξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφοῖσιν ἐοίκασι... 
Β55: ὅσων ὅψις ἀκοὴ μάθησις, ταῦτα ἐγὼ προτιμέω... 
Β87: βλάξ ἄνρθωπος ἐπὶ παντὶ λόγῳ ἐπτοῆσθαι φιλεῖ 
Β101a: ὀφθαλμοὶ τῶν ὤτων ἀκριβέστεροι μάρτυρες 
Β107: κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα... 
Β108: ὁκόσων λόγους ἤκουσα...  
  
This set of fragments shows that Heraclitus considered important both 
the skill of speaking wisely as well as of listening carefully.9 The latter 
obviously refers to the audience of Heraclitus, who can gain access to a higher 
knowledge, such as the one which he discloses, provided of course that they 
pay heed to what Heraclitus has to say. It is for this reason, furthermore, that 
Heraclitus mentions in fragments B55, B101a, and B107 the ears together with 
the eyes as possible sources of acquiring knowledge.  
In addition, written works normally included in their opening the 
name of their author. This would guarantee for that the authorship of the 
work would be handed down to future generations or when transferred to 
other cities, as for example in the following openings of prose works:  
Hecataeus: Ἑκαταῖος ὁ Μιλήσιος ὧδε μυθεῖται... 
Herodotus: Ἡροδότου Θούριου ἱστορίης ἀπόδειξις ἥδε... 
Thucydides: Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ξυνέγραψε... 
 
Although it is possible that Heraclitus used such a seal of authorship in 
the opening of his work, it seems unlikely that such a seal is for us completely 
lost. Perhaps the book of Heraclitus did not have such a seal, exactly because 
it was circulated by the author himself in a small gathering.10 The same is 
perhaps also implied by the fact that Heraclitus uses the unusual διηγεῦμαι in 
                                                 
9 For an examination of these two skills in Greek culture, see Robb (1983b, p. 156, and 
p. 159 in connection with Heraclitus’ style).  
10 For an analysis of this issue, see the relevant section in the introduction.  




his introductory fragment, while Hecataeus for instance uses γράφω, which 
immediately points towards communication through writing.11 
It is also important to point out that Heraclitus is the first thinker under 
examination, who openly registers cosmological inquiry as a valid topic for an 
account, as clearly stated in fragment B1:  
Τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐόντος ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ 
πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον. Γινομένων γὰρ 
πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸνδε ἀπείροισιν ἐοίκασι, πειρώμενοι καὶ 
ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιούτων, ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγεῦμαι κατὰ φύσιν 
διαιρέων ἕκαστον καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει. Τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους 
ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν, ὅκωσπερ ὁκόσα 
εὕδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται.  
 
With this fragment Heraclitus apparently introduces himself to his 
audience. It is therefore only natural to find here the key features of his 
thought, which potentially distinguish him from others, but also important 
information about the way in which he understands and attempts to put 
across his personal expertise and superiority. In fragment B1 Heraclitus 
discloses the two most prominent features of his thought. He refers to the new 
concept of the cosmic λόγος, according to which everything in the world 
occurs (γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε), and which he 
immediately associates with human intelligence (ἀξύνετοι).12  
It then becomes apparent that Heraclitus openly states in the opening 
of his work the topic of his discussion: it is an examination of the essence of 
the cosmic λόγος. Unlike Xenophanes, furthermore, Heraclitus appears to 
have a more clear understanding of the content and focus of the superior 
                                                 
11 Kahn takes ἐπέων διηγεῦμαι as a phrase, which is synonymous to the phrase τὰ 
ἀληθέα λέγειν (1979, p. 121). This suggests that Heraclitus aims with his account in 
disclosing what in his view is true. In a similar vein, Marcovich has proposed that 
κατὰ φύσιν of B1 is an alternative expression for ὅκως ἔχει, while διαιρέων is 
equivalent to φράζων, which forms a chiasmus (1967, p. 7).  
12 For the use of words denoting intelligence in Heraclitus, see also table VII in the 
Appendix.  




knowledge, which he reveals to his audience. He also appears to be more self-
aware of that the investigation of the cosmos can constitute a substantial 
domain of knowledge, on grounds of which expertise can be claimed.  
In addition, the fact that Heraclitus views the importance of his 
message in connection with personal intelligence, speaks volumes about the 
specialty of his expertise and the manner of his self-projection as an 
individual who is worth public attention. It implies in other words the reason 
why he considered his message to be of such great importance. Heraclitus 
also establishes in fragment B1 a sharp contrast between ἐγὼ and οἱ ἄλλοι, as 
K. Reinhardt has pointed out.13 This contrast occurs frequently in Heraclitus’ 
fragments, to the examination of which we shall now turn.  
 
2. Heraclitus and the others 
i) Heraclitus against mankind 
 
Heraclitus frequently remarks upon the way in which men fail to 
perceive that which is true.14  
B2: τοῦ λόγου δ’ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες                                 
φρόνησιν 
B17: οὐ γὰρ φρονέουσι τοιαῦτα πολλοί, ὁκόσοι ἐγκυρεῦσιν, οὐδὲ 
μαθόντες γινώσκουσιν, ἑωυτοῖσι δὲ δοκέουσι 
B70: παίδων ἀθύρματα νενόμικεν *sc. Ἡράκλειτος+ εἶναι τὰ 
ἀνθρώπινα δοξάσματα 
B72: ὧι μάλιστα διηνεκῶς ὁμιλοῦσι λόγῳ τῶι τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι, 
τούτῳ διαφέρονται, καὶ οἷς καθ’ ἡμέραν ἐγκυροῦσι, ταῦτα αὐτοῖς 
ξένα φαίνεται 
B73: οὐ δεῖ ὥσπερ καθεύδοντας ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ τότε 
δοκοῦμεν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν.  
 
                                                 
13 Cf. Reinhardt (1916, p. 217). According to Reinhardt οἱ ἄλλοι is “im stärksten 
Gegensatze zu dem hervogehobenen ἐγώ“.  
14 See also Table II in the Appendix, for the vocabulary which Heraclitus uses, when 
he refers to error or false belief.  




This set of fragments illustrates that what men fail to perceive 
according to Heraclitus is the nature of the cosmic λόγος, although it is for 
Heraclitus potentially graspable. Heraclitus thought that men live 
unconsciously and that they believe in their personal point of view (B2, B17), 
which is nonetheless alienated from the real cosmic principle (B72). This 
eventually brings about impression rather than true knowledge (B70, B73). It 
then becomes apparent that Heraclitus considered himself better than the 
members of his audience, exactly because of his ability to acquire insight into 
the true nature of the cosmic λόγος. The crucial characteristic is that 
Heraclitus is certainly more specific than Xenophanes about the why he wants 
to be heard, but also about why he considers himself worthy of public 
attention. However, although Heraclitus displays some specialisation in terms 
of his distinct topic of investigation, he does not appear to be aware of 
cosmological theorising as a distinct area of concern.  
At the same time, however, Heraclitus refers to individuals who have 
different concerns and priorities in their accounts than him, and from whom 
he nonetheless differentiates his expertise. In most cases the σοφίη of these 
individuals is well-established, and their list is quite impressive:  
B28: καὶ Δίκη καταλήψεται ψευδῶν τέκτονας καὶ μάρτυρας 
B40: πολυμαθίη νόον ἔχειν οὐ διδάσκει. Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδασκε 
καὶ Πυθαγόρην αὖτίς τε Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον 
B56: ἐξηπάτηνται οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς την γνῶσιν τῶν φανερῶν 
παραπλησίως Ὁμήρῳ, ὅς ἐγένετο τῶν Ἑλλήνων σοφώτερος 
πάντων. 
B57: διδάσκαλος δὲ πλείστων Ἡσίοδος. Τοῦτον ἐπίστανται πλεῖστα 
εἰδέναι, ὅστις ἡμέρην καὶ εὐφρόνην οὐκ ἐγινωσκεν. Ἔστι γὰρ ἕν. 
B58: οἱ γοῦν ἰατροί, φησὶν ὁ Ἡράκλειτος, τέμνοντες, καίοντες, 
πάντῃ βασανίζοντες κακῶς τοὺς ἀρρωστοῦντας, ἐπαιτέονται μηδὲν 
ἄξιοι μισθὸν λαμβάνειν παρὰ τῶν ἀρρωστούντων, ταὐτὰ 
ἐργαζόμενοι, τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰς νόσους.  
B104: τίς γὰρ αὐτῶν νόος ἢ φρήν; Δήμων ἀοιδοῖσι πείθονται καὶ 
διδασκάλῳ χρείωνται ὁμίλῳ οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι «οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί, ὀλίγοι 
δὲ ἀγαθοί». 




B108: ὁκόσων λόγους ἤκουσα, οὐδεὶς ἀφικνεῖται εἰς τοῦτο, ὥστε 
γιγνώσκειν, ὅτι σοφόν ἐστι πάντων κεχωρισμένον  
 
Heraclitus explicitly acknowledges in these fragments Homer, Hesiod, 
Pythagoras, the doctors and the bards, Hecataeus, and even Xenophanes. This 
characteristic strongly suggests that Heraclitus is unable to perceive of clear 
boundaries between different areas of expertise, and that he does not consider 
himself a member of a specialised group of experts. This is most strikingly 
illustrated by the fact that Heraclitus also distinguishes himself from 
Xenophanes, although they both apparently shared the same interest in 
cosmological inquiry.  
Fragment B104 in particular shows that what Heraclitus wants from his 
audience is recognition. The respect in which he claims to differ from other 
individual experts is stated as the cosmic knowledge which he discloses in his 
account. Clearly then, what Heraclitus asks from his audience is not only 
social recognition but recognition as someone who knows the truth about the 
nature of the cosmos. His cosmic knowledge is what in his view differentiates 
him from both his audience as well as from other charismatic individuals. It is 
for this reason, furthermore, that he lays a claim to a special status of insight.  
In addition in fragment B108 Heraclitus acknowledges the existence of 
other cosmological accounts. M. Marcovich observed that the phrase λόγους 
ἤκουσα of B108 clearly implies “teaching” or “doctrines”.15 In the same vein, 
G.S. Kirk maintained that λόγους is likely means “accounts”, even perhaps 
“theories”.16 It is possible to add to this the μάρτυρας of fragment B28, which 
may perhaps also imply other accounts. If these scholarly suggestions are 
                                                 
15 Cf. Marcovich (1967, ad B108). 
16 Cf. Kirk (1954, p. 398-9). Kirk also pointed out that this fragment refers to human 
and not to divine wisdom. See also Heidel (1980, p. 712). Colli translates “fra tutti 
coloro le cui espressioni ho ascoltato” (1977, ad B108), and Reinhardt “deren Wort er 
hörte  können doch nur die Philosophen gemeint sein“ (1916, p. 205). Granger on the 
other hand interprets λόγων as “book of others” (1974, p. 249). 




correct, then it seems that in fragment B108 Heraclitus acknowledges other 
accounts, from which he explicitly differentiates his personal σοφίη. In his 
view, other accounts fail to achieve the status of σοφίη, because they do not 
reach the same level of cosmological understanding with Heraclitus’ account, 
as the phrase σοφόν ἐστι πάντων κεχωρισμένον further implies.  
What is also remarkable about fragment B108 is that Heraclitus 
describes his expertise not only in terms of his cosmological knowledge but 
also in terms of someone who is familiar with other accounts, as suggested by 
ἤκουσα. Heraclitus had some knowledge of other accounts, which he 
nonetheless considered unreliable. However, his awareness of other accounts 
never takes the form in the extant fragments of systematic criticism. 
Heraclitus never actually proves in detail wrong a specific view with which 
he disagrees. Although he frequently tells his audience that he is different 
from others, that is, he never explains analytically why their views are wrong 
and never engages in a critical discussion of their theories. This in turn 
implies that Heraclitus failed to pursue his differentiation from other types of 
experts in a more specialised manner.  
 
ii) Heraclitus and the Ionian historiographers 
 
C. Kahn interpreted Heraclitus’ use of the medium of prose as 
evidence that he considered himself a historiographer. He argues in his 
analysis that Heraclitus’ choice of prose was dictated by an existing tradition 
of scientific prose, which was mainly formulated by the historiographers.17 
There is much reason in Kahn’s suggestion, since it is possible to trace several 
similarities between Heraclitus’ sayings and the extant fragments of the 
                                                 
17 Cf. Kahn (1979, pp. 96-7) and (1983, p. 114).  




logographers. A second closer look reveals, however, some significant 
differences.  
To begin with, Heraclitus composed a rather distinct kind of “prose”, 
which cannot be with much easy classified as a standard form of expression 
of any discipline. His style bears considerable similarities with poetic 
expression rather with Ionian prose, as Kirk rightly observed and as the 
compiler of the Suda lexicon thought.18 It seems, that is, that the fragments of 
Heraclitus are prosaic only in the respect that they are deprived of a metrical 
structure, although they are not wholly deprived of an inner-rhythm.19 His 
fragments may be considered “scientific”, furthermore, only insofar as they 
are focused upon a single topic of investigation.  
In addition, it is particularly hard, if not impossible, to detect a 
sequence in the fragments of Heraclitus. The surviving historiographic 
fragments on the other hand display some sequence and coherence in their 
exposition, since they gradually proceed from one point to another. The 
mastery of Heraclitus’ style on the other hand lies in the brevity of his 
expression, which brings to mind the style normally used in aphorisms and 
wisdom literature rather than the style of other prose works of his time.  
                                                 
18 Cf. Kirk (1954, p. 396). Kirk argues that the language of Heraclitus places him in the 
tradition of poetic thought. The Suda compiler comments that Heraclitus ἔγραψε 
πολλὰ ποιητικὦς. 
19 This inner-rhythm consists in the use of patterns either of images (e.g. the 
metaphor of sleep which describes the state of unconsciousness and, hence, 
ignorance) or of verbal echoes (e.g. the repetition of the same consonant in a phrase, 
cf. B25). Lesher thus thought that Heraclitus devised a variant of the epic style, 
because these elements of style made his account easier to remember (1981, p. 7). In a 
similar fashion, Poster maintained that Heraclitus’ style is a middle case between 
traditional epic expression and the scientific prose of the historiographers (2006, p. 
16). It is noteworthy that Heraclitus resorts to epic style in particular, whenever he 
wants to clarify a cosmological view to the audience. See, e.g., B53. In this fragment 
the phrase πόλεμος πατὴρ πάντων uses a familiar picture from epic poetry in order 
to illustrate Heraclitus’ view about cosmic strife.  




Another similarity between Heraclitus and the first historiographers is 
that both accounts are equally fascinated by etymology. H. Granger thus 
suggested that the expertise of Heraclitus can well qualify for that of a 
historiographer.20 However, Heraclitus’ interest in ὀνόματα is something 
more than a matter of mere curiosity, since for Heraclitus the name of an 
object indicates its φύσις. Etymology was thus an important aspect of way in 
which Heraclitus attempted to investigate the cosmos, because it shows that 
the cosmic principle of the λόγος is intrinsically connected with the human 
λόγος, i.e. human language. It therefore becomes apparent that etymology 
had a different role and significance in the account of Heraclitus.21  
In addition, Heraclitus’ understanding of etymology related to the 
special way with which he handled language, as becomes apparent in the 
following set of fragments:  
B2: ξυνὸς γὰρ ὁ κοινὸς. Τοὺ λόγου δ’ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ 
πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν.22  
B8: τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην 
ἁρμονίαν 
B10: συνάψιες ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα, συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον, 
συνᾶιδον διᾶιδον, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἕν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα 
B48: τῶι οὖν τόξῳ ὄνομα βίος, ἔργον δὲ θάνατος  
                                                 
20 Cf. Granger (1974, p. 239).  
21 The belief that words reflect the real nature of a thing was quite common in Greek 
culture. In the Agamemnon, for example, Aeschylus says that the etymology of 
Helen’s name is the following: Ἑλένη> Ἑλένας > ἑλῶ +ναῦς (lines 682-8). According 
to this etymology the etymology of Helen’s name implies the myth about her and the 
peril which the Greeks experienced on her behalf in the Trojan war. See also Pr. 
Vinct. 85-6: ψευδωνύμως σε δαίμονες Προμηθέα καλοῦσιν·αὐτὸν γάρ σε δεῖ 
προμηθέως, ὅτῳ τρόπῳ τῆσδ’ ἐκκυκλισθήσῃ τέχνης. In these lines Prometheus’ 
character does not correspond to what the etymology of his name implies. The 
question of etymology is extensively examined in the Platonic dialogue Cratylus, in 
the opening of which it is stated that ὀνόματος ὀρθότητα εἶναι ἑκάστῳ τὦν ὄντων 
φύσει πεφυκυῖαν (383a).   
22 The word ξυνός is a word-play on ξὺν + νόος, while it also implies the adjective 
κοινὀς, which Heraclitus contrasts to ἴδιος. See also B80, for Heraclitus’ view that war 
(i.e. cosmic reality) is ξυνός, and B89 for the view that the world which men perceive 
with their senses is common (κοινὸς) for all.  





Fragment B48 in particular leads to the conclusion that, since life and 
death are combined in a single object (βίος), they are one, despite the fact that 
they are opposite concepts. It then seems that Heraclitus deliberately 
fashioned his fragments in such a manner that their literary form was a verbal 
representation of the cosmic reality and, more specifically, of his basic tenet 
that “all is one”, by which he meant that all opposites are one.23 Although the 
surviving fragments from historiographic prose are limited, it is still possible 
to discern that these treatises did not treat human language with the same 
sensitivity that we find in Heraclitus. It seems that this was a special feature 
of Heraclitus’ style, which distinguishes his fragments not only from those of 
the historiographers but also from those of other individuals of his time.  
It is also worthy of note that despite the fact that we know of some 
cosmologies which used prose, as in the case of Anaxagoras and 
Anaximander, it seems that there did not exist a tradition of cosmological 
prose treatises. This is lucidly manifested in that the first cosmologies made 
use both of verse and of prose according to the taste, intention, or interest of 
each individual thinker. This in turn suggests that the first cosmologists did 
not care to follow any specific tradition in terms of how they would choose to 
phrase their message. Quite the contrary, they felt free to devise their own 
style and they were unaware of any specific conventions in the area of their 
expertise, for which a tradition of style was not yet formulated.  
Kahn observed in his analysis that Heraclitus’ account and the 
historiographic fragments lay a claim to the same element of “transparency”, 
by which he understands the effort which the audience has to make in order 
to look through the written word.24  This is essentially true but it is possible 
however to trace one crucial difference in the way in which these two 
                                                 
23 For this principle in Heraclitus, see frs. B32 and B50.  
24 Cf. Kahn (1983, p. 118).  




accounts were received by their audience. The audience of the historiographer 
had to apply their ability to think critically, insofar as they had to decide 
whether the version of facts which the historiographer presented was 
plausible or not. It then seems that the ability of the audience to think was in 
this case associated with an element of “historic” actuality. Heraclitus on the 
other hand frequently asks his audience to question the reliability and validity 
of his cosmic truth. Seen in this light, the audience of the historiographer do 
not have to transcend their ordinary point of view. The audience of Heraclitus 
was confronted with the challenge to reject, at least to some extent, observable 
reality in order to grasp the one truth, which lies underneath each visible 
phenomenon, i.e. the cosmic λόγος. This view of Heraclitus about his cosmic 
truth is manifested in the following fragments:  
B54: ἁρμονίη ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείττων 
B123: φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ 
 
In addition, the immediate implication of this view is that Heraclitus 
evaluated sense data differently from the historiographers. The expertise of 
the historiographer related to the testimony of eyewitness, whereas Heraclitus 
put forward a critical appreciation of the information which the senses 
provide. For this reason, furthermore, his account had a transcendental 
quality, because it deducts the invisible from the visible in order to acquire an 
unfailing understanding of the cosmic reality. H. Cherniss thus rightly 
pointed out in his analysis that the basic difference between Heraclitus and 
the historiographers is that for Heraclitus the meaning of the phenomena is a 
necessary requirement for the acquisition of wisdom.25 It then becomes 
                                                 
25 Cf. Cherniss (1951, p. 332). He also maintains that in B107 Heraclitus states with the 
phrase ὀφθαλμοί κακοὶ μάρτυρες the limitations of the instruments of 
historiography. In a similar vein Lesher observes the contrast of νόος of B40 to ὄψις 
of B55, which in his view implies the information which built up upon sense 
perception. See also Marcovich, who held that the mention of βάρβαραι ψυχαί in 




apparent that Heraclitus had a different approach to the question about the 
reliability of the senses and of observable experience in connection with 
knowledge.26   
The expertise of the historiographer had one further essential feature. It 
seems that the historiographic treatises were compilations of information, 
which the author collected in his travels to foreign lands.27 Heraclitus on the 
other hand never expresses a similar concern in his fragments. Quite on the 
contrary, he repeatedly associates his σοφίη with his ability to reflect upon the 
cosmic reality and to interpret it according to a single principle. Marcovich 
has argued, however, that Heraclitus did not dismiss the wisdom of 
historiography as wholly unreliable, and that he considered it as a stage of 
knowing which can lead to a true understanding of the cosmos.28  In his view 
this is manifested in fragment B35:  
Χρὴ γὰρ εὖ μάλα πολλῶν ἵστορας φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας εἶναι  
 
To begin with, it is not beyond any shadow of doubt that this is an 
authentic fragment, since it is an indirect quotation. At any event, the tone of 
this fragment is neutral and it does not generally give the impression that it 
expresses a criticism about a specific type of expert knowledge, such as that of 
                                                                                                                                            
B107 implies the unwarranted authority of the historiographer (1983, p. 156). Colli 
thus translated πολυμαθίη of B40 as “ricchezza di esperienza” (1977, ad B40).  
26 Kahn thus remarked that “the philosopher must reveal to his readers a world with 
which they are in some sense already familiar” (1983, p. 120). This is certainly 
implied by Heraclitus’ criticism of other accounts on grounds that οἷς καθ’ ἡμέραν 
ἐγκυροῦσι ταῦτα αὐτοῖς ξένα φαίνεται (B72). It should be pointed out, however, 
that a considerable part of his cosmic λόγος does not directly correspond to visible 
reality. 
27 The connection between wisdom and travelling was common in Greek culture. 
Odysseus, for example, is the standard mythological figure, the wisdom of whom 
was understood as the knowledge which he acquired during his wandering. 
According to Herodotus, moreover, Croesus considered Solon as a wise man, 
because he travelled φιλοσφέων καὶ θεωρίης εἵνεκεν (Hist. 1.30.9). The same belief is 
perhaps suggested by Xenophanes’ B8.  
28 Cf. Marcovich (1967, ad B35).  




the historiographers. It is also questionable, whether ἵστορες refers to the 
historiographers in specific and not to those who are learned and 
knowledgeable. It then becomes apparent that Heraclitus differs from the 
historiographers in several crucial respects, especially in terms of the way in 
which he sought knowledge.29  
3. The wise ἕν and the unwise πολυμαθίη 
 
In fragment B40 Heraclitus openly attacks other individuals, who have 
achieved social recognition.  
Πολυμαθίη νόον ἔχειν οὺ διδάσκει. Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ 
Πυθαγόρην αὖτίς τε Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον.  
 
The essence of Heraclitus’ disagreement with the expertise of these 
individuals is located in πολυμαθίη.  The importance of this fragment lies in 
the fact that Heraclitus explicitly associates knowledge with personal 
intelligence, as the phrase νόον ἔχειν implies. This in turn implies that for 
Heraclitus wisdom is the product of a theoretical activity. Granger maintained 
that in fragment B40 Heraclitus wishes to stress the importance of thinking for 
oneself, which he contrasts to the uncritical acceptance of knowledge which 
others disclose.30 It does seem, however, that the major concern of Heraclitus 
in this fragment is to contrast the knowledge of many different and unrelated 
truths with the knowledge of a single truth, as F.M. Cornford and W.K.C. 
                                                 
29 For the view that Heraclitus differs from the historiographers, see also Granger 
(1974, p. 238) but also Cornford (1957, p. 184).  Cornford, however, saw a major 
difference between Heraclitus’ “mystic temperament” and the “Ionian rationalism” 
of historiography. The mystical quality of Heraclitus is discussed in the following 
section. It seems hard to accept, however, that in B40 Heraclitus expresses his 
contempt exclusively for Ionian science and rationalism, because he also refers to 
individuals, who do not exactly fit this description. It seems that this fragment is a 
general attack against others.  
30 Cf. Granger (1974, pp. 235-46). Granger then goes on to make the interesting 
suggestion that with B40 Heraclitus objects to the second-hand learning from the 
Muse of epic poetry (p. 252).  




Guthrie observe in their examinations. Cornford bases his case on the fact that 
the πολυ- compound of the noun πολυμαθίη implies a deliberate contrast 
with the basic Heraclitean tenet that only the ἕν is wise.31  This is not to say, 
however, that Heraclitus dismissed altogether the knowledge of many 
different truths. He accepted it as a valid way of knowing provided that these 
different truths were incorporated into a single scheme. This is manifested in 
Heraclitus’ belief, which he repeats several times in his fragments, that there 
is only one truth and, consequently, only one way of knowing and of being 
wise:  
Β32: ἕν τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνός 
ὄνομα 
Β41: εἶναι γὰρ ἕν τὸ σοφόν, ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην ὁτέη ἐκυβέρνησε 
πάντα διὰ πάντων 
Β29: αἱρεῦνται γὰρ ἕν ἀντὶ ἁπάντων οἱ ἄριστοι 
Β108: σοφόν ἐστι πάντων κεχωρισμένον 
 
Fragment B41 in particular very neatly links σοφία and ἕν with the 
knowledge of a cosmic principle which regulates every phenomenon of 
reality. In fragment B108, furthermore, Heraclitus explicitly associates 
wisdom (σοφόν) with cosmic understanding. The Heraclitean notion that only 
the ἕν is wise, may perhaps imply that Heraclitus thought that an account 
worthy of public attention should be focused upon a single topic of 
investigation. If this assumption is true, then it seems that Heraclitus is trying 
to promote in B40 a more specialised form of knowledge. At any event, what 
is specifically remarkable about fragment B40 is that Heraclitus does not 
attack individuals, who belong to the same group of experts, and who share 
the same concerns in their accounts. This in turn implies that Heraclitus could 
                                                 
31 Cf. Cornford (1957, p. 186) and Guthrie (1965, p. 415). The contrast between the 
knowledge of many different things, but worthless, and the knowledge of one, but 
useful, was a favourite one for the Greeks. Cf., e.g., Arch. Fr. 20W: πόλλ’ οἶδ’ 
ἀλώπηξ, ἄλλ’ ἐχῖνος ἕν μέγα; Aesch. Fr. 286Sn: ὁ χρήσιμ’ εἰδὼς, οὐχ ὁ πολλ’ εἰδώς 
σοφός, and Margit. 46: πολλά ἠπίστατο ἔργα, κακὦς δ’ ἠπίστατο πάντα.  




not distinguish fixed borders of expertise. It also suggests that he does not 
perceive himself as a member of a specific group. This is lucidly manifested in 
that he also differentiates himself in fragment B40 from Xenophanes, although 
they both shared the same interest in discovering the nature of the cosmos.  
4. The style of Heraclitus 
 
            i) The particularity of Heraclitean language in connection with 
Heraclitus’ desire to lay a claim to a special status of insight  
 
In fragment B93 Heraclitus makes an explicit mention to oracular 
pronouncements:  
ὁ ἄναξ, οὗ τὸ μαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς, οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει 
ἀλλὰ σημαίνει.   
 
The obvious similarity between the way in which Heraclitus describes 
oracular style in B93 and the language he uses in his fragments has been 
received as an indication that he understood himself as a prophet. There is 
indeed much reason in this assumption, especially when taking into 
consideration the fact that Heraclitus adopts in the extant fragments a very 
special form of expression, which resembles in several aspects the style 
normally used in oracular answers. This characteristic gave him in antiquity 
the nickname σκοτεινός or αἰνικτής.32 
W. Guthrie has claimed that the language of Heraclitus “definitely puts 
him on the side of the inspired”. According to his examination, Heraclitus 
spoke deliberately with symbols, because he did not desire to be understood 
by the “profani”, and because he assumed a special kind of audience for his 
                                                 
32 So according to the Suda compiler, Strabo (Geog. XIV.25), pseudo-Aristotle (de 
mundo, 396b7), Timon (apud Diog. Vit. IX.6), and Aristotle (Rhet. 1407b). According to 
tradition, Socrates commented that in order to comprehend Heraclitus’ book one has 
to be as skilful as a Delian swimmer (Diog. Vit. II 22). 




cosmological observations.33 However, Heraclitus never devalues the general 
ability of mankind to perceive the truthfulness of his message, although he 
frequently refers with a derogatory tone to the stupidity of men. This becomes 
apparent from the fact that he states as the basic feature of his λόγος the fact 
that it is common to all, since the ability of critical reflection is inherent in the 
nature of all men. Heraclitus devises in fact a clever pun on κοινός and 
ξυνοῦς in fragment B2, which further elaborates this essential characteristic of 
the λόγος.34 The same notion is clearly stated in fragment B11, in which 
Heraclitus remarks that ξυνόν ἐστι πᾶσι τὸ φρονέειν. It does not therefore 
seem safe to accept the view that Heraclitus spoke to his audience as if they 
were the selected members of a religious sect, for the reason that this 
assumption violates his fundamental principle that the λόγος is common to 
all.  
In addition, it is impossible to agree with Guthrie that the poets and 
the prophets can be without much trouble placed into the same category of 
divinely inspired individuals.35 To be sure, in both cases the ability to contact 
the divine plays an important role in the process of acquiring knowledge, 
which was believed to be of a special insight. In the case of the poets, 
however, the divine patron was not expected to interfere with the verbal form 
with which the inspired message was communicated to the public. In 
manticism on the other hand the belief that a god reveals his knowledge 
through a charismatic individual could be occasionally verbally represented 
with the use of a more complex language, which was meant to illustrate to the 
recipient that divine, and therefore unordinary, knowledge was disclosed.  
                                                 
33 Cf. Guthrie (1965, p. 415).  
34 Sextus, who quotes this fragment, also interprets it in this way (cf. Adv. Math. 
VII.133).  
35 Cf. Guthrie, ibid.  




The nature thus of poetic speech does not altogether resemble the chief 
characteristics of oracular answers.36 Homer, for example, is very 
straightforward in the way he talks to his audience and so is Hesiod. There is 
simply no difficulty when it comes to understanding their stories or their 
edifying message. So it must be that Heraclitus has in mind the difficulty with 
which one understands an oracular response, when he makes a connection 
between his style and the oracular language in fragment B93. He is for this 
reason implying the intellectual effort which one has to make in order to 
perceive the truth he wishes to make known.  
            ii) Fr. B101 and Heraclitus’ attempt to establish a method 
 
In fragment B101 Heraclitus makes the following statement: 
ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν. This phrase has been commonly viewed in connection 
with the way in which Heraclitus sought to acquire knowledge,37 and as such 
it has been treated as evidence that he laid a claim to the status of the inspired 
prophet. It is important to distinguish, however, between the two possible 
ways in which knowledge could be inspired into an individual. Either an 
alien divine spirit would interfere with the capacity of his understanding (as 
in the case of the Pythia or of the epic poets) or the spirit of the individual 
would depart from his body in order to acquire a more clear perception of 
things (as in the case of shamans).  
The declaration which Heraclitus makes in fragment B101 does not 
correspond to any of these two categories of inspired knowledge. He never 
tells us that a divine agent assisted him in his discovery of the truth about the 
cosmos and, of course, he never describes in his fragments a personal 
                                                 
36 See also in the relevant section in the introduction, for a more detailed examination 
of this issue.  
37 That δίζημαι refers to Heraclitus’ methodology is also perhaps suggested from that 
Parmenides uses the noun δίζησις in order to describe the two possible ways of 
inquiry (cf. B2.8, 6.10, and 7.2).  




experience of his soul leaving his body. Quite on the contrary, he repeatedly 
stresses the importance of that the knowledge he presents is the product of his 
entirely personal speculation. It does not therefore seem likely that Heraclitus 
understood his cosmological findings as some form of divinely inspired 
knowledge. This in turn implies that he was not, intentionally at least, a 
religious thinker.  
  According to Guthrie, Heraclitus applied in his speculation about the 
cosmos the method of “inward inspiration”.38 In the case of inspired 
knowledge, however, the ability of the individual to know is enhanced by 
someone else, namely a god. This view, moreover, is biased by the modern 
notion that there is an element of mysticism and a hint of religiousness in 
introspective speculation and esoteric thinking. In fragment B101, however, 
Heraclitus explicitly associates the knowledge he has managed to acquire 
with his personal effort.  
The spirit of this statement is not in fact unparalleled in Greek 
literature. Phemius thought of himself as someone who is αὐτοδίδακτος, 
whereas Pindar praised in one of his odes the wise man who has learned 
many things φυᾷ.39 Both cases stress the importance of personal contribution 
in the possession of a certain wisdom or knowledge. The crucial difference, 
however, between the two and Heraclitus’ fragment B101 lies in that 
Heraclitus states personal responsibility as a vital aspect of his method. It then 
becomes apparent that personal inquiry is closely connected for Heraclitus, as 
perhaps also for Xenophanes (B18), with the process of acquiring insight into 
the true nature of the world.40  
                                                 
38 Cf. Guthrie (1965, p. 414).  
39 Cf. χ 347 and Ol. II.86 respectively.  
40 For the view that the knowledge implied in B101 refers to cosmological 
understanding, see Guthrie (1965, pp. 416-7) and Marcovich (1967, ad loc.). Guthrie 
thus identifies Heraclitus’ method with “self-search”. He also reads in this statement 
Heraclitus’ attempt to distinguish his method from that of ἱστορίη or of other 




The verb δίζημαι which Heraclitus uses in B101 was not normally used 
in connection with the discovery of knowledge. This suggests that with the 
use of an unusual verb Heraclitus is trying to point towards a new way of 
thinking. The sense of this verb is not unclear; it means “to find”.41 In most 
cases in which δίζημαι occurs with this sense, moreover, it is always followed 
by a direct object in accusative, which is presented as the result of the activity 
of searching. This result is always identified with an existing object, and in 
most cases it is a tangible item.42  
Seen in this light, it prima facie seems reasonable to accept as plausible 
the suggestion, which some scholars have made, that what Heraclitus 
discovered through his questioning was his own self. H. Granger, for 
example, thus maintains that for Heraclitus “self-knowledge provides a path 
to cosmic knowledge”, while Guthrie contended that for Heraclitus 
“knowledge was exemplified equally fully in oneself”.43 In a similar fashion, 
                                                                                                                                            
polymaths, such as Pythagoras. It seems likely that this fragment had an important 
polemical value against other experts.  
41 Cf. Δ 88=Ε 168, Ν 760; Hes. Op. 427-9; Theogn. 1.83 and 1.415; Hdt. Hist. 1.67, 1.139, 
2.156, and 3.41.  
42 Cf. α 261: φάρμακον διζήμενος; π 239: διζησόμεθ’ ἄλλους; Hymn. hom. Merc., 191, 
262 and 370: βοῦς διζήμενος, Theogn. 1.183: κριοὺς μὲν καὶ ὄνους διζήμεθα; 1.403: 
κέρδος διζήμενος; Anacr. 15.2: δίζημαί σε; Hippocr. Epist. 17.63: ἴδιον ἤ ἐπιδήμιον 
πρῆγμα διζήμενος; 17.80: χολῆς δὲ διζήμενος φύσιν καὶ θέσιν; 17.248: διζήμενος 
αἰτίην; and Hdt. Hist. 7.16: πλέον τι δίζησθαι ἔχειν. It could be also loosely applied 
in order to denote “to look for” in the sense of “to desire to accomplish”, cf. λ 100: 
νόστον δίζηαι; ψ 253: νόστον διζήμενος; Simon. fr. 37.121: τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατὸν 
διζήμενος; Bacchyl. Epin. 1.176: τὰ φεύγοντα δίζηνται κιχεῖν; and Hippocr. Epist. 17. 
191: διζήμενοι τὰ μὴ συμφέροντα. Herodotus also uses the verb once in the sense of 
“to ask someone to do something” (9.44: ἐδίζητο τοῖσι στρατηγοῖσι ἐς λόγους 
ἐλθεῖν), and once in the sense of “to require” (4.30: προσθήκας γὰρ δὴ μοι ὁ λόγος ἐξ 
ἀρχῆς ἐδίζητο). Herodotus also uses δίζημαι in order to describe the process of 
inquiring the oracle (cf. e.g. 7.142), from which Guthrie concludes that Heraclitus is 
referring in B101 to intuitive knowledge (1965, p. 417). However, this is not the only 
sense of δίζημαι, which Herodotus knows. He also employs it in a way similar to that 
of Parmenides in order to denote the inquiry aimed at the discovery of truth (cf. 4.151 
and 5.54, and Parmenides fr. B7.2.  
43 Cf. Granger (1974, p. 257) and Guthrie (1965, p. 417). The same view is also implied 
by Colli’s translation of B101: “tentai di decifrare me stesso” (1977, ad 101).  




Cherniss held that in Heraclitus’ method “introspection is a way of gaining 
knowledge about reality”.44 The immediate implication of these suggestions is 
that Heraclitus perhaps associates in fragment B101 his method of cosmic 
investigation with moral obligation, and that he therefore phrases a “moral 
imperative”, as Cherniss and KRS maintained in their examinations.45  
If we accept the reading of a moral tone in fragment B101 as valid, 
however, then we are bound to deprive Heraclitus of his personal curiosity 
and of his intelligent questioning of how things are, which characterise his 
thought and constitute a vital aspect of his expertise. The statements which 
Heraclitus frequently makes in his fragments give the impression that he 
considered his insight into the cosmic λόγος not so much a matter of ethical 
command but the product of his intelligent speculation.  
In case we accept that Heraclitus proposed a method of cosmological 
investigation based on self-understanding, then it certainly strikes one as odd 
that he does not appear to apply this method in any of his fragments, as one 
would normally expect. It does not therefore seem plausible that he would fail 
so wrongly to apply his own method. At any event, Heraclitus in the end 
managed to acquire knowledge not about himself but about the cosmic 
reality, for which reason he takes particular pride in fragment B1, with which 
he apparently introduced himself to his audience. In this fragment his 
personal superiority is described in terms of his ability to know the principle 
according to which everything in the world occurs and certainly not himself. 
                                                 
44 Cf. Cherniss (1951, p. 334).  
45 Cf. Cherniss, ibid., and KRS (1983, p. 211). KRS have proposed that Heraclitus’ 
method included a “correct assessment of one’s own capacities”. This view is 
attractive and there is no serious reason why it should be dismissed as unreliable. It 
should be noted, however, that the surviving evidence for Heraclitus’ moral teaching 
is far too limited to allow a safe reconstruction of its content. Kahn, furthermore, 
suggested that for Heraclitus self-knowledge is a hard task because “a man is 
divided from himself” (1979, p. 116). We certainly cannot credit Heraclitus with such 
a high level of sophistication, according to which the subject-I is separated from the 
object-I.  




It therefore becomes apparent that fragment B101 cannot be used as evidence 
for Heraclitus’ mystical outlook. It seems that this fragment was meant to 
underline the importance of that the cosmic knowledge which Heraclitus 
presents is the product of his personal endeavour and skill.  
           iii) the authoritativeness of oracular pronouncements in connection 
with the authoritative implications of  Heraclitus’ style 
 
Fragment B101 has encouraged some scholars to understand Heraclitus 
as the prophet of his λόγος.46 In the introduction it has been noted that 
inquiring with the purpose of obtaining a higher knowledge was 
characteristic of oracular manticism. Heraclitus is obviously pointing to this 
way of knowing in fragment B101. What has not received however the 
attention it perhaps deserves is that by referring to the consultation of the 
oracle Heraclitus is at the same time implying the authority of oracular 
wisdom.  
In the introduction it has been noted that the case of oracular 
knowledge was highly esteemed in Greek society, and that it was always 
taken into serious consideration either in public or in private affairs. The 
Greeks, furthermore, consulted their gods about important matters. It is also 
worthy of note that oracular knowledge was the product of a religious 
experience, since a standard procedure was applied before the inquiry, which 
took the form of a ritual. However, in fragment B101, which is telling for the 
nature of Heraclitus’ expertise, the interference of the divine in human 
knowledge is substituted by personal responsibility, as suggested by 
ἐμεωυτόν. It then seems that the point which Heraclitus actually makes in this 
fragment is a comment on the possibility of human knowledge. It therefore 
seems unwise to conclude from fragment B101 that Heraclitus considered 
himself a prophet. He might simply have thought that his method was similar 
                                                 
46 Cf. e.g. Guthrie (1965, p. 417).  




to that used in oracular responses. The purpose of this fragment is to imply to 
the audience that the message which Heraclitus discloses is important and 
worthy of their attention. It also implies that the cosmic knowledge which 
Heraclitus presents is of a similarly high status.   
It has been already noted that in fragment B93 Heraclitus expresses 
openly his admiration for oracular style. The statement which Heraclitus 
makes in this fragment shows that he consciously shaped his aphorisms 
according to the model of oracular style.47 It also suggests that for Heraclitus 
the basic feature of oracular expression was that it reveals and conceals the 
truth at the same time, as implied by the κρύπτει-λέγει pair.48 Fragment B32, 
furthermore, shows that Heraclitus considered the idea of simultaneous 
concealment and un-concealment central to his expression:  
ἓν τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνομα  
 
In the introduction we have seen that according to modern scholarly 
analysis intentional ambiguity was not as prominent a feature of oracular 
style as frequently assumed. However, fragments B93 and B32 encourage the 
impression that Heraclitus regarded ambiguous phrasing as an important 
element of both oracular and of his personal style.49 He uses this popular, 
though essentially untrue, belief about oracular responses in order to suggest 
the difficulty implied in his message, and in order to illustrate the effort 
which one has to make so as to perceive his cosmic λόγος. This idea is 
manifested in the wording which Heraclitus occasionally chooses. To begin 
with, a syntactical ambiguity is traced in Heraclitus’ first fragment:  
                                                 
47 For the view that Heraclitus’ style was an intentional choice, see Guthrie (1965, p. 
426), Burnet (1932, p. 59), Freeman (1953, pp. 106-7), KRS (1983, p. 185), and Cherniss 
(1951, p. 330).  
48 Heraclitus’ obscurity became proverbial in antiquity. Cf. e.g. Diog. Vit. IX.6.  
49 Cf. also Hölscher, according to whose interpretation the basic similarity between 
Heraclitus’ aphorisms and oracular pronouncements is that they both hint at 
something else than that which they apparently state (1993, p. 273).  




τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐόντος ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι50   
 
There are mainly two possible ways to construe this phrase, as 
Aristotle observed: (a) even though this λόγος exists forever, men are 
ἀξύνετοι, or (b) even though this λόγος exists, men are always ἀξύνετοι.51 In 
this fragment the perplexity to understand is caused by the difficulty to 
distinguish clearly between two possible meanings. The style thus of 
Heraclitus is characterised, as Ch. Kahn observed, by “linguistic density” and 
“meaningful ambiguity”.52 
It seems, furthermore, that the deliberate ambiguous syntax of 
fragment B1 corresponds to Heraclitus’ basic tenet that all things are one. By 
combining multiple meanings into a single phrase, that is to say, Heraclitus 
devises a style which reflects in its structure the essence of the cosmic truth, 
which he has perceived. This special way with which Heraclitus treated 
human language is revealed in one of his perhaps most odd fragments:  
τῶι οὖν τόξωι ὄνομα βίος, ἔργον δὲ θάνατος (B48) 
 
The first encounter with this fragment is bound to generate a feeling of 
perplexity. It is only after one has realised that Homer’s word (ὄνομα) for 
“bow” is βίος, which also means “life” in a different context, that he starts to 
grasp the point which is implied in fragment B48. What this fragment 
eventually states is that life and death, which are two opposite concepts, are 
                                                 
50 For the view that fragment B1 has a strongly introductive quality, see Gigon (1935, 
p. 8), KRS (1983, p. 184), Kirk (1954, p. 45), Kahn (1979, p. 7), and Diels (2003, p. 78).   
51 For the ambiguity caused by the lack of punctuation in B1, see Arist. Rhet. 1407b11 
and Demetr. Phal. De eloc. 192. A third possible reading of this fragment is to 
understand ἐόντος as a predicative and to thus translate: “the λόγος being this”. It is 
hard to accept, however, that Heraclitus would straightaway begin his exposition by 
assuming for granted the specific qualities of his λόγος, which he later presents. 
52 Cf. Kahn (1979, p. 91). The key idea in Kahn’s description of Heraclitean style is 
that a single word or phrase conveys multiple ideas.  




actually the same. The more general principle which is therefore here 
illustrated is the assumption that all things which men perceive as opposites 
are one. It then becomes apparent that for Heraclitus the reality of language 
mirrors the cosmic reality.53  
It is also worthy of note that this fragment has an impressive 
argumentative value, since it exemplifies a basic belief of Heraclitus. Of 
course, this is not a standard way of arguing, and it is quite distinct from the 
one with which a modern reader is familiar. At the same time, however, it is 
only plain to see that the medium of prose obviously allows for a more 
extensive form of reasoning, since it encourages elaboration but also the 
disjunction or combination of different premises. The same is impossible to 
achieve in aphorisms. In other words, it is the essence of the style which 
Heraclitus employs in his fragments that which generates his special form of 
reasoning. What is in any case remarkable about fragment B45 is that 
Heraclitus not only employs ambiguity in phrasing his message, but that he 
also uses ambiguity in order to reach his cosmological conclusion. This in turn 
suggests that ambiguity was not simply a prominent feature of Heraclitus’ 
style but also a basic element of his thought.  
It then becomes apparent that ambiguity took a rather special form in 
Heraclitus. He used it in order to represent in his account the cosmic 
polysemy, such as the one of the multiple observable manifestations of the 
cosmic λόγος, with a linguistic multivocity. This is certainly a somewhat more 
sophisticated handling of language than in average everyday speech. The 
crucial question to be examined at this point is why would Heraclitus opt for 
                                                 
53 Detienne has shown in his analysis that the belief that words are intrinsically 
connected with reality is a basic religious belief used in spells in charms, which he 
understands as the “performative value” of language (1996, p. 16 ff., but also 
Foucault 1977, p. 218).  




such a style, and how can we interpret his authority claims in connection with 
this stylistic preference.  
Scholars have put forward several explanations for the special features 
of Heraclitean style. Some have suggested that ambiguity was quite frequent 
in Heraclitus’ age, since it was occasionally employed by other authors of his 
time such as Aeschylus and Pindar.54 Others have argued that Heraclitus 
adopted this kind of style due to his personal admiration for oracular 
pronouncements, but also because he wanted in this way to claim for himself 
the authority of the prophet. 
According to Guthrie and Cornford, for example, many things in 
Heraclitus suggest the religious rather than the “philosophic” teacher.55 In a 
similar vein, K. Freeman held that Heraclitus phrased his aphorisms like the 
prophets, because he believed himself to be a “teacher of this kind”, and 
because he accepted prophecy as a valid way of knowing.56 It is impossible to 
tell from the surviving fragments, however, whether Heraclitus valued 
prophetic activity as a reliable source of knowledge. It would be also wrong, 
furthermore, to understand fragment B93 together with Freeman as a 
comment on the trustworthiness of oracular wisdom. It seems more plausible 
to accept that this fragment is a comment on the model of communication 
used in oracles and, more specifically, on the verbal formulation of oracular 
wisdom, but not on oracular wisdom itself.  
                                                 
54 So according to Burnet (1930, p. 132). It should be added however that this type of 
expression characterises several fragments of Heraclitus and that it is a prominent 
feature of his language. Aeschylus and Pindar on the other hand employ ambiguity 
admittedly less frequently in their works.  
55 Cf. Guthrie (1965, p. 487), and Cornford (1957, p. 187). Cornford argues that 
Heraclitus understood the visible world as a myth, i.e. a tale which is half true and 
half false, and which embodies a λόγος, i.e. a basic truth according to which all is 
one. In Cornford’s view, this stands for a sign of mysticism in Heraclitus’ cosmology.  
56 Cf. Freeman (1953, p. 106; p. 121).  




Some scholars have objected, however, to the understanding of 
Heraclitus’ authority claims in connection with the status of the prophet. 
Kahn argues that the negative stand which Heraclitus takes on madness in 
fragments B5 and B15 makes it hard to accept that he would have also 
considered himself one of these individuals.57 In a similar vein, P. 
Wheelwright has pointed out that Heraclitus does not share the same method 
with the prophets, since he did not participate in the divine, when he 
acquired his insight into the true nature of the world.58 Granger, moreover, 
has observed that the ability to understand the cosmic λόγος is common for 
all men in Heraclitus as opposed to the secluded knowledge of the mystical 
cults.59 
There are however more serious reasons why it is impossible to 
mistake Heraclitus for a prophet. To begin with, the form of expression which 
Heraclitus uses in his fragments suggests a rather different intention in his 
self-projection. The characteristic brevity of his statements makes his message 
more impressive and potentially easier to memorise, in the same way in 
which proverbs encompass and circulate popular wisdom. This style is 
efficient and functional for the oral communication of ideas, and it is partly 
for this reason that Heraclitus uses it for the publication of his cosmology. 
There is however one further important function of brevity, which can 
provide us with a better understanding of Heraclitus’ authority claims. This 
form of expression multiplies the possible interpretations of a single phrase, 
exactly because it is not a particularly detailed mode of exposition. This style 
can thus generate a certain polysemy, since several distinct meanings can be 
                                                 
57 Cf. Kahn (1979, p. 126 ad B92). It should be pointed out however that ecstatic 
manticism was not the only case of ancient divination. The seers were rather 
specialised experts on the divine and they had a quite sophisticated art at their 
disposal. See also in the introduction.  
58 Cf. Wheelwright (1959, p. 24).  
59 Cf. Granger (1974, p. 258). He rightly bases his case on fragment B116, in which 
Heraclitus credits everyone with the ability to be wise (σωφρονεῖν).  




implied by a single phrase. It also brings about a higher level of multivocity 
and signification. 
The immediate result of this is that language functions on two levels. 
On a first level a phrase refers to what is immediately understood, and as 
such it involves the immediate reaction of the audience to whatever it is that 
is stated. On a second, and more crucial, level however a different meaning is 
deliberately implied by the same phrase. In order to realise the second and 
intentionally concealed message the audience has to use their critical ability, 
since this message is not presented in an explicit, and therefore immediately 
graspable, manner. They have to look in other words behind the surface 
meaning. In so doing they also have to interpret the phrase from a different 
standpoint.  
 
           iv) the authoritative act of σημαίνειν : σημαίνεσθαι 
 
We have seen that in fragments B93 and B32 Heraclitus implies the 
expression which he chose for the publication of his cosmology. In fragment 
B93 in particular he uses the verb σημαίνει to describe the way in which 
oracular wisdom was communicated to each individual inquirer. This verb is 
of a particular importance for understanding Heraclitus’ authority claims, and 
it can help us throw some light on the way in which Heraclitus perceived and 
defined his personal authority.  
The verb σημαίνειν frequently occurs in connection with the disclosure 
of a truth, and as such it was not used exclusively for the description of 
oracular style. In Homer σημαίνειν appears mainly with the sense of “to issue 
a command”, i.e. “to reveal the right course of action”.60 It could also acquire 
                                                 
60 Cf. e.g., Α 289, Α 295-6, Β 205, Λ 789, Σ 250; Eur. Hel. 1256; and Hdt. Hist. 1.116. It is 
also worthy of note that the Homeric word for commander is σημάντωρ, something 
which implies that the giving of orders required a certain skill. Cf. Δ 431, Θ 127, σ 21; 




the sense of “omen”, in which case it refers to an observable sign by which a 
god reveals his will to mankind.61 In addition, it is used twice of a 
characteristic quality of an object which distinguishes it from every other and 
due to which this object acquires its unique value.62 From the last two senses 
the verb acquired a metaphorical meaning, and it could also stand for “an 
indication of something”, whereby the true nature of the latter is revealed to 
the perception of men.63 Σημαίνειν is also attested with other minor meanings, 
such as that of “tomb”,64 of “outstanding”,65 of “evidence”,66 and of 
“noticeable”.67 
                                                                                                                                            
Hymn. hom. Dem. 376, Ap. 542; and Herm. 367; Hes. Sc. 56; fr. 5.3; fr. 195.56; and Hdt. 
Hist. 7.81.  
61 Cf. Β 203, Δ 381, Θ 170, Ι 236-7, Ν 244, χ 413; Hes. Sc. 385, fr. 141.25; and Aesch. 
Choeph. 259.  
62 Cf. Η 189: γνὦ δὲ κλήρου σῆμα ἰδὼν. In this case, Aias is the only one who can 
recognise his personal mark on the lot that the herald drew. Cf. also, the σήματα of 
the connubial bed which Odysseus intimates to Penelope, and which no one else 
knows at ψ 225-6. Of course, episode of the identification of Odysseus is based on the 
scar on his leg, which he acquired when hunting a boar on Parnassus with the sons 
of Autolycus. Again, this σῆμα is convincing, because it is a unique sign which only 
Odysseus has. Ιt is this scar that Odysseus shows to his devoted Eumaeus and 
Philoetius at φ 217 (σῆμα ἀριφραδὲς ἄλλο τι δείξω), and to his father Laertes, when 
he asks Odysseus for credentials of his identity at ω 329 (σῆμα τί μοι νῦν εἰπὲ 
ἀριφραδές, ὄφρα πεποίθω). And Eyrucleia intimates to Penelope that she saw this 
scar when washing Odysseus’ feet at ψ 73 (σῆμα ἀριφραδὲς ἄλλο τι εἶπω). The 
unquestionable value of this mark is underlined by the epithet ἀριφραδές, i.e. very 
manifest and, consequently, convincing. Cf. also, Ψ 326 and λ 126 (σῆμα δέ τοι ἐρέω 
μάλ’ ἀριφραδές, οὐδέ σε λήσει). In these cases σῆμα is used of a special characteristic 
of an item, which is known only to the person who can identify it, either because he 
was the one who made it, or because he is the only one who has access to it, or 
because he is the one who knows about the way it was produced. Cf. also, the word 
σηματουργὸς for the craftsman who manufactures the decoration of a shield, Aesch. 
Sept. Th. 491. Again, this carved embellishment is a unique design.  
63 Cf. Arch. fr. 105.3W: σῆμα χειμὦνος; and Sol. fr. 27.4W: ἥβης δὲ φάνει σήματα 
γενομένης. In these examples the signs of winter and youth actually imply what they 
really are. Cf. also, Hymn. hom. Dion. 46.  
64 Cf. Λ 166; Simon. Epigr. 7.509, 7.511; and Hdt. Hist. 1.93. Cf. also Η 89, according to 
which Hector’s armour will become a σῆμα, i.e. a visual reminder, of his heroic death 
in the battlefield. It is also worthy of note that the tomb by being a σῆμα also means 
to evoke to the mind of its spectator the excellence of the brave warrior and to in this 
way set an example for morality. This particular sense of σῆμα is more overtly 




In regard to the way in which Heraclitus employs σημαίνειν in 
fragment B93, σημαίνω and cognates may be used of knowledge.68 In this case 
it refers either to the act of bringing a matter or truth to the knowledge of 
someone,69 or to the act of simply disclosing this knowledge.70 The person 
who reveals the truth, furthermore, is believed to have the authority for this, 
and the reliability of his truth is never questioned. It therefore seems that 
σημαίνειν could also indicate the revelation of knowledge from a standpoint 
of authority.  
It therefore becomes apparent that σημαίνειν taken alone does not 
generally imply the authority of the prophet. In fact, it occurs rarely in explicit 
connection with the prediction of the future, in which case the compound 
form προσημαίνω is employed.71 It then seems that σημαίνειν was more 
frequently used in order to refer to the process with which one obtains 
                                                                                                                                            
manifested in Aesch. Pers. 818-20. In this case the mass of dead bodies teaches that 
one should not exceed the limits of what is proper on moral grounds.  
65 Cf. Hymn. hom. Merc. 12: ἀρίσημά τε ἔργα τέτυκτο.  
66 Aeschylus uses it in this sense in Ag. 606. In this case σημαντήριον refers to 
evidence, which is not produced nonetheless from reasoned thinking but which 
results from observable experience. It is also worthy of note that Parmenides uses 
σήματα in Β8.2 in the sense of “reasoned evidence”.  
67 In the Homeric hymn to Luna, for example, the shine of Selene is described as 
τέκμωρ δὲ βροτοῖς καὶ σῆμα, i.e. as something which reveals her existence to men 
(line 13). Hesiod, furthermore, says that the voice of the crane is ἀρότοιο σῆμα, i.e. it 
indicates that it is the right time for the ploughing of the fields (Op. 448). In both 
cases, σῆμα is used in order to denote something which is brought to the attention of 
men.  
68 Cf. Εur. Alc. 522: οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον οἶδ’/ ἄσημα γὰρ λέγεις (i.e. what you have just 
said, does not add anything new to my knowledge).   
69 Cf. Aesch. Suppl. 245; Eur. Hec. 512, and 499; Elect. 765; Iph. Taur. 1209; Ion, 945; 
Thuc. Hist. 6.20; and Hdt. Hist. 1.75. Or, in the sense “to bring to the surface”: Eur. 
Androm. 264-5: ἀλλὰ γὰρ λόγους κρύψω, τὸ δ’ ἔργον αὺτὸ σημανεῖ.  
70 Cf. Aesch. Prom. Vinct. 295, and 683-5; Eur. Androm. 1084, and 1238; Phoen. 1076; 
Heracl. 799; Soph. OC 51; Tr. 345; Ant. 242; Hdt. Hist. 1.209, 6.39; and 7.213.  
71 Cf. Eur. Suppl. 212-3: ἐς πῦρ βλέποντες καὶ κατὰ σπλάχνων πτυχὰς μάντεις 
προσημαίνουσιν οἰωνὦν τ’ ἀπό. It is also used in this sense by Odysseus, when he 
tells to Penelope the σῆμα ἀριφραδὲς which Teiresias revealed to him, and which 
will mark in due time the end of his wandering (ψ 273).  




knowledge. It was also used in order to describe the very process of 
disclosing knowledge to someone. This in turn speaks volumes about the 
nature of Heraclitus’ authority claims, since it suggests to us the way in which 
Heraclitus understood his interaction with his audience, which we can now 
interpret in new light.   
Heraclitus appears to be aware that he never fully discloses his 
cosmological knowledge to his audience. He simply provides them with some 
indications. These will in his view inevitably lead them to the same 
cosmological conclusions which he has reached provided of course that they 
think right. He thus tries to trigger their ability to think in a reasonable 
manner and at the same time to enhance their ability to think wisely. This is 
also reflected in Heraclitus’ belief in that one can potentially improve his 
ability to understand and to be wise, as the following set of fragments shows:  
 
B79: ἀνὴρ νήπιος ἤκουσε πρὸς δαίμονος ὅκωσπερ παῖς πρὸς ἀνδρός 
B83: ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος φανεῖται καὶ 
σοφίᾳ καὶ κάλλει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν 
B115: ψυχῆς ἐστι λόγος ἑαυτὸν αὔξων 
 
However, Heraclitus thought that it is only through him that the 
audience can learn how to become wise and to obtain knowledge, as he 
clearly states in fragment B1. This also becomes apparent from that Heraclitus 
several times in his fragments repeats his personal conviction that he reveals 
to his audience the particular features of the cosmic λόγος. It then seems that 
Heraclitus adopts a didactic posture in his presentation, since he guides his 
audience towards a new knowledge. In so doing he is applying a mode of 
self-presentation, which was previously used by Hesiod in his Opera et Dies.  
It is worthy of note however, that there are two significant differences 
between Hesiod’s and Heraclitus’ didactic perspectives. To begin with, 
Heraclitus evidently intends to enhance the ability of his audience to think 




and to use their νοός appropriately. This is also suggested by that for 
Heraclitus it is crucial that one not only listens carefully to him but also that 
can understand his message.72 He also sets the issue of acquiring insight into 
the true nature of the cosmos as the default topic of the knowledge which he 
discloses.73 These two elements are notably absent from Hesiod’s teaching. 
Hesiod does not present a similarly theoretical knowledge and it is perhaps 
for this reason that he does not consider personal intelligence as crucial for 
the successful delivery of his message. The knowledge which he presents is of 
a more practical nature, since it pertains mostly to agricultural life and work. 
In such a case, personal judgement is not, of course, considered a necessary 
condition, and all Hesiod demands from Perses in his didactic epos is his 
careful attention, but he never asks him to reflect upon the advice which he 
gives him.  
 Heraclitus’ attack against other individuals shows that he 
distinguished the authoritative status of the teacher. In fragment B57 he 
criticises Hesiod, whom he describes as a διδάσκαλος, for failing to realise 
that day and night are identical. The mention of Hesiod in specific as an 
example of a διδάσκαλος in this fragment suggests that Heraclitus recognised 
a type of instructing authority. It is also significant that in fragment B57 
Heraclitus openly contrasts his personal truth, namely that all is one, to that 
presented by Hesiod. This in turn implies that he wants to claim for himself 
                                                 
72 That Heraclitus appeals with his account to the personal wit of his audience is also 
suggested by that he characterises ἀξύνετοι those who fail to perceive the truth of his 
λόγος. Cf. frs. B1 and B34. In fragment B15, furthermore, he uses the verb ξυνιᾶσιν in 
connection with the principle of ἁρμονίη, which shows that what Heraclitus wants 
from his audience is that they understand the truth which he discloses. For an 
examination of the occurrence of γνω- words in Heraclitus in connection with his 
attempt to establish an epistemological vocabulary, see Lesher (1983). See also Table  
I  and VII in the Appendix.   
73 Cf. B1: γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε; but also B40 and B72. In 
these fragments Heraclitus refers explicitly to his attempt to discover the pattern 
according to which everything in the cosmos is structured. 
 




from Hesiod the authority of the διδάσκαλος. Heraclitus refers to the status of 
the διδάσκαλος again in fragment B104:  
Τίς γὰρ αὐτῶν νόος ἢ φρήν; Δήμων ἀοιδοῖσι πείθονται καὶ 
διδασκάλῳ χρείωνται ὁμίλῳ οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι πολλοὶ κακοί, ὀλίγοι δὲ 
ἀγαθοί  
 
The polemical tone of this fragment is suggested by the contrast 
between the “many-ness” of ὁμίλῳ and πολλοί with the wise λίγοι and ἕν.74 
The mention of νόος and φρήν, furthermore, implies that for Heraclitus a 
substantial authority claim should be accompanied by intelligence and critical 
reflection. Heraclitus attacks Homer in a similar vein in fragment B56, in 
which he mocks his inability to solve a riddle presented to him by children. 
What Homer lacks according to Heraclitus is intelligence, and it is for this 
reason that he cannot be considered σοφώτατος πάντων. 75 Heraclitus then 
faults Homer for not being able to understand, like him, the cosmic riddle.76 
These fragments show that διδάσκαλος is for Heraclitus a distinct 
status of authority, which he wants to claim for himself. For this reason he 
openly criticises Hesiod and Homer and, more importantly, the knowledge 
which they presented and with which they managed to obtain social 
recognition. Yet Heraclitus gives the status of the διδάσκαλος a new twist, 
since he orients his knowledge, on grounds of which he makes a claim to 
authority, to a reasoned investigation of the structure of the cosmos.  
5. The λόγος κοινός of Heraclitus  
 
                                                 
74 See also the examination of fragment B40 above.   
75 The point which Heraclitus makes here is further underlined by that the children 
obviously represent a naive stage of understanding. Heraclitus uses children several 
times in order to imply a second-rate way of knowing. Cf. B70, B74, B79, but also 
B117.   
76 Heraclitus attacks again Homer in B42, in which he claims that he and Archilochus 
should be dismissed from the poetic contests.   




We have already noted that Heraclitus furnished his message with 
extra difficulty and perplexity. It has been suggested that Heraclitus wished 
in this way to deny access to his knowledge to those whom he regarded 
incapable of understanding his cosmology.77 It is certainly true that in the 
extant fragments Heraclitus frequently stresses the difficulty which one 
encounters when he tries to grasp his λόγος. It is not exactly true, however, 
that he also desired to exclude some members of his audience from the cosmic 
knowledge which he discloses.  
In fragments B2 and B113 he states that the λόγος, understood here as 
mental apprehension, is common (ξυνός) to all men. It then seems only 
natural to accept that for Heraclitus everyone is credited with the ability to 
perceive the truthfulness of his account. The epithet ξυνός occurs regularly in 
crucial points of Heraclitus’ fragments: 
B2: <διὸ δεῖ ἕπεσθαι> τῶι ξυνῶι. τοῦ λόγου δ’ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν 
οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν 
B113: ξυνόν ἐστι πᾶσι τὸ φρονέειν 
Β114: ξὺν νόωι λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῶι ξυνῶι πάντων 
Β80: εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ τὸν πόλεμον ἐόντα ξυνόν 
Β103: ξυνὸν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ πέρας ἐπὶ κύκλου περιφερείας  
 
Heraclitus used a pun in order to express the complex notion that wise 
thinking (ξυν-νοός) is common (κοινός) to everyone, as suggested by 
fragments B2 and B113.78 According to Heraclitus, furthermore, the condition 
of wise thinking necessarily implies the acceptance of the principle that “all is 
one”, i.e. κοινά (B114). This becomes apparent also from fragment B80, in 
which Heraclitus explicitly associates ξυνός with the cosmic process, which 
                                                 
77 So according to Diogenes, who thought that Heraclitus ἐπιτηδεύσας ἀσαφέστερον 
γράψαι, ὅπως οἱ δυνάμενοι <μόνοι> προσίοιεν αὐτὦι (Vit., 1.31). 
78 Homer also uses ξύνεσις once in order to refer to the junction point of two smaller 
rivers (Cf. κ 515: ξύνεσίς τε δύω ποταμὦν). Heraclitus is perhaps using this 
metaphorically so as to imply his personal skill of combining intelligently into a 
single scheme the visual manifestations of the λόγος. For the use of ξυνίημι in other 
works, see e.g. α 271, Ζ 289, τ 378; but also, Theogn. 2. 1239-40. 




he terms πόλεμος. In fragment B103 Heraclitus exploits this word-play on 
ξυνός in order to illustrate his basic tenet that opposite concepts are one. This 
is an impressive fragment, because it claims that one can easily observe for his 
own account in the geometrical shape of the circle that it is impossible to 
distinguish its beginning from its end. This in turn leads to the inevitable 
conclusion that these two opposite concepts, namely the beginning and the 
end, are identical.  
The adjective κοινός is from every aspect an ordinary word. What is 
special about the way in which Heraclitus uses it, however, is that he 
associates it with human intelligence. This is an important element in 
Heraclitus’ epistemology, because it shows that he credited men with the 
ability to know based on their own innate capacity to perceive and to 
understand. It immediately becomes apparent that this idea is head-on attack 
on the epic belief that charismatic individuals, and through them mankind in 
general, can obtain knowledge only from the gods. In addition, Heraclitus 
uses the metaphor of waking and sleeping life in order to denote the contrast 
between wisdom (i.e. conscious reflection) and ignorance (i.e. an 
“unconscious” or random way of experiencing cosmic reality).79 
And yet although men have the natural means to understand the 
cosmos, the interpretation of perceptible reality is what always escapes their 
attention. In his fragments he frequently criticises men for failing to grasp the 
truthfulness of his message:  
B1: ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ             
ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον 
Β2: τοῦ λόγου δ’ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες 
φρόνησιν 
Β17: οὐ γὰρ φρονέουσι τοιαῦτα πολλοί, ὁκόσοι ἐγκυρεῦσιν, οὐδὲ 
μαθόντες γινώσκουσιν, ἑωυτοῖσι δὲ δοκέουσι 
                                                 
79 Cf. also B1 and B73. On the contrast between the cosmos which men experience in 
everyday life and the deceiving one of their dreams, see Vlastos (1955), and 
Marcovich (1967, ad B30). 




Β19: ἀκοῦσαι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι οὐδ’ εἰπεῖν 
Β34: ἀξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφοῖσιν ἐοίκασι  
Β86: ἀπιστίηι διαφυγγάνει μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι  
Β87: βλὰξ ἄνθρωπος ἐπὶ παντὶ λόγωι ἐπτοῆσθαι φιλεῖ 
Β95: ἀμαθίην γὰρ ἄμεινον κρύπτειν 
Β97: κύνες γὰρ καταβα὘ζουσιν ὧν ἂν μὴ γινώσκωσι 
 
In these fragments Heraclitus links the failure of men to apply ξύνεσις 
with the unwillingness of some to listen to him carefully, and also with that 
they insist on living according to their personal standards thus showing 
disregard for the hidden principle which controls everything and which 
Heraclitus discloses to them. He was also rather disappointed by the way in 
which men tend to react when they encounter new and wholly unfamiliar 
ideas. For him indifference towards knowledge is equally unintelligent to not 
knowing at all. At any event, Heraclitus criticised men for their shortcoming 
in delivering themselves from the state of ignorance, but he never altogether 
questioned their ability to know.  
Heraclitus’ claim that his account appeals to the νόος of his audience 
speaks volumes about the way in which he perceived his personal expertise.80 
It shows that he obviously understood the investigation of the cosmos as the 
undertaking of an intellectual task. All the same, he did not consider the 
interpretation of the cosmos an easy task. This is chiefly manifested in his 
belief that φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ (B123), which Reihnhardt interpreted as 
an “erkenntnis theoretischer Satz”.81 This element of difficulty stresses the 
importance and superiority of Heraclitus’ expertise. 
                                                 
80 For an excellent examination of the early uses of νόος, see von Fritz (1945). 
Marcovich understood νόος of B40 as “intelligence”, which Kirk translated as 
“insight”. Cf. (1967, ad B40) and (1954, ad B40) respectively. In a similar fashion, 
Jaeger held that νόος signifies in Heraclitus a quality which is equivalent to σοφόν 
and σοφίη (1967, p. 125).  
81 Cf. Reinhardt (1916, p. 88).  




6. Heraclitus’ expertise: his σοφίη 
 
It appears that Heraclitus distinguished σοφίη as a solid basis which 
could reliably support authority claims. He in fact refers to σοφίη several 
times in the extant fragments:  
B32: ἕν τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς 
ὄνομα 
B41: ἕν τὸ σοφὸν ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην, ὁτέη ἐκυβέρνησε πάντα διὰ 
πάντων 
B50: ...ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν ἕν πάντα εἶναι 
B108: ...σοφόν ἐστι πάντων κεχωρισμένον 
B112: ...σοφίη ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαϊοντας 
 
Fragments B41 and B112 in particular are especially important, because 
they provide evidence that Heraclitus associated σοφίη with the interpretation 
and understanding of cosmic reality. Interestingly enough, Heraclitus never 
openly proclaims that he is a σοφός. If we view however fragments B41 and 
B112 in light of fragment B1 and in connection with the general content of 
Heraclitus’ fragments, it seems that he obviously considered himself worthy 
of such a status. In addition, his confidence for his personal σοφίη is implied 
by his belief that there is only one way of being wise, which for him is of 
course the knowledge of the wise ἕν, the principle which rules everything in 
the physical world.82 This set of fragments, furthermore, shows that 
Heraclitus was deeply concerned with the capability of men to pursue 
knowledge and to extend the capacity of their ἴδιος νοῦς, as C. Osborne put 
it.83  It then seems that Heraclitus, like Xenophanes, affirms the possibility of 
human knowledge, although he admittedly does so more emphatically and 
relatively more systematically than Xenophanes, for whom human 
knowledge is a δόκος.  
                                                 
82 See also Table VI in the Appendix for an overview of the uses of σοφίη in the 
cosmologists under examination.  
83 Cf. Osborne (1987, p. 182).  




It is perhaps possible to trace here a slight shift in the way in which 
individuals responded to the question of obtaining knowledge which is of a 
higher status, on grounds of which they sought to establish their authority 
claims. In epic poetry knowledge was viewed by the individuals who desired 
to lay a claim to a status of authority as a transcendental insight which they 
acquired from their divine patrons, who supervised them in their attempt to 
discover the truth. It should be pointed out however that this belief applies 
only to the case of charismatic individuals and it does not refer to a commonly 
held view in ancient Greek society about human epistemology.  
Human knowledge was firstly made a human affair by Xenophanes, 
who apparently questioned the validity of the knowledge, which derives from 
the gods (B18). Heraclitus on the other hand seems to push Xenophanes’ 
assumption one step further. For him the possibility of knowledge was felt as 
the product of a natural aptitude of mankind which, when oriented and 
applied correctly, could result in fruitful conclusions and bring about a better 
way of understanding. And for him better understanding is the essential 
characteristic of the authoritative status of every σοφός like himself.  




Remember the light  
and believe the light. 
Sarah Kane, 4.48 
 
Chapter IV: Parmenides 
 
Parmenides differs in many ways from Heraclitus, not only because he 
expressed his cosmology in verse, but also because of the rather distinct 
quality of his more abstract doctrine. At the outset of his poem, Parmenides 
introduces his cosmology to the audience as the product of divine revelation. 
He then proceeds to establish a proper method of inquiry, on the appropriate 
basis of which knowledge should be pursued. In addition, Parmenides 
distinguishes more systematically ἀληθείη from δόξα, which constitute the 
two major parts of his exposition. The notable feature of Parmenides’ thought 
is that in the purely cosmological-ontological part of his poem he reconstructs 
the unapparent reality of the ἐόν. This reality is not a figment of imagination 
but the product of the power of human mental apprehension, which is 
applied according to the method which Parmenides has earlier established. 
The immediate implication of these elements is that the authority claims of 
Parmenides range from that of the religious teacher or the poet to that of a 
more soberly systematic discussion of the cosmos.  
 
1. Parmenides as a poet: his proem and the goddess 
 
In the opening lines of his poem Parmenides openly claims divine 
inspiration for what he has to say. He begins his otherwise cosmological-
ontological exposition by describing an epic journey to a goddess who 
remains a shady figure throughout the poem, yet is the one who reveals the 
truth which follows. In the proem, Parmenides applies two leitmotifs: the 




journey and the encounter with a divine person who promises to disclose 
knowledge to the traveller.  
If we wish to interpret the precise function of the proem in connection 
with Parmenides’ authority claims, it is crucial that we examine firstly the 
question of whether Parmenides is sincere when he applies such a style to this 
thought or whether he is, as Bowra put it, “plainly allegorizing”.1 It is 
important to understand, that is to say, whether the proem should be read 
literally or as an imaginative recreation of traditional material of poetry which 
suggests rather at something else.  
The allegorical reading of the proem was not unknown to the ancient 
commentators. Sextus was the first who submitted a detailed examination of 
the allegorical features in Parmenides’ proem. Sextus identified ἵπποι with the 
irrational impulses and desires of the soul, ὁδός with θεωρία, which 
eventually leads to the knowledge of everything, κοῦραι with the senses 
(sight is in his view implied by Ἡλιάδες and hearing by δοιοῖς κύκλοις), and 
the keys which Δίκη holds with the ἀσφαλεῖς τὦν πραγμάτων καταλήψεις 
through the power of the mind.2 It is, of course, impossible to lend our full 
support to this view, since it seems hard to accept that Parmenides would 
                                                 
1  Cf. Bowra (1937, p. 98) and, more recently, Coxon (1986, p. 15) and Curd (2004, p. 
19). In a somewhat similar spirit Burnet interpreted the proem as an allegory for 
Parmenides’ conversion to Pythagoreanism (1930, p. 170). See also, Diels (2003, p. 9 
ff.). Henn, moreover, understood the proem as an allegory for the experience of the 
shaman (2003, p. 51). These suggestions are not safe, for reasons discussed in the 
following section. According to Farandos the “mythologische Bildsprache” of the 
proem conveys the concepts of “philosophische Zetetik und Heuristik” (1982, p. 69), 
while for Freeman the allegory of the proem actually states Parmenides’ new method 
(1966, p. 146). Tarán on the other hand points out that the content of the proem 
cannot be taken as real, since it uses tenses which imply the narration of a repeated 
experience rather than of a past event (1965, p. 30). Furley, followed by Gallop, 
interpreted the proem as a katabasis myth like the one in Odyssey’s Νέκυια (cf. 1975, 
p. 2 and 1984, p. 7, respectively). For other scholarly views which support the 
allegorical reading of the proem, see Barnes (1982, p. 156), Reinhardt (1916, p. 67; and 
1974, p. 301), and Guthrie (1965, pp. 4 and10), but also Havelock (1958, pp. 133-143), 
and Deichgraeber (1959, pp. 6-11; 23-43; and 85-6).  
2  Cf. adv. math. VII.111 ff.  




have assumed these pictures he uses in his proem as literary representations 
of other concepts. It seems safe to accept that in the proem Parmenides 
employs mythological language. However, there is no compelling reason to 
assume, together with Sextus, such a strict correspondence between every 
metaphor with an implied meaning.  At the same time, however, it is possible 
to trace some element of truth in such an interpretation. 
E. Havelock pointed out that Parmenides intends to evoke in the 
opening lines of his poem the epic figure of Odysseus.3 This is manifested in 
Parmenides’ use of the ὁδός motif, which persists throughout the poem, and 
of the imagery of travelling. It is crucial to add here that the image of 
travelling alludes not only to the well-known story about Odysseus’ 
wandering, but also to his status as an unsurpassed example of human 
wisdom.4 In the opening of the Odyssey, that is, Odysseus’ wisdom is justified 
on grounds of the experience he has acquired in his travels. This experience is 
defined, furthermore, as the opportunity to become acquainted with the 
mentality of many different peoples. In a similar vein, Parmenides claims that 
the route which he follows κατὰ πάντ’ ἄστη φέρει εἰδότα φὦτα (line 3). This 
phrase bears an obvious resonance to the Homeric line according to which 
Odysseus πολλὦν ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα.5 In addition, we learn from the 
Odyssey that Odysseus experienced his adventures κατὰ θυμόν. This in turn 
naturally brings to mind Parmenides’ mention of his θυμός in the very first 
                                                 
3 Cf. Havelock (1958).  
4 For an extensive study on the similarities between Odysseus and Parmenides, see 
Havelock (1958) but also Manfelf (1964, pp. 229-30). Havelock concludes in his 
examination that Parmenides presents himself in the opening of his poem as a new 
type of hero. However, as Mansfeld observes in his analysis, Parmenides does not 
wish to fully identify himself with Odysseus but to contrast himself with him. For 
the same suggestion, see also Mourelatos (2008, p. 39) and Cosgrove (1974, p. 92).  
5 There has been some controversy however pertinent to Parmenides’ use of εἰδότα 
φὦτα, for which see analysis below.  




line of his poem.6 It then becomes apparent that Parmenides is trying to 
appropriate the mythical example of Odysseus, who is regarded a case of 
superior knowledge, to his personal authority claims.  
However, the crucial difference is that Parmenides is an individual 
who directly address an audience with his verses. This is partly suggested also 
by the fact that he is also rather outspoken about himself in the proem.7 This 
implies that Parmenides believes that he has his own story to tell, which he 
implicitly differentiates from the myth about Odysseus. In what follows the 
verses of Parmenides run swiftly and immediately this brief association of 
himself with Odysseus retreats, since, unlike Odysseus, Parmenides claims 
that he travelled to a place which is unknown to other mortals.8 Like 
                                                 
6  It is true that θυμὸς was for the Greeks the seat of emotions. However, this should 
not be taken as evidence for that Parmenides’ doctrine combines intuitive and 
reflective knowledge, as according to Fränkel (1975, p. 365) and Sellmer (1998, p. 
200). At any event the method which Parmenides goes on to establish in B2 relies on 
critical reflection rather than on intuition. In addition, Fränkel identifies θυμός with 
Parmenides’ “metaphysical spirit”. However, metaphysics is for Parmenides a matter 
of rationality. At any event, it is not beyond doubt that the first instance of 
philosophical activity would have perceived from the outset of its appearance such a 
sharp distinction between different ways of knowing. 
7 Fränkel observed the frequent use of the authoritative-I in the proem (1975, p. 365). 
Coxon suggested that the μέ of the first line calls for an immediate clarification, from 
which he concludes that Parmenides’ work was introduced with the phrase 
Παρμενίδης Πύρητος Ἐλεάτης ὧδε μυθεῖται (1986, p. 156). This view neglects that at 
the event of the oral presentation of Parmenides’ poem such a clarification would in 
fact be superfluous. In addition, it does not seem safe to add a prose opening to a 
work composed in verse. As noted already, the use of the authoritative-I in the 
proem should be taken to imply the description of an actual experience. It functions 
as an allegory for the way in which Parmenides managed to reach his cosmological 
insights.  
8  Cf. B1.27: ἀπ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου. Parmenides makes it explicit that the 
revelation of the goddess takes place in her realm, as δὦ in B1.25 further suggests. 
Bowra rightly points out that the claim which Parmenides makes here is not a 
common one in traditional poetry. In his view, Parmenides was the only “poet” who 
presented himself as someone better than every other man (1937, p. 105). Curd on the 
other hand interpreted this phrase as evidence for that Parmenides distanced himself 
from the world of ordinary human life (2004, p. 21). To be more precise, however, the 




Odysseus, however, Parmenides is, too, on friendly terms with the divine. In 
fact, it is exactly for this reason that his journey is accomplished. Not only do 
the Ἡλιάδες κοῦραι guide his chariot (lines 8-9),9 but they also put in a word 
on his behalf, when he encounters the goddess (πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, line 15). 
The goddess then receives Parmenides warmly (πρόφρων, line 22)10 and 
promises to reveal to him the truth (Ἀληθείης ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ, line 29) as well 
as the opinions of mortals (βροτὦν δόξας, line 30).  
It is important to note, however, that although Parmenides is obviously 
aided in his travel to the realm of the goddess by these divine personages he 
is nonetheless never treated as their equal, and he never dispels his status as a 
mortal.11 At the same time, however, it is only plain to see that Parmenides 
considers himself better than the average mortal, since he is the exclusive 
recipient of divine grace.  
                                                                                                                                            
unordinary route which Parmenides follows is a metaphorical description of his 
distancing from the world of sensual experience. See also, Prier (1976, p. 103).  
9  For the traditional topos of a mortal being guided by a divinity, the formula for 
which is ὁδὸν ἡγεμονεύειν, cf. ζ 259-61 (Nausica), η 30 (Athena), κ 501 (Circe), but 
also ω 225, Hymn. hom. In Merc. 302-3, and Hes. Th. 387. For the parallel of a god 
travelling on a chariot, cf. Saph. fr. 1.9 (Aphrodite); Alc. fr. 1-4 (Apollo); Hymn. hom. 
Dem. 431-2; but also Emped. B4.5 (Calliope); Pl. Phdr. 246e (Zeus’ πτηνὸν ἅρμα); and 
Pind. Isth. 8.61 (Μοισαῖον ἅρμα), and Pyth. 10.65 (ἅρμα Πιερίδων). The closest 
parallel to Parmenides’ opening is Pind. Ol. 6.22-42. Pindar also mentions a κελεύθῳ 
καθαρᾷ and the πύλας ὕμνων, while he also claims that the Muses ὁδὸν 
ἡγεμονεῦσαι. However, the similarities between these parallels are limited to verbal 
echoes and they do not concern the general conceptual scheme of these two poems. 
For a discussion of these passages, see Wright (1997, p. 8 ff.) and Bowra (1937, p. 99).  
10  The traditional adjective πρόφρων actually means not simply “gladly” but also 
“well-disposed” and it is regularly applied to the way in which gods receive mortals. 
Cf. Θ 8.175; Ι 9. 480; Κ 242; Ψ 647; β 387; ξ 54; Hom. hymn. Dem. 226; H 31.17; Hes. Op. 
666; Sapph. Epigr. 6.269; Pind. Pyth. 9.55-6; Nem. 5.23-4; Eurip. Alc. 742-4; and Aesch. 
Suppl. 216. It is also appears frequently in connection with the eagerness with which 
a god assists a mortal in accomplishing his goal. Cf. Hymn. hom. H 307; Hes. Th. 418-
2; Pind. Pyth. 5.117-8; Aesch. Ch. 1063-4; and Sophocl. El. 1379-81.  
11  For the view that the human is never assimilated to the divine in Parmenides’ 
poem, see analysis below.  




When Parmenides finally meets the goddess he is in an obviously 
privileged position. The goddess’ friendliness towards Parmenides is 
indicated by the fact that she addresses him as κοῦρος and ἀθανάτοισιν 
συνάορος (line 24), but also by the handshake which she exchanges with him 
(line 21).12 The importance which Parmenides’ journey has in connection with 
his authority claims is hinted at in the following two questions which arise 
from this scene: (a) why is the goddess well-disposed towards him, and (b) 
what is the outcome of their encounter. Interestingly enough, the goddess 
openly declares the reasons why she chose to meet Parmenides in lines 26 and 
28, in which she says that he managed to reach her realm not because of a 
μοῖρα κακή, but because of θέμις τε δίκη. Parmenides is certainly choosing 
his words here carefully, which in turn suggests the importance which this 
scene has in establishing a claim to status of authority.  
It then seems that Parmenides attributed the reason why he was 
chosen by the goddess to both θέμις and δίκη, which appear to illustrate a 
context of necessity (Ἀνάγκη) based on what can be deemed as appropriate, 
rightful, and lawful.13 These concepts apparently imply, when taken at their 
face value, that Parmenides viewed his theoretical activity as a moral 
imperative.14 A closer look, however, reveals that they recur in the main part 
of the poem, and more specifically in the strongly logical context of fragment 
                                                 
12  For parallels of handshake as a gesture of bona fides (πίστις), cf. α 120 ff.; Soph. 
Philoct. 813; OC. 1632. See also Eur. Med. 21-2.  
13  For concept of Δίκη as a power of cosmic and social balance, cf. ξ 83-4; Hes. Op. 
276 ff., and Op. 217; and, of course, Anax. B1, and Sol. fr. 4.14. For the representation 
of Δίκη as crooked (σχολίη), i.e. false, judgment, see Hes. Op. 219; 250; and 264. For 
Ἀνάγκη as a constraint of necessity, cf. Ζ 458; η 217; Aesch. Pers. 293-4; 104-5, and 
515; Sim. fr. 37.1.29; and Hymn. Orph. 3.11. For Θέμις as ὀρθόβουλος, see Aesch. 
Prom. vinct. 18.  
14  This reading is encouraged in particular from line 28, in which the goddess says 
that χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι. This was firstly suggested by Bowra, who based 
on the obviously moral tone of Δίκη concluded that the search of truth was felt by 
Parmenides as an ethical activity (1937, p. 107).  




B8, in which Parmenides expounds the core of his doctrine, namely the true 
properties of the ἐόν. This set of lines runs as follows: 
B8.32: οὕνεκεν οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον τὸ ἐὸν θὲμις εἶναι 
Β8.14: *τοῦ εἵνεκεν+ οὔτε ὄλλυσθαι ἀνῆκε Δίκη χαλάσασα πέδῃσιν 
Β8.37: ἐπεὶ τό γε Μοῖρ’ ἐπέδησεν οὗλον ἀκίνητόν τ’ ἔμεναι 
B8.16: κέκριται δ’ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἀνάγκη 
Β8.30: κρατερὴ γὰρ Ἀνάγκη/ πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει 
 
It immediately becomes apparent that the above phrases all contain 
words which denote a logical conclusion (e.g. οὕνεκεν, ἐπεί, οὖν, γάρ). In 
addition, these statements describe the fundamental properties of the ἐόν. 
Line 32 concludes upon the incompleteness of the ἐόν, line 14 opposes the 
belief about the generation of the destruction of the ἐόν, and as such it 
encapsulates a polemic argument, line 37 discusses the immovability of the 
ἐόν, while lines 16 and 30 declare the logical necessity which follows 
Parmenides’ conclusions.  
It seems then that the argumentative context in which these qualities of 
the ἐόν appear in B8 offers decisive information for the interpretation of their 
particular function in the proem in connection with the way in Parmenides 
represents himself to his audience. Looking backwards, this is to say, we can 
now understand the reason why the goddess bestows her divine grace on 
Parmenides: he is skilful in acknowledging with his νόος the logical necessity 
which cosmological speculation requires.15 After all, Δίκη is held entirely 
responsible for granting Parmenides with the permission to access the realm 
of the goddess, since she is the one who holds in her hands the door keys 
(κλῇδας) to her realm.16 From what follows in the main part of the poem, 
furthermore, it seems only natural to identify the figure of Δίκη with the 
                                                 
15  For a thorough examination of the technique of “insight by hindsight”, which the 
early cosmologists employed in their works, see Mansfeld (1995).  
16  Cf. B1.15.  




logical necessity which, according to Parmenides, theoretical knowledge 
demands.17 
If this interpretation is correct, then this also implies that the figures of 
Θέμις and Δίκη are meant to function as a personification, and that as such 
they lose in Parmenides their purely poetic colour.18 The last lines of the 
proem in particular show that Parmenides devises a technique of oral 
presentation, which was previously employed by Xenophanes. He eventually 
subverts, that is, the poetic imagery he applies in the opening of his poem in 
favour of a somewhat more clear and straightforward exposition of his 
cosmological-ontological message. It seems that once Parmenides has 
captured the attention of his audience by using traditional language, he 
nonetheless drops it when he gets to his real theoretical task.19   
It is also in light of this that the role of the goddess in the proem should 
be interpreted. Scholars generally agree that it is impossible to identify her 
                                                 
17  So according to Fränkel (1960, p. 165; and 1975, p. 355), who understands Δίκη as 
“die Richtigkeit der Konsequenz”; Cherubin (2001, p. 267; and 2005, pp. 16-19), who 
further adds that Δίκη, Ἀνάγκη, and Μοῖρα set the conditions for the inquiry, and 
Gigon (1968, p. 252). In a similar vein, Lloyd interpreted Δίκη as the ordered 
structure of the cosmos (1979, p. 33, n.113). See also Lloyd’s very useful examination 
of forms of pre-platonic arguments, one of which is the notion of logical necessity 
(1966, p. 442). Lloyd is right in interpreting Ἀνάγκη as a metaphor for reasonable 
thinking, since it also appears in the strongly logical context of B8. That Ἀνάγκη 
generally conveys the idea of orderliness in nature was extensively examined by 
Cornford, who also viewed it in connection with the pre-philosophical background 
(1912, chh. 1 and 2). 
18   These divinities have been viewed as personifications by Tarán (1965, pp. 117-8), 
Engelhard (1996, p. 149), for whom they stand for “die Kraft der Überzeugung”, and 
Mansfeld (1964, p. 197), who further adds that these divinities are “richtitige 
Philosophengötter”. Against this view, cf. Nestle (ZN, p. 691) and, more recently, 
Blank (1982, pp. 172-3), who interpreted these divinities as Orphic elements. Blank 
also holds the view that in this way Parmenides asks his audience to have faith in his 
message.  
19  As pointed out by Bowra, who reasonably observes that once Parmenides passes 
through the gates of the goddess all associations with Phaethon’s myth, as he 
suggested, are lost (1937, p. 98). 




with any standard figure of Greek mythology.20 This in turn suggests that 
Parmenides’ claim to a divine revelation has little to do with the actual 
traditional motif of epic inspiration.21 As Mourelatos’ analysis has shown, 
Parmenides’ goddess is a “polymorphous deity”, a concept which does not in 
fact appear in epic poetry.22 This also accounts for why Parmenides 
deliberately blurs her special features. This is so because he wants in this way 
to avoid any associations which the audience would possibly make had he 
used a conventional figure for his “divine” revelation.  
In addition, one of the basic features of the agents of divine inspiration 
in the Greek epos is their omniscience.23 This characteristic is notably absent 
from Parmenides’ goddess. This somehow appears as unexpected, especially 
when considering her promise to discuss matters that are closely related to 
Ἀληθείη. In other words, Parmenides, oddly enough, never attributes her 
knowledge to her divine status. This in turn suggests that Parmenides is 
clearly working with the frame of epic tradition, from which he nonetheless 
wishes to differentiate the knowledge which he presents. He appropriates a 
familiar epic motif in order to stress the importance of his message. In the 
opening lines of his poem therefore her divine status is considered as a 
substantial guarantee for the truthfulness of her account. The same does not 
                                                 
20   For the deliberate anonymity of the goddess, cf. Bowra (1937, pp. 106-7); Furley 
(1973, p. 3); and Engelhard (1996, p. 26). Cornford identified the goddess with reason 
(1952, p. 120), Fränkel with truth (1975, p. 353), while Mansfeld and Farandos with 
Δίκη (1964, p. 270; and 1982, p. 74 respectively). Furley was perhaps right in 
objecting however, that the goddess cannot be identified with Δίκη because she is 
also mentioned in the third person at line 28 (ibid., n.3). Tarán was the only one who 
maintained that the goddess is not real for Parmenides. In his view she is a literary 
device which emphasises the objectivity of Parmenides’ method (1965, p. 230).  
21 For an analysis of which, see in introduction.  
22  Cf. Mourelatos (2008, pp. 26-9).  
23  Cf., for example, the second invocation in the Iliad, in which the poet addresses the 
Muses with these words: ὑμεῖς γὰρ θεαί ἐστε πάρεστέ τε ἴστέ τε πάντα (B485). It is 
also important to note that the poet then goes on to say that there is no possible way 
for mortals to know other than through the knowledge which gods reveal to mortals. 
In Parmenides however “mortals”, too, are credited with the ability to know.  




apply, however, for the main part of the poem, in which Parmenides 
apparently pursues knowledge on grounds of a more reasonable 
understanding.  
In addition, the content of the truth which Parmenides’ goddess 
discloses is barely similar with the truth or information which the Muses 
normally disclose in epic poetry. The goddess tells him that he will learn 
everything (πάντα πυθέσθαι, line 28), which she then goes on to define as 
both Ἀληθείης ἦτορ (line 29) and the βροτὦν δόξας (line 30). Parmenides 
reaches with this declaration the main purpose of his exposition, which he 
identifies with the discussion of truth. This distinction between right opinion 
(or of ὀρθὴ δόξα, as Plato later put it)24 and false opinion persists throughout 
the poem. In fact, it is the poem.  
The closest and most obvious poetic parallel to this distinction is found 
in what the Muses tell Hesiod:    
ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα, 
ἴδμεν δ’ εὖτ’ ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι25 
 
Parmenides understands, however, this distinction in connection not 
with the presentation of a truthful version of an older story, as Hesiod, but in 
connection with the rational understanding of cosmic reality. Hesiod, 
furthermore, never refers to the logical implications of such a distinction. He 
simply points out to the possibility of error as opposed to the real truth. If we 
view the declaration which the goddess makes in the opening lines in light of 
what follows in the main part of the poem, it becomes apparent that her 
distinction between Ἀληθείη and βροτὦν δόξας refers to what can qualify as 
truth and what should be dismissed as erroneous belief according to rational 
                                                 
24  Cf. Pl. Symp. 201d. According to Plato true δόξα is the intermediate stage between 
φρονήσις and ἀμάθια.  
25  Cf. Th. 27-28. For a comparison of Parmenides with Hesiod, especially in terms of 
style, see Dolin (1962).  




standards. This is largely manifested in fragment B2, in which the goddess 
defines the two possible routes of inquiry. The logically admissible 
conclusions, which one reaches if he follows the appropriate route of inquiry, 
are presented in fragment B8.  
It then becomes apparent that Parmenides establishes from the outset 
an elenctic process, which he bases on κρίσις and on νόος, and which 
functions as a standard according to which the truth-value of a certain 
doctrine is decided. This impression is further reinforced by the fact that in 
the last lines of the proem Parmenides uses twice words which imply the 
dialectic method which he employs in fragment B8.26 It is important to point 
out that this concept is uniquely Parmenidean and that it is the novel message 
which Parmenides introduces to his audience. It seems, furthermore, that 
Parmenides sought to establish a posture of authority for himself based on 
this distinction, since he presents this new message in his proem as the 
product of a communication with the divine.27  
Our examination of the role of the goddess in the acquisition of 
knowledge suggests that she functions as a literary device. At the same time 
however, it is only plain to see that whilst she plays an important role in the 
proem in the revelation of truth, the content of the truth which she apparently 
discloses in the main part of the poem is particularly Parmenidean in its own 
                                                 
26  Cf. πίστις ἀληθής and δοκίμως in lines 30 and 32 respectively. Heidel was the first 
to argue that the notion of πίστις was taken from forensic argumentation (1943, pp. 
717-9). For the same suggestion, cf., Verdenius (1958, p. 49), and Vlastos (1946, p. 590, 
n. 60). Blank on the other hand made the interesting suggestion that πίστις has in 
Parmenides a religious sense (1982, p. 177). For δοκίμως as “probable” in the sense of 
“proven”, cf. Wilamovitz (1899, p. 205), and Calogero (1931, pp. 31-2), but also 
Democr. B67.  
27  Cf., for instance, the claim made in B2.7: κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας. 




right.28  This realisation brings to the foreground the key question of to whom 
does the actual voice of authority which is used in the poem belong.  
If we accept the possibility that the goddess is a literary conceit, then it 
seems only natural to also assume that the voice of authority used in the 
poem belongs to Parmenides himself.29 This impression is further encouraged 
by the fact that in the main part of the poem the presence of the goddess 
gradually fades out. In fact, if we isolate the main part of Parmenides’ 
exposition from the proem, there is little to remind us of the goddess’ divine 
presence and involvement in the presentation of truth. It seems more 
reasonable to accept that in the proem the converse occurs between 
Parmenides and the goddess but in the main part of the poem it takes place 
between Parmenides and his audience. The shift in the owner of the voice of 
authority of the poem is also manifested in that the first part of the poem has 
a strongly narrative quality, which retreats in the main part, in which a more 
straightforwardly didactic posture is adopted. This is mainly manifested in 
the lines from the main part of the poem, which explicitly refer to the first or 
to the second person:  
B2.1-2:    εἰ δ’ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας 
               αἵπερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιός ἐστι νοῆσαι 
B4.1:       λεῦσσε δ’ ὅμως ἀπέοντα νόῳ παρέοντα βεβαίως 
                                                 
28 For an overview of the thing which gods normally grant to humans in poetry, see 
Hymn. hom. H 8.9; Hes. Op. 9; Theog. El. 1.4; El. 1.13; Aesch. Ch. 139-41; γ 55-6; but 
also, Ο 514 ff.; and Sapph. fr. 1. 21-4. These parallels show that the claim which the 
goddess makes in the last lines of the proem was not an unusual one in poetry.   
29  Although this point has a crucial significance, it has received little attention in 
scholarly analysis. Only Fränkel and Untersteiner have observed the shift in the 
voice of authority in the different parts of the poem. Fränkel observed that σύ in the 
proem refers to Parmenides, whereas in the main part it actually refers to 
Parmenides’ audience (1975, p. 365). According to Untersteiner, it cannot be with 
much certainty dismissed that the real speaker in the poem is Parmenides (1967, 
LXXX). In a similar fashion, Gigon contended that it is impossible to tell whether the 
goddess is differentiated from Parmenides (1968, p. 288). Tarán objected that this is 
an unnecessary hypothesis, since βροτοί obviously suggests that the speech is uttered 
from the standpoint of a goddess. This question is discussed further below.  




B5.1-2:    ξυνὸν δέ μοί ἐστιν,  
               ὁππόθεν ἄρξομαι· τόθι γὰρ πάλιν ἵξομαι αὖθις 
Β6.2-3:    τά σ’ ἐγὼ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα 
               ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος εἴργω 
Β7.2:       ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα 
               μηδέ σ’ ἔθος πολύπειρον κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω,  
               νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν 
               καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον 
               ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.  
B8.7-8:    οὐδ’ ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐάσσω/ φάσθαι σ’ οὐδὲ νοεῖν 
B8.35-6:  οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος</εὑρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν 
Β8.52:     μάνθανε κόσμον ἀπατηλόν 
Β8.61:     οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσῃ 
 
It immediately becomes apparent that the all the addresses made to the 
second person occur in critical parts of the poem. The person to whom the 
divine revelation is delivered is urged to reflect upon the validity of the two 
available routes of inquiry, to discern those objects or concepts which are 
absent with the power of his thought, to avoid the route of the μὴ ἐόν, to learn 
the deceptive order of the world, to avoid being lead astray by erroneous 
beliefs, and to judge the message which he hears based on the power of his 
reason. The “goddess” on the other hand takes full responsibility for the truth 
which she reveals, she declares that she will return to the same point of 
departure in her speech, and she defines her message as an ἔλεγχος.  
Fragment B2, in which the two routes of inquiry are introduced, 
encloses the moment of this transformation. It seems that from fragment B2 
onwards Parmenides abandons the literary mask of the goddess and proceeds 
to present his personal speculations about the true nature of things. In 
fragment B5, moreover, the goddess makes a declaration, which was not 
normally made by an epic figure:  
Ξυνὸν δέ μοί ἐστιν,  
ὁππόθεν ἄρξωμαι. Τόθι γὰρ πάλιν ἵξομαι αὖθις.  
 




This statement refers to the way in which the message is presented to 
the audience, and as such it concerns the author and not his divine patron. 
The idea recurs in Empedocles, and it is an indication of that the actual voice 
of authority in the main part of the poem belongs to Parmenides.30  
In addition, in fragment B7 the “goddess” describes her speech as an 
ἔλεγχος, a word which obviously implies critical ability which is at the 
service of knowledge. This idea of a god defending the reliability of the 
knowledge which he discloses is completely alien to the traditional belief 
about poetic inspiration. After all, why would a divinity feel the need to 
justify her or his higher knowledge? The faith which mortals generally 
displayed in divine revelations was a spontaneous human reaction to the 
unquestionable authority of the divine, as in the case of oracular 
pronouncements.  
These elements encourage the impression that Parmenides’ goddess is 
not a religious figure but a literary representation of his personal voice of 
authority. It is Parmenides’ dramatic self-image, and his way to present 
himself to his audience as someone who deserves their attention. It should be 
pointed out, however, that this identification of Parmenides’ voice with the 
divine does not also imply that he viewed himself as divine.31 In the proem 
Parmenides never dispels his mortal status, and since the goddess is not real 
nor is, consequently, her divinity. Parmenides reshapes a traditional motif 
which he borrows from epic poetry in order to lay a claim to a higher status of 
authority. It is important to note at this point that some scholars have 
proposed that Parmenides accepted in his poetry the traditional belief 
pertinent to the Einheit of god and man. It is necessary to turn to the 
                                                 
30  Cf. e.g. B35.1-2: αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ παλίνορσος ἐλεύσομαι ἐς πόρον ὕμνων,/τὸν πρότερον 
κατέλεξα.  
31  As suggested by Bowra, who claimed that “in so describing his experiences 
Parmenides made himself divine” (1937, p. 105).  




examination of this suggestion, because it questions the validity of our 
assumption that Parmenides distinguished his voice from that of the fictional 
figure of his inspiring deity.  
W. J. Verdenius was the first to point out that it is possible to view 
Parmenides’ relationship with the goddess as parallel with the poet’s 
relationship with the Muses described in epic poetry. According to his 
interpretation in both cases divine knowledge stands side by side with human 
wisdom, the responsibility for which not nonetheless wholly detached from 
the individual.32 He was later followed by J. Mansfeld, who further added to 
Verdenius’ argument that in the poem of Parmenides the goddess initiates the 
cooperation of the human and the divine for the acquisition of knowledge.33 
There is, however, one crucial difference in Parmenides. Unlike the standard 
motif of inspiration in poetry, the goddess who reveals knowledge does not 
descend to the human world, but it is Parmenides who travels to her realm.34   
When Phemius begs Odysseus in the Odyssey to spare his life, he 
invokes his respected position in society, which he justifies as follows:   
 
αὐτοδίδακτος δ’ εἰμί, θεὸς δέ μοι ἐν φρεσὶν οἴμας  
παντοίας ἐνέφυσεν· ἔοικα δέ τοι παραείδειν ὥς τε θεῷ.35  
 
                                                 
32  Cf. Verdenius (1942), pp. 11 and 13 respectively. According to his interpretation, 
the proem describes a religious experience, although, Verdenius goes on to observe, 
it should not be taken at its face value (p. 67).  
33  Cf. Mansfeld (1964, pp. 251-2). For the view that the revelation of the goddess is an 
unusual one, see also Curd (2004, p. 20).  
34  This inversion of the traditional topos is another indication of that the goddess is a 
stylistic fallacy. The ὕμνοι κλητικοί show that the standard way to ask for divine 
intervention was to ask for the god to come down to the human world and not the 
opposite. Cf. Hes. Th. 9-10: ἔνθεν (sc. Helicon’s peak) ἀπορνύμεναι…στεῖχον; Pind. 
Ol. 3.4: Μοῖσα παρέστα μοι; Sapph. fr. 1. 6-7: (to Aphrodite) ἔκλυες, πάτρος δὲ δόμον 
λίποισα χρυσίον ἦλθες; A 43-4: τοῦδ’ ἔκλυε Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων/ βῆ δὲ κατ’ 
Οὐλύμποιο; Ε 121: τοῦδ’ ἔκλυε Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη,/ γυῖα δ’ ἔθηκεν ἐλαφρά, πόδας καὶ 
χεῖρας ὑπέρθεν/ ἀγχοῦ δ’ ἱσταμένη ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα; K 291: ὥς νῦν μοι 
ἐθέλουσα παρίσταο καί με φύλασσε; and Ψ 770: κλῦθι, θεά, ἀγαθή μοι…ἐλθέ. 
35  Cf. χ 347-9. The parallel was first adduced by Mansfeld (1964, p. 250). Cf. also, 
Fränkel (1951, p. 164 ff.); Snell (1955, p. 149); and Verdenius (1948, p. 12 ff.).   




Phemius’ justification of his authority shows that he feels no 
contradiction between human and divine responsibility in knowing. The same 
belief does not appear in the opening of Parmenides’ poem, since Parmenides 
is clearly distinguished from the divine. For this reason he is referred to as 
ἀθανάτοισι συνάορος (line 24) but never as ἰσόθεος.36 This opposes directly 
the statement which Phemius make that he is able to sing ὣς θεῷ in the 
citation quoted above. However, it is necessary to note that this does not 
imply that Phemius thought of himself as a god. What he means with this 
phrase is that he is able to sing as if he were a god.  
There is, furthermore, another crucial difference between the 
knowledge which the divine personage bestows in either case. The Muse is 
said to provide Phemius with the οἴμας, which his song follows. These “paths 
of song” possibly refer to the narrative techniques used in oral epic poetry, 
such as the use of traditional formulae, either phrases or motifs. To 
Parmenides on the other hand the goddess imparts a kind of unusual skill 
which takes the form of an ἔλεγχος, i.e. critical judgement (B7.5).37 This 
ability to think in a reasonable, and therefore safe, manner is considered 
central in Parmenides’ account for acquiring valid knowledge about the 
cosmos.38  
                                                 
36  For an extensive study on θεοφιλία, cf. Dirlmeier (1935).  
37  Lloyd thus understood the claim which the goddess makes in B7.5 as proof that 
the goddess differs from any other traditional god of poetry. In his view, the original 
demonstration of the qualities of the ἐόν in the main part of the poem, have nothing 
in common with traditional divine authority (cf. 1987, p. 60, and especially n.37). In a 
similar fashion, Nussbaum held that the ability of the goddess to think is her basic 
characteristic, although he did not go as far as to distinguish between two different 
voices of authority in the poem (cf. 1979, p. 69). According to Engelhard, 
furthermore, argumentation is not a common feature of divine revelation (1996, p. 
267). He thus concludes in his analysis that humans have the capacity to reach 
knowledge on their own and unaided by the gods. For Curd on the other hand there 
is no contrast between the divine authorization of Parmenides’ truth and his use of 
rational judgement (2004, p. 20).  
38  Cf. B1.28-32.  




Verdenius provided in his analysis one further proof of that the whole 
poem is uttered from the standpoint of a god. In his view this is manifested in 
the regular references made to βροτοί.39 It is important to examine this point 
which Verdenius makes, because it prima facie threatens the reliability of our 
proposal that the actual voice of authority in the poem belongs to Parmenides 
and not to the goddess. Parmenides mentions the βροτοί in the following lines 
of his poem: 
B1.30: βροτῶν δόξαις, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής 
B6.4:   αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ’ ἀπὸ τῆς *sc. μὴ ἐόντος ὁδοῦ],  
           ἥν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδέν 
 πλάττονται, δίκρανοι· ἀμηχανίη γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν 
           στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλακτὸν νόον 
B8.39: ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ, 
           γίγνεσθαί τε ὄλλυσθαι, εἶναί τε καὶ οὐχί 
Β8.51: δόξας δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας 
           μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων 
Β8.61: ὡς οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσῃ 
 
Parmenides refers to men as βροτοί, whenever he wants to point out to 
their ignorance on specific matters.40 This in turn speaks volumes about the 
rather polemical function which this word carries in his poem. Parmenides 
thus reproaches the βροτοί because their views lack proof (B1, πίστις ἀληθής) 
as well as method (B6, ἀμηχανίη), and because they place their trust in the μὴ 
ἐόν route (B6, B8.39). In his view, all these generate the mistaken acceptance 
as true of profoundly erroneous views (B6, πλακτόν νόον; B8.52, κόσμον 
                                                 
39  Cf. Verdenius (1942).  
40 Coxon is not exactly right when he takes βροτοί to refer exclusively to 
“philosophers”. In his view this is manifested in that Parmenides discusses in his 
poem the ὁδοί διζήσεως (1986, pp. 159 and 183). According to his interpretation, 
βροτοί refers to those who allow themselves to be lead astray by visual reality (cf. 
also, Snell (1955), p. 147). It is not compelling to accept however that only 
philosophers can know and there is nothing in the text which can provide support 
for this view. It seems that Parmenides’ remarks refer to mankind in general and to a 
specific class of individuals. For other interpretations in support of this view, cf. 
Reinhardt (1916, p. 68); Verdenius (1942, p. 56 ff.); Gigon (1945, p. 258); Jaeger (1967, 
pp. 101 and 226 n.36); and Fränkel (1951, p. 404).  




ἀπατηλόν; B8.61, παρελάσσῃ). It then seems that βροτοί does not denote in 
Parmenides the contrast between human and divine nature, as in epic poetry. 
It refers rather to the general failure of men to realise the truth and, more 
importantly, to perceive that specific knowledge which Parmenides discloses 
in his poem.  
As such it establishes a different and inferior level of understanding, 
and it therefore suggests that Parmenides assumes for himself a standpoint of 
authority, when he speaks to his audience. It is unwise, however, to identify 
this standpoint with that of a god, as in Verdenius’ examination. It is a 
standpoint of superiority, which is nonetheless always associated in 
Parmenides with the status of knowing the truth and, more specifically, the 
truth about cosmic reality.41 
2. Parmenides’ choice of verse in connection with his authority 
claims 
 
If the goddess is part of Parmenides’ style, and if, consequently, her 
revelation is no revelation at all, then the question which naturally arises, is 
why would Parmenides employ such a literary device in the presentation of 
his ideas, or, in other words, why would he use a lie in order to present his 
truth.42 Starting with Cornford some scholars have interpreted Parmenides’ 
choice of verse as the most adequate verbal medium which enforces the 
                                                 
41 Engelhard thus argued that with Parmenides “philosophy” was made a human 
responsibility (1996, p. 146).  
42  The ancient compiler of the Suda lexicon found Parmenides’ preference for verse 
odd, and thus assumed that he also wrote other works καταλογάδην. In a similar 
fashion, Plutarch claims that one can perhaps blame Parmenides for having 
expressed a cosmology in hexameters (de rect. rat. aud., 45B1). According to Proclus, 
furthermore, Parmenides’ style bears more similarities with prose rather than with 
standard verse (In Prm., 665, 30). It seems that it was hard for the ancient 
commentators to accept Parmenides’ choice of verse for the publication of a 
cosmology, which for them is, of course, an area of philosophy.  




memorability of the account which he wishes to present.43 It is certainly true 
that the rhythmic pattern of verse assisted the audience in remembering 
Parmenides’ words. Taken alone however, this justification does not provide 
Parmenides’ choice of verse with enough reason.  
A different proposal which some scholars have made is that verse was 
generally considered an adequate medium for instructing an audience.44 This 
suggestion is attractive, especially because the main part of the proem 
displays a didactic quality which is hard to overlook. The intention to instruct 
an audience, however, is not a matter of verbal style alone but of mind, and as 
such the two are distinguished. Writing in verse, that is to say, does not 
immediately imply the desire to teach. The content of the message which is 
thereby delivered however does.45   
Ancient scholars explained the application of verse by Parmenides as 
choice made pro forma. Plutarch thus held that Parmenides used ὥσπερ ὄχημα 
τὸ μέτρον in order to avoid the flatness of prose,46 while Diogenes observed 
Parmenides’ keenness for metaphors.47 Proclus, furthermore, was the first to 
observe the disparity between Parmenides taste for metaphors in the opening 
                                                 
43  Cf. esp. Cornford (1957, pp. 255-6; 1952, pp. 120-1), but also Verdenius (1942, p. 2) 
contra Mourelatos (2008, pp. 45-6). Burnet on the other hand argued that Parmenides 
used verse, because he wanted in this way to follow the Pythagorean tradition (1930, 
p. 171). This perspective of Parmenides’ authority claims is discussed in the 
following section. At any event, the surviving evidence from the Orphic literature 
consists mainly in collections of hymns and ritual prayers, which reveal a rather 
specific religious function.  
44  Cf. Mansfeld (1964, p. 251), Freeman (1966, p. 141), and more recently Wright 
(1997, p. 6).  
45  Thus Osborne was very right in drawing attention to this subtle difference (1997, 
pp. 23-4, 26).  She argues that the early cosmologists did not choose the medium of 
their expression consciously, and that it is anachronistic to think that they did.  
46  Cf. Plut. quom. adol. poet. aud. deb. 16C.11.  
47  Cf. Diog. Laert. Vit. philos. 8.57: μεταφορικός τε ὤν.  




of his poem and the clarity with which he presents his doctrine in the main 
part of his poem, in which he read a prosaic quality.48   
Modern scholars have observed that the clumsiness of Parmenides’ 
hexameters suggests his difficulty to express his cosmology-ontology in a 
verbal medium which was not normally used for the publication of such a 
message. This is also suggested by the fact that, as Mourelatos observes, 
Parmenides’ hexameters are not particularly competent when judged by 
poetic standards.49 According to Mourelatos this implies that Parmenides is 
chiefly concerned with arguing rather than with conforming with the 
tradition of poetry.  In a similar vein, Barnes read in Parmenides an 
“impenetrable obscurity”, which he attributed to his unusual application of 
verse for the publication of his message.50   
Parmenides’ choice of verse can be easily explained, however, when 
taking into consideration that this medium was by far the most favourable, 
and indeed suitable, medium for the oral presentation of ideas in ancient 
Greek society.51 Parmenides’ use or, if you like, misuse of epic verse, was 
further encouraged by the nature of archaic communication.52 K. Reinhardt 
thus held that in the times of Parmenides the most abstract ideas could only 
                                                 
48 Cf. Procl. In Prm. 665.30. Proclus claims that the μεταφοραὶ ὀνομάτων, σχήματα, 
and τροπαί constitute the fundamental poetic features of Parmenides’ account. To 
these he contrast the ἀκαλλώπιστον, ἰσχνόν, and καθαρὸν style which Parmenides 
employs in the main part of his poem.   
49  Cf. Guthrie (1965, p. 4) and Mourelatos (2008, p. 35) respectively, but also, Gallop 
(1984, p. 4). Osborne on the other hand claims that Parmenides, like Empedocles, was 
a gifted poet, while Gomperz maintained that the Greek frame of mind required 
imaginative and poetical expression (cf. 1997, p. 26 and 1969, p. 178 respectively). 
Such an interpretation of Parmenides’ style, however, deprives his choice of verse 
from the importance it has in connection with that Parmenides is in this way trying 
to establish himself as a reliable voice of authority by contrasting his alternative truth 
to that already acknowledged as prestigious knowledge in his society.  
50  Cf., Barnes (1982, p. 155).  
51  For scholarly views which point out to the popularity of the medium of verse, see 
Freeman (1966, p. 141); Wright (1997, p. 6); and Osborne (1997, p. 30).  
52 For an analysis of which, see the relevant section in the introduction.  




be expressed through myth.53  It is certainly true that the employment of myth 
in the presentation of a difficult message facilitates the understanding of the 
audience. However, scholars who have examined the exact function of the 
epic nuances in Parmenides all agree that he subverts the traditional material 
in order to express a novel idea.54 In so doing Parmenides is placing standard 
epic phrasing in fresh cosmological context.  
The outcome of the way in which Parmenides treats the traditional 
material of epic poetry is that it brings about a feeling of familiarity. This is 
vital for the successful delivery of his message, because in this way it 
facilitates the understanding of his startling cosmological message. It then 
seems that Parmenides used the poetic medium of verse in his publication not 
because he considered himself a poet, but because he believed that his 
message was as socially important as that of poetry.  
Another explanation of Parmenides’ choice of verse which has been 
suggested argues that for Parmenides divine revelation was intrinsically 
connected with the process of acquiring knowledge, and that for this reason 
Parmenides had to use the medium of verse.55 However, the motif of divine 
inspiration in poetry was founded upon the genuine belief that charismatic 
individuals could be contacted by the divine, which also endorsed the 
reliability of their account. Our analysis in the previous section has suggested 
that there is considerable evidence in support of the view that Parmenides 
                                                 
53  Cf. Reinhardt (1974, p. 301).  
54  For an examination of the epic nuances in Parmenides, see Floyd (1992); Wright 
(1997, pp. 6-13); Mourelatos (2008, ch. 1, and esp., pp. 5-6, 39); Popper (1998, p. 111); 
Gallop (1984, pp. 4-5), and Coxon (1986, pp. 9-11). Coxon argues that Parmenides 
occasionally relies exclusively on the audience’s familiarity with epic poetry in order 
to deliver his personal message (1986, p. 11). For the importance of Parmenides’ 
appropriation of traditional material in connection with his authority claims, see 
Wright (1997, pp. 9 and 22). 
55  So according to Freeman (1966, p. 141); Mansfeld (1964, p. 273); and Guthrie (1965, 
p. 4). See also Fränkel (1975, p. 351, n.2) and Vernant (1983, p. 353). Reinhardt on the 
other hand contended that divine revelation is only the surface cover of Parmenides’ 
philosophy (1974, p. 301).  




employed in the proem familiar epic language in the form of an allegory. This 
is partly suggested by that in the main part of the poem, the presence of the 
goddess gradually fades into a voice of authority which seems to belong to 
Parmenides. At any event, the real guarantee for Parmenides’ account is not 
drawn from a god but from his rigorous reasoning, which is overtly 
manifested in fragment B8.  
It cannot be therefore safely argued that Parmenides composed a poem 
because he sincerely believed in divine inspiration. At the same time, 
however, it does seem likely that he opted for verse, because he identified the 
metaphor of “journey” with man’s quest for knowledge. This is the only 
image which remains operative throughout the poem, and which is closely 
related to Parmenides’ thought, as becomes apparent from fragment B2.56   
3. Parmenides as a religious figure 
           i) Parmenides as a shaman 
 
Some early interpretations of Parmenides’ poem have interpreted the 
opening of his work as the description of the celestial journey of the shaman.57 
It is for this reason important to turn to the question of whether Parmenides’ 
authority claims can be identified with that of the shaman, and to examine the 
                                                 
56  For the same conclusion, see Mourelatos (2008, p. 29, and esp., p. 46), but also 
Mansfeld (1964, pp. 222-3).  
57  Cf. Diels (2009, p. 14 ff.), Dodds (1951, ch. 5), Cornford (1952, p. 118), Guthrie 
(1965, pp. 11-3), who is careful to not overrate the influence of the religious 
background in Parmenides’ language, but also Meuli’s very influential study (1935, 
p. 171 ff.). This reading has been recently revived by Henn (2003, esp. p. 51). Henn 
makes the attractive suggestion that Parmenides was a shaman, because his thought 
reconciles the tension between mutually contradictory principles, such as light and 
darkness, future and past, and generation and decay. It is important to point out, 
however, that these pairs of conflicting notions, is not central to the actual message of 
Parmenides, and that the basic properties of the ἐόν in B8 assume no such element. In 
fact, Parmenides directly opposes to the concept of regarding as true both what is 
and what is not in B2.  




probability of whether such a type of authority claims was possible in 
Parmenides’ epoch.58  
If we turn to the surviving evidence from Greek literature, we discover 
that the descriptions of shamans concern legendary and mainly non-Greek 
figures. Aristeas of Proconnesus, son of Democharis, was an ἐποποιός, who 
composed a poem on the history of the Hyperborean people of Arimaspoi, 
also known as Ἀριμάσπεια, and a theogony in prose. According to the Suda 
lexicon, furthermore, he was able to disassociate his soul from his body at 
will. Herodotus records a story about Aristeas, according to which when 
Aristeas died, and everyone in his town knew that he was dead, a man from 
another city claimed that he had seen him there. The fellow-citizens of 
Aristeas then opened up his grave only to find to their astonishment that his 
body was missing. After seven years, Herodotus goes on to say, Aristeas 
returned to his home town and sang his poem Ἀριμάσπεια.59  
Abaris was a man from Scythia, son of Apollo, and therefore gifted 
with a natural skill in prophecy. He wrote a prose theogony and a poem 
about the technique of purification.60 According to Herodotus, he travelled 
                                                 
58  The study of Meuli has thoroughly examined the influence of the shamanistic 
trend on the Greeks. According to Meuli, the elements which suggest Parmenides’ 
claim to the authority of the shaman are the “Ich-Erzählung”, the “direkte Rede” in 
the proem, the “Göttersprache”, and the ὁδός-motif (1935, p. 173). It is important to 
distinguish, however, that these elements do not account exclusively for the 
authority of the shaman. The authoritative-I which Parmenides frequently employs 
in the proem may also imply his desire to lay a claim to a higher status of knowing, 
and as such it does not relate to the definition of this status. His encounter with the 
goddess, furthermore, and the ὁδός motif constitute two major aspects of his 
metaphorical language, and of the way in which he treats the traditional expression 
of the epos. It seems that Parmenides’ audience would for this reason immediately 
associate his poem with the epic tradition rather than with shamanism.  
59 Cf. Hes. Hist. 4.13-5. Herodotus also tells us that when Aristeas reached the land of 
the Ἰσσηδόνας he became φοιβόλαμπτος. In addition, Diels read the figure of 
Aristeas the blending of Ionian ἱστορίη with religious ecstasy (2003, p. 21).  
60  Cf. Sud. sub Ἀριστέας.  




around the world upon an arrow,61 while Plato mentions him in connection 
with chants and charms (ἐπῳδαί) as opposed to medicine proper.62  
Zalmoxis was also Scythian and was said to have believed that his soul 
was immortal, for which reason ancient commentators associated him with 
the Pythagorean tradition. According to the Suda, once he became a Greek 
(and therefore he is the only case of a shaman who was intergraded in the 
Greek society) he taught τελετάς to the Thracian Getae and persuaded them 
to believe in the immortality of their soul.63 He then disappeared for four 
years and when he returned he was widely respected in his society for his 
knowledge. Ancient tradition mentions no works of Zalmoxis, which in turn 
implies that he relied on oral teaching.  
To begin with, these known cases of shamans are not entirely 
incorporated into the Greek tradition. The relevant references made in Greek 
literature are infrequent, and they occur mainly in Herodotus, who is known 
to be fascinated by such stories of the extraordinary, and from whom the 
Suda draws with minor differentiations on some points. Even Herodotus, 
however, is expresses his disbelief about the actuality of these stories about 
the shamans.64 At any event, the remoteness of these examples from the Greek 
reality is also manifested in that they are linked mainly with the North, at best 
                                                 
61  Cf. Hdt, Hist. 4.36.  
62  Cf. Pl. Charm. 158b.  
63 Cf. Sud. sub Ζάλμοξις, according to which source he Ἑλληνικὸς γεγονώς. Cf. also 
Hdt. Hist. 4.95-6, who also credits Zalmoxis with the ability to prophecise. Plato 
mentions Zalmoxis as an ἰατρός (although ἰατρομάντις is more appropriate), who 
preached about the immortality of the soul (Charm., 156d). Plato attributed to 
Zalmoxis the belief that in order to cure the body one should firstly heal the soul, 
which in his view is what the Greek doctors failed to realise. Dodds, furthermore, 
read the story about Zalmoxis as an attempt to “rationalise Greek shamanism” (1951, 
p.162, n. 39). For the understanding of ψυχή as an organ of consciousness with a non-
rational intuition, cf. Soph. El. 902: ἐμπαίει τί μοι/ ψυχῇ σύνηθες ὄμμα…τοῦθ’ ὁρᾶν 
τεκμήριον; and Antiph. 5.93.  
64 Cf. Hdt. Hist. 4.96. When it comes to expressing his own opinion about his account, 
Herodotus says: ἐγὼ οὔτε ἀπιστέω οὔτε πιστεύω.  




with the larger region of Thrace, yet not with the Greek mainland, the 
Aegean, Ionia, or Magna Graecia, where the heart of Greek civilization beat.  
The only known case of an authentically Greek shaman is that of the 
Cretian Epimenides. His figure, however, is far too shrouded by myth to 
allow the assumption that the practice of shamanism was common in ancient 
Greece. To this we may add the example of the Greek shaman Aithalides, for 
whom Apollonius Rhodius is our exclusive source. He records Pherecydes’ 
information, according to which Aithalides received the skill of prophecy 
from Hermes, he sometimes descended to Hades, and he was able also to 
ascend to the ὑπὲρ τὴν γῆν τόποις.65 In this testimony, the katabasis seems to 
be the Greek adaptation of the shaman’s celestial journey. At any event, apart 
from this random comment of Apollonius Aithalides is otherwise completely 
unknown.  
It then becomes apparent that the figures of the shamans which appear 
in Greek literature are not common and that they are the Greek interpretation 
of a foreign custom. It seems that the ancient sources adapt shamanism 
according to familiar figures from Greek life, such as that of the μάγος. The 
point here is that there is no substantial evidence for an authentic Greek 
shaman, which in turn implies that this custom was not widespread amongst 
the Greeks, although it was not completely unknown to them either.   
The obvious similarities between Parmenides and Greek “shamans” 
are traced in the choice of the same medium of expression, and the motif of 
the journey, the final aim of which is the acquisition of knowledge.66 Our 
examination of Parmenides’ preference for the medium of verse, however, in 
the previous section has suggested that it had a rather specific function in his 
                                                 
65  Cf. Pherecydes fr. 8 (FrGrHist.). 
66 For general discussions, cf. Diels (2003, pp.14-21); Meuli (1935, esp. pp. 171-2); 
Cornford (1952, p. 118); Morrison (1955, p. 59); Guthrie (1965, pp. 11-3); Mourelatos 
(2008, p. 42-44); Kingsley (1999, p. 62 and p. 72-3); and Verdenius (1949, p. 121-3, 125, 
and 128). 




presentation in connection with the nature of his authority claims. The 
employment of verse by Parmenides implied the importance of his message, 
it contributed in its successful delivery, and it finally aimed in establishing a 
new type of authoritative knowledge by questioning existing forms of 
traditional knowledge. In terms of the motif of travelling in the opening of 
Parmenides’ poem, it is important to remind the reader that, as our analysis in 
the previous section has argued, the proem does not record a real experience. 
At any event, the celestial journey of the shaman required him to enter a state 
of, as Dodds put it, “mental disassociation”, and there is nothing in 
Parmenides’ poem to suggest such a notion.67  
It is also unlikely that the Greeks could perceive the soul 
independently from the body, or at least this idea was not a common one in 
Greek civilization. E.R. Dodds, for example, has argued that the soul was 
rarely distinguished from the body, in which case it was also taken to be the 
seat of emotions rather of intelligence.68 In the Nekyia, furthermore, in which 
we actually have a katabasis to the underworld and not an anabasis to the 
heavens, Odysseus travels in the full form of his living existence, namely in 
both body and soul. The dead he encounters in Hades of course have no 
material body, although they do have however a kind of immaterial visual 
image which resembles the form which they had, when they were alive. In 
addition, when the deceased are given blood to drink, which stands for the 
element of life, they recovered for a short period of time the personality which 
                                                 
67 Cf. Dodds (1951, p. 140), who provides a description of the key characteristics 
which distinguish a shaman. According to Dodds, the shaman derives the skill of 
manticism, poetry, and sorcery from his ability to travel to distant places. It is also 
worthy of note that Levi-Strauss argues that modern shamanism has an intellectual 
colour. In his view, although the practice of magic in the ritual of the shaman refers 
to an emotional situation, the core of the expertise of the shaman is intellectual, since 
it requires the γνὦσις of a particular ars (1963, p. 184). 
68  Cf. Dodds (1951, p. 139).  




they had in real life. This description in the Nekyia suggests that the Greeks 
did not generally perceive the living soul separately from the body.  
It is possible to trace in Parmenides the same notion. In the first line of 
his poem με indicates that the mares transfer him in the totality of his 
existence, and that they do not carry just his spirit. Parmenides also claims 
that he travels as far as his θυμός allows him to, but he never claims that he 
travels by the power of his θυμός. In addition, he is escorted by the Sun 
maidens and he does not retreat for solitude as in the case of the shaman. His 
journey is, furthermore, supervised by these divine persons (Β1.5: κοῦραι ὁδὸν 
ἡγεμόνευον), whereas the progression of the shaman towards an 
extraordinary reality is never accompanied or supervised by a divinity. The 
shaman transcends the mundane point of view through personal isolation 
from his society, in which case he is considered by his fellow citizens to be 
either deceased or missing. Parmenides apparently claims in the opening of 
his poem that he travelled, as in the Greek stories about shamans, κατὰ πάντ’ 
ἄστη (B1.3). However, it seems that this phrase has a rather different function 
in his poem. It is meant to evoke the example of wise Odysseus, and to imply 
the ὁδός motif, which persists throughout the poem, as argued in the previous 
section.  
Last but certainly not least, it cannot be claimed with much certainty 
that the journey of Parmenides is definitely located in the heavens. This is so, 
especially because he generally seems to avoid in the proem explicit 
identifications either in terms of places or in terms of persons. If we wish 
however to look for evidence which might perhaps suggest the topography of 
Parmenides’ journey, then the information that the Sun maidens depart from 
the δώματα νυκτός and that they move εἰς φάος (B1.9-10) provides us with 
some guidance. Parmenides says, furthermore, that he stands in front of the 
gates of both night and day before he enters the realm of the goddess (B1.11). 
But there is no compelling reason to accept that Parmenides identifies the 




gates of door and night with the sky. It seems more plausible to assume that 
he is here speaking in a metaphorical language, according to which day 
corresponds to knowledge, while night corresponds to the preceding state of 
ignorance.   
The stories about shamans in Greek literature also reveal another 
different and yet crucial aspect of shamanistic expertise. They were 
particularly well-received and popular in their society.69 Their skill was 
regarded, furthermore, as socially important, and it consisted mainly in the 
ability to prophesise but also in the ability to perform sorcery. In the case of 
the shamans the ability to perform miraculous actions (such as the 
disappearance or his presence in places where he was least expected to be) 
actually sanctioned his superior status. To this we may contrast Parmenides’ 
rigid proof and rigorous reasoning, which he displays in fragment B8, and 
which stands in sharp opposition with the un-argued for superiority of the 
shaman. It therefore becomes apparent that there is no serious reason to lend 
our support to the view that Parmenides truly considered himself a shaman.  
 
            ii) Parmenides as a prophet 
 
Some scholars have interpreted Parmenides’ authority claims as 
prophetic on grounds of the “apocalyptic” language which he apparently uses 
in the proem.70  Verdenius thus interpreted the speech of the goddess as the 
                                                 
69  According to Levi-Strauss modern shamans draw their social success from their 
ability to combine empirical knowledge with experimental techniques (1963, p. 180). 
They also deserve to claim social recognition, because with the practice of their art 
they fulfil the expectations of their social group, as in the case of curing a patient (p. 
168). Another element which is vital for the establishment of the authority of the 
shaman is that each time he heals a patient he offers his audience a performance, 
which is an actual re-enactment of his call (p. 180).  
70  Cf. e.g. Guthrie (1965, p. 6); Cornford (1939, p. 28; and 1952, p. 120); Vernant (1983, 
p. 353); Henn (2003, p. 8); and Diels (2003, p. 68), who reads in the phrase βροτοὶ 
εἰδότες οὐδὲν the “Stil des Prophetentums” to those ignorant. So also according to 




revelation of an oracle. In his view, this is manifested in that she addresses 
Parmenides as κοῦρος, which he took in his analysis as a parallel to the 
address of a chresmologos in Aristophanes as θέσπιος κοῦρος by old 
Peisthetaerus.71 L. Tarán objected, however, that the goddess calls Parmenides 
a κοῦρος, because she wants in this way to imply the difference between the 
human and the divine nature.72  
To begin with, it seems that the parallel from Aristophanes which 
Verdenius quotes is remote, and cannot account for the fact that the kouros 
address always implied the skill of the prophet. It is an isolated example, and 
for this reason it is hard to accept it as evidence that kouros was a standard 
way to refer to a prophet. In addition, it has been argued in the previous 
section that in the main part of the poem the voice of authority is passed on 
from the goddess to Parmenides. This redistribution of voices (though not of 
roles, since Parmenides in never identified with the divine) in the poem 
                                                                                                                                            
Bowra (1937, p. 110). Contra these interpretations cf. Cosgrove (1974, p. 88), who 
concludes that the κοῦρος address is an appropriation of a traditional epic motif. In 
addition, some scholars have interpreted the κοῦρος as autobiographical. Cf., Burnet 
(1932, p. 50); Heidel in Furley-Allen (1970, pp. 350-1); Cornford (1939, p. 146); and 
Reinhardt (1916, p. 111), who thus concludes that Parmenides’ poem was a 
“Jugendwerk”, while Meyer dated the poem in 475 BC based on this evidence (1925, 
pp. 226-7). There is no compelling reason to accept however that the poem has a 
“crude”, “uncompromising”, and “immature” tone, as these views suggest. Nor is it 
exactly clear why Parmenides would feel the need to give away such information to 
his audience. For a detailed objection to this interpretation, see also Cosgrove (1974, 
p. 84 ff.).  
71  Cf. Aristoph. Av. 977, and its citation by Verdenius (1947, p. 285). Verdenius’ 
suggestion was later followed by Guthrie (1965, p. 2, n. 2), who views Parmenides as 
the recipient of the goddess’ oracle as well as her disciple.  
72  Cf. Tarán (1965), ad B1. He further adds that it is an instant characterization of 
Parmenides, since it refers to the very moment of the revelation. Burkert later agreed 
with this when he remarked that the κοῦρος address shows Parmenides at the peak 
of his rank in facing the divine (1969, p. 14). See also Patin (1899, p. 643). Contra this 
view, cf. Cosgrove (1974, esp. p. 90). According to Mourelatos the status of the 
Parmenides in the proem is that of a ξένος, perhaps of an ἱκέτης (2008, p. 147). 
Coxon, furthermore, rightly observed that the kouros address retains in Parmenides 
the honorific quality it has in epic poetry (1986, p. 167).  




further implies that the goddess is a literary device, and that it is not therefore 
plausible to take her presence in the opening as evidence for the description 
of a religious scene.  
She is perhaps addressing Parmenides as kouros in order to express her 
favour towards him without necessarily implying a contrast between the 
human and the divine. In so doing she is also asking him to pay heed to her 
words. It is thus an implicit reference to the nature of the relationship which 
Parmenides has with the goddess. This intimacy however is quite distinct 
from the one which the μύστης experienced in a religious sect. As M.R. 
Cosgrove reasonably argues, this intimacy may perhaps suggest that 
Parmenides is at the beginning of his journey, and that kouros thus refers to 
his inexperience.73  
F. M. Cornford has made the attractive suggestion that Parmenides’ 
authority claims should be viewed as prophetic, because his truth refers to a 
timeless and reality, as in the case of prophetic knowledge.74 It is impossible to 
overlook the fact that Parmenides’ truth generally shares the same a-temporal 
quality with prophetic pronouncements. At the same time, however, these 
two types of a-temporality are distinguished in one crucial respect. The 
prophet does not conceive of a single intelligent order and he does not have 
the knowledge of one single truth which remains valid regardless of a change 
in the time perspective. The prophet, in other words, knows the past, present, 
and future, but not in total. Parmenides on the other hand perceives an 
abstract entity, namely the ἐόν, which is the same truth which applies in past, 
present, and future.  
M. Furth argues that the fact that Parmenides has to describe in his 
poem the deceptive route of μὴ ἐόν although he clearly dismisses it as 
unreliable in fragment B2 suggests that he has to explain his message to the 
                                                 
73  Cf. Cosgrove (1974, p. 88).  
74  Cf. Cornford (1952, p. 118).  




mortals thus paying the “price of prophecy”.75 In the relevant section of the 
introduction, however, we have pointed out that the belief about the 
intentional ambiguity of prophetic pronouncements was largely due to 
misrepresentations in literature, and that it was not the actual style of 
prophetic utterance. In addition, it seems that the prophets were not at serious 
pains to justify the validity of their knowledge to their audience, since their 
communion with the divine authenticated the reliability of their truth. At any 
event, Parmenides’ insertion of the Doxa route in his account does not explain 
the content of his message. It simply provides the audience with a version of 
misleading probabilities which they should avoid mistaking for true.  
 
           iii) Parmenides as a Pythagorean mystic  
 
Ancient commentators occasionally viewed Parmenides’ authority 
claims in connection with Pythagoreanism. Strabo thus referred to 
Parmenides as an ἀνὴρ Πυθαγόρειος, while Photius remarked that he was of 
a Πυθαγορείου διατριβῆς.76 In a somewhat similar fashion some modern 
scholars have proposed that the symbolic language which Parmenides 
employs in the proem accounts for his conviction that the discovery of 
knowledge is in itself a religious activity.77 
                                                 
75  Cf. Furth (1974, p. 270).  
76  Cf. Strab. Geogr. VI.1; and Photius Bibl. 249.  
77  Firstly suggested by Bowra (1937, p. 112), and followed by Vlastos (1946, p. 75). 
Vlastos later revised his interpretation in his review of Cornford, in which he 
concluded that Parmenides cannot be altogether dismissed as a mystic, since the 
goddess appeals to his critical ability, which opposes the very nature of mysticism 
(1955, p. 49). In a similar fashion, Vernant held that Parmenides employs mystical 
vocabulary, for which see analysis below (1983, p. 353). According to Zafiropoulo, 
furthermore, Parmenides’ poem is a representation of the ceremony of initiation in 
the Pythagorean sect (1950, p. 94 ff.). Cosgrove has objected however that such 
interpretations fail to view Parmenides’ poem as a coherent whole, since they are 
exclusively limited to the proem (1974, p. 88). In a similar vein, Prier observed that 




It is important to note, however, that “symbols” as an element of 
literary style are quite distinct from the symbols normally used in mystic 
communication. In this case they function as literary expressions which hint 
at something else, which nonetheless takes the form of a metaphor or of an 
allegory. For this reason they are an essential aspect of style, and they do not 
address a specific audience of chosen individuals. They therefore impose no 
barrier, at least not intentionally, against those who fail to understand their 
implied message. Our previous examination of the proem, furthermore, has 
suggested that Parmenides relies heavily upon his audience’s familiarity with 
the epic topoi, which he exploits in order to make himself understood but not 
in order to address a specifically limited audience. His account is thus not a 
deliberate concealment of truth, as in the case of mystical cults, but the exact 
opposite. It aims in un-concealing the truth about the ἐόν, and in bringing this 
truth to the attention of the audience.  
When Parmenides discusses the true properties of the ἐόν in fragment 
B8, which constitute the core of his doctrine, he can hardly be taken to talk in 
symbols. In purely religious language, however, symbols convey an element 
of exclusion, since the initiates are not so much those who can understand the 
symbol, but those who know its real meaning. And they know its meaning, 
moreover, because it was revealed to them in private secrecy. This 
presumably took place in the ceremony of the initiation of the μύστης.  
The only phrase in Parmenides which prima facie provides serious 
evidence that he is perhaps using apocalyptic vocabulary in his poem is that 
of εἰδότα φὦτα in line B1.3.78 It is disputed whether Parmenides is already a 
                                                                                                                                            
the symbols which Parmenides employs in the proem later occur in the main part in 
a strictly logical context.  
78  So according to Bowra (1937, p. 109), Verdenius (1942, p. 11, n.3), Cornford (1952, 
p. 110), Mansfeld (1964, p. 223), Furley (1973, p. 3), Coxon (1986, pp. 158-9), and Diels 
(2009, p. 23), who takes this phrase as evidence for that Parmenides speaks to his 
“Vertrauten”. It is hard to decisively dismiss, however, the possibility that 




“man who knows” at the beginning of his journey or not.79 A. H. Coxon, 
however, has pointed out that Parmenides cannot be in the position to know 
what will be later on revealed to him by the goddess. He thus interpreted the 
phrase εἰδότα φὦτα, as the necessary condition which permits Parmenides to 
travel to the goddess.80   
In addition, it is possible to read εἰδότα φὦτα (note the singular) 
together with θυμός of the first line, and to construe it altogether as “the 
personal desire to know”. This idea immediately brings to mind Pindar’s 
statement that he speaks to those who are prudent (φωνάεντα συνετοῖσιν) 
without necessarily implying religious initiation or colour.81 If this view is 
correct, then Parmenides is in the begging of his poem addressing those who 
are interested, like him, in acquiring knowledge. This in turn implies that he 
does not wish to deliver his message to a particular clique but to anyone who 
is willing to pay heed to his account. 
It is certainly true that Pythagoreanism combined logic with religion,82 
and that mysticism in general promised to unite the human with the divine.83 
                                                                                                                                            
Parmenides is perhaps addressing a larger group and not only the chosen few. In a 
similar vein, Gallop maintained that the unveiling of the Sun maiden strikes an 
apocalyptic tone (1984, p. 6). However, the unveiling of female figure in Greek 
literature may also be a gesture of faith and trust. At any event, the goddess does not 
claim to disclose a truth which is withheld from public view, but only the truth 
which has persistently escaped the attention of mortals. Contra this reading, cf. Tarán 
(1965, ad B1), and specifically against Bowra, see Cosgrove (2001, p. 88 ff.). For 
parallels of εἰδότες in the sense of conoscente, cf. Eur. Rh. 973: σεμνὸς τοῖς εἰδόσιν 
θεός; Arist. Nub. 1241; and Alexis, fr. 26: τοῖς γάρ ὀρθὦς εἰδόσιν τὰ θεῖα.  
79  Mansfeld, for instance, maintained that Parmenides already possesses knowledge 
when he visits the realm of the goddess (1964, p. 223). On the other hand Furley 
contended that Parmenides cannot be a man who knows prior to his encounter with 
the goddess (1973, p. 3). This view is attractive, especially when considering that to 
assume the opposite for Parmenides underrates the importance of her revelation.  
80  Cf. Coxon (1986, p. 159).  
81  Cf. Pind. Ol. 2.85.  
82 For scholars who treat this as evidence for Parmenides’ Pythagoric perspective, see 
Cornford (1952, pp. 110, 117; and 1939, p. 29), Reinhardt (1916, p. 255), Miller (1968, 
p. 68), and Gomperz (1969, p. 167). Coxon’s view on the issue is obscure, for while he 




However, if we turn to the poem of Parmenides for signs of these two 
elements of mysticism, we find nothing which can seriously vouchsafe such a 
reading. Parmenides apparently describes the coexistence of the divine with 
the human, but he never unites the two in his poem. In addition, he does not 
display in the surviving fragments the explicit intention to teach on 
morality.84 Interestingly enough, a moral aspect of Parmenides’ account was 
also unknown to the ancient commentators. The truth is that Parmenides’ 
                                                                                                                                            
remarks that the poem refers to the intellectual contemplation of reality, he later 
maintains that Parmenides presents himself in the proem as a Pythagorean 
philosopher (1986, p. 17 and p. 232 respectively). For recent scholarly objections to 
this reading on grounds that Parmenides’ logic is incompatible with mysticism, see 
Mourelatos (2008, p. 44), who remarks that “mystery” is exactly what the goddess 
purports to dispel, and Hermann (2004, p. 122). To this we may add Vlastos, who 
although he understands Parmenides’ authority claims as a blend of mysticism and 
logic, he nonetheless draws attention to the fact that the goddess does not say 
“believe” but “judge” (1946, pp. 75-6).  
83  Fränkel was the major representative of this view, and proposed that Parmenides 
experienced in his ecstatic inspiration a unio mystica with the ἐόν (1975, pp. 366-7). 
The same view is taken by Verdenius (1942, p. 11) and Henn (2003, p. 33), according 
to whom Parmenides’ moral teaching rests upon the belief that one should try to 
unite with the way in which things truly are. It is not exactly clear, however, how 
one can possibly unite himself with the abstract concept of the ἐόν. Tarán objected 
that Parmenides’ logical deduction in B8 start from existence, and that for this reason 
he is not concerned with defining what can qualify as a divine One (1965, p. 97). 
Against Fränkel’s interpretation, see also Mansfeld (1964, pp. 252-9). The major point 
in which Mansfeld disagrees with Fränkel is that Parmenides follows a progressive 
logical process in his poem.  
84  It is not therefore safe to assume together with Miller that much of the theoretical 
framework of the “salvation of the soul” is attested in Parmenides’ verses (1968, p. 
68). In a similar fashion, Vlastos maintained that Parmenides wishes to correct the 
trusting of empirical knowledge by offering a deliverance from it (1946, p. 76). What 
Parmenides says, however, through the mouth of the goddess is that empirical 
knowledge should be dismissed as unreliable and not that it is a moral obligation to 
avoid it. Mourelatos is therefore right when he concludes that Parmenides’ poem 
lacks a message of salvation, and that he deliberately avoids the use of divine 
epithets for the ἐόν (2008, pp. 44-5). Interestingly enough, Cornford and Diels, who 
also supported in their examinations the Pythagorean perspective of Parmenides, 
also observe the fact that there are simply no implications of religious faith in 
Parmenides’ poem (cf. 1939, p. 28; and 2009, p. 21, respectively). Diels also points out 
that in Parmenides we do not find the same type of rationality as the one we 
encounter in the mystic.  




poem does not disclose a method with which one can deliver his mortal soul. 
Quite on the contrary, the knowledge which the poem conveys pertains to a 
transcendental reality, which is detached from everyday experience.  
In addition, this truth is deprived of a practical aspect, whereas the 
knowledge of the shaman or of the mystic is not. The shaman was believed to 
have at his disposal a stock of techniques with which he practiced sorcery, 
whereas the μύστης was expected to comply with the knowledge which was 
revealed to him in the sect. This implied that he had to act in his everyday life 
according to specific rules of morality, which were the application of this 
truth. In these cases, higher knowledge functioned as a life directive, which 
regulated the behaviour of a person or of a community. Parmenides on the 
other hand never proceeds to define a set of moral imperatives based upon 
the logical conclusions which he reaches in fragment B8. It is also highly 
unlikely that in Parmenides we witness a union between the divine and the 
human. As argued in the previous section, there is no decisive evidence that 
Parmenides believed in this kind of participation in the divine (μέθεξις) or in 
the ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, as Platonic philosophy later termed it, which was 
nonetheless central in the purely religious drama of the shaman or of the 
cults.85   
The aim of Parmenides’ account is to affirm what exists, namely the 
ἐόν, under specific conditions and in a particular form. Parmenides 
discovered the ἐόν behind the veil of visual and mundane appearances which 
men commonly mistake for true (τὰ δοκοῦντα). This element is crucial, 
because religion is not concerned with the reliability of semblances or with 
                                                 
85  Cf. e.g. Pl. Theat. 176b; and Plot. Enneades I.2, for the assimilation to the divine as a 
purely intellectual activity. According to Plato, furthermore, one should seek to 
assimilate oneself to the divine μετὰ φρονήσεως, because the divine is necessarily 
just and wise. For Plotinus on the other hand, one the assimilation to the divine is 
important, because ψυχὴ ἐγγυτέρω σώματος καὶ συγγενέστερον. The reason for this 
is that the assimilation to the divine takes the form of a παράδειγμα (ibid. I.6). For 
Platos’ understanding of love as assimilation to the divine, see also Phdr. 252c-253c.  




the way in which the human mind should response to observable experience. 
Parmenides on the other hand is interested in the application of man’s mental 
ability (νόος) to apprehend reality and to decide the truthfulness of available 
data (κρίσις). It is also important to note that all our evidence that 
Parmenides’ authority claims are religious is located in the proem. It would 
be unwise, however, to direct our attention, when discussing the nature of 
these authority claims, to a specific part of the poem, because we risk taking a 
restricted standpoint. The understanding thus of Parmenides’ authority as 
Pythagorean is not safe, because it also fails to provide a complete overview 
of his authority claims in all parts of his poem.  




Felix qui potuit rerum  
conoscere causas 
Verg. Georg. 2.490  
 
Chapter V: Empedocles 
 
Empedocles is undoubtedly the most colourful case of all the thinkers 
under examination. His surviving fragments reveal a diverse personality: a 
cosmologist, a poet, a physician, a religious teacher, even perhaps a magician, 
or a mere charlatan. Modern scholars have interpreted Empedocles’ authority 
claims as a complex combination of these experts.1 It is for this reason crucial 
to examine these shades of his expertise, and to attempt to explain them in 
connection with Empedocles’ chief concern.  
1. The unity of Empedocles’ thought and his two poems 
 
According to the ancient tradition, Empedocles wrote two poems: one 
was entitled Περὶ Φύσεως and the other Καθαρμοί. The first was in line with 
the investigation of the formulation of the cosmos, while the second was a 
somewhat more religiously-felt take on the same topic. Quite naturally, this 
apparent dichotomy in Empedocles’ thought has aroused much scholarly 
dispute.  
The first attempts to explain this inconsistency were made by Diels and 
Wilamowitz, who held the very obvious, at least in a certain respect, view that 
Empedocles during a later stage of his life was spiritually converted to 
Pythagoreanism, and that this sealed decisively the character of his second 
                                                 
1 Cf. Guthrie (1965, p. 123); Lloyd (1970, p. 137); and Vernant (1983, p. 85). According 
to Vernant, furthermore, Empedocles’ view of himself as a θεῖος ἀνήρ arose from his 
conviction that he could at the same time be a diviner, a poet, a doctor and a leader 
of men. Yet it seems unlikely that Empedocles would have considered himself to be 
all these figures of authority at the same time. 




poem, the Katharmoi.2 It is certainly true that the two poems of Empedocles 
strike a different note. However, it is unwise to read this characteristic as a 
substantial piece of evidence about the real life of Empedocles. Quite on the 
contrary, it seems that there is nothing in the Katharmoi which encourages the 
view that it was a work of a more mature age. Such an understanding is based 
mainly on the modern assumption that “philosophy” comes first, while 
theology is bound to follow.3 
At any event, the existence of two separate poems was never seriously 
questioned before the publication of C. Osborne’s insightful article, which 
was received with much enthusiasm in modern scholarship, and which now 
holds a lead in the interpretation of Empedocles.4 The case which Osborne 
makes is a plausible one. She argues that we actually know one fixed title 
(Katharmoi) and the more general title Peri Physeos, which was uncritically 
ascribed to nearly every early thinker. In addition, whenever ancient scholars 
quote from Empedocles, they do not mention the title of the poem, from 
which they quote. According to Osborne, this suggests that they knew only 
one poem of Empedocles, since they do not explicitly acknowledge two 
separate poems of Empedocles. However, this is not exactly true, since 
                                                 
2 Cf. Wilamowitz (1935, pp. 626-661); Diels (1898, p. 413); but also Bidez (1894, pp. 
159-174). Hussey reasonably objected, however, that there is no independent 
evidence which compels us to accept such a conversion (1972, p. 69). On the 
conceptual unity of the two poems, cf. Bignone (1963, p. 122); Verdenius (1948, pp. 
10-14); Long (1949, 142-158); Cornford (1952, pp. 121-124); Schwabl (1957, pp. 278-89); 
Barnes (1967, pp. 18-23); and Zuntz (1971, p. 269). Jaeger thus described Empedocles 
as a “philosophical centaur” (1946-7, p. 295). For scholarly views on the 
incompatibility of the two poems, cf. Zeller (1905, pp. 802-837); Adam (1908, p. 253); 
Dodds (1951, p. 146); Vlastos (1952, pp. 119-123) and again in (1995, p. 4); Long (1966, 
p. 275); Rohde (1987, pp. 379 and 382 f.); and Jaeger (1967, p. 133). 
3 For a constructive criticism of Diels’ and Wilamowitz’ interpretation, cf. Kranz 
(1935, p. 111 ff.); Kahn (1972, p. 5), but also Millerd, who rejects this interpretation 
because it lacks conclusive evidence (1980, p. 89). She reasonably argues that the 
different temper which Empedocles displays in his fragments does not necessarily 
imply a big lapse in the time of the composition of these two poems (p. 89).  
4  Cf. Osborne (1987).  




Diogenes Laertius clearly mentions two different poems of Empedocles. In his 
work he refers once to Empedocles’ Περὶ Φύσεως, while when he introduces 
fragment B112 he says: [Ἐμπεδοκλῆς] ἐναρχόμενος τὦν Καθαρμὦν.5  
Some scholars have argued that the word Καθαρμοί may also refer to a 
set of purifying techniques, which the ancient scholars mistook for a title. This 
impression is further reinforced by the fact that Hippolytus obviously 
confused the two, when he wrote that τοὺς Ἐμπεδοκλέους λανθάνεις 
διδάσκων καθαρμοὺς.6 This passage from Hippolytus suggests that he is here 
using καθαρμοί as an alternative for δόγματα, and that for this reason he does 
not refer to the title of Empedocles’ poem. However, Hippolytus’ testimony 
cannot seriously undermine the case that Καθαρμοί was a poem composed by 
Empedocles, since it is only natural for a title of a work to reflect its actual 
content. In addition, Simplicius refers to the first and to the second book of 
Περὶ Φύσεως.7 His mention of the particular title of the poem, from which he 
is quoting, is perhaps implying his attempt to be precise on his sources. If he 
knew of only one poem of Empedocles, then this distinction would be 
pleonastic, yet, of course, possible.  
Osborne reasonably points out that the title Καθαρμοί is more original 
and, consequently, a more plausible title than the standard and generally 
unreliable title Περὶ Φύσεως. In her view, moreover, this observation 
validates the single-work hypothesis, which she proposes. However, the 
originality of the title does not necessarily rule out completely the possibility 
that Empedocles composed two poems, and it cannot offer conclusive 
                                                 
5 Cf. VIII.60 and 62. We may also add here Aristotle’s testimony, who refers to 
Empedocles’ Τὰ Φυσικά. It goes without saying, of course, that Aristotle may 
perhaps refer to the cosmology of Empedocles and not to a particular poem (Meteor. 
381b31). And Theon, although he is a minor authority, makes an explicit mention of 
Empedocles’ Καθαρμοί (de utilit. mathim., 104.1).   
6  Cf. Hippol. Ref. Haer. VII.29.  
7  Cf. Simpl. Phys. 157.25; and 381.29 respectively. Cf. also, Plut. Adv. Colot. 111F; Aet. 
I 30.1: γράφει δὲ οὕτως ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τὦν Φυσικὦν.  




evidence for the number of Empedocles’ works, even less so when taken 
alone. If we accept Καθαρμοί as a valid title for Empedocles’ one poem, then 
his discussion of cosmology in a work which has this title becomes 
problematic. For instance, how is it possible to fit fragment B17, in which 
Empedocles exposes his cosmological doctrine, into a work which has the title 
Καθαρμοί? This title makes more sense, however, if we accept it as a title for 
Empedocles’ second poem, the content of which it more successfully 
describes.  
S. Trépanier has suggested that these two titles perhaps refer to 
different thematic sections of Empedocles’ poem.8 If we accept Trépanier’s 
view, then we do not completely discard the ancient testimonies, while at the 
same time the single-work hypothesis remains intact. J. Mansfeld has 
reasonably objected, however, that alternative titles of the same work were 
normally distinguished with ἤ and not with καί, as in the case of Empedocles’ 
poems. According to Mansfeld, if this was really the case with Empedocles, 
then all references made to his poem would take the form Καθαρμοὶ ἤ Περὶ 
Φύσεως (in which case the first title is the specialised and the second the more 
general) but not Καθαρμοί καὶ Περὶ Φύσεως, as our sources clearly say.9 
Trépanier also proposes in his analysis the long title Καθαρμοί καὶ 
Περὶ Φύσεως for Empedocles’ poem, as in the case of Hesiod’s Ἔργα καὶ 
Ἡμέραι.10 However, this view is not safe, mainly because in Hesiod’s work 
the two words, which are separated by the καί, obviously refer to two 
different aspects of the same thematic whole. If this was the case with 
Empedocles, then we would have at least one standard title (Peri Physeos) and 
an alternative title (Katharmoi), which singles out a specific part of the poem, 
                                                 
8 Cf. Trépanier (2003, p. 29). He further adds in his analysis that in this case these two 
titles functioned as terms which indicated a specific section of Empedocles’ poem.  
9 Cf. Mansfeld (2005, p. 343).  
10 Cf. Trépanier, ibid.  




while in fact there is no obvious reason for this.11 It then becomes apparent 
that we are here dealing with the titles of two different works and not with 
alternative titles of the same work.  
In addition, according to Osborne’s interpretation, we should trust the 
testimony of Plutarch, who, when he quotes fragment B115, says that ἐν ἀρχῇ 
τῆς φιλοσοφίας προαναφωνήσας.12 If we trust Plutarch’s words, then we also 
have to place fragment B115 in the beginning of Empedocles’ poem and, 
consequently, at the heart of his cosmology.13 In this way, however, we are 
bound to view Empedocles’ cosmology as a religious construct and 
Empedocles himself as a religious teacher. It is for this reason important to 
address the issue, whether Empedocles was primarily concerned with 
religious matters in his account or whether he was mainly interested in 
cosmological investigation. This is not by all means an easy question, since 
the surviving fragments clearly show that both aspects were considered 
equally important by Empedocles.  
It is important to clarify, however, the meaning which φιλοσοφία has 
for Plutarch, before taking his testimony about Empedocles’ poem at its face 
value. Trépanier followed van der Ben and identified it with the “physical 
lore”.14 It is difficult, however, to lend our support to the view that the 
meaning which φιλοσοφία has for Plutarch coincides with our modern 
understanding of the term, even less so with Empedocles’, if of course he was 
                                                 
11 Mansfeld objected that this cannot qualify as a long title for a poem, because these 
words are names (2005, p. 343).  
12 Cf. Plutarch. De exil. 607C. Cf. also, Osborne, ibid., followed by Inwood in  
undermining the reliability of Diogenes Laertius’ testimony in favour of Plutarch 
(2001, p. 14).  
13  Van der Ben’s view anticipates Osborne’s take on the same issue. However, Van 
der Ben places B115 in the beginning of Empedocles’ cosmological poem (1975, p. 
25). It does seem unlikely that B115, which presents to the audience the doctrine of 
the δαίμων would have been discussed prior to Empedocles’ cosmology, since it 
presupposes his cosmological doctrine. Osborne was later followed by Trépanier 
(2003, p. 45), and Inwood (2001, p. 18).    
14  Cf. Trépanier (2003, p. 12), and van der Ben (1975, p. 13).  




aware of such a discipline. In a similar vein, Mansfeld objected to the 
reliability of Plutarch’s testimony, on grounds that φιλοσοφία has for Plutarch 
a strong moral sense, which would be unwise to impose on Empedocles’ 
thought.15   
Modern scholars, who place fragment B115 in the beginning of 
Empedocles’ poem, do so in order to defend the unity of his thought. In their 
view, this seems to be the only plausible way in which the apparent 
inconsistency of that Empedocles composed two quite different poems can be 
put to rights.16 Trépanier, for example, maintained that it is actually more 
important to establish a unity in Empedocles’ thought than it is to answer the 
question about the actual title or number of Empedocles’ poems.17 However, 
the unity of Empedocles’ thought can survive otherwise and it is not 
compelling to assume a necessary relationship between the unity of his 
thought and the existence of a single poem.  
If our mind reads a conflict between religion and cosmology, and for 
this reason it finds it hard to perceive of a cosmological religion or of a 
religious cosmology, then Empedocles is not to blame. As P. Kingsley put it, 
“the contradiction is in ourselves, not in Empedocles”.18 It is only natural to 
expect different works which were composed by the same author to 
conspicuously share some common features, at least in some crucial respects. 
In other words, the unity of Empedocles’ thought can only account for that he 
was not (perhaps) a schizophrenic, but it cannot be safely used, especially 
when taken alone, as evidence that he composed a single poem.  
The modern mind naturally finds it hard to accept a unity between 
                                                 
15  Cf. Mansfeld (2005, p. 344).  
16  According to Trépanier the majority of Empedocles’ fragments, excluding B115, 
form a consistent whole (2003, p. 11). McKirahan points out that the single-work 
hypothesis reconciles the contradiction between Empedocles’ “scientific thought” 
and his religious ideas (1994, p. 257). See also, Inwood (2001, p. 18).  
17  Cf. Trépanier (2003, p. 29).   
18  Cf. Kingsley (1995, p. 231).  




cosmology and religious thought, such as the one manifested in Empedocles’ 
fragments, and for this reason it frequently regards it as a problem, which has 
to be resolved. The number of the works written by an author, however, plays 
no significant role when it comes to deciding about the nature of his authority 
claims. Regardless of whether Empedocles composed only one poem, in 
which he intentionally blended religious reflection with cosmology, or of 
whether he composed two poems, one for his cosmology and one for his 
religious insights, the truth still remains that these two aspects of his thought 
are inseparable and that they provide information about the conceptual 
scheme of Empedocles’ doctrines. It is not therefore surprising nor should it 
cause bafflement, that in the verses of Empedocles we come across such an 
ambivalent characteristic.  At any event, the fragments of Empedocles provide 
two clues, which contradict the single-work hypothesis, to the examination of 
which we shall now turn.  
To begin with, M.R. Wright in her response to Osborne pointed out 
that in fragment B6 Empedocles says ῥιζώματα πρὦτον ἄκουε. According to 
her analysis, πρὦτον here indicates the beginning of a new exposition, which 
Empedocles explicitly associates with the ῥιζώματα, i.e. with his cosmological 
doctrine.19 It is possible to add to Wright’s observation that fragment B112 
also has an introductory tone, but it addresses completely different matters 
from fragment B6. The existence of two different introductory fragments in 
Empedocles, which nonetheless discuss a different topic, make it hard to 
accept that they both belong to the beginning of the same poem.  
Secondly, in the surviving fragments of Empedocles we have a direct 
mention of at least two different addressees. In fragment B1 Empedocles 
                                                 
19  Cf. Wright (2006, p. 209). On the introductory tone of B6, see also Mansfeld (1995, 
p. 227). Mansfeld used this in his analysis as evidence for that the first cosmologists 
employed in their works “intentional obscurity”, with which they created an 
atmosphere of suspension to their audience.  




explicitly refers by name to his student Pausanias, while in fragment B112 he 
addresses his fellow-citizens of Acragas.  In addition, it is possible to discern a 
shift in the nature of the voice of authority which Empedocles uses. In the 
fragments which are normally allocated in the Peri Physeos he generally 
adopts a didactic posture, especially when he patiently repeats his message to 
his student till he finally grasps it. In the fragments which perhaps belong to 
the Katharmoi, however, he speaks with an agonising cry about the 
unrighteous and terribly wrong behaviour which men display in religious 
matters.20 In the fragments in which Empedocles expounds his cosmology, 
moreover, he resorts to the instructing voice of Hesiod, but when he discusses 
questions of faith and morality his voice becomes firm and somewhat more 
enthusiastic and arresting. This change in Empedocles’ tone of voice is far too 
conspicuous to be disregarded. 
It then becomes apparent that Empedocles adopts two different modes 
of self-presentation in his fragments, one of which is more or less traditional, 
while the other introduces an area of concern which was never before 
pursued with such perseverance. Although Xenophanes also phrased 
concerns about religious matters, Empedocles is nonetheless the first thinker 
under examination for whom religious teaching is a complementary aspect of 
cosmology. At the same time, however, in order for one to understand either 
which poem, he does not have to know the other. Empedocles’ belief, for 
example, that it is wrong to consume meat is based on his cosmology, but it is 
not required that one knows his cosmology in detail in order to understand 
this view. Empedocles’ poems are not wholly unintelligent, that is, when read 
independently from one another.  
It seems that Empedocles is very clear about the purpose of his 
teaching. He tells Pausanias not only to “pay heed”, to “know”, like Hesiod 
                                                 
20 Cf. frs. B124, B136, B137, and B141.  




tells Perses, but also to “enhance his understanding”, to “reflect upon the 
evidence which he provides”, and to “inspect his account with studious care”. 
When Empedocles appeals with his account to the intelligence of his 
audience, he does not introduce an element which is wholly new, since 
Hesiod speaks to Perses in a similar fashion.21 In other words, Empedocles’ 
statement that his audience will benefit from his truth is to some extent 
traditional, especially for an individual who wishes to take up the role of the 
instructor in his presentation. The fact, however, that Empedocles wants 
Pausanias to think critically and to apprehend the cosmic reality suggests that 
Empedocles is actually appropriating the traditional voice of authority of the 
διδάσκαλος to new cosmological ends.  
It cannot be a matter of mere coincidence that such addresses are 
present only in the poem which deals with the question of the origin and 
constitution of the cosmos. This in turn implies that Empedocles considered 
cosmology a theoretical activity, which required intelligence and rationality. 
This is also indicated by that whenever Empedocles refers to the persuasive 
value of his cosmological account, he claims that it affects the φρήν or the 
πραπίδες of Pausanias. In the Katharmoi on the other hand Empedocles 
associates ignorance with personal misery. It is for this reason, moreover, that 
he refers to those who disregard his truth as δειλοί, i.e. wretched mortals.22 If 
our view that the cosmology of Empedocles is closely related with his moral 
teaching is correct, then in him we encounter for the first time cosmology as 
an ars vivendi, namely as a personal orientation in life.   
In addition, in fragment B110, which was perhaps at the end of 
                                                 
21 Cf., for example, its explicit expression in Op. 218: παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω. 
22 Cf. B124: ὥ δειλὸν θνητὦν γένος, ὥ δυσάνολβον, τοίων ἔκ τ’ἐρίδων ἔκ τε 
στοναχὦν ἐγένεσθε, B132: ὄλβιος, ὅς θείων πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον,/ δειλὸς δ’, 
ὧι σκοτόεσσα θεὦν πέρι δόξα μέμηλεν, but also B141. In his cosmological poem, 
however, Empedocles uses the epithet νήπιος, cf. B11. In the Καθαρμοί it is used 
once of the mindless attitude of σφάζειν ἐπευχόμενος, in which case, according to 
Empedocles, the father slaughters without realising it his own son (cf. B137).  




Empedocles’ cosmological poem, the status of ignorance goes hand in hand 
with personal misery. Empedocles says that in case Pausanias prefers to 
investigate questions other than those with which Empedocles is concerned, 
then μυρία δειλὰ πέλονται, ἅ τ’ ἀμβλύνουσι μερίμνας. It then becomes 
apparent that already in the cosmological poem Empedocles is beginning to 
pave the way for his Katharmoi, since it is in the latter that the belief that 
ignorance brings about personal misery is discussed in detail. In the 
Katharmoi, that is, knowledge is repeatedly associated with the good lot which 
follows one’s right choice of appropriate behaviour.  
The fragments from the Katharmoi are less argumentative and less 
expository than his cosmological fragments. Empedocles deals with the 
question of human morality as a set of codes, with which one has to comply, 
provided of course that he wishes to lead a happy life. Empedocles is also 
very specific about the moral guidelines which he gives to his audience. When 
he discusses moral questions his tone is straightforward and dismissive, but 
also sincere, personal, and drenched in spiritual agony. Yet he identifies 
correct moral behaviour with a specific kind of scientia, as his reference to the 
example of the wise man in fragment B129 further indicates.23 For this reason 
his moral views and his cosmological doctrine formed an inseparable unity of 
his thought, which he nonetheless presented in two different poems.  
2. Pythagorean secrecy in Empedocles  
 
The two poems of Empedocles display a striking difference. The 
cosmological poem has only one addressee and it occasionally applies a tone 
                                                 
23  There is no compelling reason to identify the σόφος mentioned in this fragment 
with Pythagoras, since Empedocles obviously makes a general statement. If we 
accept that Empedocles refers to Pythagoras here, then in this way we recycle 
Plutarch’s view, who quotes this fragment in his Vita Pythagorea. The title of this 
work clearly suggests why Plutarch found it appropriate to take Empedocles to refer 
to Pythagoras in B129.  




of secrecy in the exposition. The religious Katharmoi on the other hand,24  
which one would expect to be veiled in secrecy because of its religious topic, 
is, as W.K. Guthrie put it, “almost shouted from the rooftops”.25 It is 
important to examine the element of secrecy which Empedocles often uses in 
his poems, because it has been sometimes interpreted as evidence that he laid 
in his account a claim to the authority of the mystic.  
Modern scholars generally accept the influence which Pythagoreanism 
and Orphism had on Empedocles’ thought, and the evidence from his 
surviving fragments further encourage this impression. These mystical cults 
were active in the area of Magna Graecia, and for this reason it is very likely 
that Empedocles of Agrigentum had some knowledge of the general content of 
their teaching.26 However, it is impossible that he knew their doctrines in 
detail, since one of the basic characteristics of mysticism is to keep the truth of 
the sect in secrecy and away from public view.   
The basic principles of a mystical sect were withheld from the public 
and they were presented only within the circle of the sect itself. This was not a 
superficial characteristic, because it defined the very essence of being a 
μύστης. This is also why hardly any direct evidence for the knowledge which 
was presented in these cults has survived. It seems that the rule of secrecy 
was applied consistently by the members of the cult and it closed all doors to 
                                                 
24 The word Καθαρμοί generally refers to a set of rituals which remove moral 
defilement. Cf. Aesch. Ch. 966-8 (καθαρμοῖσιν ἀτᾶν ἐλατηρίοις); Eum. 276-8; Soph. 
OT 99-101, and 1227-30.  
25Cf. Guthrie (1965, p. 137). Guthrie maintained that in the Pythagoric tradition the 
mathematical finding were more jealously kept secret than other doctrines such as 
that of transmigration. In his view, this might also have been the case with 
Empedocles. However, nothing from the Pythagorean dogmas survives in direct 
quotation, while in the case of Empedocles we have direct quotations from both his 
cosmological as well as from his religious poem.  
26 For Acragas as the house of eschatological doctrines (Φερσέφονας ἕδος), cf. Pind. 
Pyth. 12.  




the public.27 This knowledge was disclosed only to the selective members of 
the cult. Empedocles on the other hand never attempts to keep his cosmology 
or his moral views away from the public. Quite on the contrary, in fragment 
B112 he describes the way with which he was received by a crowd of people, 
who gathered everywhere he went in order to hear a word of wisdom from 
his mouth.  
τοῖσιν †ἅμ’† ἂνἵκωμαιἐςἄστεατηλεθάοντα, 
ἀνδράσινἠδὲγυναιξί, σεβίζομαι·οἱδ’ ἅμ’ ἕπονται 
μυρίοιἐξερέοντες,  < 
 
It seems difficult to accept that these words come from an individual, 
who was fully devoted to mysticism, since it is highly unlikely that a teacher 
from an Orphic or Pythagorean sect would take such great satisfaction in his 
popularity. The way in which Empedocles presents himself in fragment B112 
shows that his teachings were not only available to the public but that they 
were also rather popular. Popularity and publicity are two characteristics that 
certainly do not go hand in hand with the tradition of Pythagoreanism or of 
Orphism. Their teachings were disseminated through oral presentation and 
they did not address a large audience of listeners but a small and limited 
audience of believers. 
Trépanier viewed fragment B112 as a public speech, which is 
nonetheless actually addressed to Pausanias, and through him to every 
potential follower.28 According to his interpretation, Empedocles addresses 
the Acragantines, only because he uses them as an example which the 
“austere or puritanically minded” listener should avoid.29 However, in the 
                                                 
27 According to Diogenes Laertius Empedocles broke with the publication of his 
poem the rule of Pythagorean secrecy (Vit. VIII.55).  
28 There is one reference in the ancient tradition according to which a bard named 
Cleomenes recited Empedocles’ Καθαρμοί at the Olympic games, cf. Athaeneus, 
620D. For Empedocles as a poet in an oral society, see Hershbell (1968).  
29 Cf. Trépanier (2003, p. 104-5).  




fragments normally assigned to the Katharmoi Empedocles often refers to 
mankind in general and not to a specific addressee, while his criticism about 
impious behaviour is explicitly directed to them.30 At any event, there is 
nothing in fragment B112 which suggests that its presentation would cause 
“righteous anger” to a conservative audience, as Trépanier claims. It seems 
more natural that Empedocles’ prohibition of sacrificing animals would shock 
such an audience.31 In addition, it seems highly unlikely that Empedocles’ 
boastful presentation of himself in fragment B112 would successfully appeal 
to a solemnly conservative mind. 
In addition, P. Kingsley and Trépanier maintained that it is possible to 
read a deliberately enigmatic style in Empedocles’ fragments, which 
guaranteed that not everyone could obtain access to his account. They thus 
propose a different explanation of the statement which Empedocles makes in 
fragment B112. They argue that Empedocles prima facie addresses a larger 
audience, while in fact he intimates his knowledge only to those who are 
capable of understanding it. He does not therefore really expect to be followed 
by the many but only by the chosen few.  
However, enigmatic expression does not occur with regularity in 
Empedocles’ fragments and it is not a general characteristic of his style. Had it 
been so significant for Empedocles in the way in which he wished to make an 
authority claim, then one would normally expect it to be more native to his 
language and thought. The example of Heraclitus shows us how an 
individual would deliberately treat human language, if he chose to exploit 
linguistic ambiguity. Quite on the contrary, Empedocles frequently speaks to 
his audience in a straightforward manner and he often repeats and explains 
                                                 
30 Cf. esp., B124: ὤ δειλὸν θνητὦν γένος. For other fragments which address directly 
a large audience, see B114, B136, and B141.  
31 According to Phaborinus, Empedocles sacrificed an effigy of an ox made ἐκ 
μέλιτος καὶ ἀλφίτων, cf. fr. 3 FHG. 




his message. This is a very clear way of presenting truth, which does not 
conceal knowledge.  
At the same time, however, it is possible to trace a spirit of secrecy in 
the way in which Empedocles communicates his message. In fragment B111 
Empedocles tells Pausanias that μούνωι σοὶ ἐγὼ κρανέω τάδε πάντα. 
Kingsley argues that Empedocles with this phrase draws from the tradition of 
transmitting knowledge from the spiritual “father” to the spiritual “son”. In 
his examination Kingsley adduces parallels from the Greco-Egyptian 
mysticism and he compares Empedocles’ fragment B111 with an excerpt from 
Sophocles.32 It is possible to find, however, a less remote parallel for this 
fragment of Empedocles. Hesiod in his Opera et dies discloses in the same way 
knowledge to an individual, whom he singles out. It is therefore reasonable to 
view the claim which Empedocles makes in fragment B111 in connection with 
the epic tradition of instruction rather than with the mystic tradition of 
secrecy. In this way, moreover, Empedocles may be perhaps underlining his 
status as a teacher.  
In fragment B5, Empedocles advises his student Pausanias to στεγάσαι 
his teachings φρενὸς ἔλλοπος εἴσω. Trépanier and Kingsley interpret this 
fragment in connection with fragment B110, in which Empedocles asks 
Pausanias to inspect his account with studious care (καθαρῇσιν ἐποπτεύσῃς 
μελέτηισιν). According to their interpretations, ἐποπτεύσῃς of fragment B110 
encourages the view that Empedocles refers in fragment B6 to secrecy. This is 
so, because they view ἐποπτεύσῃς as evidence that Empedocles implies in 
fragment B110 the three successive stages of mystical initiation, namely 
καθαρμός, παράδοσις, and ἐποπτεία.33 
To begin with, if we choose to read in fragment B5 an element of 
                                                 
32 Cf. OC 1522-32 and Kingsley (1995, p. 221), followed by Trépanier (2003, p. 19), 
who also read in Empedocles a Pythagorean tendency.  
33Cf. Kingsley (1995, pp. 230-1). 




secrecy, then we have to also accept the testimony of Plutarch. When Plutarch 
quotes this fragment he comments that Empedocles is τῷ Παυσανίᾳ 
Πυθαγορικὦς παραινεῖν τὰ δόγματα.34 According to Plutarch, moreover, the 
adjective ἔλλοπος, which Empedocles uses elsewhere in order to describe the 
silence of fish, is a γέρας ἐχεμυθίας.35 However, it is possible to understand 
this fragment differently. Empedocles’ use of “mute” for the description of the 
way in which he expects Pausanias to receive his teaching can either mean 
“you should not share with others what I have just told you” or it can mean 
“keep this words in your mind”, i.e. “take a while to consider the truth of my 
account”. Empedocles, that is, might be perhaps exhorting Pausanias to be 
“silent” in the sense that he urges him to reflect upon the account which 
Empedocles has just presented to him.  
In addition, it is not compelling to construe στεγάσαι as “to completely 
exclude from the public view”, as the interpretations of Kingsley and 
Trépanier accept, since it may also mean “to protect” or “to harbour”. The 
Greek word, for example, for “roof” is στέγη and for “cover” is στέγασμα. 
These words do not so much evoke the sense of “to keep away from” but of 
“to protect”. In fact, when Empedocles wants to express the sense of “to hide” 
he uses the compound form ἀποστεγάζειν and not στεγάζειν.36 This reading 
of fragment B5 is further encouraged, furthermore, by that Empedocles refers 
to φρήν, which clearly implies intelligence.37 It therefore seems safe to accept 
that Empedocles has in mind in fragment B6 not the last stage of mystical 
initiation, as Kingsley and Trépanier have proposed, but the last stage of 
                                                 
34 Cf. Plut.Symp.Probl. 728E.  
35 Cf. Suda, sub voc; and B117.4.  
36Cf. B42, in which Empedocles says that the light of the Sun is concealed 
(ἀπεστέγασεν) by the light of the Moon. The adjective στεγανός, furthermore, is 
associated with the idea of firmness and stability, and as such it is a synonym for 
ἔμπεδος, cf., e.g., Alcm. fr. 148.11:στεγανόποδας. 
37Cf., B17.23 (φρένας αὔξει); Β23.11 (μή σ’ ἀπάτη φρένα καινύτω); B114.4 (δύσζηλος 
ἐπὶ φρένα πίστιος ὁρμή), and B133.5 (πειθοῦς ἁμαξιτός εἰς φρένα πίπτει). 




instruction, during which the teacher asks his student to reflect upon the 
newly acquired knowledge.  
As noted already, Trépanier and Kingsley argue in their analyses that 
the phrase καθαρῇσιν ἐποπτεύσῃς μελέτῃσιν in fragment B110 implies the 
stages of Orphic-Pythagorean initiation.38 It is unwise to completely disregard 
the mystical touch which knowledge has for Empedocles in this fragment. It 
seems that for him the acquisition of knowledge was a profound and pious 
undertaking in its own right. At the same time, however, it is difficult to also 
accept that this aspect of his thought constituted the core of his authority 
claims and that it defined the very nature of his expertise.  
The verb ἐποπτεύω can refer to the last stage of mystic initiation, at 
which the initiate is spiritually transformed by the mystical knowledge and 
doctrines, which he has learned in the cult. However, it does not refer 
exclusively to this. It is also attested with the sense “to overlook”,39 whence it 
also acquired the sense “to supervise” and “to protect”.40 The adjective 
καθαρός obviously has strong religious associations. It is possible, however, 
to understand καθαρός in a different way. Empedocles may be using it here 
in the sense of “clear mind”, i.e. a mind which is free of preoccupations. In 
this way he asks his audience to grasp the truth of his account free of their 
personal convictions and free of the widely accepted views which they 
                                                 
38 Cf. Trépanier (2003, p. 19). 
39 Cf., e.g., Hom. π140; Hes. Op. 76; Aesch. Ag. 1579 (θεοὺς ἄνωθεν γῆς ἐποπτεύειν 
ἄχη); Ch.1 (ἐποπτεύων κράτη); Ch. 489 (ἐποπτεῦσαι μάχην). Cf. also its metaphorical 
use of “I am in ec-stasis” in Arist. Ran. 745-6. 
40 In this case it is generally used of a god: cf. Aesch. Ag. 1269-71 
(Ἀπόλλων…ἐποπτεύσας ἐμέ); Eum. 224 (Παλλὰς τὦνδ’ ἐποπτεύσει θεά); Ch. 1063-4 
(εὐτυχοίης, καὶ σ᾿ ἐποπτεύων πρόφρων θεὸς φυλάσσοι καιρίοισι συμφοραῖς). See 
also, Pl. Leg.951d (τὦν περὶνόμους ἐποπτευόντων). It is also used of the Sun, who 
“overlooks” and “supervises” (ἐποπτεύων) human actions: Aesch. Ch. 985, and Pind. 
Ol.8.11; Aesch. Ch. 584; and Bacchyl. Ep. 1.3. 




consider true although they are mistaken.41 Empedocles uses the adjective 
καθαρός again in fragment B3, which opens the exposition of his cosmology. 
From what follows in this fragment it is possible to construe καθαρός as 
“clear from misconception”. 
If this suggestion is safe, then Empedocles does not make in fragment 
B110 a statement which is wholly unfamiliar in early cosmologies. These 
words strikingly bring to mind, for example, the declaration of Parmenides’ 
goddess, according to which he should κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον.42 
In addition, the meaning of ἐποπτεύσῃς, becomes more clear, if we view it in 
connection with μελέτῃσιν, which evidently implies an intellectual activity. 
It then seems reasonable to accept that in fragment B110 Empedocles 
asks Pausanias to “reflect upon my words with unbiased study”.43 In this 
                                                 
41It seems that Empedocles considered the interest in knowledge not only a matter of 
personal curiosity but also a moral obligation as well. This is manifested in that for 
him, the one who knows is ὄλβιος, while someone who does not is δειλός. Cf., esp., B 
132: ὄλβιος ὅς πραπίδω νἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον, /δειλὸς δ’, ᾧ σκοτόεσσα θεὦν πέριδόξα 
μέμηλεν. 
42Cf. B7.5. Parmenides asks his audience with this phrase to judge critically the 
account which the goddess, i.e. himself, discloses.  
43 The noun μελέτη is etymologically related with the verb μέλομαι, and as such it 
primarily carries the sense “to take care of”. Cf., e.g., In Merc.556-7; Hes. Op. 316, 380, 
457; Sophocles’ adjective μελέτωρ (guardian) in El. 846, and Pindar’s ὀξείᾳ μελέτᾳ 
in Ol. 6.37. It thus gradually acquired the sense of “personal business” with a 
particular stress upon the element of action. Cf., e.g., Hes. Op. 412, 443; Theogn. El. 
1.924; Anacr.fr.11b4-5; Eur. Med. 1099-1102, and Hippol. 224. Archilochus uses μελέτη 
in order to denote not only the things for which men care, but also those things to 
which they dedicate their effort: πάντα πόνος τεύχει θνητοῖς μελέτη τε βροτείη (fr. 
17). Cf. also, Aesch.Pers.936. A more technical use of the word is attested in the 
Hippocratic corpus, in which treatises it is used with the sense “to examine”, “to 
observe” in order to reach a conclusion (hence, it implies a critical activity). Cf., e.g., 
De diaet.2.18 (of the νουσήματα which are μελετητέα); De fract. 11.25 (χρηστῇ μελέτῃ 
θεραπευθῇ); De arte, 7.5 (τὦν τὴν ἰητρικὴν μελησάντων); De affect. inter.11.9; and De 
dec. habit.8.1 (μελετᾷν δὲ χρὴ ἐν ἰητρικῇ ταῦτα μετὰ πάσης καταστολῆς).  Yet the 
word occasionally retained its primary sense “to take care of”, say of a wound,: cf., 
e.g., Vect.36.11 (μελέτη, ἴησις, ἐπίδεσις, ὡς νόμος); De fract.7.24, but also Eur. Bacch. 
892. Interestingly enough, μελέτη also occurs twice in Pindar in connection with his 
expertise. Cf. Ol.9.107-8 (μία δ’ οὐχ ἅπαντας ἄμμε θρέψει μελέτα), and Nem. 6.53-4 




way, furthermore, he repeats the advice which gives to Pausanias in fragment 
B5. Fragments B110 and B5 both describe the way in which Empedocles 
expected his audience to receive his account. It should be noted, however, 
that this suggestion does not seek to belittle the importance of the Orphic-
Pythagorean influence on Empedocles. Quite on the contrary, it helps us view 
it in new light. Perhaps Empedocles appropriates mystical vocabulary in 
order to imply his desire to address a somewhat more specialised audience. 
At the same time, however, he does not wish to exclude anyone in specific 
from his truth, in which respect he differs from mysticism, since mystical 
initiation presupposed an element of selectiveness.  
It therefore becomes apparent that in the cosmological poem of 
Empedocles, Pausanias is a special individual, whom Empedocles chooses as 
his student. It is not safe, however, to assume from this that Empedocles takes 
up the role of the mystic, since the way in which he discloses his cosmology to 
Pausanias is closer to the way in which Hesiod speaks to Perses in his didactic 
epos. Empedocles thus adopts the didactic posture of Hesiod in the 
presentation of his doctrines.44 In addition, the purpose of the religious tone of 
fragment B110 is not to establish a link with mysticism but to prepare the 
ground for a follow-up, namely the Katharmoi. It is not therefore safe to 
reverse the order of the poems, as Kingsley and Trépanier maintain in their 
examinations. They claim that Katharmoi was followed by the Peri Physeos, 
because in the ritual of mystical initiation the stage of the initiate’s 
purification was followed by the ἐποπτεία. This interpretation is not 
promising, mainly because, as noted above, fragment B6 places the doctrine 
of the ῥιζώματα in the beginning of Empedocles’ exposition, but also because 
                                                                                                                                            
(ἕπομαι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχων μελέταν). Empedocles pairs in B131 μελέτηwith φροντίς, 
i.e. “care”, which in turn suggests that he did not treat these two nouns as synonyms.  
44 For an insightful examination of the similarities between Hesiod and Empedocles, 
especially in terms of language, see Hershbell (1970b).  




some theories presented in the Katharmoi (such as the daimon dogma) require 
that one knows the theory of the ῥιζώματα, which was examined in the 
cosmological poem.  
3. Empedocles as a poet 
 
Scholars have frequently observed that Empedocles is an obviously 
charismatic poet. He has been often viewed as a true poet, for whom the task 
of expressing a cosmology in hexameter verse came naturally and easily. 
Cicero, for example, was the first to observe that there is no conflict between 
Empedocles’ skilful verses and his shrewd cosmological doctrine. In his view, 
Empedocles is proficient in both of these different domains of expertise.45 
There is indeed much truth in this, since it does seem that the medium of 
verse is not for Empedocles a mere verbal technique which is wholly alien to 
his genius.46The verses of Empedocles stand out not only because of their 
                                                 
45 Cf. Cic. De orat. I.50.217. Cicero adduces the example of citizen Mucius, who was 
equally skilful in playing two different games.  
46 For Empedocles as a poet in ancient tradition, cf. Diog. Laert. Vit. VIII.51; Horac. 
Ars Poet. 463; Quint. Inst. Or. I4.4; and, of course, Lucretius’ praise of Empedocles in 
De rerum nat. I.729-733. See also Lactanius’ confusion about whether Empedocles 
should be classified as a poet or as a philosopher (Instit. divin. II 12.4). Aristotle found 
it difficult to accept the choice of verse for a “philosophical” work. He thus thought 
that Empedocles wished to speak in this way in an ambiguous manner, as in the case 
of oracles. Cf. Arist.  Rhet. 1407a, and Meteor. 357a. For Empedocles as a poet in 
modern scholarship, cf. Barnes (1932, p. 71), Guthrie (1965, p. 135), Barnes (1982, p. 
537), Dodds (1951, p. 174, n.115), Wright (1997, p. 2), Millerd (1980, p. 21), Leonard 
(1908, p. 9), Osborne (1997, p. 25), and Zuntz (1971, p. 185). Bignone viewed 
Empedocles as a “poeta immaginoso e filosofo sottile” (1963, p. 4), while Bollack 
commented that “la mémoire d’Homère accompagne Empédocle dès les premiers 
accords du poème” (1965, vol. I, p. 277). Hussey, on the other hand maintained that 
the style of Empedocles bears little resemblance to Homer or Hesiod. In his view this 
guaranteed the originality of his poetry (1972, p. 70). For McKirahan, furthermore, 
Empedocles’ choice of verse was dictated by his religious message, which he 
understood as an exhortation to personal moral and spiritual salvation (1994, p. 256). 
McKirahan bases his case upon the assumption that there was only one poem, which 




originality, but also because of their aesthetic value, which the stiff verses of 
Parmenides fail to reach. Empedocles was a master of his own medium, and it 
is partly because of this that his expertise as a cosmologist is at stake. It is 
therefore in the interest of this analysis to investigate the way in which 
Empedocles uses his poetic medium and to examine whether his authority 
claims imply the expertise of the poet.  
The basis of Empedocles’ language is epic expression, which he refined 
however in several aspects. He used the traditional hexameter, for which 
there was not yet an alternative medium of expression, which could imply to 
the audience a claim to a higher status of expert knowledge.47 The epic 
characteristics in Empedocles range from slightly tedious, though purposeful, 
repetitions to explanatory similes and direct addresses. However, Empedocles 
appropriated the function of these epic elements of style to his personal 
purposes.48 
In his early study W.E. Leonard read in Empedocles the poet’s instinct 
for the efficient phrase, which is evocative in a variety of ways, while it still 
retains brevity of expression, an “austere simplicity”. 49 It is not exactly clear, 
however, whether this characteristic results from Empedocles’ temperament 
or whether it is the natural outcome of the limitation which the poetic metre 
imposed on his expression. At any event, the taste of Empedocles for the 
                                                                                                                                            
was focused upon the doctrine of the δαίμων. In the previous section it has been 
argued, however, that the theory of a single poem cannot stand. 
47 As Adam put it, the style of Homer and Hesiod was the “chief orthodoxy” for the 
Greeks (1908, p. 9).  
48 For a useful examination of the epic background of Empedocles’ language and for 
a comparison of his style with specific examples from epic poetry, see Wright (1997, 
pp. 11-15). For a general examination of the stylistic similarities between Empedocles 
and Hesiod in specific, see Hershbell (1970b, pp. 145-161). Hershbell maintains in his 
examination that Hesiod also influenced the conceptual scheme of Empedocles’ 
cosmology. Wright and Hershbell argue that Empedocles subverts the traditional use 
of epic phraseology in order to convey his new message. Cf. esp. Hershbell (p. 149 
ff.).  
49 Cf. Leonard (1908, p. 12).  




imaginative treatment of words and for figures of speech, his use of names of 
the epic gods as terms for the ῥιζώματα, suggest that his poems were 
delivered orally. This is so because such elements of style are more functional 
for an audience of listeners while they have little appeal to an audience of 
readers. It is perhaps for this reason, moreover, that ancient tradition 
occasionally viewed Empedocles as the inventor of the art of rhetoric.50 
Scholarly opinion is divided about the specific function of regular 
repetitions in Empedocles. Guthrie interpreted this characteristic as an 
effective way, with which Empedocles managed to hold together the unity of 
his poem’s content.51 J. P. Hershbell objected, however, that repetitions in 
Empedocles do not always underline the unity of his thought. 52 In a similar 
vein, M.R. Wright added that repetitions in epic poetry generally occur as 
summaries or reinforcements of a certain idea in critical parts of the poem.53 
Hershbell claimed in his analysis that the poetic language of Empedocles 
could perhaps imply the authority claim of the oral epic poets.54 Hershbell 
interpreted the repetitions, the frequent direct addresses, and the lack of 
“clarity and consistency” in Empedocles as evidence that he is composing his 
poem “from memory”. In his view the metrical regularity and the recurrence 
of some phrases in Empedocles’ poem resemble the formulaic diction of oral 
epic poetry. The advantage of Hershbell’s proposal is that it successfully 
places the poetry of Empedocles into an appropriate social context of oral 
compositions.  
However, Empedocles makes a direct address whenever he wishes to 
attract the attention of his audience and especially when he presents a novel 
                                                 
50 Cf. Suda, sub Ζήνων; and Schol. ad Iamblich. Ad Vit. Pyth. 198. 
51 Cf. Guthrie (1965, p. 155). 
52 Cf. Hershbell (1968, p. 354). For a list of repetitions in Empedocles, cf. pp. 355-7.  
53 Cf. Wright (1981, p. 184, ad B25).  
54 Cf. Hershbell (1968, p. 357). In the same spirit, Zuntz remarks that Empedocles is 
the disciple of the ancient vates (1971, p. 268).  




cosmological idea.55 This in turn implies the immediacy of the circumstance of 
communication, since Empedocles likely read his poem in front of an 
audience. It suggests, that is to say, the oral aspect of publication but not of 
composition. It is not exactly clear, furthermore, why we should read in 
Empedocles a lack of clarity and coherence, especially when considering the 
fact that his surviving fragments do not offer a complete view of his poetry.   
Empedocles frequently says that he will return to his point of 
departure in his exposition, and in his fragments he often repeats an idea 
which he has already presented. However, it would be unwise to view this 
characteristic as a deficient way of presentation. It seems safer to interpret this 
feature of his thought in light of the didactic standpoint which he adopts in 
his poems. It is therefore an alternative way of putting across new ideas and 
of instructing an audience, since the same cosmological theory can be 
presented, and in some cases argued for, in a variety of ways, so that the 
audience finally grasps it. The epic poet on the other hand never returns to an 
episode which he has already presented, although his formulaic style is, of 
course, characterised by repetitive patterns either of utterance or of imagery.56 
It then appears that Empedocles was conscious of the technique he 
employed in the publication of his cosmological material, as Hershbell has 
observed in his examination.57 It is important to distinguish, however, 
whether these oral techniques imply the expertise of the poet or whether 
Empedocles employs them as a vehicle for his cosmology. It is in other words 
crucial to examine whether repetition is for Empedocles a technique of 
composition, as it is for the poets, or of presentation.  
Empedocles actually declares three times in his fragments that he will 
                                                 
55 Cf. frs.B6, B8.1, B17.1, 14. 26-7. 
56 The phrase οἴμας παντοίας of epic song (θ 481 and χ 347) refers to the diversity of 
the stories which a poet can narrate as well as to the plurality of his material. But the 
poet never argues in alternative ways.  
57 Cf. Hershbell (1968, p. 355). 




later return to the point which he makes, in which cases he states as the 
purpose of his repetition the fact that he wants his audience to understand his 
message.  
Β24: κορυφὰς ἑτέρας ἑτέρῃσι προσάπτων 
        μύθων μὴ τελέειν ἀτραπὸν μίαν 
B25: καὶ δίς γὰρ, ὅδεῖ, καλόν ἐστιν ἐνισπεῖν 
B35: αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ παλίνορσος ἐλεύσομαι ἐς πόρον ὕμνων, 
        τὸν πρότερον κατάλεξα, λόγου λόγον ἐξοχετεύων 
 
This set of fragments shows that Empedocles considered himself able 
to defend his cosmological doctrines in alternative ways. It is noteworthy that 
in these lines Empedocles associates his message with the intelligence of his 
audience.58 This in turn suggests that he viewed cosmology as a theoretical 
activity. Fragment B17, furthermore, is an even better example of the way in 
which Empedocles used repetition to didactic ends for the publication of his 
cosmology. In lines 1 and 16 Empedocles says that “δίπλ’ ἐρέω”, and from 
what follows it is clear to see that he really does so, since he repeats his view 
about the way in which the cosmos is formulated and destructed. In the first 
case many different constituents are united by the power of Φιλία thus 
forming a whole, while in the second case this whole falls apart into its 
different constituents with the power of Νεῖκος. This in turn implies that 
repetition serves in Empedocles a distinctively didactic purpose and that it 
did not assist him in composing his poems on the spot, as Hershbell’s 
examination suggests.  
Scholars have frequently observed that verse generally contributes to 
the memorability of a certain poem.59 It is vital to distinguish, however, that 
                                                 
58 In B114 Empedocles explicitly says that the πίστις occurs in man’s φρένα. On the 
physical organ of φρένες, cf. Onians (1954, p. 38). 
59 For the view that the medium of verse makes the ideas more easy to remember, cf. 
Verdenius (1942, p. 2), and Cornford (1952, pp. 120-1), and (1957, pp. 255-6) contra 
Mourelatos (2008, pp. 45-6). Wright observed that repetitions function as reminders 
and reinforcements (1981, ad B25). Guthrie on the other hand observed that 




the memorability of verse can have two different functions. It can either 
facilitate the memory of the audience or it can facilitate the poet in his 
composition.60 In the latter case the rhythmic structure of metre, but also the 
traditional stock of formulae which he has at his disposal, challenge and aid 
the oral poet in his composition. In the first case, however, verse is deprived 
of such a technical function, while it still retains the feature of memorability. 
However, this is the result of the rhythmic structure of metre and not of the 
skilful way in which the individual handles his verbal instrument.  
Empedocles resorts to similes in fragment B23, B84, and B100. In 
fragment B23 he refers to the way in which painters successfully represent 
various forms in their works by combining different colours. In this simile it is 
plain to see that the mixture of the basic colours (φάρμακα) by the painters 
corresponds to the way in which the cosmic force of Φιλία unites the 
ῥιζώματα. In this way Empedocles explains the multiplicity of visual reality, 
while he also describes the process through which it is formulated. This 
ἐναργὲς παράδειγμα, in the words of Simplicius, has an apparent 
explanatory function in Empedocles’ account, since it clarifies his basic 
cosmological principle, the ῥιζώματα.61 This is a function which is not attested 
in epic similes. It then seems that Empedocles refined epic similes, since he 
introduced a new function. He used them creatively, that is, in connection 
with his desire to instruct his audience rather than as an embellishment of 
expression.  
In fragment B84 Empedocles describes the structure of the eye. If we 
take this fragment at face value, then it seems that Empedocles shares the 
                                                                                                                                            
Empedocles refined the traditional function of repetitions in epic poetry (1965, p. 
137). Snell suggested that recurrence plays an important role in Empedocles’ use of 
analogies. In his view, the knowledge which Empedocles expounds is not mystic, 
because his analogies are easily observable by everyone (1953, p. 218).  
60 See Hershbell (1968, p. 353 and p. 355) for repetition as a technique of oral 
composition.  
61Cf. Simpl. Phys. 159.27.  




same interest with the doctors. A second careful reading reveals, however, 
that Empedocles is primarily concerned in fragment B84 not with the 
anatomy of the eye but with explaining the way in which men see.62 This is 
also manifested in that the two phrases which refer to λύχνος, namely the 
eye, are symmetrically positioned at crucial points in the fragment:  
line 5: φῶς δ’ ἔξω διαθρῷσκον, ὅσον ταναώτερον ἦεν 
line 11: πῦρ δ’ ἔξω διίεσκον, ὅσον ταναώτερον ἦεν 
 
Empedocles uses repetition in theses lines in order to explain the way 
in which the light shines through its surrounding obstacles on two different 
occasions. In this simile he replaces the physical light (φὦς) which shines 
through the air (ἀνέμων πνεῦμα) with the “light” in our eye (πῦρ) which 
shines through the protecting veils which encircle it (ὀθόνῃσι). The repetition 
of the same phrase in the end of the line, furthermore, helps the audience to 
associate these two different occasions and to understand in this way 
Empedocles’ theory.  
It then becomes apparent that Empedocles uses in this fragment two 
analogous processes which clarify his theory about vision. One is taken from 
everyday experience, and for this reason is obvious to everyone, while the 
other is deducted from this common experience. It seems that Empedocles 
discussed the structure of the eye in his otherwise cosmological investigation, 
because he regarded the faculty of vision as a reliable source of information 
about the constitution of cosmic reality.63 This topic is therefore important in 
his examination of the world, because it explains the main way in which one 
can acquire truthful knowledge about the nature of the cosmos.  
In fragment B100 Empedocles examines the process of aspiration (ὧδε 
δ’ ἀναπνεῖ πάντα καὶ ἐκπνεῖ), which he describes by drawing an analogy 
                                                 
62Cf. Wright (1981), and Trépanier (2003, ad loc). 
63 Empedocles’ interest in human understanding is also manifested in his description 
of the like-perceives-like principle, which he presents in B109.  




with the clepsydra.64 It appears that Empedocles uses a simile in this fragment 
in order to illustrate a more complex theory. He uses a domestic item from 
everyday life, that is, in order to clarify his account about breathing, as in the 
case of fragment B84. It is in this respect, furthermore, that the clepsydra 
simile differs considerably from epic similes.  
Fragment B100 is structured symmetrically. In lines 1-8 Empedocles 
immediately presents his theory about respiration and in lines 8-21 he draws 
an elaborative analogy (which is introduced with ὥσπερ, as in the case of epic 
similes) between the process of aspiration and the way in which the child is 
playing with the clepsydra. He then concludes in lines 22-25 on the reliability 
of his theory. The careful design of this fragment suggests that Empedocles is 
here appropriating the structure of epic similes to his own ends.  
It is also important to note that the clepsydra simile does not seem to 
imply the conduct of a scientific experiment,65 as some scholars have 
maintained.66 Although fragment B100 obviously has a scientific topic and it is 
based on observation, it seems unlikely that it follows the specific conditions 
or method of a scientific experiment. It clearly draws an analogy between the 
process of respiration, which Empedocles proposes, with a picture taken from 
                                                 
64 For this reason, it does not prove the existence of void, as implied by Aristotle’s 
criticism (Phys. 213a) and accepted by some scholars. 
65 Ancient tradition was, of course, more than happy to consider Empedocles the 
founder of medicine. Cf. Diog. Laert. Vit. VIII.76, Sud. Sub Empedocles, and Plin. NH 
XXIX 1.5. This view is rooted in the fact that Empedocles twice in his fragments 
discusses a medical topic. It is noteworthy, however, that Empedocles does not deal 
with these questions in the same way in which a doctor would, since he does not 
take interest in curing a disease. Hershbell has argued that for Empedocles, as for 
Hesiod, poetry had a therapeutic function. However, although Empedocles makes a 
mention to φάρμακα in B112, he appears to be interested in the supreme power 
which knowledge brings to the person who knows.  
66 Cf. Burnet (1932, p. 73), Leonard (1908, p. 85), and Cornford (1952, p. 7). See also 
Furley’s extensive objection to this interpretation (1957), but also Lloyd (1979, p. 143), 
Wright (1997, p. 21), McKirahan (1994, p. 281), Powell (1923) and Booth (1960).  
More recent studies of the clepsydra fragment object to its interpretation as the 
description of a scientific experiment.  




the everyday life of his audience. This is perhaps also suggested by the fact 
that the child is playing (παίζουσα) with the water-vessel of the clepsydra, 
which opposes the systematic method with which a scientific experiment is 
normally carried out.  
It then seems that repetitions and similes have in Empedocles a 
particular function, and that it is more safe to view these features in 
connection with the purposes of his cosmological investigation and with his 
authority claims. It has become apparent that recurrences in Empedocles are 
more than flat repetitions, since they function as reminders for the 
cosmological message which the audience has to learn. Empedocles uses 
similes in his account for similar purposes. His similes have an apparent 
explanatory value, which they acquire mainly from their relevance with 
everyday experience. It seems, that is, that both repetitions and similes 
specifically serve in Empedocles a didactic purpose.  
4. The Muse of philosophy  
 
The notion of expressing a divinely inspired message in verse was 
well-rooted in Greek tradition.67 This is manifested not only in epic poetry, 
which laid a claim to divine inspiration, but also in the case of the oracular 
pronouncements, which were normally expressed in hexameter verse. In 
these cases the knowledge which was communicated was considered the 
product of a contact with the divine, either Apollo, god of prophecy, or the 
Muse.  
However, it cannot be a matter of mere coincidence that in the 
cosmological fragments under examination the Muse appears only in those 
accounts, which were composed in verse and which clearly had a focus on the 
                                                 
67 For the view that verse was the appropriate medium for divinely revealed 
knowledge, see von Fritz (1946, p. 14).  




investigation of the cosmos, such as that of Parmenides and of Empedocles. It 
seems that with these accounts divine inspiration lost its purely divine 
significance and that it was used as a literary technique which stressed the 
importance and seriousness of the message which the individual cosmologist 
wished to deliver to his audience. 
In addition, the choice of verse went hand in hand with the popularity 
of verse in Greek culture, which also assisted the publication of the text in an 
oral society. This in turn suggests that poetic invocation was used in the early 
cosmological accounts as a literary device, which was a vehicle with which 
these cosmologies could be more successfully delivered orally. It is for this 
reason safer to interpret the invocation of the Muse in these early thinkers as 
the appropriation of a traditional mode of expression, which was nonetheless 
used to different ends. It hinted at the divine authority of the inspired poets, 
from which the individual wanted however to differentiate himself and his 
expertise.  
In the extant fragments Empedocles refers three times to the authority 
of the Muse and twice he does so in conventional language:  
B3.3-5: καὶ σὲ, πολυμνήστη λευκώλενε παρθένε Μοῦσα, 
             ἄντομαι, ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν, 
             πέμπε παρ’ Εὐσεβίης ἐλάουσ’ εὐήνιον ἅρμα  
B131:    εἰ γὰρ ἐφημερίων ἕνεκέν τινος, ἄμβροτε Μοῦσα,  
             ἡμετέρας μελέτας <ἅδε τοι> διὰ φροντίδος ἐλθεῖν, 
             εὐχομένῳ νῦν αὖτε παρίστασο, Καλλιόπεια, 
             ἀμφὶ θεῶν μακάρων ἀγαθὸν λόγον ἐμφαίνοντι.  
B4.2:     ὡς δὲ παρ’ ἡμετέρης κέλεται πιστώματα Μούσης.  
 
It is also worthy of note that Empedocles addresses the Muse only in 
his cosmological poem and never in his Katharmoi, although this poem has an 
obviously religious topic.68 At any event, in fragment B3 Empedocles asks for 
                                                 
68  Except from B131, which should not be allocated however in the Katharmoi. Diels 
positioned this fragment in the Katharmoi, perhaps because the plural of ἡμετέρας 




divine inspiration in standard poetic fashion but in fragments B131 and B4 he 
hints at non-traditional elements. In fragment B131 he attributes the 
responsibility of his account not to the Muse, as one would normally expect 
had his belief in divine inspiration been sincere, but to himself (λόγον 
ἐμφαίνοντι). In this fragment he also describes his account as a μελέτη, a 
word which does not generally belong to the authoritative vocabulary of 
poetry.69 In addition, in fragment B4 Empedocles introduces a new concept, 
when he refers to the πιστώματα which the Muse provides. This statement 
does not exactly agree with what we know about poetic inspiration. In epic 
poetry the Muses are said to be omniscient but their knowledge is never 
characterised as “convincing”. In fact, the reliability of their knowledge was 
never doubted, for which reason they did not have to justify or defend their 
divine point of view.  
In fragment B23.11 Empedocles exhorts Pausanias to pay heed to the 
knowledge which is revealed to him θεοῦ πάρα. Some scholars have taken 
this phrase as evidence that Empedocles considered himself a god.70 This 
suggestion is further encouraged by the boastful declarations which 
Empedocles makes in fragment B112, in which he takes particular pride in the 
fact that he is received everywhere he goes as if he were (ὥσπερ ἔοικα) a θεὸς 
                                                                                                                                            
μελέτας implies multiple addressees. However, in B4.2, which clearly belongs to the 
cosmological poem, Empedocles refers to the πιστώματα of ἡμετέρης Μούσης, in the 
same fashion perhaps with which Xenophanes speaks of “his” ἡμετέρης σοφίης in 
B2.  
69  Cf. B110, but also the examination in the previous section of the authoritative 
phraseology which Empedocles employs in this fragment.  
70  So according to Bidez (1894, p. 102), Nestle (1906, pp. 545-7), and, more recently, 
Trépanier (2003, p. 55). Trépanier argued that Empedocles’ belief in his own personal 
divinity does not necessarily contradict his belief in the Muse (p. 145). Bollack on the 
other hand identified the θεός in fragment B23 with Aphrodite or Φιλότης (1965, 
vol. 1, p. 265 n.2, and p. 310). It seems hard to accept, however, that Empedocles held 
the view that the cosmic power of Φιλότης, and not the Muse, would interfere with 
the form of his speech, as he claims in this fragment.  





Wright has reasonably objected, however, that in fragment B4 
Empedocles’ language suggests that he is exploiting a traditional motif. 
According to her interpretation, this shows that Empedocles refers in 
fragment B112 not to himself but to the Muse.72 In our analysis of the opening 
of Parmenides’ proem, furthermore, we have examined the similar way in 
which Parmenides uses the motif of poetic revelation in order to imply the 
importance of his message. It is remarkable that in both of these cases, the 
Muse or the goddess do not generally speak in the traditional way with which 
the gods speak either in poetry or in prophecy. Wright’s suggestion is 
attractive, mainly because Empedocles uses elsewhere traditional language in 
the same fashion. He uses, for example, the names Κύπρις and Ἀφροδίτη as 
alternative names for the cosmic force of Φιλότης.73 This suggests that 
Empedocles was keen to adopt standard epic phrasing with the purpose of 
                                                 
71 The reading of this line is controversial and some scholars have taken it as evidence 
for that Empedocles claims for himself the status of a god. Panagiotou thus and van 
der Ben interpret the phrase as “I look like a god”. Cf. (1983) and (1975, p. 23), 
respectively. See also Bidez (1894, p. 102), Nestle (1966, pp. 545-57), and Zuntz (1971, 
p. 189), who read this line in connection with the phrase θεοῦ παρά in B23. Wright 
has objected, however, that such a view would amount to the kind of μανία which 
Empedocles explicitly condemns in B3.6 (1981 ad B23).  
72 Cf. Wright (1981, ad B23). According to her interpretation, the fact that Empedocles 
uses traditional epithets for the Muse further suggests that she functions as a literary 
device in his poetry. See also, (1997, p. 8, n. 10), and (2006, p. 209) against Trépanier’s 
interpretation in specific. Obbink has argued that if Empedocles refers to himself in 
this fragment, then his references to the Muse in B3 and B131 would be superfluous 
(1994, p. 63). Contra Wright’s view, see Inwood (2001), who translates “the story from 
a god”, and Zafiropoulo (1953), who translates “le discours d’ une divinité”.   
73 For Ἀφροδίτη as a cosmic force in Empedocles which brings together the 
ῥιζώματα, see B22.13: ἀλλήλοις ἔστερκται ὁμοιωθέντ’ Ἀφροδίτηι; Β71.5: ὅσσα 
συναρμοσθέντ’ Ἀφροδίτηι; but also B17.32-3. For Κύπρις, cf. B73; B75, and the 
description of her βασιλίεια in B128. For Empedocles’ use of Φιλότητα as 
synonymous to Ἀφροδίτη, cf. B20.5: Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν’ εἰς ἕν ἅπαντα; Β21.12: ἐν 
Φιλότητι καὶ ἀλλήλοισιι ποθεῖται; and B26.7: Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν’ εἰς ἕνα κόσμον.  




providing his expression with a familiar and graspable form.74 
There is yet another telling indication for that Empedocles used the 
traditional language of the epic as an instrument for expressing his thought 
and not in the way in which a true poet would. In fragment B2.9 he tells us:  
πεύσεαι οὐ πλέον ἠὲ βροτείη μῆτις ὄρωρεν 
 
This statement shows that Empedocles accepted a certain limit in 
human understanding and a specific area within which mortal knowledge 
could be pursued. The disparity between mortal and divine knowledge was 
nearly proverbial in Greek culture.75 However, Empedocles gives it in this 
fragment a new twist and builds upon the notion about the patronising 
relationship, which the poet traditionally had with his Muse. He thus refines 
the implications of this belief and he does not treat it as a banal concept.  
In the case of epic poetry and in prophecy, the purpose of divine 
inspiration is to elevate the inspired individual to a higher level of 
understanding which was previously unattainable by him in his ordinary 
status as a mortal. The individual thus manages to supersede the restrictions 
which his mortal point of view imposes and to acquire in this way a higher 
form of understanding.76 Empedocles on the other hand states in fragment 
                                                 
74 In fragment B17.24 Empedocles explicitly says that Ἀφροδίτη is an ἐπώνυμον for 
Φιλότης, while uses it as a synonym in frs. B22.5, B71.4, B73.2, B86, B87. In frs. B95, 
B98.3, B128.3 he uses Κύπρις instead of Φιλότης. This suggests that he used the 
traditional name of Aphrodite, because it immediately evokes the image of 
combining. In this way Empedocles illustrated the cosmic process with which 
everything in the world is created. See also the introduction of the four ῥιζώματα in 
B6 with the mythical names of Ζεύς, Ἥρη, Αἰδωνεύς, and Νῆστις, which Mansfeld 
interpreted as a riddle (1995, p. 227).  
75  Cf., e.g., Pind. Isth. 5.16: θνατὰ θνατοῖσι πρέπει; Soph. fr.531N2: θνητὰ φρονεῖν 
χρὴ θνητὴν φύσιν; and Antiph. fr. 289: φρόνει εἰ θνητός εἶ, βέλτιστε, θνητὰ καὶ 
φρόνει.  
76  According to Bollack, the adjective βροτείη does not necessarily imply a restriction 
in knowing, since it shows that “l’ intelligence est presque illimitée, bien que 




B2.9 the exact opposite. In his view one should not undertake to investigate 
matters which are simply beyond the reach of his mortal mind.77 The 
unconventional way, that is, in which Empedocles treats the motif of poetic 
invocation is suggested by the fact knowledge is for him a matter of personal 
responsibility.78 
It is also worthy of note that Empedocles never explicitly refers to the 
value of his poetry as such, and he never mentions other poets in his account. 
This is to some extent unexpected for an individual who is conscious of his 
poetic craft, and who whole-heartedly believes in the social importance of his 
poetry.79 It then appears that Empedocles did not associate his skill of 
devising fluent hexameters with his authority claims. The fact that he never 
competes with the poets, furthermore, may perhaps suggest that for him 
theoretical cosmologising is acknowledged as some distinct area of expertise, 
the particular characteristics of which are nonetheless unspecified. At any 
event, Empedocles repeatedly links the aim of his account with the 
                                                                                                                                            
mortelle”. At the same time, however, human intelligence can never supersede “la 
puissance divine” (1965, vol. III ad B2). 
77  Trépanier maintained that Empedocles with this phrase asks for divine assistance 
on behalf of his student Pausanias, who has already reached the peak of knowledge 
but still has to proceed further (2003, p. 55). However, it does seem that Empedocles 
is here concerned with pointing out to his audience that some things may forever 
escape the knowledge of men. Burkert on the other hand suggested that Empedocles 
here means in the “manner of the shaman” (1972, p. 216). In a similar vein, Millerd 
held that the βροτείη μῆτις resembles the claims of the seer (1980, p.25). There is 
simply not enough evidence in the surviving fragments in support of this view. For 
an examination of the expertise of the shaman, see in the introduction.  
78  This is suggested by the fact that whenever Empedocles presents a cosmological 
view he frequently uses the authoritative I. Cf. frs., B8.1; B17.1,15,16; B35.1,2; B37; 
B111.2, and B114.1-2. These fragments show that Empedocles presents a theory 
which is the product of his personal intellectual effort. This is pointed out by von 
Fritz and Trépanier, who observe in their examinations that Empedocles for the most 
part speaks in his own name, although he apparently claims divine inspiration. Cf. 
(1946, p. 14, n. 103) and (2003, p. 144), respectively. In addition, Hershbell argues that 
the poem of Empedocles is not entirely a matter of divine revelation (1970b, p. 148).  
79 Cf. also Hershbell (1970b, p. 159). For an example of the way in which a true poet 
declared his poetic skill to his audience, see Hes. Th. 75 ff.  




enhancement of the audience’s wits and with the understanding of the 
cosmos.80  
It is therefore reasonable to assume that Empedocles is not sincere 
when he employs the motif of poetic inspiration, as in the case of poets or 
prophets. It is part of the conventional language which he uses in his 
exposition, mainly because this form of expression is more effective in oral 
communication. It would be unwise, however, to take this choice of 
Empedocles as an instance of “empty formalism”, as Trépanier has 
maintained.81 It is unlikely that Empedocles’ audience could perceive an 
original use of epic style as a formalism. It is safer to assume on the other 
hand that Empedocles in this way furnishes his otherwise dull cosmological 
speculation with extra flavour. He does not handle tradition with sterility but 
with imagination and originality, and for this reason his verses show that 
conventionality could lead to a finely fruitful kind of expression, when used 
aptly.  
The modern mind perhaps finds it hard to accept the view that 
conventionality could be treated creatively and that it could function as a 
subsidiary aspect of originality. However, the circumstances under which 
these works were communicated were different, and for this reason the 
audience treated the employment of epic style with a different sensitivity. 
Empedocles’ use of a traditional expression does not therefore on the face of it 
rule out the possibility that such a choice was devoid of significance in laying 
                                                 
80  Cf. B110, but also the phrases: μάθει γάρ τοι φρένας αὔξει (Β17.14) and ἀργαλέη 
ἐπὶ φρένα πίστιος ὁρμή (B114). 
81 Cf. Trépanier (2003, p. 144). In a similar vein, von Fritz maintained that 
Empedocles invocation of the Muse cannot be merely a literary device, as the phrases 
θεοῦ πάρα (B23.11) and βροτείη μῆτις (B2.9) suggest (1946, p. 14, n. 103). Lloyd 
observed that the claim to divine inspiration which Empedocles and Parmenides 
make should not be discounted as a matter of convention (1970, p. 38). Jaeger on the 
other hand held that in the Peri Physeos Empedocles can be easily taken to talk in a 
rather conventional manner (1967, p. 94).  




a claim to a status of authority in society. His use of the highly celebrated 
medium of the epic hexameter implies to his audience the seriousness of his 
message, while at the same time it underlines the fact that Empedocles 
discloses with his account a superior form of knowledge.  




ἐν θεῷ γε μὰν τέλος 
Pind. Ol. 13.104 
 
Chapter VI: Conclusion 
1. Contextual authorities   
 
The expertise of the epic poet rested upon his ability to acquire insight 
through divine communication into past events and to narrate heroic deeds. The oral 
epic poet was to a considerable extent restricted insofar as he had to use traditional 
formulae and themes in his composition. His poetry was viewed as the product of 
divine grace and inspiration. Although poetic inspiration is present in Parmenides 
and Empedocles, our examination has suggested that they treated the 
communication with the divine as a literary device, with which they could lay a 
claim to a higher form of knowledge. In their cosmologies, that is to say, the divine 
plays no actual role in the acquisition of knowledge, since this knowledge is 
presented as a personal discovery. They exploited the traditional associations of the 
motif of divine inspiration to entirely different purposes. The expertise thus of the 
first cosmologists was not at the service of the gods or of the religious system of 
beliefs.  
In addition, the epic or lyric poets could occasionally discuss the nature of the 
gods or the origins of the human world, and it is in this respect that the early 
cosmological enterprise apparently converges with an area of poetic knowledge. 
However, the poets were not generally concerned with phrasing an epistemological 
view. It is only fair to exclude Hesiod from this observation, since he was the first to 
address the question of distinguishing between truth and falsity. Only that Hesiod 
does not proceed to examine the implications of this distinction in connection with a 
specific topic. He does not refer to the conditions of safe knowledge, and he talks 




about human knowledge in general and not about a reasonable understanding of the 
cosmos, as in the case of the thinkers under examination.  
Poetic cosmologies differ from early cosmological accounts in that they do not 
pursue an understanding of the cosmos in terms of acquiring an intellectual insight. 
They offer an explanation of the cosmos which is also characterised by rationality, 
albeit this rationality is of a different nature. It is the rationality of myth but not of 
the human mind. In early cosmological explanations the Olympian gods are 
dismissed from their influence in the cosmic world and from the role which they 
played according to tradition in the formulation of the world. The conceptualisation 
through myth was gradually abandoned and thus new forms of reasoning about the 
cosmos were pursued. The novel idea which Presocratic cosmologies introduced was 
that they confronted the world as an independent structure, the constitution of 
which was intelligible but also predictable.  
It is also worthy of note that the efficacy of poetic performance partly resulted 
in an arrival to aesthetic gratification, an aspect which is notably absent from the 
accounts under examination. This difference is important, because it reveals the shift 
in the purpose of communication. Our modern standpoint has reduced the 
importance of the fact that poetry was accompanied by a musical instrument. At the 
same time it is unwise to ignore that epic poetry had an educational value in Greek 
society and a status of authority which was hard to question. It was in this respect 
that early cosmologists wished to distinguish their expertise from the great poets of 
the epos.  
Mantic knowledge had an important practical quality, since it regarded the 
appropriate action which should be taken in a crisis situation. Like the poet, the 
diviner and the oracles based their authority claims upon the belief that they were 
the competent mediators between men and gods. It is perhaps for this reason that 
these individuals were not at pains to defend extensively the reliability of their 
expertise or knowledge. It seems that the claim to a divinely inspired message was 
sufficient.  




In addition, prophetic knowledge had an a-temporal quality, which is also 
attested in the early cosmologies. However, in the case of divination, the seer or the 
oracle knew many separate and unrelated truths, which applied to the past, present, 
or future. They do not offer a single explanation of a specific structure, and their 
knowledge is attached to the particular needs of a particular client. The first 
cosmologists present a single truth, and a cosmic pattern, which never ceases to 
affect the formulation of the cosmic order. Despite this dissimilarity, however, it is 
possible to understand the presentation of an a-temporal truth as the intention to 
emphasise the claim that the knowledge which the individual presents covers the 
whole field of human consciousness. 
The prestige of the seers and of the oracles was based upon the common belief 
that the gods are prone to communicate their knowledge directly to charismatic 
individuals. In the case of the seer, furthermore, his personal expertise was a 
necessary condition, insofar as he had to interpret correctly the omens. Divine 
inspiration does not have the same bearing in the first cosmologies, since they do not 
rely heavily on external divine sources of knowledge but on personal intelligence 
and on the ability to perceive and understand the true nature of the cosmos. These 
individuals often take the personal responsibility for the truth which they disclose. 
The Presocratics under examination thus managed to disentangle authority claims 
from such figures, and they disassociated truth from its previously divine origins. In 
this way they recognised the right of man to pursue knowledge on his own and 
without the aid of his gods.   
The first cosmologies bear one further similarity with the expertise of the seer: 
they both interpreted observable reality, albeit to different ends. The seer used visual 
omens in order to predict the will of gods, whereas the first cosmologists used 
observable reality in order to perceive a plausible explanation of the cosmos and of 
the way in which the cosmic order is formulated. Observable signs thus lost in the 
first cosmologists their religious function, which was replaced with a novel notion. 
In the early cosmologies observable reality is thought to provide the human mind 




with a system of cosmic clues, which require interpretation. They were also viewed 
as indications of a coherent world order. This in turn implies that the mind of the 
cosmologist regards these signs differently. They are no longer considered the 
manifestations of divine will but of the inner-structure of the physis, i.e. of cosmic 
reality.  
It is also worthy of note that sense data partly have in the first accounts about 
the cosmos an argumentative function, since immediate experience is highly valued, 
especially in an oral society, and it cannot be easily challenged. In the case of mantic 
knowledge on the other hand, visual testimony has no particular argumentative 
weight in connection with the truth which the seer reveals to his client.  
2. Mode of communication: archaic orality 
 
Recent scholarly examination of archaic orality and literacy has shown that 
although there was a surge of literacy in 5th century Greece, new ideas were 
publicised mainly through oral performance. However, it is hard to imagine that 
these cosmologies were performed in the Agora, where the noise would make it 
difficult for the individual to deliver his intellectually demanding message. It is safer 
to assume that these cosmologies were read out in front of a small group of persons, 
most likely the aristocrats.  
At any event, it seems that the need to convince a live audience about the 
reliability and worth of one’s personal expertise brought about a competitive spirit. 
Individuals needed a good reputation, because the transmission of new ideas did not 
yet occur within a fully literate system of communication, in which it is easier for the 
text to survive in time regardless of the public attention or approval it has managed 
to receive. The gradual spread of writing formulated an alternative way of 
conceptualising and favoured more abstract and extensive forms of reasoning, the 
circulation of which was not wholly dependent upon the popularity of a particular 
work. In addition, the oral nature of Presocratic communication offers some 




assistance in understanding the reason why the majority of the thinkers under 
examination opted for the popular medium of verse. It helps us view in new light 
the authority claims of the early cosmologists, which the use of epic language 
implies.   
In the archaic epoch myth and hexameter verse were by far the most 
prestigious and familiar types of expression. It seems that the first cosmologists had 
to forge their message according to the demands of their audience, which was 
particularly keen on epic expression and myth. The employment of epic language 
implied the desire to lay a claim to a status of authority, which was as important as 
that of the epic poets. In addition, the use of this familiar style paved the way for the 
successful delivery of the otherwise hard cosmological message by facilitating the 
understanding of the audience. The Presocratics thus used analogies, similes, and 
examples from everyday life in their accounts, because such elements establish a 
connection with the common experience of men. They therefore illustrate the content 
of the cosmological view which is presented and they have an explanatory function 
in the account. These stylistic features were used as a vehicle for expressing new and 
original ideas but they do not constitute a central aspect of Presocratic expertise. 
This is also suggested by that the only requirement which these thinkers set 
for the communication of their accounts is the application of personal intelligence. 
This is less evident in Xenophanes, although in fragment 34 he does phrase the idea 
that one should be aware of the possibility of error. At any event, the thinkers 
examined here frequently refer to those who fail to perceive the truth which they 
disclose. All the same, they do not assume a specialised or limited audience of 
listeners. The content of their message thus addressed everyone provided of course 
that they were personally interested in the examination of the cosmos. This 
characteristic, furthermore, is quite distinct from the knowledge which was 
presented in the closed circle of the mystical cults, which was kept with secrecy 
within the religious fraternity.  
The live presentation of early cosmologies has one further implication. It 




suggests that the fragments which have survived are an aide memoir for live 
performance. For this reason they have preserved a single aspect of the way in which 
Presocratic expertise was presented to the public, but they not account for the 
discussion which may perhaps have followed. It is possible that the response of the 
audience to these accounts was immediate, since they could express their agreement 
or disagreement with the view presented once the author has finished reading out 
his work, as mentioned in the Platonic dialogues. It is in this stage of performance 
that a more self-assertive tone and a defence of personal expertise were perhaps 
expected to take place. The discussion which followed the reading of a work is for us 
irretrievably lost, although it is generally safe to assume that important elements of 
authority claims were presented in this stage. 
3. The early cosmologists as a distinct group and the different stages of 
authoritative differentiation  
 
The accounts examined here all claim to investigate the formation and 
structure of the cosmos.1 Interestingly enough, however, these thinkers do not 
acknowledge one another in their works, although they often refer by name to other 
individuals such as Homer or Hesiod. This in turn makes it difficult to accept that 
they understood their activity in connection with a specific area of expertise. It is also 
questionable whether they considered their theorising about the cosmos as a distinct 
domain of interest. All the same, it is unwise to overlook the fact that they all 
attempt to answer the same question, and that they all share the same aim insofar as 
they claim to help their audience to avoid the state of ignorance or of false opinion.  
In order to decide whether a work belongs to a specialised area of knowledge 
and to a specialised group of experts, it is important to take into account three 
elements, which indicate specialisation. Firstly, it must register a specific topic of 
investigation, secondly, it must acknowledge a tradition of style, and thirdly, it must 
                                                 
1 See also Table III in the Appendix. 




acknowledge a tradition of method. A group of specialised experts, that is, follows a 
tradition in terms of the topic it discusses, of the medium it uses in exposition, and of 
the method it applies. It must display an awareness of common features and 
conventions in respect to these elements.  
In the thinkers examined here only the first element is easily detected in the 
surviving fragments, since they all apparently claim to investigate the cosmos. 
However, it appears that they are not aware of a tradition of style or of a systematic 
method, which they view in connection with their cosmological authority claims. 
Xenophanes composed verses (elegies and hexameters), Heraclitus wrote aphorisms, 
whereas Parmenides and Empedocles hexameters. It is also remarkable that 
Parmenides’ way of reflecting upon the cosmos was not picked up by Empedocles, 
although they both used the hexameter verse. Zeno and Melissus on the other hand 
display some relativity with Parmenides’ thought, but they did not follow his choice 
of verse. It then becomes apparent that the first cosmologists were not aware of any 
tradition in connection with their cosmological theorising.  
In addition, from the thinkers examined here only Parmenides explicitly 
states a new method in connection with the discovery of knowledge (B2). He applied 
this method in his account, furthermore, in order to reach safe and plausible 
conclusions about the qualities of the ἐόν (B8). Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and 
Parmenides frequently remark upon the possibility of knowledge in general, but 
they do not go as far as to describe the particular features of a specific cosmological 
method.  
It then seems that the early cosmologists did not position their accounts 
within a framework of a cosmological tradition. Their choice of medium is 
characterised by an apparent randomness, whereas they fail to establish a coherent 
methodology for cosmological knowledge. This in turn implies that whilst some of 
the aforementioned elements which define specialisation are present some others are 
not. At the same time, it is hard to accept that these individuals were completely 
detached from specialisation. This problematic feature of their accounts is resolved if 




we accept that there is not only one type of specialisation. We need therefore to 
distinguish different stages of authoritative specialisation based on the presence or 
absence of these basic elements.   
A. Laks has proposed in his examination the terms “differentiation”, 
“specialisation”, and “professionalization”, which we will borrow for our analysis. It 
is important to point out that Laks is interested in defining larger fields of 
competence and not the authority claims of specific individuals, since, according to 
his interpretation, knowledge is differentiated and not the persons.2  
In the first stage of authoritative differentiation the individuals are convinced 
that their knowledge is generally different from other types of available knowledge, 
which are regarded prestigious in their society. This is the most general and 
unspecified kind of authoritative awareness. Individuals display the desire to 
establish (while in fact they fail to do so) a different and untried domain of expertise, 
but they do not feel the need to define its particular nature or techne. They simply 
register a new are of concern, which should be investigated, but by which standards 
or on what grounds they do not explicitly say. This preliminary stage of 
authoritative differentiation is thus characterised by a diversity in terms of both 
expression and of method. This is so because in this early stage there is no 
established tradition, which dictates the use of a standard medium of expression, 
and which clearly and decisively outlines the nature and instruments of this field of 
competence.   
The lack of an established inner tradition makes the individuals of this stage 
appear as somewhat unrelated figures, since they do not acknowledge in their works 
other like-minded individuals, and they do not therefore perceive themselves as 
members of a specific authoritative group. In this stage a straightforward and 
assertive presentation of personal views is considered sufficient for claiming 
                                                 
2 Cf. Laks (2002, pp. 15-6). It is important to point out that according to Laks 
professionalization is the middle stage. This does not contradict the view presented here, 
since Laks takes interest in a different question in his analysis.  




authority, although the individual may occasionally resort to a more reasonable 
mode of exposition.  
The important contribution of the first stage in the overall process of 
establishing an authoritative enterprise lies in that individuals register, without 
defining or defending in detail however, an area of authoritative concern. In this 
stage there is one major topic of discussion, which is nonetheless pursued 
sporadically and in a relatively disorganised fashion. The individual may 
occasionally express views also on matters other than that of his affirmed main 
interest.  
In the second stage of “specialization” the individual is able to differentiate 
his expertise from other groups of experts but also from other like-minded 
individuals who claim the same type of expert knowledge. In this case he 
differentiates himself however from others on grounds of the untruthfulness of their 
knowledge, and not because he considers himself to belong to a different group of 
experts. In this stage inner-differentiation may appear but it is not common, and 
individual still perform in society generally as units. They are, however, able to 
perceive themselves in connection with a specific group more confidently and more 
consciously than the individuals of the first stage, although they are not yet able to 
completely differentiate themselves from others. The major difference between the 
stage of “specialisation” and of “differentiation” is that in “specialisation” the 
individual is concerned exclusively with a single area of knowledge, whereas in the 
preceding stage of “differentiation” he may express views on areas other than that of 
his primary interest.  
In the last stage of “professionalization” personal expertise is consciously and 
self-assertively differentiated both from other authoritative groups as well as from 
other fellow experts. In this phase the individual views his work in relation with an 
already formulated contextual tradition of his discipline, and for this reason he may 
also discuss and criticise the theories of other like-minded individuals. The 
individual who represents this stage perceives himself as the active contributor to a 




specific group of experts, who all investigate the same question. In the stage of 
“professionalization”, furthermore, the conventions and norms of the authoritative 
activity are established, especially in terms of the kind of techne employed and of the 
medium of expression used.  
In this stage the audience can immediately place the expertise of the 
individual within a specific tradition, and they can identify his expertise in 
connection with a specific discipline with which they are familiar. The work is 
presented to an audience which shares the same specialised interest in the topic 
which the individual discusses in his account. It does not address simply whoever 
happens to be present at the gathering, as in the case of the previous stages of 
authoritative differentiation. The publication of the work thus occurs within an 
established frame of pursuing expert knowledge.  
In the stage of “professionalization” the discipline has institutionalised 
establishments (such as schools), at which teachers pass on the basic skills and the 
specialised techne of the discipline. The student is free, however, to accept or reject 
the knowledge and skills which he has received from his teacher. He cannot stray 
too far from the main principles of his discipline, unless, of course, he wants to 
reinterpret them in new light and to point to an alternative kind of knowledge, in 
which case the discipline has to advance again through the same successive stages of 
authoritative differentiation.  
The professionalized individuals are thus learned and “educated”. They may 
respond creatively to the knowledge which they have received and in due time they 
may agree or disagree with the tradition of their forerunners. At any event, 
continuity is a basic feature of professionalization, and in this stage it is easy to trace 
a linear development of theories. These theories are not perceived independently or 
randomly but in connection with an existing tradition. It is in this stage that critical 
scrutiny and the refinement of theories are developed, indeed expected and 
required.  




In these stages of authoritative differentiation, personal authority claims are 
contextual, since they are always made in connection with other types of authority. 
However, it is only in the last stage of “professionalization” that the individual 
engages in critical discussion with other fellow authorities (inner differentiation), as 
in the case of Plato and Aristotle in philosophy. The first stages of “differentiation” 
and of “specialisation” are relatively close, since there are to a considerable extent 
equally vague and broad types of authoritative awareness. At the same time 
however, it seems that in both stages the individual considers himself an expert, 
although he is not yet able to defend his knowledge or map out a specific domain of 
expertise, as in the case of the more developed stage of “professionalization”.  This 
does not imply that these individuals do not wish to lay any claims to authority. 
They simply fail to establish and validate these claims due to the largely yet 
undecided and unspecified nature of their “discipline”, which is starting to emerge 
in society.  
It is now possible to interpret the authority claims of the early cosmologists in 
new light and to explain some the apparently problematic features of the way in 
which they present themselves to their audience. Their accounts are so difficult to 
tackle in terms of their authoritative perspective, because they represent different 
stages of authoritative awareness and differentiation.  
Xenophanes clearly presents himself in fragment B2 as someone worthy of 
public attention. His mention of εὐνομίη in this fragment implies that for him his 
poetry benefits, in an unspecified respect however, society.  Xenophanes cannot 
seem to find the right kind of metre for his poetry, since he composed both elegies as 
well as hexameters. However, in his elegies he strikes a generally unfamiliar note, 
whereas his scarce hexameters reveal an interest in theology and occasionally in 
cosmology.  
In addition, although Xenophanes is closer to the culture of poetic inspiration 
he never uses this motif in his verses. This implies that he wanted to avoid being 
associated with the poets. He launches an explicit attack on epic poetry and criticises 




the anthropomorphic representation of the divine in the epos, which he found 
unacceptable on rational grounds. In our examination of Xenophanes we have 
pointed out that although the criticism of epic poetry was not untraditional, the 
particular way in which Xenophanes objects to the reliability of the epic truth is an 
original discovery.  
In fragment B18 Xenophanes registers the possibility of human knowledge, 
but he does not say in which way or under which conditions it is possible to acquire 
this knowledge. In fragment B34, furthermore, he distinguishes between σαφές and 
δόκος. This distinction shows that he is concerned in his poetry with truth, which he 
nonetheless understands in connection with questions about the nature of the divine. 
He also never openly attaches the authoritative status of σαφές to his poetry. 
Xenophanes did not discover a new method, although he was conscious of that one 
should avoid false belief. At any event, his major contribution was that he managed 
to disassociate knowledge from its previously divine sources, and that he stressed 
the importance of personal ζήτησις.  
The content of his hexameters is characterised by some regularity, and it is 
possible to trace a pattern of the issues which he discusses. He is not aware of any 
tradition of metre, he does not refer to other like-minded individuals, but he 
frequently criticises epic poetry for its mistaken view about the divine.  He confronts 
the very basic question of how it is possible to express a new kind of knowledge, 
which was the product of a critical response to the tradition of epic poetry. 
Xenophanes shows the way to a new way of thinking about the divine and, hence, of 
conceptualising. He is more than a religious reformer, because he was the first to 
criticise the epic tradition in order to replace its minds-set with a more reflective 
attitude. Xenophanes thus represents the very early stage of “differentiation”. He 
obviously feels uncomfortable with existing types of expertise, but he fails to 
perceive his own σοφίη in a clear and strictly defined manner.  
Heraclitus on the other hand oscillates between the stage of “differentiation” 
and of “specialisation”, and for this reason he represents a more advanced stage of 




authoritative awareness than Xenophanes. In the opening of his work he 
immediately introduces his cosmic principle (λόγος), which he explicitly associates 
with human intelligence (ξύνεσις). In this way Heraclitus registers the major topic of 
his account, and he appears to understand his personal expertise (σοφίη) as 
theorising about the cosmos. This is also manifested in his belief that “all is one” and 
that there is only one way of being wise, which imply that knowledge is for 
Heraclitus the product of a specialised concern.  
Heraclitus decided to present his cosmological message with aphorisms and 
he did not follow Xenophanes’ choice of verse. It then seems that for him, as for 
Xenophanes, cosmology did not yet have an established traditional expression. By 
choosing prose Heraclitus may have wished to imply to his audience that he 
examined a specific question in depth, as in the case of other contemporary works of 
prose such as that of the Ionian historiographers.  His sensitivity in the way he 
handles language, furthermore, and his belief that human language can reflect the 
cosmic reality perhaps suggests that he tried to invent a unique style for his unique 
topic. At the same time, however, this implies that he did not view his expertise in 
connection with any other existing, or emerging, group of specialists.  
At any event, what is particularly distinctive about Heraclitus is that he asks 
his audience to think for themselves. In his fragments he adopts a didactic posture 
(διδάσκαλος), but he never discloses his cosmic knowledge to his audience in full 
detail. Quite on the contrary, he offers clues about the cosmic reality, which will 
guide them to his knowledge provided that they use their νόος correctly. In fragment 
B101 the phrase ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν indicates Heraclitus’ method, according to 
which critical reflection helps one discover the true nature (φύσις) of the cosmos. 
However, it is unwise to assume that Heraclitus establishes with fragment B101 a 
systematic method.  
Heraclitus occasionally competes in his fragments against poets and other 
types of polymaths (amongst whom he classifies Xenophanes), from whom he 
nonetheless struggles to differentiate his personal knowledge. It then seems that 




Heraclitus feels the need to defend the specialty of his expertise, which for him is not 
clearly distinguished from other domains of expert knowledge. Although Heraclitus 
is to a considerable extent focused on the examination of a single question, the area 
of his concern is not yet established as a distinct area of concern of a particular group 
of specialists.  
The importance of Heraclitus lies in that he is the first thinker examined here, 
who explicitly registers a specialised area of concern, and for this reason he advances 
towards the stage of “specialisation”. He does not acknowledge a traditional 
expression for cosmology and he proposes his personal style. Heraclitus displays 
some awareness of the need for a new method, albeit he does not proceed to 
establish a systematic methodology. He criticises various types of authoritative 
individuals and he does not relate his expertise with that of any other like-minded 
individual. Yet he belongs to stage of “specialisation” because, unlike Xenophanes, 
he registers a distinct area of concern (i.e. the cosmic λόγος), and because he 
attempts to establish a new method, although he does not outline its particular 
features.  
Parmenides represents in early cosmological speculation the stage of 
“specialisation”, since he deals with a single question, namely the nature and 
properties of the ἐόν. The concept of the ἐόν, furthermore, is important because for 
the first time a thinker replaces the notion of the cosmos with an abstract concept 
which he examines. It is also noteworthy that Parmenides implies that his account is 
distinct from other accounts, since he is the first who does not refer by name to any 
other experts, unlike Xenophanes and Heraclitus. It then seems that he deals with 
cosmology as a topic which is immediately recognised by his audience, and it is 
perhaps for this reason that he does not feel the need to defend his choice of 
discussing the ἐόν. In addition, our analysis of his proem has suggested that the real 
voice of authority belongs to him and not to the goddess. This in turn implies that 
Parmenides takes the full responsibility for the account which he discloses, and that 
he is in this way claiming a status of authority in his poem.  




Parmenides distinguishes in his poetry between Ἀληθείη and Δόξα, which in 
his view constitute the two possible routes of inquiry. From these two routes, 
however, only the first one can provide reliable knowledge. The crucial element in 
Parmenides’ thought is that he explicitly states his method in fragment B2. If the 
stage of “specialisation” is established with the presentation of a specialised 
knowledge and with the demonstration of a specific method, then we find both in 
Parmenides.  
Our examination of Empedocles’ fragments has suggested that he composed 
two poems, because it is otherwise difficult, if not impossible, to explain the shift in 
the addressee in his fragments. The first poem was obviously focused on 
investigating the cosmos, while the second poem, the Katharmoi, if we accept the title 
which ancient tradition records, is concerned with questions which we would 
normally brand religious. The intriguing element in Empedocles is that although he 
understands the question about the nature of the cosmos as a distinct topic of 
investigation, his attention is nonetheless not entirely focused on this topic, since he 
also discusses human morality and appropriate behaviour. And it is in this respect 
that he differs from the rest of the thinkers examined here.  
However, it seems that the starting point for his religious views is his 
cosmology. This is most lucidly manifested in that the pair Φιλία- Ἀφροδίτη has a 
double function in his poetry. In the cosmological fragments Empedocles 
understands this pair as the cosmic force which unites the ῥιζώματα, whereas in the 
Katharmoi he uses it in order to refer to moral notions. Empedocles thus refines the 
focus of cosmological speculation, since in the Katharmoi he reinterprets the lack of 
right cosmological understanding as the source of personal misery. This in turn 
implies that even for Empedocles, who is chronologically the latest thinker examined 
here, cosmology was still a vaguely mapped out area of expertise, the borders of 
which were open to other areas of concern. Cosmology was still associated with a 
rather broad field of competence, which was not yet limited to a particular domain.  




Empedocles, like Parmenides and unlike Xenophanes and Heraclitus, does 
not refer by name to any other rival authoritative individuals, such as the poets. This 
shows that for him cosmology was not an entirely new and unexplored area of 
knowledge, since he does not feel the need to justify the choice of his topic. At the 
same time, however, he does not perceive himself as a member of a specific group of 
experts, and he does not appear to be aware of any tradition either in terms of 
expression or in terms of a method. It is also worthy of note that Empedocles’ 
thought combines the empiricism of Heraclitus with Parmenides’ austere view of 
methodology. This is manifested in fragment B84, in which Empedocles uses the 
example of the torch in order to describe the way in which men see, and in fragment 
B100, in which Empedocles uses the clepsydra in order to explain his view on 
aspiration. Empedocles does not therefore belong to the stage of 
“professionalization” but to the stage of advanced “specialisation”, like Parmenides. 
The early cosmologists examined here thus represent the first two stages of 
authoritative awareness, namely either “differentiation” or “specialisation”. Their 
works do not reveal continuity, since their theories do not pursue to explain the 
cosmos in the same way. They do not apply a standard set of techniques either in the 
way in which they formulate their message or in the way in which they argue. None 
of them manages to advance towards the last stage of “professionalization”, mainly 
because their accounts when viewed as a whole do not reveal an awareness of a 
cosmological tradition.  They were not “professionalized” individuals, that is, 
because they failed to establish a tradition of metre and of method for the 
cosmological enterprise.  
However, this does not mean that these thinkers are less sophisticated than 
those individuals who come from a professionalized era. Their indecision and the 
diversity with which they make their authority claims is important, because it offers 
direct evidence for the transition towards the founding of a new theoretical 
discipline, such as that of philosophy. The four thinkers examined in this analysis are 




linear, only in the respect that they all contributed, albeit not in the same way, to the 
establishment of reflective cosmology.  
It is remarkable that each of these thinkers added new elements to the way in 
which cosmological knowledge could be used as the basis for substantial authority 
claims. Xenophanes pointed out to the need for a new, and more rational, way of 
thinking, which he did not associate exclusively with cosmology, however, but with 
the nature of the divine. Xenophanes was also responsible for making the search for 
knowledge an entirely human affair. Heraclitus on the other hand was the first to 
register the discovery of a cosmic principle as the major topic of his discussion but 
also of his expertise (σοφίη), on grounds of which one could convincingly lay a claim 
to a status of authority in public. He does not simply point out to the need for a new 
way of thinking like Xenophanes, but he proceeds to propose a whole system of 
cosmic knowledge. Yet Heraclitus, like Xenophanes, understands cosmological 
knowledge as the product of personal rational inquiry.  
Parmenides and Empedocles take the topic of cosmological investigation for 
granted and they do not defend it against other areas of expertise. This perhaps 
allows us to assume that for them cosmology had acquired some prestige in Greek 
society, and that it was already recognised as a distinct activity. For this reason their 
poems perhaps addressed a more specialised audience of listeners. Parmenides 
proposed a new systematic method of inquiry, which he also distinguished from a 
wrong method of inquiry, the details and logical conclusions of which he closely 
examined in his poem.  Empedocles on the other hand introduced the discussion of 
questions of religion and of proper human behaviour, which he viewed nonetheless 
in connection with cosmology.  
At any event, these early thinkers clearly understood their accounts as the 
product of a rational activity and as cosmological theorising. They thus provide the 
missing link in understanding the birth of a theoretical activity which was later 
branded as “philosophy”. And this we are fortunate enough to witness directly in 




APPENDIX: PRESOCRATIC VOCABULARY OF AUTHORITY IN CONTEXT 
Table I: Truth and Knowledge 
  Truth            Knowledge 
original                                                                       taught: acquired/ disclosed 
Xenophanes 8.6: ἐτύμως 





34.5: οὐκ εἴδε 
10.2: μεμαθήκασι (καθ’ 
Ὅμηρον)  
18.2: ὑπέδειξαν (θεοί)  
Heraclitus 1: φράζων ὅκως ἔχει 
41: (ἐπίστασθαι) γνώμην 
112: ἀληθέα (λέγειν και ποιεῖν)  
133: (κακοί) ἀληθινῶν (ἀντίδικοι)  
17: οὐδὲ (μαθόντες) γιγνώσκουσιν 
19: (ἀκοῦσαι) οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι (οὔδ’ εἰπεῖν)  
28: γιγνώσκει (ὁ δοκιμώτατος)  
35: ἵστορας 
40: οὐ διδάσκει/ ἐδίδαξε (πολυμαθίη)  
41: ἐπίστασθαι (γνώμην) 
55: τὴν γνώσιν (τὦν φανερὦν) 
57: (πλεῖστα) εἰδέναι 
86: μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι (ἀπιστίη) 
97: μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι 
104: οὐκ εἰδότες 
108: (σοφόν) γιγνώσκειν 
112: (κατὰ φύσιν) ἐπαἸοντας 
116: γιγνώσκειν (ἑαυτούς)  
17: μαθόντες 
40: πολυμαθίη  
55: μάθησις (ὅσων ὄψις ἀκοή) 
57: διδάσκαλος 






Parmenides 1.26: εἰδότα φῶτα 
1.52: Ἀληθείης 
1.53: (πίστις) ἀληθής 
2.11: (Πειθοῦς κέλευθος) Ἀληθείηι 
ὀπηδεῖ 
8.17: οὐ ἀληθής ἔστι ὁδός 
8.18: ἐτύτημον 
8.40: ἀληθῆ 
8.50: (νόημα) ἀμφὶς Ἀληθείης 
2.14: οὔτε ἂν γνοίης (φράσαις) 
6.11: (βροτοί) εἰδότες οὐδέν 
8.21: ἄπυστος (ὄλεθρος) 
10.1: εἴσηι 
 
1.51: (πάντα) πυθέσθαι (ἦτορ 
Ἀληθείης)  
1.54: μαθήσεαι 




Empedocles 114: ἀληθείη (παρὰ μύθοις)  4.5: γνῶθι (πιστώματα Μούσης)  
12.5: (ἀνήνυστον) ἄπυστον (τὸ ἐὸν 
ἐξαπολέσθαι)  
17.34: (οὔ τις) δεδάηκε 
23.4: εὖ δεδάωτε 
23.13: ἴσθι (ταῦτα) 
39.5: (ὀλίγον τοῦ παντός) ἰδόντων 
110.23: ἴσθι 
2.17: πεύσεαι 
17.23: μάθη (τοὶ φρένας αὔξει) 
111.5: πεύσηι (μούνωι σοι)  
112.16: ἐπύθοντο (κλύειν 
βάξιν) 
114: οἶδα (ἀληθείη παρὰ 
μύθοις)  







Table II: Opinion-Error and common belief 
 
 Opinion –Error  Common belief 




14.1: οἱ βροτοί δοκέουσι 
18: θνητοῖς 
23: ἐν ἀνθρώποισι 
32: καλέουσι 
36: θνητοῖσι 
Heraclitus 1: λανθάνει                                                   27: δοκέουσι 
17: (ἑωυτοῖσι) δοκέουσι                               28: τὰ δοκέοντα 
1: τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους (λανθάνει) 
14: τὰ νομιζόμενα 
 
Parmenides 1.53: (βροτὦν) δόξας                                    8.61: (βροτὦν) γνώμη 
1.54: τὰ δοκοῦντα                                       19.1: κατὰ δόξαν 
6.16: πλακτὸν νόον 
8.51: δόξας βροτείας 
8.52: κόσμον ἀπατηλόν 
8.54: πεπλανημένοι εἰσί 
8.60: (διάκοσμον) ἐοικότα 
6.16: νενόμισται 
8.39: βροτοὶ κατέθεντο 
8.53: κατέθεντο 
8.55: σήματ’ ἔθεντο 
9.5: ὀνόμασται 
19.3: ὄνομ’ ἄνθρωποι κατέθεντο  
 
Empedocles 17.35: οὐκ ἀπατηλόν 
23.11: ἀπάτη 
133: σκοτόεσσα δόξα (περὶ θεὦν)  
(φύσις) ὀνομάζεται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποισιν 
9.5; 15.2: καλέουσι 
17.30: νομίζεται 







Table III: The cosmic question 
 
Xenophanes 27: ἐκ γαίης πάντα καὶ εἰς γῆν πάντα τελευτᾶι  
33: πάντες γὰρ γαίης καὶ ὕδατος ἐκγενόμεθα 
34.2: περὶ πάντων (ἅσσα λέγω)  
Heraclitus 1: γινομένων γὰρ πάντων (κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε)                                72: λόγωι τῶι τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι 
8: πάντα κατ’ ἔριν γίνεσθαι                                                                       80: γιγνόμενα πάντα κατ’ ἔριν καὶ χρεών 
31: ὑπό τοῦ διοικοῦντος λόγου                                                                   89: ἕνα καὶ κοινὸν τὸν κόσμον εἶναι  
32: ἕν τὸ σοφὸν 90: πυρὸς ἀνταμοιβὴ τὰ πάντα                                                                                (τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν) 
41: (γνώμη ὁτέη) ἐκυβέρνησε πάντα διὰ πάντων                                 114: ξυνῶι πάντων 
50: (ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν) ἕν πάντα εἶναι  
Parmenides 1.51: πάντα (πυθέσθαι) 
1.55: διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα 
8.60: τὸν διάκοσμον πάντα φατίζω 
12.11: (δαίμων ἡ) πάντα κυβερνᾶι 
Empedocles 2.14: τὸ δ’ ὅλον (πᾶς εὔχεται εὑρεῖν)  
6.2: τέσσερα ῥιζώματα πάντων 
17.17; 20.6: συνερχόμενα εἰς ἕν ἅπαντα (Φιλότητι)  
26.7: (Φιλότητι) συνερχόμενα εἰς ἕνα κόσμον 
38.4: (ἐξ ὧν δῆλ’ ἐγένοντο) τὰ νῦν ἐσορῶμεν ἅπαντα 






Table IV: Inquiry and methodology 
 
 Inquiry Methodology 
Xenophanes 18.3: ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν                                         (none) 
Heraclitus 18: ἐξευρήσει; ἀνεξερεύνητον; ἄπορον 
22: διζήμενοι εὑρίσκουσιν  
45: ἐξεύροιο 
101: ἐδιζησάμην ἐμωυτόν 
101: ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν (?)  
101a: ὀφθαλμοὶ τῶν ὤτων ἀκριβέστεροι 
μάρτυρες 
107: κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ 
ὦτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἐχόντων 
Parmenides 2.9: ὁδοί διζήσιός (εἰσι νοῆσαι)  
6.10: ὁδοῦ διζήσιος 
7.2: ὁδοῦ διζήσιος (εἶργε νόημα)  
8.6: διζήσεαι 
2.9: ὁδοί διζήσιός (εἰσι νοῆσαι)  
 













Table V: Indications of oral communication 
 
 Utterer Audience 
Xenophanes 8.6: λέγειν (ἐτύμως) 
34.4: ἅσσα λέγω 
34.4:  (τετελεσμένον) εἰπών 
                                         (none) 
Heraclitus 19: εἰπεῖν 
73: (ποιεῖν καὶ) λέγειν 
112: (ἀληθέα) λέγειν (καὶ ποιεῖν) 
114: (ξὺν νόωι) λέγοντας 
1: ἀκοῦσαι; ἀκούσαντες 
19: ἀκοῦσαι 
34: ἀκούσαντες 
50: ἀκούσαντας (οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου) 
101a: τῶν ὤτων (ἀκριβέστεροι μάρτυρες)  
107: (ὀφθαλμοί καὶ) ὦτα 
108: (ὁκόσων λόγους) ἤκουσα 
Parmenides 1.46: ἔπος φάτο (θεά)  
2.8: ἐγὼν ἐρέω (κόμισαι δέ σύ μῦθον)  
2.13: τοι φράζω 
2.14: (οὔτε ἄν γνοίης) οὔτε φράσαις  
6.8: τὸ λέγειν (τε νοεῖν) 
6.9: φράζεσθαι 
7.4: ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα 
8.1: μῦθος ὁδοῖο 
8.7: φάσθαι; νοεῖν : φατόν; νοητόν 
8.35: πεφατισμένον 
8.50: (σοι παύω) λόγον (πιστόν) 
8.52: ἐμῶν ἐπέων (ἀκούων) 
2.8: ἀκούσας (κόμισαι δέ σύ μῦθον)  
8.52: (ἐμὦν ἐπέων) ἀκούων 




17.11; 17.25: διπλ’ ἐρέω 
17.24: ἔειπα; πιφάσκων; πείρατα μύθων 
23.14: μύθων 
35.19: κατάλεξα (ἐξοχετεύων λόγου) λόγον 
38.3: τοι λέξω 
114: μύθοις, οὕς ἐξερέω 
131.11: ἀγαθόν λόγον ἐμφαίνοντι 
 
6.2: ἄκουε (τέσσερα ῥιζώματα) 
17.23: κλῦθι μύθων 
17.35: ἄκουε λόγου στόλον 
23.13: (θεοῦ πάρα) μῦθον ἀκούσας 
62.6: τῶνδε κλύε 





















Table VI: Σοφία 
 
Xenophanes 2,14: ἡμετέρη σοφίη 
2.16: ἀγαθῆς σοφίης (πόλει χάρμα γένοιτο) 
Heraclitus 32: (ἕν) τὸ σοφόν 
41: τὸ σοφὸν (ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην ὁτέη ἐκυβέρνησε πάντα) 
50: (ὁμολογεῖν) σοφόν ἔστιν (ἕν πάντα εἶναι) 
56: σοφώτερος (Ὅμηρος) 
83: σοφώτατος; σοφίᾳ 
108: σοφὸν (ἐπὶ πάντων κεχωρισμένον)  
112: σοφίη (ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαἸοντας) 
116: σωφρονεῖν (?)  
118: ψυχή σοφωτάτη (καὶ ἀρίστη) 
Parmenides (none) 
Empedocles 3.13: σοφίης ἐπ’ ἄκροισι θοάζειν 
15.1: ἀνὴρ σοφός (φρεσὶ ταῦτα μαντεύσαιτο) 













Table VII: Intelligence 
 
Xenophanes 23.4: νόημα 
24.2: (οὗλος) νοεῖ 
25.2: νόου φρενί (πάντα κραδαίνει) 
Heraclitus 2: ξυνός; φρόνησιν                                                             112: σωφρονεῖν (ἀρετή μεγίστη) 
17: φρονέουσι                                                                         113: τὸ φρονέειν (ξυνόν ἐστι πᾶσι)  
40: νόον ἔχειν (πολυμαθίη οὐ διδάσκει)                            116: (ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι μέτεστι) σωφρονεῖν 
104: νόος ἢ φρήν  
Parmenides 1.27: πολύφραστοι (ἵπποι)                                                 8.9: νοεῖν (φάσθαι); Νοητόν (φατόν) 
1.39: ἐπιφραδέως                                                                    8.15: κρίσις  
1.45: (θεά) πρόφρων                                                              8.16: κέκριται  
1.55: δοκίμως                                                                        8.16: ἀνόητον; ἀνώνυμος 
2.9: (ὁδοὶ διζήσιος) νοῆσαι                                                    8.34: νοεῖν; νόημα 
3: νοεῖν= εἶναι                                                                         8.36: τὸ νοεῖν 
4.1: νόωι (ἀπεόντα παρεόντα βεβαίως)                              8.50: νόημα (ἀμφὶς Ἀληθείης) 
6.8: (χρή) τὸ νοεῖν (τ’ ἐὸν ἔμμεναι)                                     16.2: νόος (ἀνθρώποισι παρίσταται)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
6.14: (πλακτόν) νόον                                                              16.3: φρονέει (φύσις μελέων ἀνθρώποισι) 
7.2: (εἶργε) νόημα                                                                   16.4: νόημα 
7.5: κρῖναι λόγωι; ἔλεγχον 
Empedocles 2.16: νόωι περιληπτά                                                                 23.11: (μή σ΄ ἀπάτη καινύτω) φρένα 
2.17: βροτείη μῆτις                                                                    105.5: (αἷμα περικάρδιον) νόημα  
3.14: ἄθρει                                                                                   108.2: τὸ φρονεῖν 
3.17: πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι                                                            110.23: πάντα φρόνησιν ἔχειν 
3.18: νόει (ἧι δῆλον ἕκαστον)                                                    114: ἐπὶ φρένα (τέτυκται ὁρμὴ πίστιος) 
5: φρενὸς εἴσω στεγάσαι                                                          129: πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον; πραπίδεσσιν 
15.1: φρεσί (σοφὸς ἀνὴρ μαντεύσαιτο)                                    132,2: θείων πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον 




17.30: τὴν (Φιλότητα; Ἀφροδίτην) σὺ νόωι δέρκευ               134: φρὴν ἱερή 
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